FILE IN CLERICI OPFICI This opin1on was flied for record llJINME COIMT,81'11110I'IINI_.. at 1S ~c,o a ~ on .:JIA. ti 17 , 2..o fl·1· , :i;!L 1 7 2014 ~ ltv&d-"-~· IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, NO. 88559-1
Respondent, ENBANC v.
DOUGLAS L. BAUER, Filed JUL 1 7 2014
Petitioner.
GORDON McCLOUD, J.-TC, a child, took a loaded gun from the home
where his mother lived with her boyfriend, Douglas Bauer. The gun belonged to
Bauer. 1 TC brought that loaded gun to school in his backpack a few days after he
stole it. The gun discharged as TC was rummaging in his pack at the end of the
day. The bullet struck TC's classmate, and it seriously injured her.
The State charged Bauer with assault in the third degree, alleging that he,
"[w]ith criminal negligence, cause[d] bodily harm to another person by means of a
weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm." RCW
1 Bauer is not related to TC and is not TC's guardian. TC does not live with his mother and Bauer, but visits. State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
9A.36.031(1)(d). Bauer moved to dismiss pretrial under State v. Knapstad, 2
arguing that the facts did not support a third degree assault charge as a matter of
law. The State argued that the statutory phrase "causes bodily harm" reached
Bauer's conduct as a primary "cause" of the harm to TC's classmate. The trial
court agreed with the State and denied the motion to dismiss but then certified the
matter to the Court of Appeals. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's ruling. State v. Bauer, 174 Wn. App. 59, 295 P.3d 1227 (2013). We
now reverse the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
On February 22, 2012, at about 1:30 p.m., the children at Armin Jahr
Elementary School in Bremerton, Washington, were getting ready to go home for
the day. As the teacher prepared to lead the children from the classroom to the
school bus, she heard a loud pop. Looking around, the teacher saw one child bent
over with blood on her hands. She summoned other staff, and before long they
realized that the bloodied child had been shot.
A staff member noticed a backpack on TC's desk. It contained a gun. The
backpack was identified as TC's backpack, and after the police arrived, TC was
transported to a Youth Services Center for booking. Police later concluded that the
2 107 Wn.2d 346, 356, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). 2 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
gun, a Heckler & Koch .45 caliber pistol, had discharged "while still inside the
backpack." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 86.
Police interviewed TC several times. TC explained that he had been visiting
his mother and her boyfriend Bauer in their home for the past three years, since he
was six years old. He asserted that ever since he first visited, he had seen multiple
guns accessible throughout the house. TC said that his mother and Bauer told him
the guns were all loaded. According to TC, the weekend before the shooting, as he
was leaving Bauer's house, he saw a gun on a bedroom dresser and "swiped the
gun into his backpack." CP at 116. 3 TC explained that he took the gun because
some classmates had "told him they were going to have teenagers come and beat
him up." Id. He asserted that the shooting was accidental. TC pleaded guilty in
juvenile court to reckless endangerment and was sentenced to probation and
counseling.
Police also interviewed TC's mother and Bauer, along with TC's siblings.
Their statements corroborate TC's statements that there were multiple unsecured
and loaded guns around the house.
3 Bauer's Knapstad motion to dismiss was based on the factual summary provided in defense counsel's affidavit attached to the motion. That factual summary was based on "a review of the police reports, discovery and other material received thus far from the Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office." CP at 49. The State does not dispute the version of the facts set forth in the Knapstad motion. 3 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
The State charged Bauer with assault in the third degree under the deadly
weapon prong. That portion of the assault statute states that a person is guilty of
third degree assault who, "[ w]ith criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to
another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to
produce bodily harm." RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d). The State also charged Bauer with
TC's unlawful possession of a firearm, relying on the complicity statute, which
states in relevant part that a person is liable for the criminal conduct of another if,
"[a]cting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct." RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a). Bauer moved to dismiss both charges under
Knapstad. 4 He also moved to dismiss the charges on vagueness grounds.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the unlawful possession of a
firearm charge, and the State did not appeal that decision. CP at 139. The trial
court also denied the motions to dismiss the third degree assault charge. Id.
However, the trial judge recognized that this ruling "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion"
and certified the questions to the Court of Appeals. CP at 142.
4A defendant is entitled to dismissal of charges pretrial if "there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt." Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356. 4 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. Bauer, 174 Wn. App. 59.
Two judges concluded that the word "causes" in the third degree assault statute
was sufficiently flexible to present a jury question on whether Bauer "caused" the
injury to TC's classmate by leaving a loaded gun where TC could access it. Id. at
69-70. The two-member majority also held that the facts of the case did not
preclude the State from seeking to convict Bauer under the complicity statute,
RCW 9A.08.020. Id. at 77. The majority rejected Bauer's vagueness argument.
Id. at 80-81.
Bauer sought discretionary review by this court, and we granted it. State v.
Bauer, 177 Wn.2d 1019, 304 P.3d 115 (2013). We hold that the third degree
assault statute does not apply to Bauer's conduct. We further hold that the
complicity statute does not expand the assault statute's reach to Bauer's conduct.
Because we resolve the case on those grounds, we do not reach Bauer's vagueness
challenge.
ANALYSIS
A. KNAPSTAD MOTION
i. Standard ofReview
Under Knapstad, a defendant may move to dismiss a criminal charge on the
ground that there are no disputed material facts and the undisputed facts do not
establish a prima facie case of guilt as a matter of law. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at
5 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
356-57. We review a trial court's decision on a Knapstad motion de novo. See
State v. Montano, 169 Wn.2d 872, 876, 239 P.3d 360 (2010) (citing State v. Conte,
159 Wn.2d 797, 803, 154 P.3d 194 (2007)).
ii. Causation in Criminal Law Is Different from Causation in Tort
In this case, resolution of the Knapstad motion turns on statutory
interpretation-primarily, the meaning of the word "causes" in the third degree
assault statute. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d). The legislature has provided the following
rule for interpreting such criminal statutes: "[t]he provisions of the common law
relating to the commission of crime and the punishment thereof, insofar as not
inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes of this state, shall supplement all
penal statutes of this state .... " RCW 9A.04.060. The assault statute does not
define the term "cause." We therefore turn to "the common law relating to the
commission of crime and the punishment thereof' to supplement that provision.
I d.
Our court has ruled that "[b]efore criminal liability is imposed, the conduct
of the defendant must be both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the 'legal' or
'proximate' cause of the result." State v. Rivas, 126 Wn.2d 443, 453, 896 P.2d 57
6 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
(1995) (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 3 .12, at 3 92 (1986) ). 5
"'Cause in fact refers to the "but for" consequences of an act-the physical
connection between an act and an injury."' State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609,
624, 801 P.2d 193 (1990) (quoting Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 778, 698 P.2d
77 (1985)). "Legal causation, on the other hand,"
involves a determination of whether liability should attach as a matter of law given the existence of cause in fact. If the factual elements of the tort are proved, determination of legal liability will be dependent on "mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent."
Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 779 (quoting King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 239, 250,
525 P.2d 228 (1974) (citing 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY 100, 110 (1906))). 6
5 Washington recognizes two elements of causation: cause in fact (sometimes called "actual" or "but for" cause); and legal cause (sometimes called "proximate" cause). Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 777-79, 698 P.2d 77 (1985) (citing Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wn.2d 460, 475, 656 P.2d 483 (1983)). In Washington, unlike other jurisdictions, we call both of these elements together "proximate cause." Id. at 777. Note, however, that in Rivas, we used the phrase "legal cause" to mean the same thing as "proximate cause." Rivas, 126 Wn.2d at 453. In context, we did not mean "cause in fact," but the other type of causation. To be clear, this opinion will refer to the two different types of causation as "legal cause" and "cause in fact" unless otherwise noted. 6 Note that this case discusses legal causation in the civil, not criminal, context. 7 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
This court, in agreement with commentators and other jurisdictions, has
observed that "as to cause in fact, tort and criminal situations are exactly alike."
Dennison, 115 Wn.2d at 624 n.15 (citing LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at 397 n.31).
Legal causation, however, is different. Commentators and courts recognize
that criminal law and tort law serve different purposes and therefore have different
principles of legal causation. "[W]ith crimes, where the consequences of a
determination of guilt are more drastic ... it is arguable that a closer relationship
between the result achieved and that intended or hazarded should be required." 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§ 6.4(c), at 472 (2d ed. 2003).
"The wider doctrines of causation currently applied in tort law should not be
extended to criminal law . . . . [I]n criminal law, ... it is not normally enough
merely to prove that [the] accused occasioned the harm; he must have 'caused' it in
the strict sense." H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 350-51
(2d ed. 1985); see also JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
254-55 (2d ed. 1960) (noting that causation in tort may be much broader than
causation in criminallaw). 7
7 Some scholars hold contrasting views. See, e.g., HALL, supra, at 294-95 (describing Justice Holmes's view that identical policies underlie both tort and criminal law).
8 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
Most states that have addressed the question agree that legal causation is
defined more narrowly in criminal law than it is in tort law. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained, in the context of felony murder:
A closer causal connection between the felony and the killing than the proximate-cause[8] theory normally applicable to tort cases should be required because of the extreme penalty attaching to a conviction for felony murder and the difference between the underlying rationales of criminal and tort law. The former is intended to impose punishment in appropriate cases while the latter is primarily concerned with who shall bear the burden of a loss.
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 232, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
Cases from multiple jurisdictions, both state and federal, support this principle.
E.g., United States v. Schmidt, 626 F.2d 616, 618 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e
believe that proof of some more direct causal connection between act and result
should be required in criminal cases than would be sufficient to uphold liability in
tort."); Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 450-51, 444 A.2d 1034 (1982) ("[T]he tort
liability concept of proximate cause is generally too broad and comprehensive to
be appropriate in a criminal proceeding .... "); People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407,
413, 321 N.E.2d 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974) ("We subscribe to the requirement
that the defendants' actions must be a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death
before there can be any imposition of criminal liability, and recognize, of course,
8 Note that most jurisdictions use the term "proximate cause" to mean something similar to what we call "legal cause"; whereas in Washington, "proximate cause" means both "cause in fact" and "legal cause" together. 9 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
that this standard is greater than that required to serve as a basis for tort liability.");
People v. Scott, 29 Mich. App. 549, 558, 185 N.W.2d 576 (1971) ("In criminal
prosecutions there must be a more direct causal connection between the criminal
conduct of the defendant and the homicide charged than is required by the tort
liability concept of proximate cause.").
This court has never explicitly addressed whether "legal cause" is the same
in both tort and criminal law. But a comparison of Washington criminal and tort
cases shows that liability tends to extend further in tort cases. For example, in
Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., we held that, as a matter of policy, a vendor
who sells alcohol to a minor may be the legal cause of injuries to a second minor
who obtained the alcohol purchased by the first minor. 134 Wn.2d 468, 480, 951
P.2d 749 (1998). In Bronk v. Davenny, we held that liability could extend to a
defendant who left a tractor operational and unguarded on his property, which was
stolen by children who used it to cause damage to the plaintiffs property. 25
Wn.2d 443, 171 P.2d 237 (1946). And in Parrilla v. King County, a county bus
driver left his bus with the engine running while there was a single passenger on
board who was behaving in an obviously erratic manner. 138 Wn. App. 427, 430-
31, 157 P.3d 879 (2007). The passenger then got in the driver's seat and crashed
the bus, causing injuries. !d. at 431. The Court of Appeals concluded that under
those circumstances the county was not shielded from liability. I d. at 441.
10 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
No appellate criminal case in Washington has found legal causation based
on negligent acts similar to those in the civil cases above that were incapable of
causing injury directly. This is apparent in the facts of the cases cited by the State
in support of its argument that it may charge Bauer with third degree assault. For
example, in State v. Leech, this court held that an arsonist "caused" the death of a
fire fighter who responded to the arson fire, despite the fact that the fire fighter
may have been negligent in his fire fighting. 114 Wn.2d 700, 705, 790 P.2d 160
( 1990). The arsonist, however, intentionally started the fire-clearly an intentional
criminal act capable of causing harm in and of itself. In State v. Perez-Cervantes,
we held that a person who stabs another may be liable for the other's death even if
drug abuse also contributed to the death. 141 Wn.2d 468, 6 P.3d 1160 (2000). In
contrast to this case, that defendant performed an intentional criminal act-
stabbing-which directly caused harm. And in State v. Christman, the Court of
Appeals applied causation principles to determine that a person who gives illicit
drugs to another may be liable for the other's death from overdose even if other
drugs from another source also contributed to the death. 160 Wn. App. 741, 249
P.3d 680 (2011). Once again, the initial act was not only intentional, but felonious,
and capable of causing harm in and of itself.
Bauer's act of gun ownership, in contrast, is not felonious or criminal. His
decision to keep loaded weapons around the house is not, in itself, a crime in this
11 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
state, either. The most analogous criminal case that we have found is from Iowa:
State v. Ayers, 478 N.W.2d 606 (Iowa 1991). In that case, Ayers was a firearm
vendor convicted of involuntary manslaughter for selling a gun to a minor. Id. at
607. The minor accidentally shot and killed his girl friend a few days later. I d.
The court held, "More is required than appears here to support a showing of
proximate cause in a manslaughter case. The missing ingredient is a more direct
connection between Ayers and the act which killed the young victim." Id. at 608.
Neither party has identified a Washington case upholding criminal liability
on facts like the ones on which the Bauer prosecution is based. This court has
found no Washington case upholding such liability, either, where the accused did
not actively participate in the immediate physical impetus of harm. Cf HART &
HONORE, supra, at 326 ("[W]here [the first actor's] conduct was not sufficient [to
bring about the harm] without the intervention of the second actor . . . most
decisions relieve the first actor of responsibility.").
In light of the scholarly literature, our case law, and case law from foreign
jurisdictions, we hold that "legal cause" in criminal cases differs from, and is
narrower than, "legal cause" in tort cases in Washington.
iii. Liability Does Not Attach to Bauer in This Case
As discussed above, there is no criminal case in Washington upholding
criminal liability based on a negligent act that has such intervening facts as in this
12 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
case between the original negligence and the final, specific, injurious result. More
tellingly, even in analogous civil cases, we have declined to extend liability so far.
For example, in Sailor v. Ohlde, this court addressed whether "the owner of
an automobile who leaves the key in the ignition switch [can be civilly] liable for
injury or damage caused by a stranger who enters upon private property and steals
the automobile." 71 Wn.2d 646, 647, 430 P.2d 591 (1967). We answered the
question no. !d.
In Pratt v. Thomas, we reached the same conclusion regarding an accident
involving a car stolen from a public parking lot. 80 Wn.2d 117, 118, 491 P .2d
1285 (1971). Characterizing the question as one of"proximate cause," we held:
Here it is plain the accident which caused plaintiff's injuries was not a part of the natural and continuous sequence of events which flowed from respondents' act in leaving their station wagon in the parking lot. It was the result of new and independent forces. Among the new forces were the stealing of the vehicle, the pursuit by the state patrol, the attempt by the thieves to run from the officers and, finally, the accident.
!d. at 119. We acknowledge that this summary could be characterized as
addressing cause in fact, legal cause, or both. 9 The court did not distinguish
9 For example, the language "natural and continuous sequence of events which flowed from the act" is similar to language often associated with legal, rather than factual, causation. E.g., 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 26, at 14 7-48 (15th ed. 1993 ). But the language regarding "new and independent forces" is, under Washington case law, a part of the factual inquiry. See Lowman v. Wilbur, 178 Wn.2d 165, 172, 309 P.3d 387 (2013). 13 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
between the two, and we had not yet decided Hartley, which clarified the two
different kinds of causation. Still, this court found that "proximate cause" was
lacking. Id.
Likewise, in Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc., we held that causation
was lacking where a car rental company left a car unlocked in its parking lot with
keys in the ignition, the car was stolen, and the thief caused injuries in an accident
the following day. 143 Wn.2d 190, 15 P.3d 1283 (2001). We stated that "[a]t a
minimum, the remoteness in time between the criminal act and the injury is
dispositive to the question of legal cause in this case." I d. at 205. We explained
that "[ e]ven if it were negligent for Budget to leave the keys inside of its minivan,
'the responsibility for such negligence must terminate at some time in the future ...
."' I d. (quoting Gmerek v. Rachlin, 390 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980)). We therefore concluded that legal cause was lacking because "Young
went home, went to sleep, and became intoxicated before criminally causing the
accident injuring plaintiff the day after the theft." I d. In addition, we noted that
where other jurisdictions had found liability, "most have not involved the type of
attenuated facts present here." Id.
Finally, the Washington tort case most closely analogous to the one at hand,
McGrane v. Cline, also supports our holding that Bauer is not liable for third
degree assault in this case. 94 Wn. App. 925, 973 P.2d 1092 (1999). In McGrane,
14 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
a teenage daughter took the parents' firearm from their home, gave it to a friend,
the friend used it to commit a robbery, and he fatally shot a third person during that
crime. Id. at 926-27. The Court of Appeals ruled that the parents were not civilly
liable for that result. Id. at 928-29. Although that case was decided on grounds of
duty, there is a well-recognized "interrelationship between questions of duty and
legal cause." Lowman v. Wilbur, 178 Wn.2d 165, 169, 309 P.3d 387 (2013).
Just as in McGrane, the firearm here was taken, without the owner's
permission or knowledge, by a minor child and later used to cause serious harm.
Similar to Kim, two days passed between TC taking the gun from Bauer on
Monday afternoon and the shooting at school on Wednesday afternoon. McGrane,
Kim, and its companion cases Sailor and Pratt are civil cases, not criminal cases.
No criminal case in Washington has found liability on such attenuated facts as
those in this case. Because legal causation in civil cases is broader and more
flexible than it is in criminal cases, these civil cases compel the conclusion that
legal causation is not satisfied as to Bauer in this case.
B. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF A THIRD PARTY
Bauer asserts that where injury is caused by a third party, the State may
charge a person other than that third party with a crime only under the complicity
statute and that the complicity statute does not reach Bauer's conduct. See RCW
9A.08.020 ("Liability for conduct of another-Complicity" (boldface omitted)).
15 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
The State responds that it is not charging Bauer for another's conduct, it is
charging him with his own conduct-leaving loaded guns around with children
present. The Court of Appeals found that the State could rely on both principal
and complicity liability. Bauer, 174 Wn. App. at 76-77.
We need not decide whether the State can ever charge a person, as a
principal, for harm that is the immediate result of a third party's actions. As
discussed supra Part A.iii, immediately above, the State cannot do so on the facts
of this case.
As to the second point-whether complicity liability is available in this
case-the Court of Appeals is mistaken. Under the undisputed facts of this case,
the State cannot rely on the complicity statute. 10
The complicity statute establishes vicarious criminal liability in three
situations: accomplice liability (RCW 9A.08.020(2)(c)); when a criminal statute
itself expressly provides for vicarious liability (RCW 9A.08.020(2)(b )); and by
"caus[ing]" an innocent person to do the illegal act (RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a)). The
Court of Appeals first noted, correctly, that the State could not rely on accomplice
liability under the subsection (2)( c) prong. For accomplice liability to attach, the
10 The State has represented to this court in its supplemental briefing that "the State is not arguing that Bauer should be held responsible for the actions of another pursuant to RCW 9A.08.0[2]0." Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 19. But it does not need to charge accomplice liability to seek an accomplice liability instruction, and the Court of Appeals addressed the availability of such an instruction. Bauer, 174 Wn. App. at 77. 16 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
defendant must have knowledge that his actions will "'promote or facilitate"' the
commission of "'the"' particular crime at issue. State v. Stein, 144 Wn.2d 236,
245, 27 P.3d 184 (2001) (quoting RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)). Because there is no
evidence of such knowledge in this case, the Court of Appeals held, the State could
not seek to convict Bauer as an accomplice. We agree.
The Court of Appeals did not separately discuss vicarious liability under
prong (2)(b ). That was appropriate. Prong (2)(b) seems to refer the reader back to
the language of the statute defining the substantive crime, which, in this case, we
have already analyzed, above.
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the State could seek to
convict Bauer under the "innocent or irresponsible person" prong of the complicity
statute, that is, RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a). Bauer, 174 Wn. App. at 77. Under that
prong, a person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another
when, "[a]cting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
the crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct." RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a) (emphasis added). Prong (2)(a) does not require
intent, only "culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the crime." Id.
Since a third degree assault charge requires only a culpability of criminal
17 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
negligence, 11 the Court of Appeals reasoned that Bauer could be liable for TC's
conduct if he caused that conduct:
Here, the State ... has produced evidence that would support a jury's determination that Bauer caused TC's conduct. While it is not clear that the State will seek to instruct the jury under this section in this case, the facts of the case at this stage do not preclude it from doing so.
Bauer, 174 Wn. App. at 77. It is not completely clear to what evidence of
causation the Court of Appeals is referring to, but it appears to mean the evidence
that Bauer left guns lying around. 12
The Court of Appeals's reasoning fails to take account of two things. First,
RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a) requires proof that the defendant acted with the same mens
rea as that required for "the crime." We have previously interpreted the words "the
crime" in other subsections of the complicity statute very narrowly. We have said
that "the crime" means intent to promote the crime that was actually charged, not
11 The trial court dismissed the State's charge of unlawful possession of a firearm, the State did not appeal that decision, and it is therefore not before us. We note, however, that "knowing possession" is an essential element of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm. State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357, 366, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000). Thus it seems likely that even if the charge had not been dismissed, the State would not have been able to show that Bauer was liable for TC's possession of a firearm under the complicity statute. 12 The Court of Appeals did not address whether TC was an "innocent or irresponsible" person; since the record is insufficient for us to make that determination, we do not address it either. Bauer notes, however, that TC did plead guilty to criminal reckless endangerment in a separate case, which has a mens rea of recklessness, not innocence. 18 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
just any crime. State v. Cronin, 142 Wn.2d 568, 579, 14 P.3d 752 (2000); State v.
Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 510-11, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). Using that same narrow
interpretation here, we find evidence of such mens rea was lacking. Bauer may
have been negligent about leaving loaded guns out in the presence of children. TC
may have been negligent about enabling a gun enclosed in a backpack to
discharge. Bauer's negligence was thus not the same as the culpability required for
"the crime"; it might have been equally negligent, but not as to the same act, result,
and balancing of costs and benefits. Any negligence on Bauer's part thus does not
meet the definition of culpability for "the crime" required by RCW
9A.08.020(2)(a). Since any negligence on his part was not "culpability . . .
sufficient for the commission of the crime," id., Bauer cannot be liable under prong
(2)(a).
Second, there is a difference between "caus[ing]" a particular result and
"caus[ing]" another actor to engage in conduct-and the latter is what RCW
9A.08.020(2)(a) requires. State v. Chester, a case much cited by Bauer, illustrates
this distinction. 133 Wn.2d 15, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). There, we analyzed the
meaning of "cause" in a different statute, RCW 9.68A.040(1 )(b), that criminalizes
"caus[ing] a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct." We held that to
"cause" a child to engage in sexually explicit behavior "requires some affirmative
act of assistance, interaction, influence or communication on the part of a
19 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
defendant which initiates and results in a child's display of sexually explicit
conduct." Chester, 133 Wn.2d at 22. The legislature probably intended "cause" to
mean the same thing in the statute at issue here, RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a), that
criminalizes "caus[ing] an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in [illegal]
conduct." But there is no evidence of any such interaction here that would permit
a finding that Bauer "caused" TC to take a gun to school. See id.; HART &
HONORE, supra, at 363-64, 368 (discussing the significant difference between
causing a result and causing another actor to engage in behavior); see also id. at
367 ('"causing' a person to act refers to a species of the genus 'inducing' or
'instigating'").
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Bauer could be
liable under RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a).
CONCLUSION
The legislature defined the crime of third degree assault to reach a person
who "[w]ith criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to another person by means
of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm." RCW
9A.36.031(1)(d). Bauer asserts that the State has failed to make a prima facie case
that his conduct of leaving guns around his house loaded and accessible to invited
children "caused" the bodily harm here. We agree. Although causation in fact is
the same in criminal and civil cases, legal causation is not. Our case law suggests
20 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
that legal causation does not extend as far in criminal cases as it does in tort cases,
and even our civil cases do not extend liability as far as the State seeks to do in this
case. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
21 State v. Bauer (Douglas L.), No. 88559-1
WE CONCUR:
22 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
No. 88559-1
GONZALEZ, J. (dissenting)-Douglas Bauer kept multiple loaded guns
unsecured throughout his house. These weapons were easily accessible to his girl
friend's minor children, including TC, a nine-year-old boy who frequently visited and
sometimes stayed the night. Unsupervised, TC put one of Bauer's handguns into his
backpack. Two days later, that gun, still in TC's backpack, discharged in a classroom,
seriously injuring one of TC' s classmates. Bauer did not notice his handgun was
missing until after the shooting. The majority believes that because nine-year-old TC
did not have permission to take the weapon and because two days elapsed between the
taking and the subsequent shooting, Bauer's carelessness could not, as a matter of law,
be the cause of the victim's serious injury. See majority at 15, 20. I disagree. The
delay in Bauer noticing that his gun was missing is itself evidence of his negligence.
Though a jury may well find Bauer's actions to be too attenuated from the victim's
injury to impose criminal liability as a matter of fact, whether criminal liability can
attach as a matter of law is a policy question for the legislature. The legislature has
1 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
made this policy judgment in RCW 9A.36.03l(l)(d). It is neither unreasonable nor
unwise to allow a jury to decide if it was the firearm owner's criminal negligence that
caused the handgun to be brought to school, to be accidentally discharged, and to
seriously injure the young victim. Since the majority believes otherwise, I
respectfully dissent.
The issue before us is a novel one. As the majority notes, no Washington
appellate court has weighed in on the lawful extent of legal cause in the context of the
third degree assault statute. Id. at 10-12. But that "[t]his court has found no
Washington case upholding . . . liability . . . where the accused did not actively
participate in the immediate physical impetus of harm" is not a compelling argument
against whether the legislature intended to criminalize this sort of carelessness. Id. at
12. It is well settled that legal causation "rests on policy considerations as to how far
the consequences of defendant's acts should extend. It involves a determination of
whether liability should attach as a matter oflaw given the existence of cause in fact."
Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 779, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). In the context of criminal
law, that question is for the legislature, and it has answered it.
Given scientific research on the topic, it is clear the legislative purpose of RCW
9A.36.031(1)(d) would be best served by letting a jury decide whether a firearm
owner is liable for an unintended shooting that is the result of a young child picking
up a carelessly stored handgun. In one study, scientists monitored numerous small
groups of 8- to 12-year-old boys in a room that had two water pistols concealed in one
2 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
drawer and an actual handgun concealed in another. Geoffrey A. Jackman et al.,
Seeing Is Believing: What Do Boys Do When They Find a Real Gun?, 107
PEDIATRICS 1247, 1247-48 (2001).1 The researchers limited the study to boys in this
age range because they are "a high-risk group for unintentional fire-arm injury." !d. at
1248. The scientists found that 75 percent of the boys found the handgun within 15
minutes, 63 percent of these boys handled it, and 33 percent of them actually pulled
the trigger enough to discharge the weapon. !d. Overall, the "results suggest that 8-
to 12-year-old boys cannot be trusted to refrain from handling a handgun if they
encounter one outside the immediate supervision of an adult." !d. at 1250.
A different study, which measured the association of household firearm storage
practices and the risk of unintentional and self-inflicted injuries associated with child
or adolescent access to firearms in the home, also supports the conclusion that we
should not preclude liability on legal causation grounds. See David C. Grossman et
al., Gun Storage Practices and Risk of Youth Suicide and Unintentional Firearm
Injuries, 293 JAMA 707,708-10 (2005). 2 There, researchers found that "storing
household guns as locked, unloaded, or separate from the ammunition [was]
associated with significant reductions in the risk of unintentional and self-inflicted
firearm injuries and deaths among adolescents and children." !d. at 714. In other
words, and not surprisingly, this survey revealed that guns that were kept loaded,
1 Available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/1 07 /6/1247.full.pdf (subscription required). 2 Available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/JAMA/4963/JOC32162.pdf.
3 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
unsecured, and accessible to children were involved in accidents far more frequently
than those that were not. Id.
Given both science and common sense, I find the legislature's inclusion of
criminal negligence as a proper basis for an assault charge as permitting a jury to
determine a handgun owner's liability in situations such as this. The jury would be
able to consider all of the relevant circumstances, including the age and maturity of
the child, the child's familiarity with fireanns, and the precautions the.firearm owner
took or did not take to determine if the firearm owner's conduct amounts to criminal
negligence. What the majority believes to be the intervening actions and attenuating
circumstances in this case are the natural and foreseeable consequences of the very
danger that Bauer's careless actions created.
TC' s picking up the handgun and Bauer's failure to notice are not intervening
causes in the ultimate injury. Like the majority, I do not believe "Bauer's act of gun
ownership" or "[h]is decision to keep loaded weapons around the house" is in itself
criminal. See majority at 11-12. But it need not be. Third degree assault predicated
on criminal negligence does not require an underlying illegal act or an intentional act
but merely criminal negligence that results in bodily harm. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d).
By its plain language, the purpose of the statute is to impose liability when injury is
caused by criminal negligence, not criminal intent or felonious action. Id. A
defendant can face liability for criminal negligence "when he or she fails to be aware
of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of
4 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in the same situation." RCW 9A.08.010(1)(d).
TC's actions are not distinct from Bauer's carelessness for legal causation purposes.
When Bauer's gun ownership and method of storage is combined with the known
presence of an unsupervised nine-year-old boy, especially when coupled with a failure
to notice the unsecured weapon was missing, a jury, not a judge, should decide if this
created a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur.
Finding that TC's taking the gun without Bauer's permission was an
intervening action, as the majority does, tacitly shifts the ultimate responsibility for
the victim's injury to a nine-year-old child. Not only do I find this troubling in light
of behavioral science, but also I agree with the legislature that "[c]hildren of eight and
under twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime." RCW
9A.04.050. Though this presumption may be removed, see id., and I do not seek to
address the appropriateness of the liability imposed on TC, it is unsettling that TC, as
a matter of law, will face more criminal culpability in this situation than Bauer.
At its core, this case comes down to considerations of sound policy. Bauer kept
a loaded, unsecured handgun in a room that an unsupervised nine-year-old boy could
access freely. Bauer also did not notice that this loaded weapon had been taken for
two days as TC toted it in his backpack to and from school. Given that both science
and common sense strongly suggest that Bauer was in the best position to prevent the
injury to TC's classmate and that his conduct was its primary cause, I would not
5 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
preclude Bauer's liability on legal causation grounds and would allow a jury to
resolve the matter.
With these observations, I respectfully dissent.
6 State v. Bauer (Douglas), No. 88559-1 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting)
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