State v. Alexander

2026 Ohio 522

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 5-25-25
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Alexander, 2026-Ohio-522.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HANCOCK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 5-25-25 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

VINCENT D. ALEXANDER, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2024 CR 60

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: February 17, 2026

APPEARANCES:

W. Alex Smith for Appellant

Sean M. Abbott for Appellee Case No. 5-25-25

ZIMMERMAN, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Vincent D. Alexander (“Alexander”), appeals the

July 23, 2025 judgment entry of sentencing of the Hancock County Court of

Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This case stems from an assault that occurred on the evening of January

24, 2024 in a moving vehicle in Findlay, Ohio. While the victim, V.C., was driving,

Alexander punched her at least two times in the face. After V.C. fled from the

vehicle, Alexander drove off—leaving an injured V.C. on the side of the road. A

police officer arrived on the scene to find V.C. with a swollen and bloodied face.

V.C. suffered an orbital fracture and lacerated lip as a result of the assault.

{¶3} On March 5, 2024, the Hancock County Grand Jury indicted Alexander

on Count One of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-

degree felony, and Count Two of grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C.

2913.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony. Alexander appeared for arraignment on

April 10, 2024 and entered pleas of not guilty to both counts in the indictment. He

subsequently filed a notice of self-defense on April 22, 2024.

{¶4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on April 7 and 8, 2025. At trial, as

relevant to the facts of this appeal, the State presented the testimony of V.C. and the

responding police officer, while Alexander testified in his own defense.

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{¶5} V.C. testified that Alexander called her earlier in the day asking for a

ride. Even though she and Alexander had broken up a month prior, V.C. agreed to

travel to Columbus to pick up Alexander and transport him to the Findlay area. Per

his request, V.C. dropped Alexander off at Riverside Park in Findlay.

Approximately 15 minutes later, Alexander called V.C. again asking for a ride. V.C.

met Alexander at a gas station. While V.C. was driving, Alexander accused her of

cheating on him. V.C. testified that she denied Alexander’s allegations “and he just

started punching on me.” (Apr. 7, 2024 Tr. at 180). “He just kept punching, just

punching on me.” (Id. at 181). V.C. further testified that she was able to slow the

vehicle down and pull off to the side of the road. Alexander pinned her down with

his forearm and “started punching me some more.” (Id.). V.C. removed her seatbelt

and fled from the vehicle. V.C. testified that Alexander followed her and continued

punching her outside of the vehicle. At one point, V.C. fell and Alexander kicked

her. When a passing vehicle stopped, Alexander “jumped in [V.C’s] car” and “took

off.” (Id. at 182). The driver of the stopped vehicle called 911.

{¶6} Officer Kyle Sours of the Findlay Police Department was dispatched to

the scene. Officer Sours testified that he encountered V.C. crying on the side of the

road with bloody clothing, a swollen face, a dark purple left eye, and a bleeding

nose. Officer Sours called for medical assistance and an ambulance transported

V.C. to the hospital. A video from the body camera worn by Officer Sours depicting

his interaction with V.C. was played for the jury. Officer Sours further testified that

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he followed the ambulance to the hospital where he took photos of V.C.’s injuries.

The photos taken by Officer Sours were admitted into evidence.

{¶7} Alexander testified that V.C. owns a handgun and “[w]hen she was

leaving, going places, she would take her gun with her.” (Apr. 8, 2025 Tr. at 292).

Alexander further testified that it was common for V.C. to leave the handgun in the

vehicle. With respect to what took place on the night of the incident, Alexander

testified that he and V.C. were talking and she started to get loud. “She was - - when

I asked a couple of questions, she - - she - - she got irritated, and - - and she said, I

don’t know what the hell you’re talking about, and that’s when it got - - it got out

of hand.” (Id. at 302). Alexander was concerned about V.C.’s “tone of voice” and

“[t]hat she had her gun.” (Id. at 302-303). Alexander testified that V.C. “was

reaching . . . to her left” and he believed she was reaching into the door pocket for

her handgun. (Id. at 303). When asked to explain what happened next, Alexander

testified as follows:

Well, I went to go reach for her arm, I was like what are you doing? And when I said, what you doing, she - - she got to jerking back. And when she jerked back, I didn’t see - - I didn’t - - I just punched her twice. And then when I realized she - - she - - she stopped, I stopped. She was getting out of the car, I was getting out of the car. And when she - - when she was coming around the van, I was waiting, and then I went around the front of the van, and I got in the car. I didn’t know if she had her gun or not, because I was just watching which way she was going. And she took off running, and I jumped in the van.

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(Id. at 304-305). Alexander admitted to punching V.C. twice in the face. He was

asked on cross-examination, “You hit her, never seeing a gun?” (Id. at 321).

Alexander answered, “I didn’t see no gun, no.” (Id.).

{¶8} On April 8, 2025, the jury found Alexander guilty as to Count One of

felonious assault, a second-degree felony, and guilty as to a lesser-included offense

on Count Two of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first

degree. On July 10, 2025, the trial court sentenced Alexander to a minimum term

of eight years in prison to a maximum term of 12 years in prison on Count One.1

The trial court further sentenced Alexander to a jail term of 180 days for

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, to be served concurrently with the sentence

imposed on Count One.

{¶9} Alexander filed his notice of appeal on August 4, 2025, raising a single

assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The Jury Erred When It Did Not Find That Vincent Alexander Acted In Self-Defense.

{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Alexander argues that his felonious-

assault conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. According to

Alexander, he “acted under a reasonable belief of imminent bodily harm when the

altercation with [V.C.] occurred.” (Appellant’s Brief at 5). Alexander contends that

1 The judgment entry of sentencing was filed on July 23, 2025.

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the jury lost its way because the State failed to meet its burden of disproving his

self-defense claim.

Standard of Review

{¶11} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, a reviewing court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting

testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). A reviewing court

must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175

(1st Dist. 1983). Nonetheless, a reviewing court must allow the trier of fact

appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).

{¶12} When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-

Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

Analysis

{¶13} Alexander was convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C.

2903.11, which provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person shall knowingly . . .

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[c]ause serious physical harm to another . . . .” R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). “A person acts

knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s

conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.

A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such

circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).

{¶14} “‘Serious physical harm to persons’ means,” as relevant to this case,

“[a]ny physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial or

total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;” “[a]ny physical harm

that involves some permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary,

serious disfigurement;” or “[a]ny physical harm that involves acute pain of such

duration as to result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged

or intractable pain.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(c)-(e).

{¶15} On appeal, Alexander does not dispute that the evidence presented at

trial establishes the elements of felonious assault. Rather, he contends that the jury

lost its way by rejecting his claim of self-defense. That is, he argues that his

felonious-assault conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because

the State failed to satisfy its burden of disproving at least one of the elements of self-

defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

{¶16} Self-defense is an affirmative defense. State v. Messenger, 2022-

Ohio-4562, ¶ 21. If proven, it relieves the defendant of criminal liability for the

force used by the defendant. State v. Bender, 2024-Ohio-1750, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.). R.C.

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2901.05(B)(1) governs the burden and degree of proof required for a claim of self-

defense as follows:

A person is allowed to act in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence. If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, as the case may be.

Thus, “[b]y statute, a defendant has the initial burden of production, and if he or she

meets that burden, then the State has the burden of persuasion to disprove the

defendant’s claim of self-defense . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in

original.) State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-5571, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.).

{¶17} “The elements of self-defense differ depending on whether the

defendant used deadly or non-deadly force to defend himself.” State v. Bagley,

2014-Ohio-1787, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.).

Where a defendant asserts a self-defense claim involving the use of nondeadly force, a [defendant] must provide sufficient evidence that “‘(1) he was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) he had reasonable grounds to believe or an honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (3) he did not use more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the imminent danger of bodily harm.’”

State v. Weemes, 2025-Ohio-2319, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Greer, 2023-

Ohio-103, ¶ 33 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Paskins, 2022-Ohio-4024, ¶ 48 (5th

Dist.). Generally, “a person is privileged only to ‘use as much force as is reasonably

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necessary to repel [an] attack.’” State v. Crowe, 2019-Ohio-3986, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Shine-Johnson, 2018-Ohio-3347, ¶ 61 (10th Dist.). “In determining

whether the defendant presented evidence tending to support a self-defense claim,

the trial court considers all of the evidence, from all sources, construed most

strongly in the defendant’s favor.” Weemes at ¶ 31. “‘The elements of self-defense

are cumulative, and a defendant’s claim of self-defense fails if any one of the

elements is not present.’” State v. Passmore, 2023-Ohio-3209, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Ridley, 2022-Ohio-2561, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

{¶18} Once a defendant presents a viable self-defense claim, the State bears

the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act in

self-defense. Weemes at ¶ 32. Thus, to defeat a self-defense claim, “the State must

‘disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Passmore at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Carney, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.).

{¶19} On appeal, Alexander contends that the greater weight of the evidence

supports his claim of self-defense. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to

disprove that he had a reasonable and honest belief that he was in imminent danger

of bodily harm. In support of this argument, Alexander points to the testimony of

V.C.’s children who testified that their mother has a handgun and “she sometimes

carried it in her purse when leaving home.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). Alexander

asserts that his belief of imminent danger was objectively reasonable because V.C.

is known to carry a handgun when leaving home and she “became agitated and

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reached toward the driver’s side door pocket.” (Id. at 8). Consequently, Alexander

argues that his version of events—that he was reacting to a reasonable belief that

V.C. was reaching for a handgun—is more credible than the State’s theory of the

case.

{¶20} Here, V.C. testified on cross-examination that she owns a handgun and

keeps it “[i]n my drawer.” (Apr. 7, 2025 Tr. at 202). When asked if she carried the

handgun with her on the night of the assault, V.C. answered “No.” (Id.). V.C.

further testified that she “never carried” the handgun. (Id. at 203). V.C.’s son and

daughter also testified at trial. On cross-examination, V.C.’s son was asked if he

had ever seen his mother “brandish” or “hold” the handgun. (Id. at 240). V.C.’s

son replied, “Not really. She kept it mostly in her purse and in her drawer.” (Id.).

Similarly, V.C.’s daughter was asked on cross-examination about her mother’s

handgun. When asked where her mother kept the handgun, V.C.’s daughter

answered, “Sometimes in her purse and sometimes in her drawer.” (Id. at 263).

Alexander contends that the discrepancy between V.C.’s testimony and the

testimony of her children “undermines [V.C.’s] claim the gun was always secured

and supports the objective reasonableness of Mr. Alexander believing the firearm

could be accessible within the vehicle during their altercation.” (Appellant’s Brief

at 7-8).

{¶21} “Although we review credibility when considering the manifest

weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is primarily a determination for

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the trier of fact.” State v. Banks, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). In this case, the

jury was presented with conflicting accounts of what transpired in the vehicle. V.C.

testified that Alexander punched her repeatedly while she was driving and after she

stopped the vehicle. V.C. further testified that, after she fled from the vehicle,

Alexander pursued her and continued the assault outside of the vehicle. Video

evidence of V.C.’s bloodied appearance at the side of the road and photos taken at

the hospital of her injuries were admitted into evidence. Notwithstanding

Alexander’s contention that his reasonable belief that V.C. was reaching for a

handgun justified him in punching her, “we are mindful of the jury’s ‘superior first-

hand perspective in judging the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.’” State v.

Suffel, 2015-Ohio-222, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips, 2014-Ohio-5162, ¶

125 (10th Dist.). See State v. Rawlins, 2024-Ohio-1733, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.) (stating that

a verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury chose

to believe the State’s witnesses rather than the defendant’s version of events).

Consequently, the trier of fact was free to believe V.C.’s testimony that Alexander

initiated the physical violence or to disbelieve Alexander’s testimony that he was

reacting to a perceived threat.

{¶22} Additionally, because the elements of self-defense are cumulative, the

State was required to disprove at least one of the cumulative elements of self-

defense beyond a reasonable doubt—most notably in this case, that Alexander was

at fault for creating the situation or that he used force in excess of what was

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reasonably necessary. Regarding the element of fault, “‘Ohio courts have long

recognized that a person cannot provoke [an] assault or voluntarily enter an

encounter and then claim a right of self-defense.’” (Emphasis deleted.) State v.

Woodson, 2022-Ohio-2528, ¶ 82 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Nichols, 2002 Ohio

App. LEXIS 329, *7 (4th Dist. Jan. 22, 2002). In this case, while Alexander argues

that he was defending himself because he believed V.C. was reaching for a handgun,

his own trial testimony undermines this element. Indeed, Alexander admitted that

he never saw a handgun. He further admitted that he punched V.C. two times in the

face.

{¶23} Moreover, beyond Alexander’s admission of fault, the greater weight

of the evidence further supports the conclusion that he used more force than was

reasonably necessary to repel the perceived threat. A defendant may only use “that

force which is reasonably necessary to repel the attack.” State v. Williford, 49 Ohio

St.3d 247, 249 (1990). The affirmative defense of self-defense is unavailable if the

defendant uses more force than is reasonably necessary or if the force used is so

disproportionate that it shows a purpose to injure. State v. Grant, 2023-Ohio-2720,

¶ 71 (3d Dist.).

{¶24} Therefore, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the

trier of fact did not lose its way by rejecting Alexander’s claim of self-defense.

Importantly, the jury heard all of the testimony and found the State’s witnesses and

evidence to be more credible than Alexander’s. Accordingly, weighing the evidence

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and all reasonable inferences, we conclude the jury did not clearly lose its way and

create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Alexander’s felonious-assault

conviction must be reversed.

{¶25} Alexander’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

{¶26} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED: /hls

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