COVINGTON, Judge.
The appellant, Larry Bernard, was tried and convicted by a jury of sexual abuse in the first degree and attempted forcible sodomy. §§ 566.100 and .060, RSMo 1986. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years on the first degree sexual abuse conviction and five years for the attempted forcible sodomy conviction, the sentences to be served consecutively. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed. This Court granted transfer. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
The evidence shows that in 1988 the victim, a fourteen year old male, attended a church in which appellant was the interim pastor. Appellant and the victim’s family developed a close relationship, participating in many activities together. In October of 1988, appellant convinced the victim’s family to give a surprise birthday party for the victim. As part of the birthday events, the appellant and the victim’s family agreed that the victim should spend the night before the party with appellant. The victim’s parents assumed that the victim would stay at appellant’s house.
On the night of October 21, 1988, appellant took the victim, the victim’s sister, and appellant’s daughter to a movie. After the movie, appellant drove the two young women to their college dormitory. The victim was led to believe that the two women were going to be only briefly in the dormitory and would then return to the car. By prearrangement with the young women, appellant drove off without explanation to the victim. Appellant, with the victim in the car, drove for some time. The victim testified that during this time he was a “little bit scared” because he did not understand why appellant had left the women at the dormitory and because the victim did not know where appellant was taking him.
Eventually appellant stopped at a motel where he rented a room for himself and the victim. Appellant feigned waiting for someone to arrive while he and the victim watched television and played cards. After a time, appellant convinced the victim to play a game of “strip rummy.” The game ended when both appellant and the victim had stripped to their underwear, at which time they got into a single bed and fell asleep.
During the night, the victim awakened to find appellant rubbing the victim’s back, arm and chest. Appellant then moved his hand to the victim’s genitals. The victim attempted to push appellant’s hand away but was not strong enough. The victim told appellant to stop, but appellant continued to place his hands on the victim’s genitals. The victim testified that he was terrified and tried repeatedly to stop appellant’s activity. Later during the night, appellant placed his erect penis against the victim’s genitals. The victim attempted to push away appellant, but appellant overpowered him.
The next morning, appellant began to caress the victim’s arms and legs as he had done the night before. Afterward, appellant requested that the victim allow him to take a picture of the victim nude. The victim refused but did agree to being photographed in his underwear. Appellant then had the victim take a nude photograph of appellant. Upon leaving the motel, appellant encouraged the victim to take off his clothes and run around the car or to walk around the car in his underwear. The victim refused. Appellant then took the victim to the birthday party. The victim did not report the incident until more than one year later.
I.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing, over appellant’s objection, four witnesses to testify regarding prior sexual abuse committed by appellant for which appellant was never charged.
[13]*13The witnesses were members of appellant’s youth group during 1977-78 in a church in which appellant was then pastor.
The general rule concerning the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs, or acts is that evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is inadmissible for the purpose of showing the propensity of the defendant to commit such crimes. State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221, 274 S.W.2d 304, 307 (1954). There are exceptions to the rule. Evidence of prior misconduct of the defendant, although not admissible to show propensity, is admissible if the evidence is logically relevant, in that it has some legitimate tendency to establish directly the accused’s guilt of the charges for which he is on trial, State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. banc 1992) (quoting State v. Reese, 274 S.W.2d at 307), and if the evidence is legally relevant, in that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 309, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). The balancing of the effect and value of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 672 (Mo. banc), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 239, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982).
Generally, evidence of other, uncharged misconduct has a legitimate tendency to prove the specific crime charged when it “ ‘tends to establish: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other; [or] (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.’ ” State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 311 (quoting Peo-pie v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (1901)). The five enumerated exceptions have sometimes been difficult to define and apply. State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 314 (Thomas, J. concurring). Evidence of prior misconduct that does not fall within one of the five enumerated exceptions may nevertheless be admissible if the evidence is logically and legally relevant. Id. at 311-12.
In cases involving sexual abuse of children, the recent trend in Missouri has been liberally to allow the admission of evidence of prior sexual misconduct by the defendant. State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo.App.1991). Cases that have admitted evidence of prior sexual misconduct have allowed it under three of the five enumerated exceptions: motive; identity; or common scheme or plan.1 Neither motive nor identity is at issue in this case.
It is in the application of the common scheme or plan exception that courts most often have admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual abuse of minors other than the victim. Liberal use of the exception has led to a distortion of the original purpose of the exception. A recapitulation of the cases regarding the common scheme or plan exception is useful not only in understanding the development of the distortion but also in resolving the confusion born of it.
Courts have long recognized the admissibility of evidence of other crimes to prove that the crime for which the defendant is currently on trial was part of a larger plan. See e.g. State v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S.W. 733, 740-41 (1905). The common scheme or plan exception initially required proof of existence of an actual plan connecting the prior misconduct with the crime [14]*14charged. In State v. Buxton, 324 Mo. 78, 22 S.W.2d 635 (1929), this Court held “[i]t certainly is not enough to show that the person on trial committed one or more crimes of the same general nature” in order to fall within the common scheme or plan exception. Buxton, 22 S.W.2d at 637. For the prior crimes to be admissible under a common scheme or plan, it must be shown that the prior crimes had “some relation to the general criminal enterprise.” Id.
In State v. Atkinson, 293 S.W.2d 941 (Mo.1956), this Court specifically rejected application of the common scheme or plan exception in a case involving evidence of prior sexual misconduct by the defendant with someone other than the victim. Atkinson involved an employer who sodomized his teenaged employee. The state argued that the evidence of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct with two other teenage boys also employed by the defendant should be admissible because it indicated that the “defendant followed substantially the same pattern in his dealings with each of these three boys.” The state contended “so strange and unusual are the acts of homosexuality” that the prior acts of sodomy tended to prove that the defendant had committed the act with the victim. Atkinson, 293 S.W.2d at 943. The Court rejected the state’s argument, noting that “the evidence did not disclose crimes that were so interrelated that proof of one would tend to establish the others.” Id.
Other early cases that applied the common scheme or plan exception to prior sexual misconduct required that the prior sexual misconduct be part of the “same general criminal enterprise” that led to the sexual assault charged. Buxton, 22 S.W.2d at 637. In State v. Komegger, 255 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.1953), the defendant committed an act of molestation against the victim. After the incident the defendant told the victim to meet him at the same place the following day. The defendant did not appear the following day but did appear the day after. The defendant again approached the victim, who had notified her parents, and after the defendant again exposed himself indecently to the victim the police arrested him. At trial the court admitted testimony concerning the subsequent incident of exposure. This Court affirmed the decision of the trial court under both the common scheme or plan and the identity exceptions. This Court found that the acts were connected by the defendant’s request that the victim meet him again and also tended to show that the person who committed the second incident of exposure also committed the first act of molestation charged in the information. Id. at 769.
In State v. Shumate, 478 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Mo.1972), the victim testified that the defendant and others abducted her and during the following hours repeatedly sexually attacked her. The Court found that the victim’s testimony regarding sexual attacks other than those charged that were committed during her captivity were properly admitted into evidence. “The facts reveal that prosecutrix was the victim of a common plan or scheme of a continuing nature involving sexual excesses committed by several persons at different places over a considerable period of time.” Id. at 330; see also State v. Torrence, 519 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Mo.App.1975).
In State v. Davis, 540 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. App.1976), the defendant raped his daughter, then later in the day forced her into an act of oral copulation. The defendant was charged with immoral intent, § 563.160, RSMo 1969, based on the oral copulation. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony of the victim regarding the rape that occurred earlier in the day. The court found that the prior sexual attack by the defendant on the victim was admissible under common scheme or plan because “[b]oth the intercourse and the attempted sodomy occurred when the victim had been sent to spend the weekend with her father. Both acts occurred within a 12-hour period_ These circumstances indicate that both sexual assaults resulted from a plan by defendant to exercise control and custody over the victim and make her the target of his sexual excesses.” Id. at 124.
[15]*15Finally, in State v. Dalton, 587 S.W.2d 644 (Mo.App.1979), the court affirmed the trial court’s admission of evidence of various acts of sexual misconduct committed against two brothers, placed briefly in the care of the defendant. The court found the evidence admissible under the common scheme or plan exception in part because the defendant exercised control and custody of the boys and in part because the various acts of sexual misconduct, both charged and uncharged, occurred during an approximately one-hour period. Id. at 645.
Kornegger, Shumate, Davis, and Dalton applied the common scheme or plan exception in situations in which the prior acts of sexual misconduct sought to be admitted into evidence occurred: (1) against the victim (or in the case of Dalton, victims); (2) from one hour to several days before or after the sexual misconduct for which the defendant was on trial; and (3) except for Kornegger, within the same period of “custody and control” that eventually led to the charged criminal sexual act. In Komeg-ger, the incidents were connected by the defendant’s request to the victim to meet him the following day. These cases applied the traditional common scheme or plan exception since the prior misconduct about which the victim was allowed to testify occurred as a part of the “same criminal enterprise,” referred to by Judge Thomas as “a single plan case,” Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315 (Thomas, J. concurring), that led to the charged sexual assault.
State v. Koster, 684 S.W.2d 488 (Mo.App.1984), purporting specifically to rely upon Dalton, significantly expanded the scope covered by the common scheme or plan exception beyond that traditionally allowed. The defendant was a house parent at a juvenile detention center. He used his position of authority to assault sexually a minor female confined at the center. The trial court allowed the testimony of three other residents of the detention center who testified that over a period of several months the defendant had made sexual advances toward them. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the evidence indicated a common scheme or plan by the defendant “to exercise control and custody over his wards and to make them the target of his sexual excesses.” Koster, 684 S.W.2d at 490. The Koster court also relied upon the identity exception of Young and McDaniels to find the evidence admissible even though the identity of the defendant in Koster was not in question. Koster, 684 S.W.2d at 491.
After Koster the court of appeals regularly recognized that a defendant’s sexual misconduct with those other than the victim and separated by a period of time could be considered part of a common scheme or plan to abuse sexually children within the defendant’s custody and control.2 The cases required that the sexual misconduct be similar in nature but did not require a showing that the prior sexual misconduct is so “unusual and distinct” as to be a signature of the defendant and his activities. See Erickson, 793 S.W.2d at 383; see also State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo.App.1985). As the court of appeals noted in State v. Brooks, 810 S.W.2d 627 (Mo.App.1991), the result has been that “the common scheme or plan exception [is] being conflated or mixed with the identity exception; the definitional lines separating these two exceptions [has] become blurred; and the trial court admits evidence of other crimes without a clear rationale for doing so.” Id. at 633.
After Koster the focus in analyzing the common scheme or plan exception has shifted from whether the defendant committed the prior sexual conduct within the [16]*16context of the activity that led to the crime charged to whether the defendant over the course of several months or years systematically engaged in similar sexual conduct with other victims under his “custody and control.” See e.g. Erickson, 793 S.W.2d at 383. Roster and the subsequent cases have in essence converted the traditional common scheme or plan exception into a “series-of-similar-crimes” exception. Brooks, 810 S.W.2d at 633.
In State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo.App.1991), the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, directly confronted the distortion. The court held that cases using the “common scheme or plan exception as a means of demonstrating the relevance of uncharged acts of sexual abuse of equatpng] similarity of conduct with common scheme ... distort[ ] the common scheme or plan exception.” Id. at 767. According to Lachterman:
[t]o say the similarity of defendant’s conduct with the victim and with others shows a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related that proof of one tends to establish the other is tantamount to saying that the defendant’s scheme or plan was to fulfill his propensity, proclivity or disposition toward such deviant behavior.
Id. at 768.
Lachterman properly refused to apply the common scheme or plan exception, but the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of prior sexual abuse by the defendant of children other than the victim under a new exception. The La-chterman court held that “[e]vidence of repeated acts of sexual abuse of children demonstrates, per se, a propensity for sexual aberration and a depraved sexual instinct and should be recognized as an additional distinct exception to the rule against the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes.” Id. at 768; see also State v. Taylor, 735 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Mo.App.1987). The court limited the depraved sexual instinct exception to “other acts of sexual abuse of children of the same sex as the victim occurring near the time of the acts charged.” Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d at 769.
This Court agrees with the Lachterman court that admission of prior sexual misconduct of the defendant with persons other than the victim under the common scheme or plan exception is a distortion of that exception as traditionally interpreted; it is contrary to Atkinson, Kornegger, Shumate, Davis and Dalton. The common scheme or plan exception has become instead “a series of crimes theory,” and the evidence of prior misconduct is admitted more to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in the deviant sexual behavior than to prove a common scheme or plan that connects the misconduct with the present crime. See Brooks, 810 S.W.2d at 633. The exception, in effect, engulfs the rule. Roster and its progeny incorrectly interpreted and applied the common scheme or plan exception and, in this regard, should no longer be followed.
Although the Lachterman court was clearly seeking to provide legitimacy in the midst of disarray, this Court determines not to adopt the “depraved sexual instinct” exception articulated in Lachterman. As Judge Thomas observed in Sladek:
The titles sound generic, but if they are applied broadly and generically without consideration for the underlying theory and reasoning, they will often be improperly applied. This application can easily cause an exception to become so broad that it swallows up the underlying rule of exclusion.
Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315 (Thomas, J. concurring). A blanket rule allowing evidence of any recent misconduct by the defendant with a child of the same sex as the victim may encourage the jury to convict the defendant because of his propensity to commit such crimes without regard to whether he is actually guilty of the crime charged. See Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 4.16 (1990); People v. Lewis, 69 N.Y.2d. 321, 514 N.Y.S.2d 205, 506 N.E.2d 915, 918-19 (1987).
This Court’s refusal to adopt the “depraved sexual instincts” exception does [17]*17not, however, automatically require exclusion of all evidence of prior misconduct. In Sladek Judge Thomas suggested it appropriate to recognize a separate exception for “signature modus operandi/corroboration” evidence. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 314-15 (Thomas, J. concurring). The signature modus operand/corroboration exception approximates the long established, well recognized exception that allows evidence of prior uncharged misconduct for the purpose of proving the identity of the wrongdoer. If the identity of the wrongdoer is at issue, the identity exception permits the state to show the defendant as the culprit who has committed the sexual crime charged by showing that the defendant committed other uncharged sexual acts that are sufficiently similar to the crime charged in time, place and method. State v. McDaniels, 668 S.W.2d 230, 232-33 (Mo.App.1984); State v. Young, 661 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Mo.App.1983). For the prior conduct to fall within the identity exception, there must be more than mere similarity between the crime charged and the uncharged crime. The charged and uncharged crimes must be nearly “identical” and their methodology “so unusual and distinctive” that they resemble a “signature” of the defendant’s involvement in both crimes. McDaniels, 668 S.W.2d at 232-33; Young, 661 S.W.2d at 639; see Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317 (Thomas, J. concurring).
In the context of corroboration, evidence of prior crimes is logically relevant in that it has a legitimate tendency to prove a material fact in the case by corroborating the testimony of the victim as to the sexual assault. See Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 314 (Thomas, J. concurring); see also State v. Garner, 481 S.W.2d at 241. Because of the secretive nature of the crime in most cases involving sexual abuse or molestation of a child by an adult, the only eyewitnesses to the crime are the defendant and the victim. Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 4.13 (1990). The trial often becomes a credibility contest between the defendant and the victim. Id. Evidence of prior crimes in such situations, is, therefore, probative.
Evidence of prior crimes is legally relevant, thus admissible, however, only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. See Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 314-15 (Thomas, J. concurring). Judge Thomas cautioned against using corroboration evidence casually because:
[a]lthough we have called this exception corroboration, it really involves reasoning from the signature modus operandi based upon the propensity of the defendant to commit this type of crime to the conclusion that the defendant committed the crime charged. This reasoning goes squarely against the rationale for the general rule. This makes it particularly important that the requirement for a signature modus operandi be strictly enforced.
Id. For corroboration evidence to be of sufficiently increased probative value so as to outweigh its prejudicial effect, the evidence must be more than merely similar in nature to the sexual assault for which the defendant is charged. See Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317. (Thomas, J. concurring). Evidence of prior sexual misconduct that corroborates the testimony of the victim should be nearly identical to the charged crime and so unusual and distinctive as to be a signature of the defendant’s modus operandi. Id. This is a threshold requirement that must be met before the trial court can proceed to weigh any additional factors in determining the question of admissibility.
For the reasons stated above, and subject to the constraints delineated there, this Court adopts a signature modus operan-di/corroboration exception to the rule prohibiting evidence of prior uncharged misconduct. It remains to examine the testimony at issue in view of the prohibition against evidence of prior uncharged misconduct and to determine whether the signature modus operandi/corroboration exception is applicable in the present case.
The subject testimony was adduced from four witnesses who were members of a youth group in a church in which appellant previously served as pastor. An[18]*18drew3, age 27 at the time of the trial, testified that he had first contact with appellant in 1977 or 1978, when Andrew was 13 or 14 years old. According to Andrew, appellant organized an “initiation” ritual for certain members of the youth group, in the “Dare Club,” requiring them to sit naked upon the hood of a slow-moving car driven by appellant. Andrew participated in this ritual. Andrew testified that on other occasions, after the conclusion of a youth activity, appellant asked several of the male members of the group to remain. Appellant held down members of the group and poured ice cream topping on their bodies. Andrew testified that appellant placed a small candle in the anus of a male member of the youth group.
Andrew testified that appellant on three different occasions touched Andrew’s genitals, causing appellant to ejaculate, the first time while appellant slept with Andrew in a hotel in southern Missouri, the second time when Andrew spent the night at appellant’s house and the third time during the lock-in of the youth group at the church. According to Andrew, appellant kept a set of polaroid photographs of nude young men in his desk at work.
Bob, 26 years old at the time of trial, testified that he began attending the youth group in which appellant previously served as pastor when Bob was age 14. Bob testified that he and another friend went though an initiation process of jogging naked in front of a car driven by appellant, while other boys rode in the car watching. Bob testified that appellant showed him polaroid pictures of other young men, unclothed, whom Bob knew at school, as well as one photograph of appellant naked. According to Bob, while spending the night at appellant’s house, appellant got into bed with Bob and touched his genitals. Bob left the bedroom and slept on a couch in the living room while appellant remained in the bedroom.
Charles, 25 years old at the time of trial, testified that he began attending appellant’s youth group when he was twelve. Charles testified that he participated in an “initiation” in which appellant organized masturbation parties where male members of the youth group were supposed to stand on the church pulpit and achieve an erection. Charles observed another initiation, similar to those about which Andrew and Bob testified, in which appellant had new members of the group strip naked and run in front of a car driven by appellant, with other boys riding in the car.
According to Charles, appellant directed one boy to place ice cream syrup at the end of his, the boy’s, penis and directed another boy to lick it off. On another occasion, appellant had Charles and another boy put lotion on their penises and try to masturbate. Later that same evening, appellant tied Charles to a table, blindfolded him, put ketchup and mayonnaise on his penis, cut Charles free, and then told him to masturbate. Charles masturbated to the point of ejaculation and the appellant took the semen and wiped it on Charles’s lips. Charles also testified that on another occasion appellant spent the night with Charles, touched Charles’s genitals, masturbated Charles.
Don, age 25 at the time of trial, testified that he began attending appellant’s youth group when he was 12 or 13 years old. Don testified that appellant initiated him into the youth group by requiring him to run naked in front of a car driven by appellant; three or four other youth were present in the car. There were three additional incidents. According to Don, appellant required male members of the youth group to go naked up onto the stage in the church sanctuary, achieve erections and then hang a tennis shoe from their penises. Don also testified that appellant paired male members of the group and had them kiss each other and lick ice cream toppings from each other’s genitals. Male members of the group were encouraged by appellant to perform the “elephant” walk, unclothed from the waist down, with males walking in a line holding the penis of the boy in front. Don testified that appellant showed him polaroid photos of male members of the youth group, naked or partially naked, and [19]*19encouraged Don to allow him to take a nude photograph of Don. Appellant also encouraged Don to masturbate but Don refused both to pose for appellant or to masturbate.
There are strains of commonality in the testimony of Andrew, Bob, Charles and Don. Only one type of uncharged act, however, is not only nearly identical to the others but also so unusual and distinctive that the prior acts resemble the signature of the defendant’s involvement in the present crime. To recapitulate, the victim in the present case testified that appellant, while driving around, asked the victim to take off his clothes and run around appellant’s car or, if not, to walk around the car in his underwear. Charles testified that he rode in a car with appellant and observed two other boys stripped and running naked in front of the car as the vehicle followed behind them with the lights on, all at appellant’s direction. Bob and Don testified that appellant asked them to run naked in front of a slow moving car. Andrew’s testimony, slightly dissimilar, was that appellant asked him to sit naked upon a slow moving car while appellant drove.
Appellant’s conduct involving his preference for naked or partially clothed boys in motion on or around an automobile is more than merely similar in nature to the sexual assault with which appellant is charged; it operates as a “signature” of appellant’s involvement in both crimes. Appellant’s conduct in this respect is so unusual and distinctive, as to “earmark” it as the conduct of the accused and, thus, to corroborate the testimony of the victim in the present case. See McDaniels, 668 S.W.2d at 233. The evidence is admissible.
No other evidence adduced by Andrew, Bob, Charles, or Don is admissible. The state suggests that Andrew, Bob and Don’s testimony that appellant possessed and showed nude photographs of members of the youth group, as well as Andrew, Bob and Charles’s testimony that appellant arranged sleepovers with them in order to abuse them sexually, is similar to the misconduct in the present case in which appellant arranged for the victim to sleep over with him and also took a photograph of the victim in his underwear. Although the conduct is similar, even nearly identical, it is not so unusual and distinctive as to be a signature of appellant’s modus operandi.
Appellant cites State v. Cutler, 499 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Mo.App.1973), and State v. Courter, 793 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Mo.App.1990), arguing that all of the events portrayed by the testimony of the four witnesses are too remote in time from the crime charged to be admissible. The holdings of Cutler and Courter were correct under the traditional common scheme or plan exception allowing admission of evidence of prior misconduct only if it were part of, or connected to, the same general criminal enterprise; remoteness in time can make difficult, or even impossible, proof of a traditional common plan or scheme between separate acts of misconduct. Under the signature modus operandi!corroboration exception, however, it rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether the passage of time between incidents is so lengthy that the prejudice or other “cost” of the evidence outweighs the probative value of the signature modus operandi. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317 (Thomas, J. concurring). A prior crime nearer in time to the charged crime is clearly more relevant. Id. The number of unusual and distinctive incidents that occurred in the past should also be taken into account by the trial court; the greater the number, the more weight given to them. Id.
The testimony of Andrew, Bob and Don concerning their running naked in front of, or sitting naked upon, an automobile, and of Charles, concerning his direct observation of the others engaged in the same act, all at appellant’s direction, is not too remote in time to admit. Although the events about which the four testified occurred between 12 and 13 years prior to the trial in the present case, the remoteness is outweighed by there being at least four nearly identical incidents so unusual and distinctive as to corroborate the victim’s testimony. The remoteness is not a bar in this case to the admission of the evidence [20]*20that is admissible under the signature mo-dus operandi!corroboration exception. On remand the state may call Andrew, Bob, Charles and Don to testify concerning the incidents in which appellant directed youth to run naked in front of or sit naked upon a slow-moving car driven by the appellant.
The remainder of the testimony of the four witnesses is inadmissible. Some bears no similarity to the conduct with which appellant is charged in the present case. Some is insufficiently unusual or distinctive, although similar. All occurred on occasions separate from the “signature” incidents. The evidence is prejudicial, and its admission requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
II.
Appellant raises two additional points on appeal, each of which may recur on retrial.
A.
Appellant argues that his convictions for both sexual abuse in the first degree and attempted forcible sodomy violate the double jeopardy clauses of the Missouri and United States Constitutions. Appellant contends that the two charges are essentially the same offense because each requires forcible compulsion and sexual contact, the only difference between the charges being that attempted forcible sodomy requires an additional element of deviate sexual intercourse.
Appellant was charged in Count! of the substitute information with sexual abuse in the first degree on the theory that he had subjected the victim “to sexual contact without his consent by the use of forcible compulsion,” in violation of § 566!00!(1).4 Section 566.010.1(3), RSMo 1986, defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of the genitals or anus of any person, or the breast of any female person, or any such touching through the clothing, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person.” Appellant was convicted of first degree sexual abuse based upon the evidence that appellant had touched the victim’s penis with his erect penis.
Appellant was convicted under Count II of attempted forcible sodomy based on the allegation that appellant “attempted to have deviate sexual intercourse with ... [the victim] by the use of forcible compulsion: in violation of § 566.060.1.” Section 566.010.1(2) defines “deviate sexual intercourse” as “any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, hand or anus of another person. ...” Appellant was convicted for attempted forcible sodomy because he touched the victim’s penis with his hand.
Double jeopardy is not a bar to either of appellant’s convictions. Appellant was convicted of the two offenses because he committed two separate criminal acts. He was convicted of first degree sexual abuse because he touched the victim’s genitals with his erect penis, and he was convicted of attempted forcible sodomy because he touched the victim’s genitals with his hand. Appellant committed two distinct crimes resulting from separate acts involving different parts of his body. Each offense involved an episode of distinct conduct. The double jeopardy clause does not prevent appellant from being prosecuted and convicted for committing these separate acts. See State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72, 76 (Mo. banc 1992). See also State v. Hagan, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. banc 1992). Appellant’s argument that the double jeopardy clause prohibits both convictions is without merit.
B.
Appellant also contends that the state introduced insufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that he used “forcible compulsion” in committing sexual abuse in the first degree and attempted forcible sodomy. His contention is incorrect.
[21]*21Appellate courts view all evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and all contrary evidence is rejected. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1,11 (Mo. banc 1991). Review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence existed from which a jury could conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1989). “Forcible compulsion” is defined in part as “physical force that overcomes reasonable resistance.” § 556.-061(12)(a). There is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s conclusion that appellant used “forcible compulsion” when committing the acts for which he was charged.
The evidence discloses that after the two young women exited appellant’s vehicle and entered their college dormitory, appellant drove the vehicle with the victim as a passenger until the victim did not know where he was. The victim testified that he became frightened. At the motel room, appellant feigned that someone would soon arrive. When no one came, appellant convinced the victim to play “strip rummy.” After removing all clothing but underwear, appellant suggested that he and the victim sleep, both occupying a single bed. During the night appellant caressed the victim’s back, arms and chest. The victim was frightened. When appellant moved his hands to the victim’s genitals, the victim was physically unable to push appellant’s hand away, although he tried. The victim attempted unsuccessfully several times to prevent appellant from touching him. The evidence reflects that appellant used physical force against the victim that overcame reasonable resistance by the victim, thereby supporting the jury’s determination that appellant used “forcible compulsion” in the commission of the crimes.
Ill
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
HOLSTEIN, BENTON and PRICE, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in result in part in separate opinion filed.
THOMAS, J., concurs in part and concurs in result in part in separate opinion filed.
LIMBAUGH, J., concurs in opinions of ROBERTSON, C.J., and THOMAS, J.