State v. Allen

291 S.E.2d 459, 277 S.C. 595, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 332
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedMay 5, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 291 S.E.2d 459 (State v. Allen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Allen, 291 S.E.2d 459, 277 S.C. 595, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 332 (S.C. 1982).

Opinion

ORDER

APPEAL DISMISSED

Appellant, along with his co-defendant Walter Childers, Jr., has been charged with murder, attempted armed robbery and other crimes in connection with an incident in Greenville County. The lower court ordered appellant to submit to surgery to remove a bullet from below the skin near appellant’s left shoulder. Appellant has appealed from this order, and respondent moves to have the appeal dismissed.

*596 We are of the view that the lower court’s order properly sets forth and disposes of the issues in this matter. The appeal is dismissed and it is ordered that the lower court order, as modified, be published as the directive of this Court.

JUDGE PYLE’S ORDER

Pursuant to the Order of this court dated March 22, 1982, the Defendants were examined by surgeons, selected by the Solicitor of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit and the Defense attorneys, to ascertain whether their bodies contained bullets and, if so, what surgical procedures would be necessary to effect their removal. The examinations were ordered to determine whether motions should be granted requiring the Defendants to submit to surgical removal of such evidence. The motion is granted as to Larry Ford Allen, and denied as to Walter Childers, Jr.

The defendants are charged with murder, attempted armed robbery, assault and battery with intent to kill and conspiracy in connection with an attempted armed robbery at Coker’s Supermarket in Greenville County on March 10, 1982. After hearings on March 19, 1982 and March 22, 1982, at which defendants were represented by counsel and written and oral testimony were presented, I found that the Solicitor had established probable cause that these defendants may have been present at and participants in the crimes charged and that their bodies may contain critical evidence thereof, and that substantial need 1 for the evidence was demonstrated. I further concluded that this State would permit court-ordered surgical removal of physical evidence of a crime from a Defendant’s body, provided the procedures insuring the Defendant’s rights developed by case law from other jurisdictions were complied with. Therefore, having previously ordered the Defendants to be examined by surgeons, a hearing was held on April 2, 1982 for the purpose of taking medical testimony to establish the degree of intrusion into their bodies *597 and whether the surgical removal would endanger their health, safety or life.

The United States Supreme Court decision in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952), imposes upon this court a duty to exercise its judgment in ascertaining whether the requested surgery would “offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.” Id. at 169, 72 S. Ct. at 208. There, the Court found the course of proceeedings by agents of the government to obtain evidence — illegally breaking into the privacy of the defendant, struggling with him to open his mouth and remove what was there, and failing that, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents — to be “conduct that shocks the conscience” and “bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.”

However, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826,16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the withdrawal and chemical analysis of blood from the defendant, over his objection, violated neither the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent nor the Fourth Amendment provision against unwarranted search and seizure:

History and precedent have required that we today reject the claim that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the human body in all circumstances to be held inviolate against state expeditions seeking evidence of crime.

Id. at 767, 86 S. Ct. at 1834. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither the accused’s testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing, it was not barred by the Fifth Amendment. Further, the Fourth Amendment was found not to forbid minor intrusions by the State into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions. Basing its conclusion on the principle that the integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society, the Court stated:

[T]he Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which *598 are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. Id. at 768, 86 S. Ct. at 1834.

Citing both Rochin and Schmerber, the Courts of four states and the District of Columbia have expressly or implicitly held court-ordered surgical removal of bullets to be constitutionally permissible when justified under the circumstances and performed in a proper manner. 2 Further, the procedures for determining need and method of removal, similar to those utilized in the instant cases, were sanctioned by the Courts of two other states although the ultimate question of removal was not reached. 3 Finally, only one state has concluded that surgical procedures for removal of bullets pursuant to a court order, regardless of the circumstances, are “per se” violative of the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 4

In Creamer v. State, supra, the testifying physician found an entry wound but no exit wound in the defendant, and stated that he could feel a foreign body in the fat, subcutaneous area of the right side of the chest, within the area of the muscle. X-Ray examination further indicated the presence of steel which could have been a bullet. The doctor concluded the bullet could be removed with a local and not a general anesthetic, and that no risk to the defendant would be involved in either administering the local anesthetic or in removing the bullet although it would involve a cutting procedure. Similarly, there was uncontradicted evidence by a surgeon in Allison v. State, supra, that the bullet lodged under the defendant’s skin might be surgically removed without *599 damage to life or limb. Thus, removal was found proper in both Georgia cases.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered the propriety of ordering the reinoval of two bullets from the defendant in United State v. Crowder, supra. One bullet lodged in Crowder’s left thigh was not ordered removed on the basis of medical testimony that such a procedure might cause reduction of use or function of his leg. A second bullet was lying immediately under the skin of the defendant’s right forearm, not in any muscle or effective portion of any major nerves or veins.

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Bluebook (online)
291 S.E.2d 459, 277 S.C. 595, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-allen-sc-1982.