[Cite as State v. Armstrong, 2025-Ohio-771.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1025 L-24-1026
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202002188 CR0202302508
v.
Adrian Armstrong DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: March 7, 2025
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
***** MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellant, Adrian Armstrong, appeals the
January 29, 2024 judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him
following his conviction of aggravated possession of drugs, having weapons while under
disability, and carrying a concealed weapon. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background and Facts
{¶ 2} Armstrong was indicted in two separate cases. In the first, trial court case
No. CR-20-2188 (“2020 case”), he was indicted on one count each of carrying concealed
weapons in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony, and aggravated
possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony.1
In the second, trial court case No. CR-2023-2508 (“2023 case”), he was indicted on one
count each of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3),
a third-degree felony, and carrying concealed weapons in violation of R.C.
2923.12(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony.
{¶ 3} All charges against Armstrong were tried to a jury. The state presented the
testimony of Toledo Police Department officer Matthew Sulick; detectives George
Stauch and Aaron Dudley; sergeants Gabe Greenwalt and Kenneth Krabil; and forensics
laboratory employees including Chadwyck Douglas and David Cogan. The following
evidence was adduced at trial.
A. 2020 case
{¶ 4} In July 2020, Stauch, a member of the TPD vice narcotics unit, was in a
parking lot on Sylvania Avenue in Toledo conducting undercover surveillance for an
unrelated narcotics complaint. While he was there, a red Elantra and a blue Impala drove
into the lot. The Elantra parked next to Stauch’s car, and the Impala parked “nose-to-
1 He was also indicted on one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs that was dismissed before trial.
2. nose” with the Elantra and was “just catty-corner from where [Stauch] was sitting, within
ten feet of where [Stauch] was sitting . . . .” His attention was drawn to the cars because
of the “quick succession that they entered the parking lot and it was also COVID so there
were no other cars in the parking lot at that time.” He saw one man in the Elantra and
two people in the front seats of the Impala, a man in the driver’s seat and a woman in the
passenger seat. Shortly after they arrived, the driver of the Impala left his car and walked
to the driver’s door of the Elantra. Stauch identified the driver of the Impala as
Armstrong. He could see directly into the Elantra, and while Armstrong was at the
Elantra’s window, the driver of the Elantra reached down toward his waistband and
pulled out a bag of what Stauch thought “appeared to be narcotics.” Stauch saw the bag
because the driver was “flipping it in his hand, holding both corners of the bag and
flipping it.” He also saw Armstrong lean into the window and drop a small bag. He said
this “appeared to be a hand-to-hand transaction.” After that, Armstrong walked back to
the Impala’s driver’s seat. A third car drove up, and a man got out, went to the Elantra,
and appeared to engage in a hand-to-hand transaction with the driver. Stauch “could
clearly see money in [the driver’s] hand after . . .” the driver of the third car walked away
from the Elantra.
{¶ 5} Stauch contacted the TPD SWAT unit to come to the scene. While he
waited for their arrival, he saw Armstrong get out of the Impala for a second time and get
into the passenger seat of the Elantra. Stauch saw the driver of the Elantra “appear to be
making a marijuana cigarette . . . .” Shortly after, the SWAT unit arrived and made
3. arrests. When Stauch patted down the driver of the Elantra, he found a bag of marijuana
“in his genital area.” Another officer, Greenwalt, found a loaded gun and a bag of pills in
the Impala. Greenwalt told Stauch that he found the pills “[i]n the door handle area, like
where you would grab the door, . . .” on the driver’s side of the car. Other officers also
found some mail addressed to Armstrong in the Impala’s glove compartment and
Armstrong’s state identification card in the car. Stauch never saw the Impala’s passenger
move to the driver’s side of the vehicle.
{¶ 6} On cross-examination, Stauch said that the bag Armstrong dropped into the
Impala was small, about the size of a grape. He was about seven feet away from the car.
He did not request the bag containing the pills be tested for fingerprints. About five
minutes elapsed from the time Armstrong got into the Elantra to the time that he was
arrested. The Impala’s passenger did not leave the car during that time. Stauch admitted
that he never saw Armstrong carrying a firearm or the pills found in the Impala.
{¶ 7} Greenwalt, a member of the TPD SWAT unit, testified that he was
dispatched to Sylvania Avenue to assist an undercover narcotics officer. As he was
moving toward the vehicles, he saw one person in the passenger seat of the Impala.
Greenwalt found the bag of pills “in the door handle . . . in the little slot as if like when
you were to pull your door shut that little pocket . . . .” He also found Armstrong’s state
identification card and some mail addressed to Armstrong in the car.
{¶ 8} On cross, Greenwalt admitted that he never saw Armstrong anywhere near
the pills found in the door handle.
4. {¶ 9} Douglas, a drug analyst in the TPD crime lab, tested the pills found in the
Impala. He found that they contained methamphetamine, pentylone, and caffeine.
B. 2023 case
{¶ 10} In September 2023, Dudley, a detective in the TPD gang task force unit,
and his partner, Krabil, were doing “proactive policing” on the east side of Toledo. That
day, an undercover officer saw Armstrong, “who was known to have felony warrants . . .
.”
{¶ 11} Dudley and Krabil drove to the area where Armstrong was located and saw
him on the front porch of a duplex on Nevada Street in Toledo. The officers parked in an
alley so they could “sneak up on [Armstrong] so he doesn’t run.” When the officers
rounded the corner and saw Armstrong on the porch, they ordered him to show his hands
and told him not to run. Despite that, Armstrong ran into the duplex. Dudley followed
him inside toward the upper apartment. There was a stack of bench seats from a car in
the hallway where Dudley found Armstrong.
{¶ 12} At first, Dudley testified that he saw Armstrong run to the end of the pile of
car seats and “slowly pick[] up his right hand . . . .” Dudley “all the sudden [] looked
right where his immediate area was and there was a firearm.” By the time Dudley had
drawn his gun, Armstrong “had his hands up and he basically gave up after that.” Soon
after, Dudley clarified what happened when he entered the duplex. He said that he saw
Armstrong reach for his waistband and when “he brought it up [Dudley] saw the gun . . .
.” When Armstrong “got towards the end of the [car] seats[,] you could see him drop
5. something and slowly raise his hands up and surrender.” Dudley also saw “some furtive
movements on [Armstrong’s] right hand” while he was near the end of the pile of car
seats. After officers took Armstrong into custody, they checked the area where
Armstrong had been standing and found the gun on one of the car seats. When officers
searched Armstrong after his arrest, they found “a holster on his person along with some
marijuana.”
{¶ 13} The state presented footage from Dudley’s body camera as an exhibit. In
the video, Dudley and Krabil approach the porch from the side of the house, and one of
them yells “show me your hands” and “don’t do it.” After that, Dudley jumps onto the
porch and runs toward the door. As soon as he enters the door of the duplex, Dudley
yells “gun” and “get on the ground now.” The lens of the camera is blocked at this point,
so the video does not show what Armstrong was doing when Dudley first saw him. A
few seconds later, the video shows Dudley handcuffing Armstrong and walking him out
the door.
{¶ 14} The state also presented the docket sheet from the 2020 case showing that
the trial court had entered a warrant for Armstrong on August 29, 2022, because he failed
to appear for a pretrial.
{¶ 15} On cross, Dudley said that he did not announce that he was with TPD when
he approached Armstrong on the porch. He only said, “show me your hands and don’t do
it . . . .” He chased Armstrong for two to three seconds. He went fully inside the duplex
and was four or five feet from Armstrong. He definitively testified that he saw
6. Armstrong with the gun after Armstrong ran into the duplex. However, in his
supplemental report regarding the incident, Dudley stated that “[w]hen we approached
originally before we ran, we did not see the firearm because it was covered.” He could
not give a reason why he did not state in the supplemental report that he saw a gun. He
further elaborated that Armstrong had pulled a gun from a holster. He could not think of
any reason why someone would wear a holster and not have a firearm and denied that it
was possible that “the potential scene or sight of a holster [could] maybe thwart someone
without actually carrying a firearm[.]”
{¶ 16} Dudley did not talk to the other man at the duplex—a potential witness—or
talk to any other officers about the man. He recalled seeing a vehicle beside the duplex,
but did not look inside it. Dudley submitted the gun for fingerprint and DNA testing but
had not gotten the results at the time of trial or followed up on the lab’s progress in
processing the evidence.
{¶ 17} On redirect, Dudley read from his supplemental report, in which he wrote
that Armstrong “was observed to have a holster in his pants and a firearm was observed .
. . . [Dudley] did not originally observe a firearm or holster on Armstrong while giving
commands. His shirt was covering the firearm and holster in his waistband.”
{¶ 18} Krabil, a sergeant with the TPD gang task force, testified that he and
Dudley went to the duplex on Nevada because the officer who originally saw Armstrong
there was in plainclothes and conducting surveillance, so he was “not in a capacity to
conduct a stop . . . .” He and Dudley parked in an alley and walked along the side of the
7. house. When they turned the corner, they saw Armstrong on the porch, and when they
“[s]aid Adrian come here, he turned and ran into the door . . . and [they] provided chase
in that entryway there.” Krabil was behind Dudley and heard Dudley yell “gun.” He
recalled that the gun was on the second or third lowest car seat in the pile in the hallway.
Krabil could not recall if he saw the holster before or after it was removed from
Armstrong’s waistband but he definitely remembered seeing it that day.
{¶ 19} The state presented a second video from a body camera during Krabil’s
testimony. The prosecutor did not ask Krabil if the footage was from his body camera, so
it is unclear if the footage came from his camera or Dudley’s camera. This video shows
Armstrong handcuffed on the porch and shows a gun holster clipped to the front of his
waistband. The officer wearing the camera refers to Armstrong having a gun on him.
{¶ 20} On cross, Krabil testified that he never saw Armstrong with a firearm. He
said that it was TPD policy for officers to turn on their body cameras when serving
warrants. Despite that, Krabil did not turn on his body camera until after Armstrong was
arrested. He explained that “after everything settled down, [he] probably went to turn it
off and turned it on and [he] probably just left it on.”
{¶ 21} Sulick, a TPD patrolman, responded to the duplex. Inside the door to the
upper apartment was a hallway; a pile of bench seats from a car and a suitcase were
stacked along the left wall. Sulick found a loaded gun sitting on one of the seats in the
pile.
8. {¶ 22} On cross-examination, Sulick testified that Armstrong had been detained
and handcuffed by other officers by the time he arrived at the duplex. He never saw
Armstrong carrying a gun. Another man was at the duplex that day doing some
renovations. Sulick spoke to him briefly but could not recall if he asked the man if the
gun on the car seat was his. He also could not recall which side of the duplex the man
was working on. The man was driving a work van that Sulick did not recall looking
inside. He admitted that the car seats in the hallway “[p]ossibly” could have come from
the work van. He did not look at the luggage tag on the suitcase to see who it belonged
to. He found the gun about five to ten yards from the door.
{¶ 23} Cogan, the administrator of the TPD forensic lab, tested the gun from the
duplex and found that it was operable.
{¶ 24} On cross, Cogan explained that the gun came with a work request asking
that it be tested for operability. He was unsure if anyone had asked for the gun to be
fingerprinted and tested for DNA but said that those tests were handled by a different unit
and would be done before he test fired the gun.
{¶ 25} After Cogan’s testimony, the state rested.
{¶ 26} Armstrong moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29, arguing that the state had
not proven that Armstrong was carrying the drugs or gun. He pointed out that the
testimony of the only officer who said he saw Armstrong with a gun was contradicted by
the police report. The state responded that, in the 2020 case, the drugs were in the “door
compartment” on the driver’s side, and Armstrong “occupied” the driver’s side of the car.
9. In the 2023 case, the officer saw Armstrong “dispose of the firearm,” and Armstrong had
a holster on him when he was arrested.
{¶ 27} The trial court denied Armstrong’s motion. It agreed with the state’s
assessment of the charges in the 2020 case, and because the state did not have to prove
actual possession, based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the state had
established all of the elements of the charges in the 2023 case.
C. Outcome
{¶ 28} The jury found Armstrong guilty of aggravated possession of drugs in the
2020 case, not guilty of carrying concealed weapons in the 2020 case, and guilty of both
counts in the 2023 case. The trial court sentenced him to prison terms of 11 months for
the aggravated possession charge, 12 months for the concealed weapons charge, and 18
months for the weapons under disability charge. The court ordered Armstrong to serve
his sentences concurrently for an aggregate prison term of 18 months.
{¶ 29} Armstrong now appeals, raising two assignments of error:
Assignment of Error One: The conviction for aggravated possession
of drugs was unsupported by sufficient evidence and was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
Assignment of Error Two: The conviction for having a weapon
under disability was unsupported by sufficient evidence and was against the
II. Law and Analysis
10. {¶ 30} In his assignments of error, Armstrong argues that his possession and
weapons under disability convictions are unsupported by sufficient evidence and are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Regarding the possession conviction, he
contends that the state failed to show that he had constructive possession of the
methamphetamine found in the door handle of the Impala because the only evidence
showing that Armstrong was aware of the drugs’ existence was the bag’s location in the
driver’s door, and the state failed to produce evidence that Armstrong owned the car or
was able to exercise dominion and control over it. Regarding the weapons under
disability conviction, he contends that the state failed to show that he had constructive
possession of the gun found in the duplex because Dudley’s testimony contradicted his
supplemental police report and police did not interview the witness who was at the
duplex when Armstrong was arrested.
{¶ 31} The state responds that it sufficiently showed that Armstrong constructively
possessed the drugs based on Armstrong’s behavior just before the police discovered the
drugs; the drugs’ location in the handle of the car door, which Armstrong used at least
twice while Stauch observed the Impala; and the facts that Armstrong was driving the car
and had mail addressed to him in the glove box. It also contends that it sufficiently
showed that Armstrong constructively possessed the gun found at the duplex based on the
location of the gun and Dudley’s testimony, which the jury was entitled to believe, being
consistent with his report. And it points out that the officers did not have a duty to
interview every potential witness or perform every possible test on evidence.
11. A. Armstrong’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶ 32} Armstrong argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
aggravated possession of drugs and having weapons under disability. We disagree.
{¶ 33} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113 (1997). We do not weigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Were, 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 132.
“Rather, we decide whether, if believed, the evidence can sustain the verdict as a matter
of law.” State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13. Naturally, this requires “a review
of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the state’s evidence.” Id.
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a question of law. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
{¶ 34} As relevant here, to convict Armstrong of aggravated possession of drugs,
the state was required to prove that Armstrong knowingly possessed a controlled
substance that was “a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance included in schedule
I or II, with the exception of marihuana, cocaine, L.S.D., heroin, any fentanyl-related
compound, hashish, and any controlled substance analog . . . .” R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1).
To convict Armstrong of having weapons under disability, the state was required to prove
that Armstrong knowingly had or carried a firearm while he was under indictment for a
felony offense involving the illegal possession of any drug of abuse. R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).
12. {¶ 35} A person acts “knowingly” when, regardless of his purpose, he is aware
that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. R.C. 2901.22(B). “Possession” means “having control over a thing or substance,
but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through
ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”
R.C. 2925.01(K). Methamphetamine is a schedule II drug and a drug of abuse. Ohio
Adm. Code 4729:9-1-02(C)(2); R.C. 3719.01(C); R.C. 3719.011(A). A gun is a firearm.
In re Marcus T.D., 2004-Ohio-477, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.), citing R.C. 2923.11; R.C. 2923.11(B);
Aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11 is a drug abuse offense.
R.C. 2925.01(G)(1).
{¶ 36} The State can prove the “had” element of a possession offense by showing
that the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of the object. State v.
Brooks, 2020-Ohio-6648, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). “Actual possession requires ownership or
physical control.” State v. Galindo, 1999 WL 461749, *3 (6th Dist. July 9, 1999), citing
State v. Messer, 107 Ohio App.3d 51, 56 (9th Dist. 1995). Constructive possession
means that a person “‘knowingly exercises dominion and control over an object, even
though that object may not be within his immediate physical possession.’” In re Israel
D., 1996 WL 339918, *4 (6th Dist. June 21, 1996), quoting State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio
St.2d 87 (1982).
{¶ 37} “Constructive possession of [contraband] may be inferred from ‘the
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the defendant’s actions.’” State v.
13. Washington, 2014-Ohio-1008, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Pilgrim, 2009-Ohio-5357,
¶ 28 (10th Dist.); State v. Teamer, 82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492 (1998). Something more than
close proximity is necessary to show constructive possession. R.C. 2925.01(K). But
“presence in the vicinity of contraband, coupled with another factor or factors probative
of dominion or control over the contraband, may establish constructive possession.”
State v. Brown, 2009-Ohio-5390, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.). Possession of the keys to an
automobile “‘is a strong indication of control over the automobile and all things found in
or upon the automobile.’” State v. Reed, 2018-Ohio-4451, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), quoting State
v. Buckley, 1986 WL 1748, *1 (7th Dist. Feb. 6, 1986). Additionally, “where contraband
is found in a vehicle driven by the defendant, the State need not prove that the defendant
owned the vehicle.” State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-4722, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 38} Here, Armstrong first argues that the state failed to show that he
constructively possessed the drugs found in the Impala because it showed only that the
drugs were in the door handle, not that Armstrong was conscious of their existence, and it
was equally reasonable to infer that the passenger put the drugs in the door without
Armstrong’s knowledge.
{¶ 39} When we construe the evidence in the state’s favor, we find that it is
sufficient to show that Armstrong constructively possessed the drugs in the door handle.
First, Armstrong was driving the Impala, which is sufficient to show that he exercised
dominion and control over the car and the area around the driver’s seat. Reed at ¶ 16-18.
Officers finding mail addressed to Armstrong and his state identification card in the
14. Impala is additional circumstantial evidence that Armstrong exercised dominion and
control over the car. The state was not required to prove that Armstrong owned the car to
show that he constructively possessed drugs in the car. Harris at ¶ 19.
{¶ 40} Next, Armstrong was driving the Impala and sitting where the drugs were
easily accessible. Constructive possession of drugs can be established when the drugs are
found in an area easily accessible to the driver. Brown at ¶ 20. In fact, Armstrong used
the interior door handle twice while Stauch was watching him, so it is reasonable to infer
that Armstrong was aware of the bag of drugs stored near the handle. Additionally,
Stauch saw Armstrong give what appeared to be drugs to the driver of the Elantra—from
which the jury could infer that Armstrong took drugs from the car to the Elantra. The
presence of these factors shows that the state proved something more than mere
proximity to the drugs. Compare State v. Devaughn, 2020-Ohio-651, ¶ 35-37 (1st Dist.)
(evidence was insufficient to support possession charge when officers saw defendant lean
into a car that contained drugs, but there was no testimony about him accessing center
console where drugs were stored, no evidence that he placed items in or removed items
from the car, and no evidence that he had ever driven the car or had keys to it).
{¶ 41} Finally, Armstrong’s argument that his passenger could have been
responsible for the drugs does not help his position because two or more people can have
constructive possession of the same object. Reed, 2018-Ohio-4451, at ¶ 20 (6th Dist.).
In other words, the fact that his passenger might also have had something to do with the
drugs does not preclude a finding that Armstrong constructively possessed them.
15. {¶ 42} Taken together, these facts sufficiently show that Armstrong constructively
possessed the drugs found in the Impala.
{¶ 43} Armstrong also argues that the state failed to show that he constructively
possessed the gun that officers found at the duplex. This argument ignores the fact that
the state presented evidence showing that Armstrong had actual possession of the gun.
Dudley testified that he saw Armstrong with a gun and saw him drop something,
Dudley’s body camera video showed him yelling “gun” as soon as he entered the duplex,
and the gun was found immediately next to the area where Dudley apprehended
Armstrong. This evidence of actual possession is sufficient to support Armstrong’s
weapons under disability conviction.
B. Armstrong’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 44} Armstrong also argues that his convictions are not supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence. Again, we disagree.
{¶ 45} When we review a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, we weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
the witnesses, and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary
conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed, and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. We do not view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth
juror’ and scrutinize ‘the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.’” State v.
Robinson, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387. Reversal on
16. manifest weight grounds is reserved for “‘the exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶ 46} Although we consider the credibility of witnesses under a manifest-weight
standard, we must, nonetheless, extend special deference to the jury’s credibility
determinations, given that it is the jury that has the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify,
observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice inflections, and
discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor. State v. Fell, 2012-
Ohio-616, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). The jury, as the finder of fact and the sole judge of the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or
none of a witness’s testimony. State v. Caudill, 2008-Ohio-1557, ¶ 62 (6th Dist.), citing
State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964).
{¶ 47} After carefully reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
and weighing the testimony, we are not convinced that this is an exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the convictions. Armstrong’s manifest-weight
argument regarding the possession conviction boils down to him disagreeing with the
jury’s decision to accept one inference about the drugs over another inference, i.e., the
jury chose to infer that Armstrong knew about the drugs in the door handle instead of
choosing to infer that his passenger put the drugs there. Based on the evidence, however,
this was a reasonable choice, and we cannot say that the jury lost its way in that regard.
17. {¶ 48} Armstrong’s manifest-weight argument regarding the weapons under
disability conviction focuses on Dudley’s credibility. He argues that Dudley’s
supplemental report “directly contradicts his trial testimony and Dudley had no
explanation for the discrepancy[,]” and combined with the fact that the other person at the
duplex was not interviewed, this shows that his weapons under disability conviction is
against the weight of the evidence.
{¶ 49} Dudley’s report did not “directly contradict[]” his testimony. In it, Dudley
wrote that Armstrong “was observed to have a holster in his pants and a firearm was
observed . . . . [Dudley] did not originally observe a firearm or holster on Armstrong
while giving commands. His shirt was covering the firearm and holster in his waistband.”
(Emphasis added.) Dudley testified that he saw Armstrong and gave him commands
while Armstrong was on the duplex’s porch, before he chased Armstrong into the duplex
and saw Armstrong with a gun that he dropped. This is entirely consistent with Dudley’s
statements in his report that “a firearm was observed” and he did not see a gun at first.
Dudley’s testimony is also supported by his body camera video, in which he yelled “gun”
when he got inside the duplex. Although the gun is not visible in the video, Dudley’s
reaction implies that he saw a gun in the hallway when he was there with Armstrong, and
it is reasonable to infer that the gun he saw was not hidden in the stack of car seats, where
it was not immediately visible in the hallway. On the whole, Dudley’s testimony was
credible, and the jury did lose its way by believing it.
18. {¶ 50} Given the evidence before it, the jury did not clearly lose its way by finding
Armstrong guilty. Accordingly, Armstrong’s convictions are not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶ 51} Armstrong’s assignments of error are not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, the January 29, 2024 judgments of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. Armstrong is ordered to pay the costs of
this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgments affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
19.