State v. Baxter

2025 Ohio 5722

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 23, 2025
• Docket: C-240555
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Baxter, 2025-Ohio-5722.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240555 TRIAL NO. B-2305281-B Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. :

JEFFREY BAXTER, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

Defendant-Appellee. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 12/23/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Baxter, 2025-Ohio-5722.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240555 TRIAL NO. B-2305281-B Plaintiff-Appellant, :

JEFFREY BAXTER, : OPINION

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 23, 2025

Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, Norbert Wessels and Scott Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Jon R. Sinclair, for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

MOORE, Judge.

{¶1} The State of Ohio, as plaintiff-appellant, appeals the judgment of the

Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas dismissing the indictment against

defendant-appellee Jeffrey Baxter. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of

the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} On October 26, 2023, police initiated a traffic stop for an equipment

violation in the 3200 block of Vine Street. Eighteen-year-old Baxter was a passenger

in the car. Police noted a strong odor of marijuana during the stop, and asked Baxter

to exit from the car. After police located a firearm concealed along Baxter’s waistband,

Baxter fled on foot. On November 2, 2023, Baxter was indicted for unlawfully carrying

a concealed weapon, in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony, and

one count of improper handling of a firearm in a vehicle, in violation of R.C.

2923.16(B), a fourth-degree felony. Under Ohio’s concealed-carry regime, a qualifying

adult “means a person who is . . . twenty-one years of age or older . . . .” Because Baxter

was 18 years old at the time of stop, he was not a “qualifying adult” and was therefore

not “deemed to have been issued a valid concealed carry license.” See R.C.

2923.111(C)(1)(a). On December 5, 2023, following his arrest, Baxter pleaded not

guilty to each of the charges in the indictment.

{¶3} On March 4, 2024, Baxter filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the

indictment. He argued that Ohio’s regulatory scheme prohibiting individuals under

the age of 21 from carrying a concealed firearm violated his rights under the Second

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

{¶4} The court granted Baxter’s motion and dismissed both counts. The

3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

court’s analysis focused on the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), citing a lack of

historical support for the “qualifying adult” exception. The court noted that R.C.

2923.16(B) was problematic for the same reasons and concluded both statutes were

unconstitutional as applied to Baxter.

{¶5} On appeal, the State raises a single assignment of error, arguing the

court erred when it granted Baxter’s motion to dismiss and that the State’s prosecution

of an individual under 21 years of age for carrying a concealed weapon is consistent

with the United States Constitution.

II. Analysis

A. Dismissal

{¶6} We review de novo a court’s dismissal of an indictment for purely legal

reasons. State v. Thacker, 2024-Ohio-5835, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). Legislative enactments, like

statutes, enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, which requires the

challenger to prove the constitutional flaw beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.

Hammock, 2022-Ohio-3570, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), citing State ex rel. Dickman v.

Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[D]oubts

regarding the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of the statute.” State v.

Grevious, 2022-Ohio-4361, ¶ 9. An as-applied challenge asserts that a law is

unconstitutional based on its enforcement in the factual context surrounding the

challenger. Simkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 2016-Ohio-8118, ¶

20, citing Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 2004-Ohio-357, ¶ 14.

{¶7} The United States Supreme Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol

Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024),

has instructed courts on how to assess whether a challenged firearm regulation

violates the Second Amendment. The Court in Bruen held that we must ask if the

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

modern firearm regulation at issue “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition

of firearm regulation.” Bruen at 24. The Court in Rahimi tasked that we consider both

“why” and “how” the regulation at issue burdens the right, and to then see if the

modern regulation imposes “similar restrictions for similar reasons” to the analogues

considered. Rahimi at 692. However, the regulation at issue does not need to be a

“historical twin” or a “dead ringer” to survive Bruen muster. Id. at 692. Instead, the

State need only produce “a pattern of analogous regulations in effect at the time of the

Country’s founding.” Thacker at ¶ 12, fn. 1.

{¶8} We assess the court’s dismissal of each charged offense in turn.

1. R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) – Concealed Carry

{¶9} In State v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708 (1st Dist.), this court assessed a

similar challenge to R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), and held,

We conclude that the Second Amendment, as construed in New York

State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United

States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), does not preclude the State's

prosecution of [the defendant] for carrying a concealed weapon. The

State has adequately demonstrated that, as applied to [the defendant],

R.C. 2923.12 “is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is

understood to permit.” Rahimi at 692, quoting Bruen at 29.

Reed at ¶ 5.

{¶10} Pursuant to this court’s disposition in Reed, the State may prosecute

Baxter for unlawfully carrying concealed weapons.

2. R.C. 2923.16(B) – Improper Handling

{¶11} R.C. 2923.16(B) regulates the manner in which an individual may

possess a firearm in a vehicle. The statute states that “no person shall knowingly

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

transport or have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner that the firearm

is accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving the vehicle.” In State v.

Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.), however, we recognized that “qualified

adults” are exempt from this prohibition.

{¶12} In Stonewall, we addressed a challenge to an improper-handling

conviction brought by an individual under the age of 21. The Stonewall court

underscored that R.C. 2923.16(B) does not impose an outright prohibition on the

individual’s ability to defend themselves outside of the home. Id. at ¶ 39. Instead, the

statute limits the manner in which individuals under the age of 21 may possess a

firearm in a car. Id. at ¶ 39. We concluded that “Bruen does not stand for the

proposition that the Second Amendment affords individuals the unfettered right to

carry an unregistered firearm while in a vehicle” and held that R.C. 2923.16(B) was

constitutional as applied. Id., quoting State v. Quintile, 2024-Ohio-2026, ¶ 26 (9th

Dist.).

{¶13} Like in Stonewall, R.C. 2923.16(B) is constitutional as applied to Baxter.

The restriction that R.C. 2923.16(B) places upon an unqualified adult like Baxter is

limited to the duration in which Baxter is in a car. This furthers the regulatory interest

we discussed in State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644, ¶ 103 (1st Dist.). Specifically, in Hall

we explained that the purpose behind concealed-carry laws was to reduce the risk of

surprise attacks from hidden weapons. Id. Here, Baxter’s conduct, keeping a firearm

concealed in his waistband while he was a passenger in a car, is a prime example of the

kind of conduct that Hall recognized the State could regulate. Id.

{¶14} Therefore, R.C. 2923.16(B) as applied to Baxter is constitutional. The

assignment of error is sustained.

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

III. Conclusion

{¶15} Having sustained the State’s sole assignment of error, we reverse the

trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

CROUSE, P.J., concurs separately. BOCK, J., dissents.

CROUSE, P.J., concurring separately.

{¶16} I fully concur in the majority’s opinion upholding Baxter’s conviction

for carrying a concealed weapon under R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) for the reasons set forth in

State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 (1st Dist.), and in my concurring opinion in State v.

Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708, ¶ 26-27 (1st Dist.) (Crouse, J., concurring separately).

{¶17} I further concur in the majority’s holding that the State may

constitutionally prosecute Baxter for improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle

under R.C. 2923.16(B). However, I write separately to explain that, while I agree with

the portions of State v. Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974 (1st Dist.), relied upon in the

majority opinion, I cannot endorse Stonewall’s reasoning in its entirety.

{¶18} As I read Stonewall, it offered two bases for upholding the improper-

handling conviction of a 19-year-old defendant. First, it argued “that restricting

firearms to minors ‘fits comfortably’ within the ‘American tradition of burdening the

ability of 18- to 20-year-olds to purchase goods, including firearms.’” Id. at ¶ 33,

quoting McCoy v. BATFE, 140 F.4th 568, 577 (4th Cir. 2025). Second, it noted that

“Ohio’s statute regulates the manner in which a person under 21 may carry a firearm

in a motor vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 39.

{¶19} I generally agree with Stonewall’s second rationale, as I believe that R.C.

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2923.16(B) can be constitutionally applied as a regulation of the manner in which

individuals carry firearms. I view this as a modest extension of the reasoning set forth

in Hall. Compare Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644, at ¶ 79 (1st Dist.) (noting that history shows

states were generally “free to regulate the manner in which . . . protected weapons had

to be carried”). Just as the State may criminalize the carrying of concealed weapons

generally, it may also criminalize concealing them in a motor vehicle “to reduce the

number of surprise shootings and to put individuals around the arms-bearer on notice

of the dangerous weapon they carry.” Id. at ¶ 87. As the majority opinion in this case

notes, “Baxter’s conduct, keeping a firearm concealed in his waistband while he was a

passenger in a car, is a prime example of the kind of conduct that Hall recognized the

State could regulate.” Majority opinion, at ¶ 14, citing Hall at ¶ 103.

{¶20} However, I cannot agree with Stonewall in upholding R.C. 2923.16(B)

based on an alleged history and tradition of regulating the rights of those under 21.

For the reasons I explained in detail in my Reed concurrence, I believe that “[a]ny

tradition of firearm restrictions based on age and infancy . . . should be viewed as tied

to the line between minority and majority, not to the line between 20 and 21 years.”

Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708, at ¶ 23 (1st Dist.) (Crouse, J., concurring separately). I

continue to hold that “laws restricting the rights of modern 18-to-20-year-olds are not

‘relevantly similar’ to laws or traditions restricting the rights of infants” for purposes

of Bruen. Id. at ¶ 25. In this case, while Baxter was under 21, he was over the age of

majority. Compare id. at ¶ 15; see also R.C. 3109.01 (setting age of majority in Ohio at

18). Thus, a regulation of his right to bear arms is not “relevantly similar” to

regulations of infants’ rights at the founding.

{¶21} The majority opinion in this case does not explicitly adopt Stonewall’s

age-based rationale, only its manner-of-carry rationale, so I join it in full. I concur that

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

our Nation’s history and tradition of concealed-carry regulations means that R.C.

2923.16(B) can be constitutionally applied to a car passenger with a firearm concealed

in his waistband.

BOCK, J., dissenting.

{¶22} The State indicted Jeffrey Baxter for carrying concealed weapons and

improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. Eighteen-year-old Baxter’s conduct

would not have been criminal in Ohio had Baxter been 21 years old. For the reasons

stated in State v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.) (Bock, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part), and State v. Barber, 2025-Ohio-1193, ¶ 64-79 (1st Dist.), I

would overrule the State’s assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s dismissal

of the two charges. Because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.