State v. Best

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 18, 2020
• Docket: 300A93-3
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 300A93-3

Filed 18 December 2020

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. NORFOLK JUNIOR BEST

On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order entered

on 23 January 2018 by Judge Douglas B. Sasser, Sr. in Superior Court, Bladen

County denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief. Heard in the Supreme

Court on 1 September 2020.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Jonathan P. Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.

Thomas, Ferguson & Mullins, LLP, by Jay H. Ferguson, and Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Ivy A. Johnson, for defendant-appellant.

EARLS, Justice.

In December 1991, the bodies of an elderly couple, Gertrude and Leslie

Baldwin, were found in their home in Whiteville, North Carolina. The couple had

been beaten, stabbed, and apparently robbed. Norfolk Junior Best, the defendant in

this case, was indicted for first-degree burglary, first-degree rape, robbery with a

dangerous weapon, and two counts of first-degree murder. Following a jury trial, he

was convicted of all counts and sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed on

direct appeal by this Court. State v. Best, 342 N.C. 502, 467 S.E.2d 45 (1996). STATE V. BEST

Opinion of the Court

In postconviction proceedings, it became clear that the State failed to produce

certain pieces of evidence to Mr. Best prior to the 1993 trial. Instead, the evidence

was, in part, voluntarily provided to Mr. Best’s postconviction counsel in 2011. Later

that year, postconviction counsel located additional evidence in the attic of Whiteville

City Hall. After the additional evidence was produced and uncovered, Mr. Best filed

a motion for appropriate relief arguing, inter alia, that the State’s failure to disclose

exculpatory evidence was a violation of his right to due process pursuant to the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct.

1194 (1963). The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Mr. Best had not

shown prejudice.

Mr. Best claims, and the State denies, that the undisclosed evidence was

material to his guilt such that he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to produce it.

Mr. Best argues, and the State denies, that had the evidence been disclosed, there is

a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. We

conclude that the undisclosed evidence was material. It was reasonably probable that,

had it been disclosed to Mr. Best prior to trial, the outcome would have been different.

Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Mr. Best’s motion for appropriate

relief, remanding with instructions to grant the motion and order a new trial.

-2- STATE V. BEST

Background1

Prior to trial, Mr. Best had requested discovery from the State several times

regarding the case against him. On 20 December 1991, Mr. Best filed a motion for

discovery requesting, inter alia, the following:

6. To permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, motion picture, mechanical or electronic recordings, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof which are within the possession, custody, or control of the State and which are material to the preparation of this defendant’s defense, which the State intends to use as evidence at defendant’s trial or which were obtained from or belong to the defendant (G.S., 15A-903(d);

7. To provide a copy or permit the defendant or his attorney to inspect and copy or photograph results or reports of physical or mental examinations or of tests, measurements or experiments made in connection with this case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the State, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecutor (G.S. 15A-903(e);

8. The District Attorney is also given notice that these requests are continuing, and the State is under a duty to disclose any of the requested material promptly to the defendant or his attorney if discovered or the State decides to use it at the captioned defendant’s trial (G.S. 15A-907);

1 The State does not dispute that the evidence identified by Mr. Best was not disclosed

prior to trial, arguing instead that Mr. Best has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence affected the outcome of Mr. Best’s trial. We note this only to emphasize our sensitivity to the principle that “[f]act finding is not a function of our appellate courts.” Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 317 N.C. 51, 63, 344 S.E.2d 272, 279 (1986). If there was a factual dispute to be resolved in this case, the appropriate remedy would likely be to remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.

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On 12 March 1992, Mr. Best filed a motion (dated 7 January 1992) seeking to

inspect, examine, and test physical evidence in the State’s control. On the same date,

remarking that the 20 December 1991 request had gone unanswered, Mr. Best filed

a motion to compel the State to produce discovery. The motion to compel specifically

requested test results, exculpatory information, and potentially favorable evidence.

After being told that the District Attorney had an “open file policy,” defense counsel

attempted on 19 March and 20 March 1992 to review Mr. Best’s file at the District

Attorney’s office, but in both instances was told that the file was unavailable. On 2

April 1992, the District Attorney provided defense counsel with discovery, and

continued to produce materials until shortly before trial.

Although the file stamps are unclear, it appears that Mr. Best filed two more

discovery requests on 24 June and 16 September 1992. In the first, Mr. Best

requested DNA test results from samples referenced in a report that had been

produced to him. In the second, he requested information relevant to the reliability

of the DNA testing expected to be offered as evidence during trial.

In the preliminary statement that appears before our decision on Mr. Best’s

direct appeal, the evidence presented at trial was described as follows:

The defendant was tried on two charges of first-degree murder and one charge each of first-degree burglary, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree rape. The State’s evidence showed that Leslie Baldwin and his wife, Gertrude Baldwin, were eighty-two and seventy-nine years of age, respectively. They were killed in their home

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during the night of 30 November [1991]. Earlier that day, the defendant had done yard work for them.

Mr. Baldwin died as a result of the cutting of his carotid artery, and Mrs. Baldwin died of blunt-force trauma to the head. Money was missing from Mr. Baldwin’s wallet and from Mrs. Baldwin’s purse. The defendant’s DNA matched one of the semen samples taken from Mrs. Baldwin, and his fingerprint matched one on a paring knife found beside Mr. Baldwin’s body. The defendant bought between $700 and $1,000 worth of crack cocaine within two days after the killings.

Best, 342 N.C. at 508–09, 467 S.E.2d at 49–50.

The Baldwins were discovered dead in their home on Tuesday, 3 December

1991. At trial, the State presented evidence that the Baldwins were robbed of several

hundred dollars, killed in their home, and that Mrs. Baldwin had been raped. The

couple’s daughter testified that Mrs. Baldwin, who took various medications, filled

her pillbox regularly each Thursday. The medicine in the pillbox was arranged by

time of day, as well as day of the week. Based on the slots that were filled with

medicine in the pillbox, the couple’s daughter testified that Mrs. Baldwin had last

taken her medication at 11:00 p.m. on Saturday, 30 November 1991. The couple’s

daughter also testified that Mr. Baldwin habitually turned on a light in the kitchen

before retiring to bed. The light was discovered to be on in the kitchen. Similarly, she

testified that Mr. Baldwin, by routine, retrieved and read the newspaper every

morning, and that it was the first thing he did after rising, getting dressed, and taking

his medicine. When the Baldwins’ bodies were discovered, the papers for Sunday, 1

December; Monday, 2 December; and Tuesday, 3 December 1991 were all laying on

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the front porch. The State points to this evidence as support for the conclusion that

the deaths occurred in the late evening of Saturday, 30 November 1991. A witness for

the State testified that she was with Mr. Best at a night club beginning at 12:30 a.m.

or 1:00 a.m. on 1 December 1991.

At trial, the State also tendered evidence that Mr. Best was the perpetrator.

The trial evidence identified by the State consists of (1) a latent bloody fingerprint,

matched to Mr. Best, found on the blade of a paring knife which was lying near Mr.

Baldwin’s body; (2) the results of a DNA test showing that sperm found in Mrs.

Baldwin’s vagina was a partial match to Mr. Best, and that the probability of another

unrelated person matching the tested profile was “approximately 1 in 459 for the

North Carolina white population, 1 in 18 for the North Carolina black population,2

and 1 in 484 for the North Carolina Lumbee population;” and (3) testimony from

Tammy Rose Smith that Mr. Best spent one or two hundred dollars on cocaine in the

early morning hours of 1 December 1991, and from Carolyn Troy that Mr. Best spent

several hundred dollars on cocaine during the evening of 2 December 1991.

At the trial’s conclusion, Mr. Best was convicted and sentenced to death. After

we affirmed the conviction, Mr. Best sought postconviction relief. He filed a motion

for appropriate relief in August 1997, which the trial court denied in April 1998. We

denied certiorari review. State v. Best, 349 N.C. 365, 525 S.E.2d 179 (1998).

2 Mr. Best is African-American.

-6- STATE V. BEST

In March and August of 2011, the State voluntarily produced parts of its file

to Mr. Best’s new postconviction counsel. After defense counsel filed a motion seeking

complete discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), defense counsel discovered

additional evidence “in a storage room in the attic of the Whiteville City Hall.” The

following evidence arose in postconviction discovery:

Undisclosed Forensic Evidence

At trial, a witness for the State testified that hairs were collected from the

crime scene. Further, testimony established that, in addition to Mr. Best, head and

pubic hair samples were collected from two other suspects, Eddie Best and Daniel

Blanks, and from Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin. The hair was analyzed. At trial, Mr. Best’s

counsel attempted to elicit that none of the hairs had been identified as coming from

a Black person but was unable to cross-examine the witness on the findings of a non-

testifying expert. However, the State never disclosed that more than 70 hairs

collected from the crime scene, found on Mrs. Baldwin’s arm, in her pubic hair

combings, and beneath Mr. Baldwin’s fingernails, were identified as Caucasian and

were not a match to anyone who was tested.

At trial, a witness for the State testified that tapings from the crime scene were

taken and tested for trace hair and fiber evidence. The State did not disclose,

however, that a fiber comparison analysis was conducted between (1) a number of

items, including various items of clothing and shoes, from Mr. Best’s home and

person; and (2) various items from the crime scene, including bedding, tapings,

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clothing, fingernail scrapings, a place mat, and carpeting. The results of the

undisclosed comparison were that no association was found between Mr. Best’s effects

and the items from the crime scene.

As discussed previously, Mr. Best’s fingerprint was located on a paring knife

that was lying next to Mr. Baldwin’s body at the crime scene. Lab notes which had

not been disclosed prior to trial contained the following statement pertaining to the

possible fingerprint: “The ridge detail on item #4 was examined & determined to be

of no value @ this time however; major case inked impressions will be needed in order

to effect any kind of conclusive comparison.”

At trial, witnesses for the State testified that blood remnants were found as a

result of luminol testing “on the carpet in Gertrude Baldwin’s bedroom and in the

hallway” near where Mr. Baldwin was found. Another witness testified that she

tested a pair of Mr. Best’s shoes and determined that they did not have blood on them.

Undisclosed lab notes indicated that the luminol tests had revealed shoe tracks of

blood residue, about which the witness did not testify and of which defense counsel

was not aware.

Undisclosed Witness Interviews

As discussed previously, Carolyn Troy testified at trial that Mr. Best spent

hundreds of dollars during the evening of 2 December 1991, near the time that the

State believes the Baldwins were robbed and murdered. However, the State did not

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disclose Ms. Troy’s initial witness interview, during which Ms. Troy stated that she

was with Mr. Best at the time, but that he only had $30 to $40 on him.

Other Evidence

The evidence at trial also indicated that the assailant broke a pane of glass to

enter the home. A lab report discussing the analysis of the glass indicated that

clothing and two pairs of shoes from Mr. Best did not have any glass that matched

the glass collected from the crime scene—although one of the pairs of shoes showed

glass particles which did not match the glass from the crime scene. The record

includes an affidavit from Mr. Best’s trial counsel indicating that the report was

included in postconviction discovery, and had not been previously disclosed to trial

counsel.

The State also did not disclose that three one-hundred-dollar bills were found

in a money holder in Mrs. Baldwin’s purse.

Undisclosed Alternate Suspects

Finally, the State failed to disclose evidence regarding two alternate suspects:

Ricky Winford and Destene Harris.

Ricky Winford

The State’s 2011 disclosures contained a number of documents relating to

Ricky Winford, an alternate suspect in the crime. Interview notes suggest that a

woman called police on the evening of 4 December 1991 to report that, on the morning

of 3 December 1991, someone named “Rick” was driving around the Baldwins’

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neighborhood without lights. The driver drove up and down the street three or four

times until someone exited the car and walked away. The car drove off and returned

about forty-five minutes later, at which time a friend of the woman’s asked the driver

what he was doing. The driver stated that he was looking for a friend. This occurred

before the Baldwins’ bodies were discovered. Police ran the license plate and

connected the vehicle to someone named Gary Clayton Derrick, who apparently knew

Mr. Winford. Mr. Derrick reported that Mr. Winford had stolen his car and taken off,

and later reported speaking with a third person, Janet. The notes indicate that Mr.

Winford told Janet “that he had killed some people in Whiteville.” In a record of a

phone interview, Mr. Derrick reported that Winford had previously bragged about

killing people, had previously committed burglaries, and had once pulled a knife on

Derrick.

Destene Harris

The State’s 2011 disclosures also included a number of documents pertaining

to Destene Harris. According to a 5 December 1991 report from Alice Cooke, Mr.

Harris threatened to kill some “old farts” that lived hear him. He apparently also

often carried a knife. Ms. Cooke also reported that, on 2 December 1991 (a Monday),

she had heard Mr. Harris state that he had killed two “old farts” over the weekend.

Mr. Harris was incarcerated in Alamance County from 29 November until 3

December 1991.

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Mr. Best filed the instant motion, his second motion for appropriate relief, on

16 January 2014. He argued (1) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in

violation of his constitutional rights established in Brady and its progeny; (2) that the

State misled the jury as to the victims’ time of death, or, in the alternative, that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to refute the State’s theory on time of death;

and (3) that the State misled the jury as to the reliability of the DNA evidence it

presented against him, or, in the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to refute the DNA evidence. Because we determine that Mr. Best’s Brady claim

is meritorious, we need not address the remaining claims.

As to Mr. Best’s claim that he is entitled to a new trial due to the State’s failure

to disclose favorable evidence, the superior court made the following conclusions of

law:

7. In his MAR2 Claim I, Best claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the state wrongfully concealed exculpatory evidence regarding (a) two alternate suspects[,] (b) exculpatory forensic testing results[,] and (c) key evidence undermining its theory of motive and identity.

8. Best has failed to show the existence of the asserted ground for relief. N.C. Gen[.] Stat. § 15A-1420(c)(6); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); State v. Strickland, 346 N.C. 443, 488 S.E.2d 194 (1997).

9. In the present case there was overwhelming evidence at trial against defendant and none of the alleged Brady material would have amounted to a reasonable probability of a different result. Therefore, defendant’s Brady claim must fail. Strickland at 457, 488 S.E.2d at 202.

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10. In post-conviction, the overwhelming evidence presented at trial was not refuted or weakened. Instead the post-conviction DNA removed any doubt, reasonable or unreasonable, of defendant’s guilt. Both experts testified in post-conviction that the sperm fraction, not the skin fraction, taken from the rape/murder victim was an exact match for defendant’s DNA profile. (See 11 April 2016 Post- conviction hearing transcript pp. 56 [testimony of Maher Noureddine] and 68 [ testimony of Mark Boodee].)

11. Given the evidence showing defendant’s guilt presented at trial, none of the complained of evidence in Claim I, if turned over could have amounted to a reasonable probability of a different result. Additionally, the post-conviction DNA testing results further illustrate the lack of any possible prejudice.

12. As this Court can determine from the motion and any supporting or opposing information presented that this claim is without merit, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to decide the issues raised in this claim. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(c)(1) and State v. McHone, 348 N.C. 254, 257, 499 S.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1095, 120 S. Ct. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2000).

Mr. Best petitioned for a writ of certiorari to this Court, which we allowed.

Standard of Review

The trial court denied Mr. Best’s motion for appropriate relief without an

evidentiary hearing, deciding that it could “determine from the motion and any

supporting or opposing information presented that this claim is without merit.” See

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(1) (2019) (permitting a trial court to forgo an evidentiary

hearing on a motion for appropriate relief if “the court determines that the motion is

without merit”). Because the trial court did not make findings of fact, instead

concluding that Mr. Best was not entitled to relief as a matter of law, our review of

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the trial court’s decision is de novo. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874,

878 (2011) (“Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.”).

Analysis

The State violates the federal constitution’s Due Process Clause “if it withholds

evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or

punishment.” Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1888 (2017) (quoting Smith v.

Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012)). However, not every failure to

disclose violates the Constitution. Instead, “prejudicial error must be determined by

examining the materiality of the evidence.” State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 589, 599

S.E.2d 515, 540 (2004) (quoting State v. Howard, 334 N.C. 602, 605, 433 S.E.2d 742,

744 (1993)). To establish prejudice on such a claim, often referred to as a Brady

claim,3 a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375,

3383 (1985)).

A reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome” of the proceeding. State v. Byers, 375 N.C. 386, 400, 847 S.E.2d 735, 741

(2020) (quoting State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006)). The

3 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97 (1963) (“We now

hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).

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defendant’s burden to show a reasonable probability is less than that for showing a

preponderance. Smith, 565 U.S. at 75, 132 S. Ct. at 630 (“A reasonable probability

does not mean that the defendant would more likely than not have received a

different verdict with the evidence, only that the likelihood of a different result is

great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” (cleaned up));

accord Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565–66 (1995). However,

a reasonable probability is more than a mere possibility. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.

263, 291, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1953 (1999). A defendant’s burden, then, on a Brady claim,

is more than showing that withheld evidence might have affected the verdict, but less

than showing that withheld evidence more likely than not affected the verdict. When

we consider whether there was a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence

would have altered the jury’s verdict, we consider “the context of the entire record.”

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2402 (1976).

While we review the entire record, we need not consider every piece of

undisclosed material evidence identified by the defendant. Where any portion of the

evidence “alone suffice[s] to undermine confidence in [the defendant’s] conviction, we

have no need to consider his arguments that the other undisclosed evidence also

requires reversal under Brady.” Smith, 565 U.S. at 76, 132 S. Ct. at 631. As a result,

any piece of undisclosed evidence, if sufficiently material to undermine confidence in

the outcome of the trial, is sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s burden on a Brady

claim.

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The question that we must answer when deciding such a claim is not whether

the defendant is guilty or innocent, but whether he received a fair trial in accordance

with the requirements of due process. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196–

97 (holding that nondisclosure of favorable evidence to the defense violates due

process). As a result, we cannot, and do not here, consider new evidence produced

after conviction which may tend to support or negate either guilt or innocence.4 After

a thorough review of the record, and consideration of the arguments of the parties,

we are convinced that Mr. Best has met his burden.

According to the State, the principal evidence presented at trial which proved

Mr. Best’s guilt consisted of: (1) Best’s fingerprint on a paring knife; (2) the partial

DNA match between Mr. Best and the semen found in Mrs. Baldwin’s vagina; and (3)

testimonial evidence that the Baldwins had been robbed, and that Mr. Best was

4 The State refers at various points in its brief to the results of a postconviction DNA

test which Mr. Best requested pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-269. results indicated an exact match between Mr. Best’s DNA profile and that of a sperm fraction recovered from a vaginal swab of Mrs. Baldwin’s body. While this result may be relevant to subsequent proceedings designed to prove Mr. Best’s guilt or innocence, that is not the question before us now. Instead, we must decide whether Mr. Best’s original trial, which took place in 1993, was procedurally fair. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381 (1985) (“[A] constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 699, 105 S. Ct. at 3392 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[The Court] defines the right . . . by reference to the likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial.”). Because the postconviction DNA test result identifying Mr. Best did not exist until decades after the trial took place, it could not have affected the outcome of the trial. As a result, we do not consider it here. We note also defense counsel’s assertions that the test sample may have been contaminated—although, again, the test result does not factor into our analysis.

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spending large amounts of money on drugs around the time of the murders. This

evidence was strong enough at trial for the jury to have convicted Mr. Best. However,

upon consideration of the undisclosed evidence, the case is far less compelling.

Regarding the assertion that Mr. Best was spending large sums of money

around the time of the murders, the State relied upon the testimony of both Carolyn

Troy and Tammy Rose Smith. The State’s undisclosed witness interview of Carolyn

Troy, in which she stated that Mr. Best had only thirty or forty dollars on him on the

night of 2 December 1991, would have permitted Mr. Best to impeach Ms. Troy’s

testimony. In addition to directly contradicting what Ms. Troy testified to at trial, the

fact that Ms. Troy’s story had changed over time, if admitted to at trial, could have

been used by Mr. Best to impeach her credibility. We have previously stated that

“exculpatory evidence is evidence that is either material to the guilt of the defendant

or relevant to the punishment to be imposed, . . . including impeachment evidence.”

State v. Lewis, 365 N.C. 488, 501, 724 S.E.2d 492, 501 (2012) (cleaned up). Ms. Troy

was the principal witness testifying to what the State identifies as a principal piece

of evidence—namely, that Mr. Best was spending the money stolen from the

Baldwins.

The State argues that the undisclosed witness interview is not material

because another witness, Tammy Rose Smith, testified that Mr. Best was spending

money on 1 December 1991. However, according to the State, Ms. Smith testified that

Mr. Best spent about two hundred dollars, and may have also paid for a hotel room.

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This is a far cry from the $1,800 that the State claims were stolen from the Baldwins.

More importantly, it is a significant departure from the testimony of Ms. Troy, who

testified at trial that she saw Mr. Best with $300 and saw him purchase $750 to $900

worth of drugs during the late night of Monday, 2 December 1991 and early morning

of Tuesday, 3 December 1991. The State cannot credibly claim that the evidence

undermining the testimony of Ms. Troy, who claimed that Mr. Best used over $1000

to buy drugs, is inconsequential because another witness testified that Mr. Best had

about $200 and paid for a hotel room.5

While the other evidence identified by Mr. Best does not directly refute the

DNA and fingerprint evidence presented at trial, it does undermine its persuasive

effect. For example, because the State failed to disclose the lab notes for the luminol

tests conducted in the Baldwins’ home, the jury did not learn that the State found

“shoe tracks” in the hallway and kitchen areas, suggesting that the assailant left

bloody footprints during the attack. This increases the exculpatory relevance of the

testimony, presented at trial, that Mr. Best’s shoes were tested and found to be devoid

5 The dissent refers to three additional persons who might have, but did not, testify

that Mr. Best was spending money around the time the State argued the Baldwins were murdered. However, the question before us is whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the undisclosed evidence had been provided to the defense. State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 589, 599 S.E.2d 515, 540 (2004). As a result, we cannot speculate as to what evidence the State could have, but did not, put on. We must instead look to the record of the proceeding as it exists, and determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of that proceeding, rather than a hypothetical proceeding with stronger evidence from the State, would have changed with the undisclosed evidence. Cf. Browning v. Trammell, 717 F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 2013) (confining Brady analysis “to the record before the state trial court”).

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of blood. Had these pieces of evidence been presented together, it is more likely that

the jury may have concluded that Mr. Best was not in the home during the murders.

Similarly, due to the State’s failure to disclose, the jury never learned that the State

had discovered 70 Caucasian hairs on the bodies of the victims which were not yet

matched to anyone in the case. Mr. Best could have easily pointed out at trial that,

as a Black man, he could not have left those hairs on the victims’ bodies and

underneath the fingernails of Mr. Baldwin. It also does not appear from the lab notes

that the hairs were tested to see if they matched Ricky Winford. We do not conclude

or suggest that this proves Mr. Best’s innocence. Instead, we conclude only that this

evidence creates a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a

different verdict had it been presented with the undisclosed evidence. See Tirado, 358

N.C. at 589, 599 S.E.2d at 540 (stating that establishing prejudice requires a showing

that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quoting Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383)); see also Smith, 565 U.S. at 75, 132 S. Ct. at 630 (“A

reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant would more likely than not

have received a different verdict with the evidence, only that the likelihood of a

different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” (cleaned up)).

Not all of the withheld evidence described by Mr. Best is material. Mr. Best

makes much in his brief of a statement in the fingerprint analyst’s lab notes that

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“[t]he ridge detail on [the knife] was examined & determined to be of no value.” As

the State correctly points out, Mr. Best ignores the rest of the sentence, which

clarifies that the ridge detail is not of value “[at] this time” and that a conclusive

comparison will require “major case inked impressions.” As to Mr. Best’s fingerprint

on the knife, then, the evidence highlighted by Mr. Best does not undercut the

reliability of the fingerprint identification.

That being said, the evidence against Mr. Best is not as strong as the State

claims it is. The State’s evidence establishes that Mr. Best touched the knife while he

had blood on his finger—Mr. Best testified at trial that he was using the knife to clean

the gutters, which he had been hired to do that day, and had scraped the backs of his

hands. While the dissent claims that the fingerprint on the knife consisted of Mr.

Baldwin’s blood, this claim is unsupported by the record. 6 While the jury certainly

did not have to believe Mr. Best’s testimony, the existence of a ready explanation for

the fingerprint on the knife undermines the State’s argument that the fingerprint is

such overwhelming evidence so as to render harmless the State’s failure to disclose

other exculpatory evidence.

6 It appears that the dissent takes a stray statement from the State’s brief and attempts to create a factual dispute in the evidence regarding the source of the blood that made up the fingerprint on the knife. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the State’s brief claims only that the knife had Mr. Baldwin’s blood on it, not that the fingerprint was composed of Mr. Baldwin’s blood. It is unsurprising that the State made no such claim, as Special Agent Lucy Milks, testifying for the State at Mr. Best’s trial, stated that she tested the blood from the fingerprint and was able to determine only that it was blood—she was unable to determine a blood type, or even whether it was animal or human blood.

-19- STATE V. BEST

Finally, the State relies on the partial DNA match between Mr. Best and the

semen recovered from Mrs. Baldwin. However, this evidence is similarly

underwhelming. The State’s expert testified that, regarding the reliability of the DNA

match, one out of every eighteen African-American men would match the sample

recovered from Mrs. Baldwin. To put that into perspective, out of every 90 African-

American men, five would match the sample, but at least four of them would not be

the actual source of the DNA sample. Typically DNA evidence is significantly more

compelling. See, e.g., State v. Honeycutt, 235 N.C. App. 656, 764 S.E.2d 699 (2014)

(stating that a DNA analysis of the victim’s bedsheet indicated “a DNA match

probability with defendant of one in 730 billion Caucasians, and her rape kit had a

match probability with defendant of one in 36.2 billion Caucasians” and that another

victim’s “rape kit was consistent with defendant with a match probability of one in

16.2 million Caucasians”). Where, here, the DNA evidence presented at trial

indicated that the tested DNA sample would match one out of every eighteen African-

American men, we conclude that it is not nearly the overwhelming evidence that the

State suggests it is.

While it is not relevant to our analysis on Mr. Best’s Brady claim, Mr. Best also

raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which casts doubt on the State’s

timeline of events. At trial, the State relied upon the testimony of the Baldwins’

daughter to establish that, based on the contents of Mrs. Baldwin’s pillbox, the

presence of newspapers on the Baldwins’ front porch, and the fact that a light in the

-20- STATE V. BEST

kitchen was on which Mr. Baldwin habitually turned on before retiring to bed, the

Baldwins had been killed after 11 p.m. on 30 November 1991 and before Mr. Baldwin

would have normally awoken the following morning. The State also presented

testimony that Mr. Best was out at a nightclub at approximately 12:30 a.m. or 1:00

a.m. on 1 December 1991. The State, in its brief, argues that the killings must have

occurred between 11:00 p.m. on 30 November 1991 and 12:30 a.m. on 1 December

1991:

To sum up – all the physical evidence at the crime scene indicated the victims were killed after 11:00 p.m. Saturday night and before Mr. Baldwin went to bed, and certainly before the next morning. At some point between 12:30 am Sunday morning and 1:00 a.m. Sunday morning defendant was seen paying for hotel rooms, beer, and drugs with cash. Ms. Smith was called by defendant at trial and was the witness who testified about the large amount of cash spent by defendant after midnight Saturday night.

Mr. Best argued that effective trial counsel would have challenged this timeline,

pointing out that the State’s theory that Mr. Best killed the Baldwins required that

the crime occur during an exceedingly narrow window of time, unsupported by expert

testimony as to time of death. Mr. Best points to medical evidence gathered after

conviction by postconviction counsel, which suggests the Baldwins did not die during

the narrow window of time posited by the State. While the dissent views the State’s

evidence on this point as persuasive, the combination of (1) no medical evidence

confirming the State’s timeline and (2) the postconviction medical evidence

suggesting that the State’s timeline was inaccurate confirms our independent view

-21- STATE V. BEST

that the State’s evidence presented at trial was weak enough that there is a

reasonable probability of a different outcome if the State had disclosed the

exculpatory evidence.

We are not considering and do not decide whether Mr. Best received effective

assistance of counsel during his original trial. Further, we cannot and do not decide

that the production of this additional evidence postconviction supports a reasonable

probability that the jury in Mr. Best’s trial would have come to a different result if

presented with evidence that the State failed to disclose. Instead, we mention Mr.

Best’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the evidence supporting it, only to

underscore the weakness of the State’s case at trial, and the likelihood that the jury

may have decided to acquit if it had been presented with all of the evidence.

Our decision is based upon Mr. Best’s claim that the State failed to disclose

material exculpatory evidence. We are sufficiently disturbed by the extent of the

withheld evidence in this case, and by the materiality of that evidence, that it

undermines our confidence in the jury’s verdict. The exculpatory evidence withheld

by the State for approximately twenty years was material. It either negated or cast

doubt upon the principal evidence presented by the State at Mr. Best’s trial. For that

reason, we are of the opinion that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Tirado, 358 N.C. at 589, 599 S.E.2d at 540.

-22- STATE V. BEST

We have not discussed all of the evidence which the State failed to disclose, but

“we have no need to consider [Mr. Best’s] arguments that the other undisclosed

evidence also requires reversal under Brady.” Smith, 565 U.S. at 76, 132 S. Ct. at

631. The undisclosed witness interview of Carolyn Troy and the undisclosed forensic

evidence, particularly the unidentified Caucasian hairs and luminol test notes

indicating the presence of bloody shoe tracks, are sufficiently material. When

considered against the facts that (1) the State relied heavily on the testimony of Ms.

Troy that Mr. Best was spending the proceeds of the robbery on drugs; (2) Mr. Best

is not white and could not have contributed the “Caucasian” hairs recovered from the

crime scene, while no “Negroid” hairs were recovered; and (3) Mr. Best’s shoes were

tested and revealed no traces of blood, there is a reasonable probability that the jury

would have returned a different verdict if presented with the undisclosed evidence.

Conclusion

We have not decided today that Mr. Best is guilty or innocent, that the district

attorney was right or wrong to charge him, or that Mr. Best should be convicted or

acquitted on retrial. Instead, our review of the record in this case shows that the

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence prejudiced Mr. Best’s ability to present a

defense. Every criminal defendant in this state is entitled to a fair trial with full

opportunity to confront the evidence against him and to attempt to rebut the charges

of which he is accused. The state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process

require that the State turn over favorable evidence that is material to the defendant’s

-23- STATE V. BEST

guilt or punishment prior to trial. That did not happen in this case. Accordingly, we

reverse the superior court’s denial of Mr. Best’s motion for appropriate relief and

remand this case to the Superior Court, Bladen County, with instructions to grant

the motion and order a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

-24- Justice NEWBY dissenting.

The issue in this case is whether evidence that the State presumably should

have disclosed before defendant’s trial under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.

Ct. 1194 (1963), creates a reasonable probability of a different outcome of that trial.

Because the undisclosed evidence is not sufficient to undermine the substantial

evidence of defendant’s guilt presented at trial, any Brady violation did not meet the

standard of being prejudicial to defendant. The majority inflates the significance of

vague undisclosed evidence and improperly minimizes the weight of the State’s

strong evidence presented at trial. The majority seems to find facts, weighing

conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. The decision of the

superior court denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief should be affirmed.

I respectfully dissent.

Due process guards a defendant’s right to a fair trial free from prejudicial error.

The State may deprive a defendant of due process when it fails to disclose evidence

that is favorable to the defendant and material to the defendant’s guilt or

punishment. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012). As the

majority notes, however, not every failure to disclose amounts to a constitutional

violation. Instead, a defendant also must show that “there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. STATE V. BEST

Newby, J., dissenting

3375, 3383 (1985).

The following evidence presented at trial supported defendant’s conviction and

sentencing: Eighty-two-year-old Leslie Baldwin met defendant at a gas station the

evening of 29 November 1991. The details of their encounter are unclear, but the

evidence shows that Mr. Baldwin hired defendant to perform yard work for him the

next day. Defendant walked to the home of Mr. Baldwin and his wife, seventy-nine-

year-old Gertrude Baldwin, on 30 November 1991. He performed yard work,

including cleaning the gutters. Mr. Baldwin fed him lunch. At the completion of

defendant’s work, Mr. Baldwin paid him $30.

Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin were then murdered—Mr. Baldwin by a cut to his

carotid artery on his neck and other trauma and Mrs. Baldwin by blunt force trauma

to her head and multiple knife wounds. The State put on substantial evidence that

the murders occurred the night of defendant’s work at the victims’ home. Specifically,

testimony indicated that Mrs. Baldwin’s niece spoke to her on the phone at 7:00 p.m.

that evening and that Mrs. Baldwin’s medication dose, which she habitually took at

11:00 p.m. before going to bed, was gone when the bodies were later discovered.

Testimony also showed that the 1 December 1991 newspaper, which Mr. Baldwin

typically would have retrieved by around 5:00 a.m. that day, was still on the front

porch, along with the papers for the following few days. Thus, evidence showed that

the Baldwins were likely killed late at night on 30 November 1991 or very early in

the morning on 1 December 1991.

Mrs. Baldwin was also raped, and the evidence at trial showed a DNA sample

taken from her vaginal swab matched defendant’s DNA.1 A paring knife found at the

crime scene, under Mr. Baldwin’s body and covered in his blood, bore a fingerprint in

the blood that matched defendant’s print.

Defendant claimed that the bloody print came from him using a similar knife

to clean gutters, and that during that process, he scraped the back of his hand.

Defendant alleges that the scrapes on the back of his hand would have produced the

blood for the fingerprint later found on the knife. But defendant’s testimony is

undermined by the fact that his bloody fingerprint was placed on the pairing knife

since it was last washed. Further, testimony indicated that the paring knife was

typically stored in a kitchen drawer and that Mr. Baldwin never used kitchen utensils

for yard work.

The Baldwins were also robbed of between one and two thousand dollars cash,

some of which consisted of one-hundred-dollar bills. Witness testimony indicated that

defendant possessed several one-hundred-dollar bills after the murders, spent one

hundred dollars on cocaine just hours after the murders, and spent several hundred

dollars more on cocaine within a couple days of the murders. When defendant filed

this motion for appropriate relief over twenty years later, alleging certain evidence

1 The DNA test ruled out about a 99.7% of unrelated members of North Carolina’s

Caucasian population, about 99.7% of the Lumbee population, and about 94.4% of the Black population. A second DNA test conducted at defendant’s request showed a 100% match to defendant. While not considered in this Brady analysis, the second DNA test further confirms the reliability of the first test. -3- STATE V. BEST

not disclosed before trial could have been used for his benefit, the superior court

determined any nondisclosed evidence could not create a reasonable probability that

the evidence’s disclosure would have produced a different result. The superior court

thus denied his motion.

The majority reverses that decision and awards defendant a new trial nearly

thirty years after this tragedy. It does so because in its view the evidence defendant

presents that was not disclosed by the State before the trial would have a reasonable

probability of bringing about a different trial outcome. The evidence defendant

identifies would not do so. It does not begin to outweigh the evidence the jury

considered at trial that is highly probative of defendant’s guilt.

First, the majority properly rejects defendant’s argument that the State failed

to disclose evidence related to defendant’s bloody fingerprint on the knife. Although

records indicate that the print was not useful on its own at first, an analyst went on

to explain how the print was eventually evaluated and found to be a match with

defendant. This evidence does not benefit defendant; thus, it cannot serve as a

foundation for establishing a Brady violation.

Second, defendant asserts that the State’s failure to disclose evidence of two

other potential culprits prejudiced his defense. The majority does not appear to give

this evidence much weight. Rightly so, because one of the potential suspects was

incarcerated during the time the murders likely occurred, and the other was excluded

as a possible source of the DNA found from Mrs. Baldwin’s vaginal swab.

Next, defendant argues that the State improperly withheld evidence from a

witness interview with Carolyn Troy. Troy testified at trial that defendant spent

hundreds of dollars a couple nights after the murders, but the prior witness interview

indicates that Troy originally stated defendant had around $40 on his person on that

same night. The majority claims that this evidence could have been used to impeach

Troy’s testimony, which helped the State show that defendant was spending money

he stole from the Baldwins.

There are two problems with the majority’s position. First, in addition to Troy’s

testimony, the State was able to present testimony from Tammy Rose Smith, who

testified that defendant spent a couple hundred dollars or more just a couple hours

after the crime likely occurred. The majority sidesteps this evidence and says that

amount “is a far cry from the $1,8002 that the State claims were stolen from the

Baldwins.” That response is unsatisfying. The evidence shows that defendant spent

one-hundred dollar bills shortly after the robbery. That testimony is probative enough

in its own right. There is no reason whatsoever to expect that someone who stole over

one thousand dollars would spend the entirety of that sum only hours after acquiring

it. Second, Troy’s later testimony went into far greater detail about the large bills

defendant possessed and the sums he spent on various purchases. This more detailed

testimony would likely weaken the impact of any vague earlier statement she made.

2 It is unclear precisely how much money was stolen from the Baldwins, but testimony

indicates that about $1000 was likely stolen from Mr. Baldwin and as much as $800 from Mrs. Baldwin. -5- STATE V. BEST

Therefore, a jury would still have substantial reason to believe Troy’s subsequent

testimony, and the State had presented other evidence of defendant’s substantial

spending after the crime on which it could rely even if Troy’s testimony were

undermined. Additionally, the SBI interviewed three other people who gave witness

statements about defendant possessing one-hundred-dollar bills and spending them

on cocaine. Thus, if the evidence of defendant’s possession and spending of cash

presented at trial had been at all questioned, these other three witnesses were

available to support the State’s case.

The majority also relies on undisclosed luminol tests and hair follicle samples.

But these pieces of potential evidence have minimal probative value at best. The

luminol tests indicated that bloody footprints were found in the home. The majority

suggests that if such prints were found, then blood perhaps should have been found

on defendant’s shoes after the crime. The hair follicle collections revealed Caucasian

hairs on the victims’ bodies which could not have been left by defendant, who is Black.

Yet, DNA testing and fingerprint analysis are well known to be more probative than

hair follicle comparisons. Moreover, it is unclear that reports of Caucasian hair

particles found on the victims would be helpful to defendant. The DNA test

implicating defendant left only a 0.3% chance that the DNA left by the rapist belonged

to a Caucasian person. Despite the fact that the footprints and the hair follicles do

not point to anyone in particular, however, it is key that the DNA testing and

fingerprint evidence did specifically implicate defendant. Evidence that implicates no

one does not invalidate or even significantly undermine solid evidence that implicates

one person. Therefore, any introduction of evidence not pointing to a specific

individual does not raise a reasonable probability that a different result would have

been reached at trial, especially considering the two pieces of evidence that

specifically implicate defendant.

In light of the strength of the evidence from the DNA and fingerprint testing,

the majority finally resorts to attacking those things. Though the majority cannot

point to any new evidence that would undermine the credibility of either the DNA

test or the bloody fingerprint, it asserts that “the evidence against Mr. Best is not as

strong as the State claims it is.” As to the fingerprint, the majority states that

defendant testified at trial that his bloody fingerprint was on the knife because he

used a similar one to clean the gutters and scraped the back of his hand, meaning he

could have touched the knife while he had blood on his fingers. The majority admits

that defendant already tried this explanation at trial and that the jury did not have

to believe him. Indeed, it would be implausible for the jury to believe him because the

knife (1) bore defendant’s fingerprint in Mr. Baldwin’s blood after the knife had just

been washed; (2) was found underneath the body of Mr. Baldwin, whose neck was

sliced open;3 and (3) rarely left the kitchen and was not used for yard work. But the

3 The majority contests whose blood was on the knife as well as the location of the

knife. The State reiterated multiple times throughout this case and in its brief that the blood found on the knife was Mr. Baldwin’s and that the knife was found under the victim. If there is a dispute over this evidence, this dispute should be resolved by the trial court. The majority

majority nonetheless considers defendant’s bare assertion significant as evidence

that could undermine the State’s case.

The majority then, confusingly, describes the DNA test results directly

implicating defendant as “similarly underwhelming.” It notes that “[t]he State’s

expert testified that, regarding the reliability of the DNA match, one out of every

eighteen African-American men would match the sample recovered from Mrs.

Baldwin.” Stated another way, the DNA test revealed that if defendant were being

falsely accused, there is only a one-in-eighteen chance, just over a five-percent chance,

that he would be a match to the sample taken from Mrs. Baldwin’s vaginal swab.

Thus, the DNA test alone (without even considering the other evidence of defendant’s

guilt) presents a high likelihood that he raped Mrs. Baldwin. Of course, on top of that,

defendant has been unable to point to a plausible alternative suspect of the same race

to whom the DNA sample could belong. The majority simply asserts, contrary to logic

and evidence, that the incriminating result of the DNA test is underwhelming.

The majority’s ultimate contention is that, in its view, the State’s evidence

presented at trial is weak, and thus there is a reasonable probability the withheld

evidence defendant identifies, had it been disclosed, would have produced a different

result in the proceeding. But the evidence the State presented at trial is indeed

strong, and the evidence defendant argues should be included is weak. The State has

states that it is not their job to weigh facts or find evidence, but that is exactly what the majority does here by making a finding about the placement of the knife. -8- STATE V. BEST

shown: a statistically reliable DNA test directly implicating defendant as Mrs.

Baldwin’s rapist; defendant’s bloody fingerprint on a likely murder weapon;

uncontradicted testimony that defendant was at the Baldwin’s home before the crime;

and testimony that defendant possessed and spent considerable sums of cash soon

after the Baldwins were robbed of a considerable sum of cash. Defendant, on the other

hand, has only: minimally called into question just one witness’s statement as to

precisely how much cash defendant carried a couple days after the murders; pointed

to two other potential culprits, whom the evidence has generally ruled out as the

assailants; and identified some tests and samples that do not implicate defendant (or

anyone else in particular). As the superior court determined, a rational jury would

not conclude that any reasonable doubt existed as to defendant’s guilt.4

Thus, even if the additional evidence to which defendant points had been

available for trial, there is not a reasonably probability that the jury would have

reached a different result. Holding otherwise, the majority weighs the evidence in

favor of defendant, inappropriately attempts to undermine strong evidence

supporting the State’s case, and inflates the significance of flimsy evidence defendant

uncovered later. If there is a conflict in the evidence, this issue should be remanded

4 The evidence here indicates that the knife was found under the victim. The State

reiterated this point multiple times throughout the case and in its brief. If there is a dispute over this evidence, this dispute should be resolved by the trial court. The majority states that it is not their job to weigh facts or find evidence, but that is exactly what the majority does here by making a finding about the placement of the knife.

to the trial court. The superior court’s denial of defendant’s motion for appropriate

relief should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent.5

5 Defendant also asserts that his trial counsel’s representation was unconstitutionally

deficient. I disagree. Defendant has not shown either that his trial counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s purported errors, the result of the proceeding likely would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–96, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064–69 (1984). -10-