State v. Bienvenu

258 So. 2d 72, 260 La. 1023, 1972 La. LEXIS 5617
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 3, 1972
DocketNo. 51608
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 258 So. 2d 72 (State v. Bienvenu) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Bienvenu, 258 So. 2d 72, 260 La. 1023, 1972 La. LEXIS 5617 (La. 1972).

Opinion

TATE, Justice.

The defendant Bienvenu appeals from a conviction of possession of marijuana, La. R.S. 40:962, for which he was sentenced to one year in the Lafayette parish prison. The defendant relies on his three perfected bills of exceptions.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1

The first and most serious bill of exceptions was taken to the trial court’s overruling a motion to suppress the drugs seized at the defendant’s premises. The evidence is alleged to be inadmissible because seized under an illegally issued search warrant.

The two principal grounds urged as the alleged illegality of the search are: (a) that the application for the search warrant was executed by only one affiant, whereas La.R.S. 40:972 (1950; since repealed), in effect at the time of the search, required two affiants in an application for a search warrant to search any dwelling for narcotics ; (b) that such search was illegally conducted in the nighttime, since the application for the warrant did not lay a sufficient predicate to establish the necessity for a nighttime search.

[1027]*1027(a) Two affiants required for search warrant?

The present search warrant was issued upon the affidavit of a police officer showing an adequate factual basis for probable cause. It complies with the requirements of Article 162 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure (1966), providing for the issuance of a search warrant “upon. probable cause established to the satisfaction of the judge, by the affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause * * (Italics ours.)

The defendant contends, however, that a special requirement of two affiants for the issuance of search warrants for illegal drugs is- set forth by the enactment in force at. the time of the present offense, namely, the “Uniform Narcotic Drug. Law”, La.R.S. 40:961 et seq. (repealed by Act 457.of 1970).

We hold, essentially, that the authority under Article 162 to secure search warrants for narcotics is additional to any authority provided by La.R.S. 40:972.

According to the official enactment, Article 162 of the 1966 code had as its source former La.R.S. 15:42-44 (1950). These former statutes expressly provided that the authority to search for illegal narcotics iki-as additional to that provided by La.R.S. 40:972. See La.R.S. 15:43(5) (1950).

These 1950 statutes replaced by Article 162 (1966) authorized search warrants only in specific instances, e. g., for: personal property which was the subject of a theft, 15:42; obscene publications, 15:43(1); lottery tickets or materials, 15:43(2); gambling apparatus, 15:43(3); in all cases where expressly authorized by other law of the state, 15:53(4); illegal narcotics, 15:43(5); etc. The 1966 code statutory scheme instead provides general statutory authority to secure search warrants for any thing used or to be used to commit a crime or which may constitute evidence tending to prove a crime. Article 161. It was unnecessary therefore to spell out the authority to seize narcotics specifically.

However, neither the new code articles themselves nor the official revision comments have the slightest indication that such broader search authority conferred by the 1966 articles was not intended to be additional to the search authority of 40 :962, just as under the former law.

The defendant relies upon the provision of La.R.S. 40:972 (1950) which pertinently states that “no . . . residence, shall be subject to invasion and search, except [through] ... a search warrant issued . . . upon ... an affidavit by two reliable persons * * *.”

The provision relied upon is, in our view, taken out of context. The full text of La.R.S. 40:972 is set forth in the Ap[1029]*1029pendix to this opinion. This is its text in its redaction in the Revised Statutes of 1950, unchanged until its repeal in 1970 (after the present offense).

Before analyzing Section 972 in detail, we should note its statutory setting. It is contained in the ■ Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, La.R.S. 40:971 et seq. (1950), enacted hy Act 14 of 2d Extra.Session of 1934, and, relevantly to the present issue, virtually unchanged since then. While possession for consumption was penalized, La.R.S. 40:962, 981, the main body of the statute concerns detailed regulation (under supervision of the state board of health) of the manufacture, sale, distribution, and prescription of regulated drugs by manufacturers, wholesalers, apothecaries, physicians, dentists, and veterinarians. These include detailed provisions for licensing, keeping records, and labelling.

It is in this general context that Section 972 (“Searches and seizures; forfeiture of illegally possessed narcotics”) is found. The chief thrust of the act as a whole is administrative regulation. The provision of criminal penalties is only an incidental feature of the enactment.

With regard to Section 972 itself, we find that the search warrant provisions relate to those obtained by the president of the- state board of health (or his agent), the official primarily responsible for drug regulation and licensing under the uniform law. Analyzing Section' 972’s provisions, set forth in full in the Appendix to this opinion, we find:

(1) The first paragraph authorizes the president of the state hoard of health or his agent to “seize” narcotic drugs ;

(2) The second paragraph, first sentence, grants the president of the board of health broad authority to “search and examine” warehouses and places of storage and a wide variety of means of transportation. Excepted from his authority to search places of storage are “private residences, which may be searched only in the manner provided by law.”

(3) Then, second sentence (first clause), second paragraph, occurs the first limitation upon this broad searching authority: “Provided, that no place, other than such as is open to the public, shall be invaded and searched except by an officer named in a search warrant issued by a competent court” upon an affidavit of probable cause by an affiant. Despite the broad and apparently warrantless search authority given to the state board president by the prior sentence of this second paragraph, the second sentence (this proviso) limits it to places “open to the public”, and it further requires the president to secure a search warrant directed to a specific officer, before he may invade storage places, etc., not open to the public.

(4) Now follows, second sentence (second clause), the second limitation upon the [1031]*1031president’s broad authority: “Provided . . . no house, room or apartment used as ... a bona fide residence, shall be subject to invasion and search, except by an officer designated in a search warrant issued by a competent court . upon the filing in said court of an affidavit by two reliable persons . . . that said place of residence is being used as a cloak or cover for a violation” of the Uniform Drug Law. This is the provision relied upon by the defendant. Nevertheless, in the context of the enactment as a whole, the limitation of requiring two affidavits for search of residences is placed only upon such warrants secured for searches and seizures for the president of the state board of health.

We know of no provision authorizing a private person to secure a search warrant.

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Bluebook (online)
258 So. 2d 72, 260 La. 1023, 1972 La. LEXIS 5617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bienvenu-la-1972.