[Cite as State v. Bibbins, 2025-Ohio-4341.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0020
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, BRYDEN L. BIBBINS, Case No. CR2024-0613
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: September 12, 2015
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: April F. Campbell, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Bryden Bibbins pled guilty in Muskingum County to
two first-degree-felony charges of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, and he pled
guilty as well to firearm and major-drug-offender specifications. The trial court sentenced
Bibbins to a jointly recommended indefinite prison term with an aggregate minimum
length of 22 years. Finding no error in the trial court’s acceptance of Bibbins’s guilty plea
and no error in the sentence imposed, we now affirm.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In August 2024, Bibbins and his co-defendants were in a vehicle that was
pulled over by Muskingum County deputies for three traffic violations. During the traffic
stop, the deputies found in the vehicle large amounts of drugs and a machine gun. {¶3} Bibbins was indicted on six first-degree-felony drug charges, and the
indictment included firearm and major-drug-offender specifications too.
{¶4} On the second day of Bibbins’s jury trial in December 2024, the parties
reached a plea deal that called for Bibbins to plead guilty not only to two F1 counts of
trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound (with the amount of the drug being at least 100
grams or at least 1,000 unit doses in each of those charges) but also to the specifications
appended to those charges. In their plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended
that the trial judge impose a prison term with an aggregate minimum length of 22 years.
{¶5} The trial judge held the plea-change hearing on the record in accordance
with Criminal Rule 22, and the judge also conducted the hearing in the way that Criminal
Rule 11(C) requires, ensuring that Bibbins was entering his guilty pleas voluntarily, that
he understood the nature of the criminal charges, that he understood the maximum
penalties, that he understood the effect of a guilty plea, and that he understood that the
immediate imposition of a sentence was possible. The trial judge thoroughly addressed,
as well, the constitutional rights spelled out in Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(c), and Bibbins
expressed on the record not only his understanding of each of those rights but also his
desire to waive them.
{¶6} Bibbins himself, along with counsel for both parties, signed a written plea of
guilty, and that document was promptly filed in the clerk’s office in Muskingum County.
Once the trial judge had accepted Bibbins’s guilty pleas and made guilty findings on those
pleas, the judge ordered that a presentence investigation be conducted.
{¶7} At the sentencing hearing several weeks later, the parties agreed, in
accordance with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), that just one prison term should be imposed for the multiple firearm specifications that were part of the plea agreement, and the State
requested that Bibbins be sentenced, for one automatic-firearm specification, to a
mandatory definite prison term of six years in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(i).
The judge accommodated that request, and, after affording the parties an opportunity to
be heard in accordance with Criminal Rule 32(A), he imposed the very sentence that the
parties had jointly recommended: an indefinite mandatory prison term with a minimum
length of 11 years and a maximum length of 16.5 years on each of the two counts of
trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound (with those sentences on the two counts to be
served concurrently), plus a mandatory five-year prison term on a major-drug-offender
specification, plus the six-year prison term for the automatic-firearm specification (with
the sentences on the specifications to be served consecutively to the prison terms on the
underlying drug charges). The trial judge also imposed the mandatory minimum fines
contemplated by R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) for each of the two drug charges.
{¶8} The judge explained to Bibbins that the minimum prison term for the drug
charges was 11 years and the maximum prison term was 16.5 years, and the judge told
Bibbins that his prison terms for his drug offenses were mandatory prison terms. The
judge also explained that the six-year prison term for the automatic-firearm specification
and the five-year prison term for the major-drug-offender specification were mandatory
and that those prison terms would be served by Bibbins consecutively to the indefinite
prison terms on the drug charges themselves. The judge then noted that Bibbins was
entitled to 158 days of jail-time credit, and Bibbins’s counsel stated that she had no
objection to the trial judge’s finding on that issue. {¶9} Soon thereafter, Bibbins filed a handwritten letter stating his desire to
pursue an appeal. New counsel was then promptly appointed to represent him here.
{¶10} Once the record for this appeal was transmitted, Bibbins’s appellate counsel
filed an appellate brief on his behalf. In that brief, Bibbins’s counsel, in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), indicates that no colorable issues exist that
might prompt this court to overturn Bibbins’s convictions and sentence. The appellate
lawyer also indicated in the brief that she had provided copies of it to both Bibbins himself
and to the prosecutor. Appellate counsel also moved to withdraw as counsel in the case.
{¶11} This court then sent a notice to the parties indicating that Bibbins could file
his own appellate brief and the State could of course respond to any such brief and to the
Anders brief. No additional briefs beyond the original Anders brief have been filed here.
Our Review of the Record Supports the View of Bibbins’s Counsel: This Appeal Is Frivolous
{¶12} Under Anders, of course, court-appointed appellate counsel in a criminal
case is permitted to indicate — after the attorney has conscientiously reviewed the full
record — that any possible grounds for an appeal in the case appear to be frivolous. See
id. at 744. When such a brief is filed, Anders instructs counsel to file a brief identifying
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See State v. Sergent,
2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 8, fn.1. The court of appeals should then ensure that the indigent
defendant receives a copy of that brief and should give the defendant an opportunity to
raise any arguments that he or she would like to present in the appeal. Anders at 744.
And then finally, the court itself should fully examine the case record to determine whether
the appeal is frivolous. Id. {¶13} All of those steps have occurred in this appeal. Though the Anders brief
filed by Bibbins’s appellate counsel in fact indicates that that lawyer could not find any
issues that might arguably support the appeal, we have undertaken our duty to
independently examine the record so that we can determine for ourselves whether the
appeal is frivolous. We agree with Bibbins’s attorney and find that it is.
A.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Bibbins, 2025-Ohio-4341.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0020
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, BRYDEN L. BIBBINS, Case No. CR2024-0613
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: September 12, 2015
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: April F. Campbell, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Bryden Bibbins pled guilty in Muskingum County to
two first-degree-felony charges of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, and he pled
guilty as well to firearm and major-drug-offender specifications. The trial court sentenced
Bibbins to a jointly recommended indefinite prison term with an aggregate minimum
length of 22 years. Finding no error in the trial court’s acceptance of Bibbins’s guilty plea
and no error in the sentence imposed, we now affirm.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In August 2024, Bibbins and his co-defendants were in a vehicle that was
pulled over by Muskingum County deputies for three traffic violations. During the traffic
stop, the deputies found in the vehicle large amounts of drugs and a machine gun. {¶3} Bibbins was indicted on six first-degree-felony drug charges, and the
indictment included firearm and major-drug-offender specifications too.
{¶4} On the second day of Bibbins’s jury trial in December 2024, the parties
reached a plea deal that called for Bibbins to plead guilty not only to two F1 counts of
trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound (with the amount of the drug being at least 100
grams or at least 1,000 unit doses in each of those charges) but also to the specifications
appended to those charges. In their plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended
that the trial judge impose a prison term with an aggregate minimum length of 22 years.
{¶5} The trial judge held the plea-change hearing on the record in accordance
with Criminal Rule 22, and the judge also conducted the hearing in the way that Criminal
Rule 11(C) requires, ensuring that Bibbins was entering his guilty pleas voluntarily, that
he understood the nature of the criminal charges, that he understood the maximum
penalties, that he understood the effect of a guilty plea, and that he understood that the
immediate imposition of a sentence was possible. The trial judge thoroughly addressed,
as well, the constitutional rights spelled out in Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(c), and Bibbins
expressed on the record not only his understanding of each of those rights but also his
desire to waive them.
{¶6} Bibbins himself, along with counsel for both parties, signed a written plea of
guilty, and that document was promptly filed in the clerk’s office in Muskingum County.
Once the trial judge had accepted Bibbins’s guilty pleas and made guilty findings on those
pleas, the judge ordered that a presentence investigation be conducted.
{¶7} At the sentencing hearing several weeks later, the parties agreed, in
accordance with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), that just one prison term should be imposed for the multiple firearm specifications that were part of the plea agreement, and the State
requested that Bibbins be sentenced, for one automatic-firearm specification, to a
mandatory definite prison term of six years in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(i).
The judge accommodated that request, and, after affording the parties an opportunity to
be heard in accordance with Criminal Rule 32(A), he imposed the very sentence that the
parties had jointly recommended: an indefinite mandatory prison term with a minimum
length of 11 years and a maximum length of 16.5 years on each of the two counts of
trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound (with those sentences on the two counts to be
served concurrently), plus a mandatory five-year prison term on a major-drug-offender
specification, plus the six-year prison term for the automatic-firearm specification (with
the sentences on the specifications to be served consecutively to the prison terms on the
underlying drug charges). The trial judge also imposed the mandatory minimum fines
contemplated by R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) for each of the two drug charges.
{¶8} The judge explained to Bibbins that the minimum prison term for the drug
charges was 11 years and the maximum prison term was 16.5 years, and the judge told
Bibbins that his prison terms for his drug offenses were mandatory prison terms. The
judge also explained that the six-year prison term for the automatic-firearm specification
and the five-year prison term for the major-drug-offender specification were mandatory
and that those prison terms would be served by Bibbins consecutively to the indefinite
prison terms on the drug charges themselves. The judge then noted that Bibbins was
entitled to 158 days of jail-time credit, and Bibbins’s counsel stated that she had no
objection to the trial judge’s finding on that issue. {¶9} Soon thereafter, Bibbins filed a handwritten letter stating his desire to
pursue an appeal. New counsel was then promptly appointed to represent him here.
{¶10} Once the record for this appeal was transmitted, Bibbins’s appellate counsel
filed an appellate brief on his behalf. In that brief, Bibbins’s counsel, in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), indicates that no colorable issues exist that
might prompt this court to overturn Bibbins’s convictions and sentence. The appellate
lawyer also indicated in the brief that she had provided copies of it to both Bibbins himself
and to the prosecutor. Appellate counsel also moved to withdraw as counsel in the case.
{¶11} This court then sent a notice to the parties indicating that Bibbins could file
his own appellate brief and the State could of course respond to any such brief and to the
Anders brief. No additional briefs beyond the original Anders brief have been filed here.
Our Review of the Record Supports the View of Bibbins’s Counsel: This Appeal Is Frivolous
{¶12} Under Anders, of course, court-appointed appellate counsel in a criminal
case is permitted to indicate — after the attorney has conscientiously reviewed the full
record — that any possible grounds for an appeal in the case appear to be frivolous. See
id. at 744. When such a brief is filed, Anders instructs counsel to file a brief identifying
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See State v. Sergent,
2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 8, fn.1. The court of appeals should then ensure that the indigent
defendant receives a copy of that brief and should give the defendant an opportunity to
raise any arguments that he or she would like to present in the appeal. Anders at 744.
And then finally, the court itself should fully examine the case record to determine whether
the appeal is frivolous. Id. {¶13} All of those steps have occurred in this appeal. Though the Anders brief
filed by Bibbins’s appellate counsel in fact indicates that that lawyer could not find any
issues that might arguably support the appeal, we have undertaken our duty to
independently examine the record so that we can determine for ourselves whether the
appeal is frivolous. We agree with Bibbins’s attorney and find that it is.
A. The Guilty-Plea Hearing Was Properly Conducted
{¶14} The trial judge properly conducted the plea-change hearing in this felony
case on the record, and he addressed at that hearing the constitutional rights that must
be discussed, the nature of the charges, the maximum penalties, the effect of a guilty
plea, and the possibility of an immediate sentence. The trial judge’s colloquy with the
defendant demonstrates, too, that the defendant entered his guilty plea knowingly and
voluntarily and with a full understanding of his rights and of the implications of the plea
change. Bibbins indicated to the trial judge that he was satisfied with the work that his
attorney had done in the case.
{¶15} Bibbins signed a plea of guilty that was presented to the trial judge during
the hearing. The written plea was also signed by Bibbins’s counsel and by the prosecutor.
That plea document was filed in the trial court on the same morning as the hearing.
{¶16} In short, the plea fully comported with Ohio law. See State v. Veney, 2008-
Ohio-5200, ¶ 8 (“Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial court must use before
accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest”); State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527
(1996) (“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”). B. Bibbins’s Sentence Was Not Contrary to Law
{¶17} At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge gave the attorneys and Bibbins
one last opportunity to address the judge about the sentence before it was imposed.
Counsel requested that the judge impose the joint recommendation, and the judge did in
fact impose that recommended sentence.
{¶18} “A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under [R.C.
2953.08] if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the
defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” R.C.
2953.08(D)(1). “A sentence is ‘authorized by law’ and not appealable within the meaning
of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) only if it comports with all mandatory sentencing provisions.” State
v. Owens, 2016-Ohio-1203, ¶ 8 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1. The
sentence in this case comports with all mandatory sentencing provisions.
{¶19} The sentence imposed by the trial judge was a mandatory sentence both
for the offenses and for the specifications to which Bibbins pled guilty. Under R.C.
2925.03(C)(9)(h), “trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound is a felony of the first degree,
the offender is a major drug offender, and the court shall impose as a mandatory prison
term the maximum prison term prescribed for a felony of the first degree.” R.C.
2929.14(A)(1)(a) provides that any prison term for a felony of the first degree committed
after March 22, 2019 is an indefinite prison term with a minimum length of up to 11 years
and a maximum length determined under R.C. 2929.144. The automatic-firearm
specification required, according to R.C. 2941.144(A) and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(i),
imposition of a six-year mandatory prison term. And the major-drug-offender specification required imposition of a mandatory prison term of three, four, five, six, seven, or eight
years. R.C. 2941.1410(B) and R.C. 2929.14(B)(11).
{¶20} The judge considered Bibbins’s prior criminal record and the sentencing
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. The judge also advised Bibbins that he would, after his
release from prison, be subject, in accordance with R.C. 2967.28(B)(2), to a mandatory
period of post-release-control supervision by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority for a period
of at least two years and up to five years. Bibbins was also advised of the consequences
of violating the conditions of post-release control.
{¶21} Nothing about the sentence or its imposition was improper, and any
challenge to it now is frivolous.
{¶22} For the reasons explained above, we grant defense counsel’s May 5, 2025
motion to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Muskingum County. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Bryden Bibbins.
By: Gormley, J.;
Baldwin, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.