State v. Anderson

Superior Court of Delaware·Decided December 9, 2024·No. 30109009DI·Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) ) Crim I.D. No. 30109009DI v. ) ) LESTER ANDERSON, ) ) Defendant. )

Date Submitted: October 10, 2024 Date Decided: December 9, 2024

ORDER

On Defendant’s Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence – DENIED On Defendant’s Motion “to leave for Summary Judgment” - DENIED

On this 6th day of December, 2024, after having considered Lester Anderson’s

(hereinafter “Anderson”) Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence and Motion to

Leave for Summary Judgment, the facts, procedural history and the entire record in

this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. Anderson was convicted following a jury trial of Murder in the First Degree

on February 11, 1992.1 The State announced its intention not to seek capital

punishment shortly after Indictment and at no time sought to reverse course. 2 Trial

was held and Anderson was ultimately convicted of Murder in the First Degree and

1 See Docket: State v. Lester Anderson, Criminal Action No. 2012004283, D.I. 11. 2 D.I. 9. -1- acquitted of Conspiracy Second Degree. Anderson was sentenced to mandatory life

imprisonment on July 10, 1992.3 Anderson filed an unsuccessful direct appeal,

followed by six unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief and respective

appeals, as well a multitude of other various motions since his conviction.4

2. Most recently, Anderson’s sixth motion for postconviction relief was denied

by this Court on May 31, 2024.5 Anderson appealed that denial to the Delaware

Supreme Court.6 Anderson filed the instant motion for correction of an illegal

sentence on September 19, 2024, while the aforementioned appeal was pending.7

Anderson also filed a Motion to Leave for Summary Judgment on October 7, 2024.8

Pursuant to the discretion afforded to the Court in Superior Court Criminal Rule 35,

as well as the Order of the Delaware Supreme Court on August 12, 2024,9 the Court

considered Anderson’s pending motion, despite the pendency of this appeal.10

3 D.I. 35; 11 Del. C. § 4902. 4 D.I. 18, 38, 52, 57, 61, 65, 69, 71, 73-75. 77, 81, 84-85, 87, 90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 103, 104-105, 115-118, 129-133, 137, 147, 151. 5 State v. Anderson, 2024 WL 2815460 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2024); D.I. 153. 6 Anderson’s appeal has now been resolved and the denial of his sixth postconviction motion has been affirmed. Anderson v. State, 258, 2024, Nov. 2, 2024, LeGrow, J. (ORDER). 7 D.I. 162. 8 D.I. 164. 9 Anderson v. State, 258, 2024, Aug. 12, 2024, Valihura, J. (ORDER). 10 Anderson filed a Motion for Leave to File a Stay and Reserve Jurisdiction in both this Court and in the Supreme Court. D.I. 165. The Motion, while filed in this Court, had the Supreme Court caption on it. To the extent this can be deemed a pending motion before the Superior Court, it is DENIED as moot. -2- MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE

3. Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), “[t]he court may correct an

illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner

within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence.”11 “The narrow

function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine

errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of the

sentence.”12 A sentence is illegal if: (1) the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-

authorized limits; (2) is violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause; (3) is ambiguous

with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served; (4) is intentionally

contradictory; (5) it omits a term required to be imposed by statute; (6) it is uncertain

as to the substance of the sentence; or (7) it is a sentence which the judgment of

conviction did not authorize.13

4. Anderson raises two separate grounds for relief in his motion for correction of

an illegal sentence. First, Anderson claims that he was improperly sentenced to a

greater penalty than one that is authorized by the General Assembly for his crime of

first degree murder.14 Second, Anderson claims his conviction was improper because

the indictment did not allege his crime was committed with a baseball bat, and as a

11 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 12 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962). 13 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 14 D.I. 162, at Ground II. -3- result his sentence was improperly enhanced because a jury did not find he

“possessed” a bat.15

5. As to his first argument, Anderson is mistaken. Anderson was tried by a Jury

and convicted of Murder in the First Degree under 11 Del. C. § 636.16 Consequently,

a jury found that Anderson intentionally caused the death of Steven Shumate by

beating him about the head and body.17 Anderson was accordingly sentenced under

11 Del. C. § 4209 following his conviction.18 Delaware law dictates that, “[a]ny

person who is convicted of first-degree murder for an offense that was committed

after the person had reached the person’s eighteenth birthday shall be punished by

imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life without benefit of

probation or parole or any other reduction.”19 Anderson was not sentenced to a

greater penalty than authorized by the General Assembly – he was convicted of first

degree murder and subsequently sentenced under the statute that sets forth the

mandatory sentence for that criminal offense.20 Anderson was legally sentenced

pursuant to the statutory requirements of 11 Del. C. § 4209.

6. Anderson next argues that he did not receive proper notice that the state set out

15 Id. 16 D.I. 1, Indictment (Sept. 20, 1991). 17 Id. 18 D.I. 35, Sentencing Hearing (Jul. 19, 1992). 19 11 Del. C. § 4209 20 Id. -4- to pursue a sentence enhancement under 11 Del. C. § 4209, in violation of his due

process rights.21 Anderson argues that he has a due process right to fair notice of any

sentencing allegation that, if proven, will increase the punishment for a crime; i.e. a

sentence enhancement provision.22 Anderson claims that the State did not properly

plead the crimes he was charged with, which did not allow Anderson to predict his

potential sentence.23

7. Anderson’s claim fails first and foremost because he was not sentenced

pursuant to any sentencing enhancement. Anderson argues that 11 Del. C. § 4209 is

a “built-in enhancement of 11 Del. C. § 4205.”24 This assertion is incorrect. Section

4205(b)(1), of Title 11 states, “[f]or a class A felony not less than 15 years up to life

imprisonment to be served at Level V except for conviction of first degree murder in

which event § 4209 of this title shall apply.”25 Section 4209 defines the minimum

punishment for an adult offended found guilty of first degree murder.26 The statue

does not implicate any additional punishment outside of the minimum sentence

required for the crime committed.27 Anderson was not deprived any due process

21 D.I. 162, at Ground I. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id., at Ground II. 25 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1). 26 See 11 Del. C. § 4209. 27 Id. -5- rights; Anderson was given the statutorily mandated sentence for the charge of

murder in the first degree. This is the sentence for intentional murder regardless of

the instrumentality of the crime.

8. Any arguments made by Anderson regarding the legality of his conviction is

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Related

Hill v. United States
368 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Brittingham v. State
705 A.2d 577 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1998)