IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) Crim. I.D. No. 30109009DI ) LESTER ANDERSON, ) ) Defendant. )
ORDER
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF – DENIED
MOTION FOR EXPANSION OF RECORD – DENIED
This 31st day of May, 2024, after having considered Lester Anderson’s
(hereinafter “Anderson”) motion for postconviction relief, the State’s response in
opposition and the record in the matter, it appears to the Court that:
1. Anderson was convicted following a jury trial of Murder in the First
Degree on February 11, 1992.1 The State announced its intention not to seek capital
punishment shortly after Indictment,2 and at no time sought to reverse course.
Anderson was then sentenced to the mandatory life imprisonment on July 10, 1992.3
Anderson filed an unsuccessful direct appeal, followed by four unsuccessful motions
1 See Docket: State v. Lester Anderson, Criminal Action No. 2012004283, D.I. 11. 2 D.I. 9. 3 D.I. 35. for postconviction relief and respective appeals, among other various motions in the
ensuing years.4
2. Anderson has filed the instant motion for postconviction relief in June,
2023, along with a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for transcripts.5
The motion for appointment of counsel was denied on August 28, 2023.6 The motion
for transcripts was denied in part, granted in part. 7 On September 11, 2023,
Anderson filed a Motion for Certification of Questions of Law.8 That motion, which
was denied by this Court on March 25, 2024,9 overlapped significantly with the
issues raised in the instant post-conviction motion.
POSTCONVICTION MOTION
3. In this postconviction motion, Anderson raises two grounds for relief:
1) “The State violated [Anderson’s] right to due process, equal protection, right to
Jury-Trial [sic] and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the State
and Federal Constitutions, when the state failed to resentence Movant to alternative
sentence.” and 2) “Delaware Courts must look to parameter established by the
4 D.I. 18, 38, 52, 57, 61, 65, 69, 71, 73-75. 77, 81, 84-85, 87, 90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 103, 104-105, 115-118, 129. 5 D.I. 130. 6 D.I. 135. 7 D.I. 134. 8 D.I. 137. 9 D.I. 152. legislature to impose sentences, and Delaware legislature did not provide for and
[sic] alternative sentence in the event that § 4209 was ruled unconstitutional.”10
1. Reading his motion in totality, Anderson’s claims relate to the
Delaware Supreme Court holding in Rauf v. State11, which held capital murder
sentences under 11 Del. C. § 4209 unconstitutional. Anderson’s claims both argue,
that Rauf invalidates his non-capital sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4209(a).12 Anderson
contends he should be resentenced under 11 Del. C. § 635, because imposing a non-
capital mandatory life sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4209 violates his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.13
2. In opposition, the State argues that Anderson’s claims are both
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) and meritless.14 The State argues that Rauf
and its progeny does not apply, nor does it create any question regarding the legality
of Anderson’s now “thirty-one year old non-capital sentence.” 15
3. In response to the State’s opposition, Anderson filed an extensive reply,
seeming to argue a due process challenge to his jury trial and that he should not be
procedurally barred from relief because he is entitled to “meaningful access to state
10 D.I. 130. 11 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016). 12 D.I. 130. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 D.I. 145. Anderson moved to strike the State’s response and to deem his motion unopposed due to the fact that the State’s filing was untimely. This motion was denied under separate cover. D.I. 147. postconviction” procedures.16 Anderson continues to argue that the Rauf decision is
newly decided constitutional law which should allow review of his claim despite the
procedural bars cited by the State.17
4. Before addressing the merits of a postconviction motion, the Court
must apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).18 The finding
of a procedural bar precludes a reviewing court from addressing the merits of a
postconviction claim, to “protect the procedural integrity” of the Court Rules. 19 A
motion for postconviction relief can be procedurally barred as untimely, repetitive,
failure to raise a claim in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction and
for being formerly adjudicated.20
5. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) precludes review of a motion for
postconviction relief filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is
final.21 A defendant’s conviction is final thirty days after this Court imposes its
sentence, or when the Delaware Supreme Court issues a mandate or order where the
conviction was directly appealed.22 As noted above, Anderson took a direct appeal
to the Delaware Supreme Court, who affirmed his convictions on June 4, 1993. The
16 D.I. 150, p. 5, citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1974). 17 See generally, D.I. 150. 18 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 19 State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at *13 (Del. Super. April 29, 2009). 20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4). 21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 22 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1)-(2). instant motion was filed three decades after his judgment of conviction became final
and is procedurally barred from review as untimely.
6. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2), a second or subsequent
postconviction motion is considered successive and barred.23 Being that Anderson
has filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, this procedural bar is applicable.
To overcome this bar, Anderson, having been convicted following a jury trial, must
plead with particularity, “a claim that a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the
Delaware Supreme Court applies to the [defendant’s] case and renders the
conviction . . . invalid.”
7. Affording Anderson a liberal reading of his pleadings, he appears to
attempt to avoid this procedural bar in arguing that the Rauf decision is a “new rule
of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the …
Delaware Supreme Court.” While Rauf found Delaware’s statutory scheme in 11
Del. C. § 4209 as it related to capital murder unconstitutional24 and Powell v. State25
made Rauf retroactive to all applicable persons, Anderson is not an applicable
person.
8. The State neither sought the death penalty for Anderson, nor was he
sentenced as a capital offender under 11 Del. C. § 4209. As Anderson was not
23 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 24 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016). 25 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016). sentenced under the provision of 11 Del C. § 4209 ruled unconstitutional, the relief
from the procedural bar he seeks is unavailing.
9. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), claims “not asserted in
the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally
defaulted unless the defendant can show cause for relief and prejudice. 26 This does
not bar review of Anderson’s claim, as Rauf and Powell were decided after his
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) Crim. I.D. No. 30109009DI ) LESTER ANDERSON, ) ) Defendant. )
ORDER
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF – DENIED
MOTION FOR EXPANSION OF RECORD – DENIED
This 31st day of May, 2024, after having considered Lester Anderson’s
(hereinafter “Anderson”) motion for postconviction relief, the State’s response in
opposition and the record in the matter, it appears to the Court that:
1. Anderson was convicted following a jury trial of Murder in the First
Degree on February 11, 1992.1 The State announced its intention not to seek capital
punishment shortly after Indictment,2 and at no time sought to reverse course.
Anderson was then sentenced to the mandatory life imprisonment on July 10, 1992.3
Anderson filed an unsuccessful direct appeal, followed by four unsuccessful motions
1 See Docket: State v. Lester Anderson, Criminal Action No. 2012004283, D.I. 11. 2 D.I. 9. 3 D.I. 35. for postconviction relief and respective appeals, among other various motions in the
ensuing years.4
2. Anderson has filed the instant motion for postconviction relief in June,
2023, along with a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for transcripts.5
The motion for appointment of counsel was denied on August 28, 2023.6 The motion
for transcripts was denied in part, granted in part. 7 On September 11, 2023,
Anderson filed a Motion for Certification of Questions of Law.8 That motion, which
was denied by this Court on March 25, 2024,9 overlapped significantly with the
issues raised in the instant post-conviction motion.
POSTCONVICTION MOTION
3. In this postconviction motion, Anderson raises two grounds for relief:
1) “The State violated [Anderson’s] right to due process, equal protection, right to
Jury-Trial [sic] and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the State
and Federal Constitutions, when the state failed to resentence Movant to alternative
sentence.” and 2) “Delaware Courts must look to parameter established by the
4 D.I. 18, 38, 52, 57, 61, 65, 69, 71, 73-75. 77, 81, 84-85, 87, 90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 103, 104-105, 115-118, 129. 5 D.I. 130. 6 D.I. 135. 7 D.I. 134. 8 D.I. 137. 9 D.I. 152. legislature to impose sentences, and Delaware legislature did not provide for and
[sic] alternative sentence in the event that § 4209 was ruled unconstitutional.”10
1. Reading his motion in totality, Anderson’s claims relate to the
Delaware Supreme Court holding in Rauf v. State11, which held capital murder
sentences under 11 Del. C. § 4209 unconstitutional. Anderson’s claims both argue,
that Rauf invalidates his non-capital sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4209(a).12 Anderson
contends he should be resentenced under 11 Del. C. § 635, because imposing a non-
capital mandatory life sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4209 violates his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.13
2. In opposition, the State argues that Anderson’s claims are both
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) and meritless.14 The State argues that Rauf
and its progeny does not apply, nor does it create any question regarding the legality
of Anderson’s now “thirty-one year old non-capital sentence.” 15
3. In response to the State’s opposition, Anderson filed an extensive reply,
seeming to argue a due process challenge to his jury trial and that he should not be
procedurally barred from relief because he is entitled to “meaningful access to state
10 D.I. 130. 11 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016). 12 D.I. 130. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 D.I. 145. Anderson moved to strike the State’s response and to deem his motion unopposed due to the fact that the State’s filing was untimely. This motion was denied under separate cover. D.I. 147. postconviction” procedures.16 Anderson continues to argue that the Rauf decision is
newly decided constitutional law which should allow review of his claim despite the
procedural bars cited by the State.17
4. Before addressing the merits of a postconviction motion, the Court
must apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).18 The finding
of a procedural bar precludes a reviewing court from addressing the merits of a
postconviction claim, to “protect the procedural integrity” of the Court Rules. 19 A
motion for postconviction relief can be procedurally barred as untimely, repetitive,
failure to raise a claim in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction and
for being formerly adjudicated.20
5. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) precludes review of a motion for
postconviction relief filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is
final.21 A defendant’s conviction is final thirty days after this Court imposes its
sentence, or when the Delaware Supreme Court issues a mandate or order where the
conviction was directly appealed.22 As noted above, Anderson took a direct appeal
to the Delaware Supreme Court, who affirmed his convictions on June 4, 1993. The
16 D.I. 150, p. 5, citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1974). 17 See generally, D.I. 150. 18 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 19 State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at *13 (Del. Super. April 29, 2009). 20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4). 21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 22 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1)-(2). instant motion was filed three decades after his judgment of conviction became final
and is procedurally barred from review as untimely.
6. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2), a second or subsequent
postconviction motion is considered successive and barred.23 Being that Anderson
has filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, this procedural bar is applicable.
To overcome this bar, Anderson, having been convicted following a jury trial, must
plead with particularity, “a claim that a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the
Delaware Supreme Court applies to the [defendant’s] case and renders the
conviction . . . invalid.”
7. Affording Anderson a liberal reading of his pleadings, he appears to
attempt to avoid this procedural bar in arguing that the Rauf decision is a “new rule
of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the …
Delaware Supreme Court.” While Rauf found Delaware’s statutory scheme in 11
Del. C. § 4209 as it related to capital murder unconstitutional24 and Powell v. State25
made Rauf retroactive to all applicable persons, Anderson is not an applicable
person.
8. The State neither sought the death penalty for Anderson, nor was he
sentenced as a capital offender under 11 Del. C. § 4209. As Anderson was not
23 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 24 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016). 25 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016). sentenced under the provision of 11 Del C. § 4209 ruled unconstitutional, the relief
from the procedural bar he seeks is unavailing.
9. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), claims “not asserted in
the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally
defaulted unless the defendant can show cause for relief and prejudice. 26 This does
not bar review of Anderson’s claim, as Rauf and Powell were decided after his
conviction became final in 1993. However, as mentioned above, Rauf is
inapplicable to Anderson so his claims, while not barred, fail on their merits.
10. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4), formerly adjudicated
claims in this case are barred.27 This is the first time Anderson has raised this claim
despite his many prior filings, therefore Rule 61(i)(4) does not bar consideration of
his claims on the merits.
11. To overcome the procedural bars do not apply if the movant can show
the court lacked jurisdiction, or meets the pleading requirements under Rule
61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).28 Rule 61(d)(2) requires movant to plead with particularity
that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual innocence or that a
new retroactively applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.29
26 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 27 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). This includes postconviction proceedings. 28 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 29 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 12. Anderson also fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rule
61(d)(2)(i) and (ii) to overcome the procedural bars.30 Again, Anderson mistakenly
assumes that Rauf was applicable to both capital and non-capital offenders; Rauf
very clearly only analyzes the constitutionality of the capital sentencing structure of
11 Del. C. § 4209.31
13. Rauf did not strike down the entirety of 11 Del. C. § 4209.32 Further, in
Powell, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the mandatory sentence of life without
parole portion of the statute.33 Neither Rauf or Powell helps Anderson overcome
Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).
14. Summary dismissal, as well as dismissal on the merits, is appropriate
as it plainly appears from the motions, the State’s Response, Anderson’s replies
thereto and the record of the prior proceedings in the case that Anderson is not
entitled to relief.34
MOTION FOR EXPANSION OF RECORD
15. Anderson moved on February 26, 2024, to expand the record in order
to pursue his postconviction motion. To the extent the Court is able to make out a
30 Super. Ct. Crim. R 61(i)(5). 31 Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433. 32 State v. Manley, 2018 WL 1110420, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2018). See generally 11 Del. C. § 636(b). 33 153 A.3d 69, 70–1 (Del. 2016) (holding that the defendant’s “death sentence must be vacated and he must be sentenced to ‘imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction.’” (quoting 11 Del. C. § 4209(d)(2)). 34 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5). cognizable claim from his filing, it appears Anderson is seeking the Court’s
consideration of the supplemental filings, the file contents of the State’s appeal, pre-
trial motion documents, office conference transcripts from 1991 and appears to seek
this Court’s review of the trial testimony to review whether the State met its burden
of proof upon conviction.35 Anderson has failed to articulate the necessity of his
requests. The Court has reviewed the record in making the above findings, to the
extent relevant.
16. In recognition of the claims pursued by Anderson in his postconviction
motion, the applicable procedural bars to his relief in the instant motion and the bars
to relief should subsequent motions be filed, the motion is meritless and irrelevant.36
Anderson has not provided a factual basis for his requests for transcripts, nor has he
identified the specific rights he claims are violated.37 To the extent Anderson
requests additional documents, any appellate documents are already contained in the
record, therefore an expansion request is moot. And it is simply inappropriate to
move to review the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction, as Anderson’s
direct appeal has come and gone. The Court has reviewed the relevant record and
does not find an expansion of the record necessary for its finding.
35 D.I. 151. 36 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g). 37 State v. Allen, 2002 WL 31814750, *1 (Del. Super. Ct.). THEREFORE, Anderson’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED, and
Anderson’s Motion for Expansion of the Record is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Danielle J. Brennan, Judge
Original to Prothonotary cc: John Williams, Deputy Attorney General Lester Anderson, Pro Se, SBI: 225954