Supreme Court
No. 2023-368-C.A. (P1/21-3503AG) No. 2023-369-C.A. (P2/22-646ADV)
State :
v. :
Andrew Mangru. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
No. 2023-368-C.A. (P1/21-3503AG) No. 2023-369-C.A. (P2/22-646ADV)
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. In these consolidated appeals, the
defendant, Andrew Mangru, appeals from two judgments of conviction following a
jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree murder and other offenses. The
defendant raises one argument on appeal, asserting that the trial justice erred in
instructing the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if it found that the state
did not prove either first-degree or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgments of conviction of the
Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
We derive the following facts from the trial transcripts. In 2017, defendant
and Daniya Isom began dating. In 2019, defendant and Isom had a child together.
-1- The defendant and Isom’s relationship was “[o]n and off,” and the two would see
other people “[w]hen [they] were off * * *.” The defendant and Isom continued this
“[o]n and off” relationship through July 2021, when, according to Isom, they
permanently ended their relationship. Although the couple had separated, defendant
and Isom maintained contact via text messaging throughout August 2021. During
that same month, Isom became sexually intimate with Andrei Bonilla, the decedent
in the case at bar. At trial, Isom described her relationship with Bonilla as one of
“friends with benefits.”
On August 27, 2021, Isom spent time with her brother, her cousin, her
cousin’s girlfriend, and a friend. The group was gathered at the home of Isom’s
friend in Pawtucket, until about ten o’clock at night. At this time, the group left the
friend’s house in Pawtucket and moved to Isom’s house in Providence. Once at
Isom’s house, some of the group, including Isom, continued “[d]rinking, smoking
hookah, smoking weed, [and] listening to music[,]” as they had been doing since the
afternoon.
Andrei Bonilla arrived at Isom’s house around one o’clock in the morning on
August 28, 2021. After Bonilla arrived, Isom exited her house and got into Bonilla’s
car. Isom and Bonilla then “parked in the parking lot behind [Isom’s] house and
* * * had sex for a while.” After this, Isom and Bonilla sat in Bonilla’s car and
talked. While Isom was with Bonilla, defendant arrived at Isom’s house. The
-2- defendant was searching for Isom, questioning the individuals in Isom’s house as to
her whereabouts. The defendant then exited the house.
According to her testimony at trial, it was at this point that Isom saw defendant
on the street corner near her house. Isom then exited Bonilla’s car and questioned
defendant as to why he was there. In response, defendant asked Isom, “Who is that
in the car? Who the f*** is that in the car?” Following this exchange, Isom testified,
she informed defendant that her friend was in the car. Thereafter, Isom testified,
defendant slapped her, then banged on the car window, and fired gunshots through
the driver’s side window while Bonilla was still in the driver’s seat. At trial, Isom
testified that she heard about five shots fired and then saw Bonilla drive away. Isom
further testified that as Bonilla drove away, she observed defendant continue to fire
shots towards the car, until the firearm made “a clicking sound once there was [sic]
no more bullets.”
Eventually, defendant and Isom proceeded back inside Isom’s house, where,
according to Isom, defendant yelled at a guest and argued with Isom’s brother. At
trial, Isom testified that she stated to defendant that she would call the police “if
something bad happened to [Bonilla],” at which point defendant “r[an] out the door.”
Isom, and all of the other individuals at the gathering, then got in Isom’s car to search
for Bonilla. Shortly after turning onto Branch Avenue, Isom observed emergency
vehicles at the Cumberland Farms gas station and store. When she got closer, Isom
-3- observed that Bonilla’s car had crashed into the protective bollards in the parking lot
of Cumberland Farms. Isom then spoke with police officers on scene and gave them
a statement. Bonilla was deceased in his car.
On November 15, 2021, a grand jury indictment was filed, charging defendant
with: murder (count one); discharge of a firearm while in the commission of a crime
of violence, to wit, murder (count two); assault with a dangerous weapon (count
three); use of a firearm while in the commission of a crime of violence, to wit,
domestic assault with a dangerous weapon (count four); assault or battery, or both,
by strangulation (count five); assault (count six); and possession of a pistol without
a license (count seven).
Thereafter, a criminal information in a second case against defendant was filed
on March 21, 2022, charging defendant with: the corrupt, malicious, or reckless
endeavor to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice (count
eight); felony solicitation to commit obstruction of the judicial system (count nine);
and attempted violation of a no contact order (count ten).1 These charges arose from
defendant’s conduct while incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions,
1 For clarity, we refer to all of the charges against defendant as counts one through ten, as they were presented to the trial jury as such, in a consolidated case as discussed supra. In the Superior Court, there were two separate judgments of conviction entered under the two individual case numbers. The defendant appealed from both judgments of conviction, and this Court granted defendant’s motion to consolidate his appeals.
-4- awaiting trial for the charges on which he was indicted, as discussed supra. The two
cases were consolidated, pursuant to a motion by the state, over the objection of the
defendant, and all charges—ten in total—were tried in one trial.
A jury trial commenced in the Superior Court on November 30, 2022. After
the close of evidence, the trial justice instructed the jury according to her proposed
instructions. Prior to this, both the state and defendant, through counsel, had
objected to the trial justice’s proposed jury instructions. The state objected to the
inclusion of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and argued that there was no
evidence showing provocation that could have given rise to defendant losing self-
control, causing him to kill the decedent. This, according to the state, obviated the
need for any instruction on voluntary manslaughter. In response, defendant
countered that there need be only a scintilla of evidence of adequate provocation to
warrant such an instruction. The trial justice agreed and overruled the state’s
objection to the voluntary manslaughter instruction and included it in the final
instructions to be delivered to the jury.
The defendant also objected to the jury instructions as proposed by the trial
justice. Specifically, defendant objected “to language indicating that the jury should
only consider the charge of involuntary [sic] manslaughter if, in fact, they have found
that the [s]tate failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt elements of the crime of
either first-degree or second-degree [murder].” The defendant argued “that even if
-5- the jury finds that the elements of first- or second-degree [murder] have been
satisfied, they then can proceed * * * to determine whether or not there was adequate
provocation that would negate the malice aforethought or the malice element of
second- and first-degree murder.” In making this argument, defendant relied upon
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Additionally, defendant argued that even if the jury is satisfied that the state
has proven the elements of first-degree or second-degree murder,
“the jury should be instructed that they must then consider whether or not the [s]tate has negated any adequate provocation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, inasmuch as a similar manner, that when self-defense is presented in a case that would normally be a murder case or a finding of second-degree murder, when self-defense is presented, the [s]tate has the obligation to negate that by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The trial justice overruled this objection by defendant. The trial justice
reasoned:
“Rhode Island law is clear that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of a murder charge. It does not require first that the [s]tate demonstrate a murder charge and then disprove a lesser-included offense. I do not know of any case law in Rhode Island that analogizes a voluntar[y] manslaughter requested instruction with [] self-defense[.] * * * The [s]tate is required to prove each and every element of the charge of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, and that voluntary manslaughter comes about in this case only if the [s]tate first does not prove first-degree murder, then the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.”
-6- Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder on count
one, and guilty on counts two, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten. The jury found
defendant not guilty on counts three, four, and five. Accordingly, the trial justice
sentenced defendant to two consecutive life sentences for counts one and two, and
concurrent terms of one year for count six, ten years for count seven, five years for
count eight, five years for count nine, and one year for count ten. Judgments of
conviction entered to that effect on June 13, 2023. The defendant filed premature
but valid notices of appeal on May 22, 2023.
II
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews ‘jury instructions on a de novo basis.’” State v. Isom, 251
A.3d 1, 6 (R.I. 2021) (quoting State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148, 1166 (R.I. 2009)). “It is
well established that, on review, we examine jury instructions in their entirety to
ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have
understood them.” Id. (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166). “This Court will not
examine a single sentence apart from the rest of the instructions, but rather the
challenged portions must be examined in the context in which they were rendered.”
Id. (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166).
“Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-38, we determine whether the jury charge
sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable
-7- law.” Isom, 251 A.3d at 6 (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166). “In so doing, we examine
the record in a light most favorable to the defendant.” Id. (quoting State v. Soler, 140
A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016)). “An erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it
can be shown that the jury could have been misled to the resultant prejudice of the
complaining party.” Yangambi v. Providence School Board, 162 A.3d 1205, 1217
(R.I. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Long, 61 A.3d 439, 445 (R.I. 2013)).
III
Discussion
We begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent proceedings after both the
prosecution and defense had rested. First, the trial justice entertained and denied
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Then, she took up the issue of jury
instructions, indicating that she had previously provided both parties with a copy of
her proposed instructions. The state objected to the inclusion of an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter, arguing that “the evidence wholly fails to support such a
charge.” The state elaborated that defendant may have been angry but there was
simply no evidence of provocation such as would entitle him to a manslaughter
instruction.
The defendant disagreed. It should be noted, however, that heat-of-passion
manslaughter was not his theory of defense. Instead, defendant maintained that he
was not the shooter; he argued that he was the victim of a sloppy and incomplete
-8- police investigation. Nevertheless, he suggested that an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter was appropriate because there was more than a scintilla of evidence to
support a finding of adequate provocation.
Additionally, defendant objected to language indicating that the jury should
consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter only if it first found that the state
failed to prove either first- or second-degree murder. In support, he cited Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), for the proposition that “the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat
of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case.” Under this theory, defendant posited “that even if the jury finds that the
elements of first- or second-degree [murder] have been satisfied, they then can
proceed on to determine whether or not there was adequate provocation that would
negate the malice aforethought or the malice element of second- and first-degree
murder.” The defendant referred to his proposed instructions concerning
first-degree murder, which stated:2 “The state must also disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [defendant] did not act in the heat of passion under adequate
provocation.”
2 The defendant’s proposed instructions did not include an instruction on second-degree murder.
-9- To this point, defendant requested that the jury be advised that, even if it finds
that the elements of first- or second-degree murder had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, it also must consider “whether or not the State has negated any
provocation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt * * *.” The trial justice declined to
give defendant’s requested instructions, stating: “Rhode Island law is clear that
voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of a murder charge. It does not
require first that the State demonstrate a murder charge and then disprove a
lesser-included offense.”
On appeal, defendant submits that the trial justice erred in “giving an
instruction that did not allow the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter unless it
first found that the state had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either first- or
second-degree murder.” According to defendant, “[t]he jury was not permitted to
consider whether the specific intent to kill had been negated by heat of passion,
which would have reduced the crime of murder to one of voluntary manslaughter.”
We disagree.
The trial justice clearly instructed the jurors that they “must consider these
instructions in their entirety.” She also emphasized on several occasions, in words
to the effect, that:
“[T]he burden at all times is on the State of Rhode Island to prove to you with competent, credible evidence that this defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant never has to prove his innocence. Therefore, if
- 10 - the State fails to establish each and every fact essential to the defendant’s guilt of a crime charged because the testimony in support of such element does not satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty on that charge.”
Further, the trial justice informed the jurors that they may “infer a defendant’s
intent or state of mind from all of the surrounding circumstances [and] may consider
any statement made or acts done by [defendant] and all other facts and circumstances
in evidence which may indicate to you the defendant’s intent or state of mind.”
Finally, the trial justice explained the elements of the specific charges against
defendant, defining such terms as “malice,” “premeditation,” “willfully,” and
“malice aforethought.” Significantly, she instructed the jury that if the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had caused the death of Andrei Bonilla
with malice aforethought but failed to prove premeditation, then it should find
defendant not guilty of first-degree murder and proceed to consider the
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Similarly, if the state failed to
prove any of the elements of second-degree murder, the jury should “take up and
consider the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.”
The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the jury instructions did not allow
the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter unless it first found that the state had
failed to prove either first- or second-degree murder. His argument rests upon two
theories, neither of which we deem persuasive.
- 11 - First, citing to State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I. 1987), and State v.
Correra, 430 A.2d 1251 (R.I. 1981), as his principal authorities, defendant maintains
that the jury instructions are in error as a matter of Rhode Island common law.
Second, he posits that the instructions offend principles of due process under the
teachings of Mullaney.
Although it is true that the trial justice instructed the jurors that they could not
consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter unless the state had failed to prove
first- and second-degree murder, she never advised them that they could not consider
the heat of passion mitigating factors in their deliberations on the two murder
charges. Viewing the instructions in their entirety, as both the jury and we must, we
are of the opinion that the trial justice thoroughly explicated the criminal act of
voluntary manslaughter. As it pertained to the evidence in the instant case, she
explained:
“One, there must have been an adequate provocation for the shooting; two, the shooting must have occurred in the heat of passion; three, it must have been a sudden heat of passion, that is, the shooting must have followed the provocation before there was a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool; and, four, there must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act.”
The trial justice then went on to define a few terms including “heat of
passion”—“it must be enough that he acted as a result of passion rather than reason.
Heat of passion may include anger, terror, or fear.” Armed with this information,
- 12 - the jury considered the crimes of first- and second-degree murder, ultimately
concluding that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had
committed second-degree murder. At no point in her instructions did the trial justice
preclude the jury from considering whether defendant had acted in the heat of
passion due to adequate provocation. Rather, she informed the jurors that they must
consider her instructions in their entirety. Specifically, with respect to the issue of
intent, she said: “You should consider all of the circumstances in evidence that you
think are relevant in determining whether the State has fulfilled its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required intent or state
of mind.”
As to the crime of second-degree murder (for which defendant was in fact
convicted), the trial justice explained that it was a willful killing committed with
malice, but when “a person’s conscious intent or design to kill existed only
momentarily or fleetingly, before he committed the fatal act * * *.” She further
defined malice as an essential element of first- or second-degree murder that, inter
alia, can arise from an express intent to kill or be implied from “wanton recklessness
and an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human life.”
The defendant takes primary issue with the following instruction: “If you find
the State has failed to prove * * * beyond a reasonable doubt the crime of murder,
either in the first degree or the second degree, you should then take up and consider
- 13 - the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.” Because of that instruction, defendant
argues that the “jury was not permitted to consider whether the specific intent to kill
had been negated by heat of passion, which would have reduced the crime of murder
to one of voluntary manslaughter.”
It is certainly true that the trial justice methodically instructed the jury to
consider three homicidal offenses in descending order of severity—first-degree
murder first; then, if the state failed to prove all of its elements, the lesser-included
offense of second-degree murder; and if the state failed to prove second-degree
murder, then the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Yet the jury
was never prevented from considering the evidence that may have supported a
finding of voluntary manslaughter. The jurors were specifically told that “voluntary
manslaughter is an intentional homicide that does not include the element of malice
aforethought by reason of one or more mitigating factors. Such mitigating factors
include the heat of passion that arises out of adequate provocation.” Thus, the
concern expressed in Hockenhull that “a jury may erroneously convict a criminal
defendant of the principal offense charged, despite the prosecution’s inability to
prove an element of that offense, when the jury is convinced that the defendant’s
conduct was criminal” was significantly reduced. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d at 930.
Here, the jury was aware that voluntary manslaughter was in play as a possible
alternative to the murder offenses. It had been instructed that adequate provocation
- 14 - “must be of a nature such that it would inflame the passion of a reasonable person in
similar circumstances causing that reasonable person to act for the moment from
passion rather than reason, that is, tending for the moment to cause a reasonable
person to lose self-control.” Having been instructed that “voluntary manslaughter is
an intentional homicide that does not include the element of malice aforethought by
reason of one or more mitigating factors,” the jury nevertheless returned a verdict of
guilty on second-degree murder, thereby finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant harbored a specific intent to kill, albeit of only a momentary duration. In
other words, the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted
with malice.
Having done so, the state necessarily disproved beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant acted in a heat of passion upon adequate provocation. Malice and
heat of passion signify two contrary states of mind. To kill with malice, one must
act with deliberation. In second-degree murder the deliberation is only momentary;
nevertheless, the intent to kill must be formed before the killing itself. See State v.
Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 88-89 (R.I. 2013).
Heat of passion, however, requires a loss of self-control. The fatal act is
committed out of passion rather than reason. “Malice and heat of passion are
mutually exclusive; malice excludes passion, and passion presupposes the absence
of malice.” Dandridge v. Commonwealth, 852 S.E.2d 488, 493 (Va. Ct. App. 2021)
- 15 - (quoting Canipe v. Commonwealth, 491 S.E.2d 747, 753 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)). By
proving the existence of the former beyond a reasonable doubt, the state necessarily
disproved the existence of the latter beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.
Hinrichsen, 877 N.W.2d 211, 227 (Neb. 2016).
“In determining the correctness of a jury charge, ‘we determine how a jury
composed of ordinarily intelligent persons listening to that instruction at the close of
trial would have [interpreted] the instructions as a whole.’” State v. Parkhurst, 706
A.2d 412, 418 (R.I. 1998) (quoting State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1262 (R.I.
1981)). Viewing the instructions in their entirety, we are satisfied that they
adequately explained the relevant law and were appropriate. Notwithstanding the
fact that neither defendant nor the state advocated for a finding of voluntary
manslaughter, the trial justice determined that such a charge was warranted. See
State v. Esdel, 317 A.3d 756, 766 (R.I. 2024) (“[I]n determining whether the
evidence calls for a lesser-included-offense instruction, the trial justice should * * *
consider whether, at the very least, some minimal evidence exists that, if credited by
the jury, could support a conviction for the lesser-included offense.”) (quoting State
v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 414 (R.I. 2008) (emphasis omitted)). We perceive no error
in the instructions given, nor in the order in which the jury was to consider each
individual charge. The crime of voluntary manslaughter committed in the heat of
passion upon adequate provocation was explained to the jury. Similar to the
- 16 - Hinrichsen case, “[w]hen [the jury] decided beyond a reasonable doubt that [the
defendant] killed with deliberate and premeditated malice, it necessarily also
decided beyond a reasonable doubt that the converse was true—i.e., his actions were
not the result of a sudden quarrel, done rashly, without due deliberation and
reflection.” Hinrichsen, 877 N.W.2d at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Most significantly, the trial justice instructed the jurors, clearly and on multiple
occasions, that the state bore the burden to prove the elements of each offense
beyond a reasonable doubt:
“[T]he burden at all times is on the State of Rhode Island to prove to you with competent, credible evidence that this defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant never has to prove his innocence. Therefore, if the State fails to establish each and every fact essential to the defendant’s guilt of a crime charged because the testimony in support of such element does not satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty on that charge.
“* * *
“You should consider all of the circumstances in evidence that you think are relevant in determining whether the State has fulfilled its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required intent or state of mind.”
Considering the jury instructions in their entirety, as this Court is compelled
to do, we hold that the trial justice adequately described the law, so that a lay jury of
ordinary intelligence would have understood it. See Isom, 251 A.3d at 6 (“This Court
- 17 - will not examine a single sentence apart from the rest of the instructions, but rather
the challenged portions must be examined in the context in which they were
rendered.”) (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166).
The trial justice explained all elements required to prove voluntary
manslaughter, including what factors, such as heat of passion from adequate
provocation, can mitigate the malice aforethought required to commit first-degree or
second-degree murder. When taken with the rest of the jury instructions, it is clear
that a lay jury of ordinary intelligence would understand that if they found that
defendant had not acted with malice, he could not be found guilty of either first- or
second-degree murder. It is within the province of the jury alone to make that
determination based upon their findings of fact. See Joplin v. Cassin, 252 A.3d 271,
281-82 (R.I. 2021) (“It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It
weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of
witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the
facts.”) (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)).
Accordingly, we find that the jury was not misled by the trial justice’s instructions
and a reversal is not warranted.
Additionally, we are of the opinion that defendant’s reliance on Mullaney is
flawed. On appeal, defendant maintains that Mullaney “requires that the prosecution
‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden
- 18 - provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.’” (Quoting
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704.) Further, defendant argues that “[t]his Court has long
since adopted the holding in Mullaney[,]” citing to State v. McGehearty, 121 R.I.
55, 394 A.2d 1348 (1978), and State v. Smith, 121 R.I. 495, 401 A.2d 41 (1979).
These cases are markedly different from the case at bar, however. In
McGehearty, the issue before the Court was whether or not the properly proffered
affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication warranted a jury instruction on the
prosecution’s burden to prove “that defendant was not so intoxicated as to be unable
to harbor a specific intention to steal.” McGehearty, 121 R.I. at 60, 394 A.2d at 1351.
Similarly, as the state points out on appeal, Smith deals with an affirmative defense
issue where “the State merely conceded that it was the ‘state’s burden to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was not so intoxicated as to be unable to
harbor a specific intention to kill.’” (Quoting Smith, 121 R.I. at 496, 401 A.2d at 41.)
Once again, that was a case involving an affirmative defense and was therefore
distinct from the case at bar. In the case before us, the trial justice clearly instructed
the jury that the state bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the
elements of the enumerated offenses.
We now turn to the Supreme Court of the United States’ own interpretation
of Mullaney. Two years after the publication of Mullaney, the Supreme Court
- 19 - “sharply limited”3 the decision’s potential reach in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977). The Supreme Court recalled that, in Mullaney, “[m]alice, as the statute
[in question] indicated and as the court instructed, could be implied and was to be
implied from ‘any deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another
suddenly * * * or without a considerable provocation,’ in which event an intentional
killing was murder unless by a preponderance of the evidence it was shown that the
act was committed ‘in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation.’” Patterson, 432
U.S. at 212. The Supreme Court further clarified that “Mullaney surely held that a
State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient
upon proof of the other elements of the offense.” Id. at 215 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court went on to explain that, in Mullaney, “malice, i.e., lack of
provocation, was presumed and could be rebutted by the defendant only by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted with heat of passion upon sudden
provocation. * * * [H]owever traditional this mode of proceeding might have been,
it is contrary to the Due Process Clause * * *.” Id. at 216.
As the state points out, however, the Mullaney trial court “instructed the jury
that ‘if the prosecution established the homicide was both intentional and unlawful,
malice aforethought (murder) was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant
3 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 94 (1977).
- 20 - proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation’ * * *.” (Quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 (emphasis
added).) This presumption is what did not comport with the Due Process Clause,
because the state bears the burden to prove each element of the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Haffner, 242 A.3d 468, 476 (R.I. 2020).
In the case at bar, no such presumptions were made. As discussed supra, the trial
justice repeatedly reminded the jury that the state bore the burden to prove each of
the elements of each of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. At no point
was the burden of proof shifted to the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant’s
reliance on Mullaney is misplaced.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of conviction of the
Superior Court. The papers in this case may be remanded to that tribunal.
Justice Robinson did not participate.
- 21 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Andrew Mangru.
No. 2023-368-C.A. (P1/21-3503AG) Case Number No. 2023-369-C.A. (P2/22-646ADV)
Date Opinion Filed July 15, 2025
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kristin E. Rodgers
For State:
Sean P. Malloy Department of Attorney General Attorney(s) on Appeal For Petitioner:
Megan F. Jackson Rhode Island Public Defender