Opinion of the Court by
RAMIL, J.
Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i appeals from the July 26, 2000 judgment of the district court of the second circuit, the Honorable John T. Vail presiding, convicting Hyde-lene Batson of and sentencing her for the offense of assault against a police officer, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712.5. On appeal, the prosecution argues that the district court erred by suspending twenty-five days of the minimum thirty-day jail sentence mandated by HRS § 707-712.5.
For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence.
I.BACKGROUND
On November 24, 1999, Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i filed a complaint against Defendant-appellee Hydelene Batson for one count of assault against a police officer in violation of HRS § 707-712.5. On July 26, 2000, following a jury-waived trial, the district court found Batson guilty as charged. The court sentenced Batson to a thirty-day jail sentence, as required by HRS § 707-712.5, but suspended twenty-five days of the sentence. The court also placed Batson on probation
and ordered her to perform fifty hours of community service within ninety days.
The prosecution timely filed a notice of appeal on August 14, 2000.
II.STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he interpretation of a statute ... is a question of law reviewable
de novo.” State v. Kaufman,
92 Hawai'i 322, 326, 991 P.2d 832, 836 (2000) (citations omitted, brackets in original).
III.DISCUSSION
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by suspending a portion of Batson’s thirty-day sentence,
pursuant to HRS § 707-712.5.
The prosecution argues that the language of HRS § 707-712.5 is plain, unambiguous, and conclusive, that the legislature intended this specifically prescribed sentence to be served. The prosecution therefore asserts that the trial court did not have the discretion to suspend any portion of the minimum thirty-day sentence, and thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court is an illegal sentence. Batson, on the other hand, argues that the language of HRS § 707-712.5 does not limit the trial court’s discretion to suspend the minimum sentence.
It has long been held that:
When construing a statute, the starting point is the language of the statute itself.
Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu,
76 Hawai'i 46, 63, 868 P.2d 1193, 1210,
reconsideration denied,
76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994). The court’s “foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,”
Crosby v. State Dept. of Budget and Finance,
76 Hawai'i 332, 340, 876 P.2d 1300, 1308 (1994),
cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1081, 115 S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), which we discern primarily from the language of the statute itself, although we may consider other sources.
Shimabuku [v. Montgomery Elevator Co.],
79 Hawai'i [352,] at 357, 903 P.2d [48,] at 52. “[W]e must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.”
Mathewson v. Aloha Airlines, Inc.,
82 Hawai'i 57, 71, 919 P.2d 969, 983 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Vallesteros,
84 Hawai'i 295, 300, 933 P.2d 632, 637 (1997) (bracketed material added).
This court has adopted a three-step approach when interpreting statutes that appear to relate to the same subject matter:
First, legislative enactments are presumptively valid and “should be interpreted [in such a manner as] to give them effect.”
State v. Spencer,
68 Haw. 622, 624, 725 P.2d 799, 800 (1986) (citation omitted). Second, “[l]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16 (1985);
Kam v. Noh,
70 Haw. 321, 325, 770 P.2d 414, 417 (1989). Third, “where there is a ‘plainly irreconcilable’ conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific will be favored. However, where the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if possible, as repeal by implication is disfavored.”
Mahiai v. Suwa,
69 Haw. 349, 356-57, 742 P.2d 359, 366 (1987) (citations omitted).
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu,
76 Hawai'i 46, 54-55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1201-02,
reconsideration denied,
76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994),
judgment aff'd
124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.1997) (brackets in original).
A.
Plain Meaning
The offense of assault against a police officer, pursuant to HRS § 707-712.5, provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault against a police officer if the person:
(a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to a police officer who is engaged in the performance of duty; or
(b) Negligently causes, with a dangerous instrument, bodily injury to a police officer who is engaged in the performance of duty.
(2)
Assault of a police office is a misdemeanor. The court shall, at a minimum, sentence the person who has been
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Opinion of the Court by
RAMIL, J.
Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i appeals from the July 26, 2000 judgment of the district court of the second circuit, the Honorable John T. Vail presiding, convicting Hyde-lene Batson of and sentencing her for the offense of assault against a police officer, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712.5. On appeal, the prosecution argues that the district court erred by suspending twenty-five days of the minimum thirty-day jail sentence mandated by HRS § 707-712.5.
For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence.
I.BACKGROUND
On November 24, 1999, Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i filed a complaint against Defendant-appellee Hydelene Batson for one count of assault against a police officer in violation of HRS § 707-712.5. On July 26, 2000, following a jury-waived trial, the district court found Batson guilty as charged. The court sentenced Batson to a thirty-day jail sentence, as required by HRS § 707-712.5, but suspended twenty-five days of the sentence. The court also placed Batson on probation
and ordered her to perform fifty hours of community service within ninety days.
The prosecution timely filed a notice of appeal on August 14, 2000.
II.STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he interpretation of a statute ... is a question of law reviewable
de novo.” State v. Kaufman,
92 Hawai'i 322, 326, 991 P.2d 832, 836 (2000) (citations omitted, brackets in original).
III.DISCUSSION
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by suspending a portion of Batson’s thirty-day sentence,
pursuant to HRS § 707-712.5.
The prosecution argues that the language of HRS § 707-712.5 is plain, unambiguous, and conclusive, that the legislature intended this specifically prescribed sentence to be served. The prosecution therefore asserts that the trial court did not have the discretion to suspend any portion of the minimum thirty-day sentence, and thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court is an illegal sentence. Batson, on the other hand, argues that the language of HRS § 707-712.5 does not limit the trial court’s discretion to suspend the minimum sentence.
It has long been held that:
When construing a statute, the starting point is the language of the statute itself.
Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu,
76 Hawai'i 46, 63, 868 P.2d 1193, 1210,
reconsideration denied,
76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994). The court’s “foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,”
Crosby v. State Dept. of Budget and Finance,
76 Hawai'i 332, 340, 876 P.2d 1300, 1308 (1994),
cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1081, 115 S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), which we discern primarily from the language of the statute itself, although we may consider other sources.
Shimabuku [v. Montgomery Elevator Co.],
79 Hawai'i [352,] at 357, 903 P.2d [48,] at 52. “[W]e must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.”
Mathewson v. Aloha Airlines, Inc.,
82 Hawai'i 57, 71, 919 P.2d 969, 983 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Vallesteros,
84 Hawai'i 295, 300, 933 P.2d 632, 637 (1997) (bracketed material added).
This court has adopted a three-step approach when interpreting statutes that appear to relate to the same subject matter:
First, legislative enactments are presumptively valid and “should be interpreted [in such a manner as] to give them effect.”
State v. Spencer,
68 Haw. 622, 624, 725 P.2d 799, 800 (1986) (citation omitted). Second, “[l]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16 (1985);
Kam v. Noh,
70 Haw. 321, 325, 770 P.2d 414, 417 (1989). Third, “where there is a ‘plainly irreconcilable’ conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific will be favored. However, where the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if possible, as repeal by implication is disfavored.”
Mahiai v. Suwa,
69 Haw. 349, 356-57, 742 P.2d 359, 366 (1987) (citations omitted).
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu,
76 Hawai'i 46, 54-55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1201-02,
reconsideration denied,
76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994),
judgment aff'd
124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.1997) (brackets in original).
A.
Plain Meaning
The offense of assault against a police officer, pursuant to HRS § 707-712.5, provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault against a police officer if the person:
(a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to a police officer who is engaged in the performance of duty; or
(b) Negligently causes, with a dangerous instrument, bodily injury to a police officer who is engaged in the performance of duty.
(2)
Assault of a police office is a misdemeanor. The court shall, at a minimum, sentence the person who has been
convicted of this offense to imprisonment for no less than thirty days.
(Emphasis added.)
Because a conviction under HRS § 707-712.5 is a misdemeanor, it is subject to HRS § 706-605. HRS § 706-605 sets forth the “Authorized dispositions of convicted defendants,” and provides in relevant part, “In addition to any disposition authorized in subsection (1) of this section, the court may sentence a person convicted of a misdemean- or or petty misdemeanor to a
suspended sentence.”
HRS § 706-605(3) (1993 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
A “sentence” is defined as, “The judgement formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the defendant after his conviction to be inflicted, usually in the form of a fine, incarceration, or probation.... ” Black’s Law Dictionary 1362 (6th ed.1990).
Here, the statute does not specifically state that the convicted “shall serve” the minimum sentence, nor does the statute explicitly limit the court’s ability to suspend a sentence. The language of the statute simply states that the court shall “sentence” the convicted to no less than thirty days imprisonment. Thus, under a plain meaning analysis, the sentencing court may sentence Batson to a suspended sentence.
Moreover, HRS § 707-712.5, when read in concert with relevant sentencing statutes found in chapter 706 of the HRS, allows a court to sentence a defendant convicted of assaulting a police officer either to a “definite” prison term, so long as it is at least thirty days,
see
HRS § 706-663 (1993),
or to probation, subject to up to six months as a special condition, so long as it is at least thirty days,
see
HRS § 706-624(2)(a). In this case, Batson’s jail term was a lawful condition of probation, and such a probation sentence is not inconsistent with HRS § 707-712.5.
B.
Latos in Pari Materia
Despite this clarity, even if we assume that HRS § 707-712.5 is ambiguoús, a review of the laws
in pari materia,
i.e., on the same subject matter, does not alter the plain meaning interpretation of this statute. Inasmuch as HRS §§ 707-712.5 and 706-605 each pertain to the sentencing authority of the sentencing court on misdemeanor offenses, we review those statutes as laws
in part materia.
We note that when the legislature has intended to carve out an exception to HRS § 706-605, it has been
express
when doing so. For example, HRS § 709-906 (1993 & Supp.2001)
provides that a defendant con
victed of a first offense “shall serve” a minimum sentence of forty-eight hours. Also under this statute, a repeat offender “shall serve” a minimum jail sentence of thirty days.
See id.
Clearly the legislature intended that persons convicted under HRS § 709-906 actually serve their terms of imprisonment.
The legislature has also expressly carved out exceptions in other sentencing statutes.
See
HRS § 291E-61(b) (Supp.2001) (“A person committing the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant shall be sentenced as follows
without possibility of probation or suspension of sentence
....’’'(Emphasis added.)); HRS §712-1200(4) (1993 & Supp.2001)
(an individual convicted of a second offense of prostitution will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty days,
“vnthout possibility of suspension of sentence or probation.”
(Emphasis added.)); HRS § 712-1241 (Supp.2001) (“the person convicted shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of twenty years with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, the length of which shall not be less than one year and not greater than ten year's.... The person convicted
sha,ll not be eligible for parole during the mandatory term of imprisonment.”
(Emphasis added.)).
In Batson’s case, HRS § 707-712.5 directs the court to sentence the convicted defendant to a minimum of thirty days of imprisonment. HRS § 707-712.5 does not expressly prohibit the sentencing court the discretion to suspend a sentence. Thus, the above-mentioned laws
in pari materia
support the plain meaning of HRS § 706-605 that the sentencing court maintained the discretion to suspend Batson’s sentence.
C.
Legislative History
The prosecution argues that the legislative history of HRS § 707-712.5, found in Stand. Comm. 'Rep. No. 1203-90, in 1990 House Journal at 1315-16,
shows that the legisla
ture intended the thirty-day imprisonment to be served. The prosecution argues:
Although the Committee on Judiciary amended the original bill to reclassify Assault Against a Police Officer from a class C felony to a misdemeanor, the committee compensated this action by attaching to the offense a minimum penalty of imprisonment for thirty days. Suspending any portion of this sentence as the lower court did in the present case, dilutes the force the legislature intended for this law to have.
Id.
The legislative history does indicate an initial intent to place assaults against police officers in the same category as assaults against correctional workers and educational workers (constituting second degree assault under HRS § 707-711). However, the legislative history also acknowledged the classification of an assault against a police officer as a
misdemeanor
instead of a felony. The legislature explained, “Your Committee finds that a separate category of assault against police officers should be created[;]
however, the offense should be categorized as a misdemeanor,
with a minimum sentence of imprisonment for thirty days. Your Committee has amended this bill accordingly.” Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1203-90, in 1990 House Journal at 1316 (emphasis added). Here, the legislature recognized the difference between the proposed bill and the final form of the ámended bill. Nonetheless, when faced with the statute’s wording and the application of HRS § 706-605, the legislature failed to expressly limit the power of a sentencing court to suspend part of the minimum sentence under HRS § 707-712.5. Thus, the legislative history does little to support the contention that the legislature
intended
to carve out an exception to HRS § 706-605 for HRS § 707-712.5.
Inasmuch as the plain language of HRS § 707-712.5 does not restrict the court’s ability to suspend part of the minimum sentence, and the laws
in pari materia
and legislative history do not contradict the plain language interpretation of HRS § 707-712.5, we conclude that courts are not prohibited from suspending part' of the minimum jail sentence under HRS § 707-712.5.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s July 26, 2000 judgment and sentence of Hydelene Batson for assault of a police officer, pursuant to HRS § 707-712.5.