State v. Berentz

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25 CA 000034
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Berentz, 2026-Ohio-1853.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 25 CA 000034

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Guernsey County, GARY D. BERENTZ, Case No. 25 CR 000063

Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed and Remanded

Date of Judgment: May 20, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Mark A. Perlaky (Assistant County Prosecuting Attorney), Cambridge, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Christopher C. Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Defendant- Appellant

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Challenging his convictions on two felony charges, Defendant Gary Berentz

contends that the trial court erred by accepting his Alford pleas where the record before

the trial court, in his view, did not include sufficient facts to support the trial court’s guilty

findings on the charges. Berentz also argues that the trial court failed at his sentencing

hearing to recite to him the indefinite-sentencing notifications that are spelled out in R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c).

{¶2} We conclude that the trial court properly accepted Berentz’s Alford pleas,

but we remand the case to the trial court so that Berentz can be provided orally with the

required indefinite-sentencing information.

The Key Facts

{¶3} Berentz began providing transportation services to members of the Amish

community in Guernsey County in May 2022. Two separate incidents involving two different victims, C.S. and L.Y., resulted in Berentz’s indictment in Guernsey County case

number 24CR34 on six felony charges: three counts of rape, one count of kidnapping, one

count of gross sexual imposition, and one count of abduction.

{¶4} Berentz’s rape, kidnapping, and gross sexual imposition charges stemmed

from allegations that Berentz had forcibly engaged in vaginal intercourse with C.S. while

Berentz was tasked with driving her home. Berentz’s abduction charge resulted from the

county grand jury’s finding that, instead of taking L.Y. home as he had been instructed to

do, Berentz drove her to his house and asked her to come inside. When L.Y. refused,

Berentz drove her around in his truck for several hours and made unwanted sexual

advances toward her.

{¶5} While Berentz was being held in the county jail awaiting trial on those

charges, law-enforcement officers discovered several letters allegedly authored by

Berentz and directed to his son. Those letters expressed, in part, Berentz’s desire to “go

after” the Amish community. Berentz was then indicted in Guernsey County case number

24CR57 on two counts of retaliation.

{¶6} In the end, Berentz reached a plea agreement that called for him to enter

Alford pleas to two charges — felonious assault and attempted abduction — listed in a bill

of information. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the eight charges in the two

earlier indictments. The bill of information was designated by the clerk as case number

25CR63, and Berentz entered Alford pleas to the two new felony charges in March 2025.

{¶7} When asked by the trial judge during the plea-change hearing to explain the

facts supporting Berentz’s Alford pleas, the State merely recited the statutory definitions

of the two crimes from the bill of information. Berentz’s earlier rape case and retaliation

case were both on the trial court’s docket that day too, though, and filings in those cases included multiple reports from law-enforcement officers detailing their investigations

into the allegations against Berentz. After thoroughly questioning Berentz at the plea-

change hearing about his decision to enter the Alford pleas, the trial judge accepted the

pleas and scheduled a sentencing hearing for the following month.

{¶8} At that sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed an indefinite prison term

on the felonious-assault charge (a second-degree felony) and a definite prison term on the

attempted-abduction charge (a fourth-degree felony). At the plea-change hearing the

previous month, Berentz had signed a document listing the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)

indefinite-sentencing notifications, but the trial judge did not recite those orally to

Berentz at the sentencing hearing. Berentz now appeals.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Accepting Berentz’s Alford Pleas

{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Berentz argues that the trial court

improperly accepted his pleas because the State, in his view, failed in its duty to explain

at the plea change the underlying facts supporting the charges.

{¶10} We review with fresh eyes Berentz’s assertion that the trial court improperly

accepted his Alford pleas. State v. Cook, 2024-Ohio-4481, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.) (“When a

defendant contends a guilty plea is invalid because a court failed to comply with the Alford

requirements, this Court must undertake a de novo review”).

{¶11} The so-called Alford plea draws its name from the U.S. Supreme Court’s

decision in North Carolina v. Alford, in which the court explained that a defendant may

“voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison

sentence even though he is unwilling to admit participation in the crime, or even if his

guilty plea contains a protestation of innocence, when, as here, he intelligently concludes

that his interests require a guilty plea and the record strongly evidences guilt.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), syllabus. Under Alford, then, a defendant who

maintains his or her innocence may rationally conclude, based on the strength of the

evidence that the State is prepared to offer at trial, that a plea bargain is in his or her best

interest so that he or she can try to avoid the prospect of the greater punishment that

seems likely to result if the defendant goes to trial on the original charges. State v. Byrd,

2008-Ohio-3909, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.).

{¶12} An Alford plea, just like an ordinary guilty plea, must be made knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Willis, 2008-Ohio-6808, ¶ 4 (6th Dist.). When a

defendant’s plea is accompanied by a protestation of innocence, a trial court has a

heightened duty to ensure that the defendant has made a rational decision to enter the

plea. Cook at ¶ 9. This generally requires “a presentation of some basic facts surrounding

the charge from which the court may determine whether the accused has made an

intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.” State v. Drzayich, 2016-Ohio-1398, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.).

{¶13} That kind of factual explanation allows the trial court to resolve the

apparent conflict between “a defendant's claim of innocence and the defendant's desire

to plead guilty to the charges.” State v. Johnson, 2016-Ohio-2840, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). In

gathering the necessary facts, the trial court may rely on the entire record before it. State

v. Koperski, 2024-Ohio-2838, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.). See also State v. Hughes, 2021-Ohio-111,

¶ 15 (4th Dist.) (suggesting that a “bill of particulars, . . . witness statements[,] . . .

investigative reports, . . . [or a] recitation of basic facts at the plea hearing” can suffice for

an Alford plea); State v. Krieg, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.) (finding that the trial

court’s possession of a bill of particulars was sufficient to supply the court with a factual

basis for the defendant’s Alford plea). {¶14} Notably, Berentz does not claim that his plea was anything other than

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In fact, Berentz concedes in his reply brief that

“voluntariness is not at issue in this case.” Instead, Berentz argues only that the trial court

failed to ensure that the record contained strong evidence of Berentz’s guilt.

{¶15} A defendant who enters a guilty plea, “including an Alford plea, waives all

appealable errors . . . except to the extent that the errors precluded the defendant from

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” entering the plea. State v. Clark, 2021-Ohio-

2531, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). We therefore review Berentz’s challenge to the adequacy of the

court’s understanding of the facts only to the extent that it may have affected the court’s

determination that Berentz was properly entering his guilty pleas.

{¶16} The trial-court record in the bill-of-information case (number 25CR63) is

— in the words of the trial judge at Berentz’s sentencing hearing — “very limited,” given

that Berentz entered his Alford plea to the two charges in that case just three days after

the bill of information was filed. The records in the rape case (number 24CR34) and the

retaliation case (number 24CR57), though, are much more extensive because both were

pending on the trial court’s docket for more than a year, during which both Berentz and

the State filed multiple motions and responses. Several of those filings included law-

enforcement reports describing the conduct underlying not only the original charges but

also the two charges to which Berentz ultimately entered his Alford pleas. In addition,

the trial court in the older cases had conducted a hearing to determine whether those two

cases should be joined together for trial.

{¶17} In an effort to resolve both of Berentz’s original cases, the parties agreed

that the State would file the bill of information listing the felonious-assault and

attempted-abduction charges, and then Berentz would enter Alford pleas to them. Their agreement called, too, for the State to dismiss the original eight charges in the older cases.

The parties acknowledged, also, that Berentz’s convictions would not require him to

register as a sex offender under Ohio law, and the parties jointly recommended that any

prison terms on the two new charges be served concurrently. That information was all

presented on the record at the plea-change hearing.

{¶18} While the State, at that same hearing, ideally ought to have said more about

the alleged facts underlying the charges in the bill of information and also should have

detailed the strength of the State’s evidence on the original charges, we find that the trial

court had sufficient facts before it to accept Berentz’s pleas. The transcript of Berentz’s

plea-change hearing indicates that the trial judge knew that Berentz’s pleas to the charges

in the bill of information resulted from a negotiated agreement resolving all three cases,

and the same judge presided over them all.

{¶19} In the rape case (number 24CR34), an investigative report that was attached

as an exhibit to one of the State’s filings spells out various allegations that support a

charge of felonious assault: (1) Berentz often provided transportation services to members

of the Amish community; (2) In late December 2023, a friend of C.S.’s had called Berentz

and asked him to drive C.S. and that friend to their respective homes, and Berentz picked

them up in a white truck; (3) After the friend had been dropped off, Berentz, according to

C.S., started speaking to her in a sexually suggestive manner and began reaching over and

touching her leg; (4) Berentz eventually parked the truck and forced C.S. to move into the

backseat where Berentz pulled up C.S.’s dress and forcibly engaged in vaginal intercourse

with her, and (5) C.S. reported bruising that lasted for several days and was treated by

both medical and mental-health professionals after the incident. {¶20} That same investigative report also contained the following information —

reported by L.Y. to law-enforcement officers — that supports a charge of attempted

abduction: (1) In January 2024, L.Y. called Berentz after midnight and asked him for a

ride home; (2) Instead of driving L.Y. home after picking her up, Berentz instead drove

L.Y. to his house and asked her to come inside multiple times despite L.Y.’s repeated

rebuffs; (3) After getting back on the road to take L.Y. home, Berentz stopped several

times and asked to see L.Y.’s vagina; and (4) L.Y. was in Berentz’s truck for approximately

three hours before he took her home.

{¶21} We note, too, that the judge at the plea-change hearing inquired into

Berentz’s reason for entering guilty pleas to crimes that he claimed he had not committed.

In response, Berentz’s attorney stated that Berentz had initially been charged with “very

serious crimes,” including three felonies of the first degree. The attorney further reasoned

that Berentz was entering the Alford pleas to avoid the possibility of being convicted of

those more serious crimes and spending significantly more time in prison. The trial judge

at the plea-change hearing then turned to Berentz to confirm that his attorney had

accurately expressed Berentz’s reasons for entering the pleas. “Yes” was Berentz’s

response.

{¶22} The information that was before the trial court when Berentz entered his

pleas provided the judge with a sufficient factual basis for accepting the Alford pleas. The

State’s evidence was strong on some if not all of the original eight charges, facts in the

record before the trial judge supported the two charges to which Berentz entered his pleas,

and the agreed resolution offered Berentz the prospect of a much less severe penalty than

he likely faced had he gone to trial and been convicted. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in accepting Berentz’s Alford pleas, and Berentz’s first assignment

of error is overruled.

Berentz Was Not Provided at the Sentencing Hearing with the Necessary Explanation About Ohio’s Indefinite-Sentencing System

{¶23} Berentz argues in his second assignment of error that the trial judge failed

at his sentencing hearing to provide to him the required indefinite-sentencing

notifications that are listed in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). We agree.

{¶24} Felony sentences are reviewed under the standard explained in R.C.

2953.08. State v. Corbett, 2023-Ohio-556, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). That statute allows an

appellate court to either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for

resentencing if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the sentence either is not

supported by the record or is otherwise contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 25.

{¶25} A non-life indefinite sentence is contrary to law when the trial judge does

not advise the defendant of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) factors at the sentencing hearing.

State v. Toth, 2026-Ohio-1401, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.); State v. Wolfe, 2020-Ohio-5501, ¶ 36–37

(5th Dist.).

{¶26} When a trial court sentences a defendant to an indefinite prison term, R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c) calls for the trial judge to explain Ohio’s indefinite-sentencing process

to that defendant at the sentencing hearing. That same statutory provision lists five key

pieces of information that must be conveyed to the defendant then to apprise him or her

about the rebuttable presumption that is explained in even greater detail in R.C. 2967.271.

{¶27} The trial court here imposed an indefinite prison term on the F2 felonious-

assault charge, but the judge did not recite the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v) notifications

to Berentz at the sentencing hearing. And though Berentz had received written notice about those Reagan Tokes advisements at his plea-change hearing, the trial court was still

required to provide the notifications to him orally at his sentencing hearing. Toth at ¶ 37

(“the mandate of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires, at a minimum, a trial court to provide

the mandatory advisements orally and memorialized in a sentencing entry”); State v.

Searight, 2023-Ohio-3584, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.) (“a trial court’s failure to advise the defendant

of the notifications during the sentencing hearing is not cured by inclusion of the R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c) provisions in a plea entry signed by the defendant”).

{¶28} Because the trial court did not provide the required information to Berentz

at the sentencing hearing, a remand to that court is now appropriate so that that

additional step required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) can be completed. Toth at ¶ 38.

{¶29} Berentz’s second assignment of error is sustained. {¶30} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Court of Common

Pleas of Guernsey County is affirmed, but we remand the case so that the trial court can

orally advise Berentz about the indefinite-sentencing provisions in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

Any costs are to be paid by Appellant Gary Berentz.

By: Gormley, J.;

King, P.J. and

Popham, J. concur.