State v. Alexander-Keels

2024 Ohio 3138

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 16, 2024
• Docket: WD-23-044
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Alexander-Keels, 2024-Ohio-3138.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-23-044

Appellee Trial Court No. 2023 CR 0171

v.

Jaedyn Joshua Alexander-Keels DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: August 16, 2024

*****

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.

SULEK, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Jaedyn J. Alexander-Keels, appeals the August 21, 2023

judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to community

control after a bench trial finding him guilty of counterfeiting and possessing criminal

tools. Because the counterfeiting convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence,

the judgment is reversed, in part, and Keels’ convictions for counterfeiting are vacated. I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On April 6, 2023, the Wood County Grand Jury returned an indictment

charging Alexander-Keels with two fourth-degree felony counts of counterfeiting and one

fifth-degree felony count of possessing criminal tools. Alexander-Keels pleaded not

guilty to the charges.

{¶ 3} At the June 21, 2023 bench trial, Ohio State Highway Patrol (“OSHP”)

Trooper Devon Black testified that on June 30, 2022, he was on patrol in Wood County,

Ohio, when he observed a vehicle traveling 89 m.p.h. in a 65-m.p.h. zone. Black initiated

a traffic stop and observed two occupants; Alexander-Keels was the driver. Black

testified that the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle led to a probable

cause search. Alexander-Keels and the passenger informed Black that they were

returning to Michigan from Columbus.

{¶ 4} Trooper Black testified he recovered Alexander-Keels’ wallet from the

center console. Alexander-Keels admitted the wallet was his and that it contained his

identification. The wallet held multiple credit cards that were not in Alexander-Keels’

name. Black testified that he recovered three cards: one with the name Sylvander Ottos,

and two with Jermaine Hayzen. Neither of these individuals were in the vehicle.

Trooper Black also recovered Alexander-Keels’ cell phone.

{¶ 5} OSHP Sergeant Garrett Lawson testified that on the date of the traffic stop,

he was assigned to criminal investigations which includes matters beyond routine road

patrol. Lawson assisted in searching Alexander-Keels’ vehicle. He stated that based on

2. multiple years of experience with credit card cases, he enlisted the help of OSHP Trooper

Justin Craig who has additional credentialing in credit card fraud cases as well as cell

phone data analysis.

{¶ 6} Trooper Craig testified that he is assigned to the OSHP Office of

Investigative Services and through that office, he is also assigned to the United States

Secret Service Cyber Crime Task Force. Craig stated that he attended criminal

investigator’s school and the National Criminal Forensic Institute where he received

training on extracting evidence from cellular phones. He also testified that he had

investigated approximately 500 cases involving credit card fraud over the past five years.

{¶ 7} When Craig arrived on the scene, he interviewed Alexander-Keels, who told

him that he collects credit cards that he finds. Craig testified that it is extremely unlikely

that someone would find multiple cards from the same issuing bank.

{¶ 8} Alexander-Keels gave Trooper Craig his cell phone passcode and permitted

him to search the phone. The “Notes” application had information on how to use a

“Fullz” name. Craig explained that the term Fullz means fool or victim. He found Gmail

accounts for Sylvander Ottos and Jermanine Hayzen, the names on the recovered credit

cards. Craig stated that the phone contained detailed information regarding Ottos and

Hayzen including birth dates, employment, Social Security numbers, and cell phone

numbers. He confirmed that there were no individuals with the Social Security numbers

and that the identities were created to obtain the bank debit cards. The bank was directed

to send both debit cards to Alexander-Keels’ home address in Pontiac, Michigan.

3. {¶ 9} Trooper Craig stated that the phone contained evidence that Alexander-

Keels was accessing the dark web which allows a user to perform untraceable internet

searches and transactions and is frequently used for criminal purposes. Craig stated that

Alexander-Keels had accessed websites with information, including step-by-step

instructions, on how to fraudulently obtain loans, credit cards numbers, and Social

Security numbers. Craig testified that the searches outlined a scheme involving opening

a bank account in a fictitious individual’s name and applying for a loan. The loan funds

would then be transferred to the bank account, loaded on the prepaid card also obtained in

the fictitious name, and withdrawn using the card before the fraud was caught by the

bank. Craig did not investigate where the phone was physically located during the

creation of the false identities. Exhibits documenting the information taken from

Alexander-Keels cell phone were admitted into evidence.

{¶ 10} Trooper Craig explained that because the identities of Ottos and Hayzen

were fabricated, the bank was the potential fraud victim. Craig clarified that the cards

were genuine but the card holders were fictitious. He stated that the cards functioned as

pre-loaded debit cards and that they had neither been activated nor loaded with funds.

Craig agreed that Alexander-Keels may have never used the cards and that the bank

closed both accounts in May 2022, due to inactivity.

{¶ 11} At the close of the State’s case, Alexander-Keels moved for a directed

verdict under Crim.R. 29. He first argued that Wood County was not the proper venue to

try the charges because no element of the crimes, beyond possession of the items, was

4. furthered in Wood County. He claimed that the purported illegal activity took place at

his residence in Pontiac, Michigan. As to the counterfeiting charges, Alexander-Keels

argued that the State failed to establish his intent to utter the debit cards in Wood County

and as to possessing criminal tools, that there was no evidence presented that Alexander-

Keels intended to use his cell phone to commit a felony while in Wood County.

{¶ 12} Alexander-Keels further contended that he could not be convicted under

R.C. 2913.30(B)(3), because the stated failed to prove either that he intended to utter the

debit cards or that they were an “obligation or other security of the United States”

because they were never activated and had no monetary value.

{¶ 13} The State asserted that the possession element satisfied the venue

requirement that at least one element of the offenses occurred in Wood County. The

State maintained that it was not required to show that Alexander-Keels intended to use

the cards in Wood County or that he used his cell phone in Wood County in furtherance

of the commission of a felony. As to counterfeiting, the State claimed that it established

that Alexander-Keels intended to use the cards by presenting evidence of the steps he had

taken to acquire them and the fact that the cards themselves were real satisfied the

“security or obligation” element.

{¶ 14} Denying the Crim.R. 29 motion, the trial court found that as to venue, the

State was not required to prove that Alexander-Keels had a specific purpose to utter the

cards in Wood County. The court concluded that based on the information on Alexander-

Keels cell phone regarding funding the debit cards through a fraudulent loan, he intended

5. to utter them. Finally, the court found sufficient evidence of counterfeiting based on the

fictitious names, Social Security numbers, and other information generated and collected

by Alexander-Keels.

{¶ 15} The defense then rested and Alexander-Keels renewed his Crim.R. 29

motion. Alexander-Keels argued that as to venue, the State failed to establish a

“significant nexus” between Wood County and the crimes at issue. He argued that some

“purpose to utter” had to be present in Wood County. The court again denied the motion.

{¶ 16} After deliberation, the trial court found Alexander-Keels guilty on all

counts. At the August 21, 2023 sentencing, the court merged the two counterfeiting

counts and the State elected to proceed on count No. 1. Alexander-Keels was then

sentenced to a three-year community control term subject to various terms and

conditions. This appeal followed.

II. Assignments of Error

I. Insufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction on the

charged offenses in violation of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions.

II. Venue was not proper in Wood County for any charge.

III. Analysis

{¶ 17} In his first assignment of error, Alexander-Keels contends that his

convictions for counterfeiting, R.C. 2913.30(B)(3) and (C), and possessing criminal tools,

R.C. 2923.24(A) and (C), were supported by insufficient evidence. The State filed a

concession of error under 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 10(H), conceding that Alexander-Keels’

6. counterfeiting convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. The State’s

concession of error is not controlling and this court is tasked with independently

reviewing alleged error. State v. Strange, 2024-Ohio-2199, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

Hermes, 2023-Ohio-2011, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.). “However, if the error is clear from the

record, we may accept the concession of error as part of our analysis.” Id., citing Hermes

at ¶ 26.

{¶ 18} Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Alexander-Keels’

convictions is a question of law. State v. Bailey, 2023-Ohio-657, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, (1997). In reviewing such a challenge, a

court “must consider all evidence admitted at trial, including the improperly admitted

evidence * * *.” State v. Gideon, 2020-Ohio-6961, ¶ 29. “‘The relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113 (1997), quoting State v. Jenks,

61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, the appellate

court will not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v.

Jones, 2021-Ohio-3311, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13.

Rather, the court decides whether, if believed, “the evidence can sustain the verdict as a

matter of law.” Richardson at ¶ 13.

7. A. Counterfeiting

{¶ 19} Alexander-Keels’ convictions for counterfeiting, R.C. 2913.30 (B)(3),

required the State to prove:

(B) No person, with purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is

facilitating a fraud, shall do any of the following:

…

(3) Possess with the purpose to utter any obligation or other security

of the United States, knowing that the obligation or other security has been

counterfeited; …

{¶ 20} Alexander-Keels contends, and the State agrees, that the fictitious debit

cards were not an “obligation or other security” which is defined under R.C.

2913.30(A)(2) as “an instrument recognized as currency or legal tender or that is issued

by the United States treasury, including bills, coins, bonds, or checks” and, thus, could

not form the basis of the counterfeiting charges. See Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed.

2024), defining “legal tender” as “[t]he money (bills and coins) approved in a country for

the payment of debts, the purchase of goods, and other exchanges for value”; Black’s

further defines “currency” as “[a]n item (such as a coin, government note, or banknote)

that circulates as a medium of exchange.” Upon review, the bank-issued cards with no

monetary value do not meet the definition of United States’ issued “currency or legal

tender.” Thus, as to the portion of Alexander-Keels’ first assignment of error challenging

8. the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his counterfeiting conviction, the assignment is

well-taken.

B. Possessing Criminal Tools

{¶ 21} Alexander-Keels’ first assignment of error also challenges his possessing

criminal tools’ conviction as not being supported by sufficient evidence.1 His second

assignment of error contends that Wood County was not a proper venue to prosecute the

charges.

{¶ 22} To convict Alexander-Keels of possessing criminal tools, R.C. 2923.24, the

State had to prove the following:

(A) No person shall possess or have under the person’s control any

substance, device, instrument, or article, with purpose to use it criminally.

(B) Each of the following constitutes prima-facie evidence of

criminal purpose:

(1) Possession or control of any dangerous ordnance, or the materials

or parts for making dangerous ordnance, in the absence of circumstances

indicating the dangerous ordnance, materials, or parts are intended for

legitimate use;

1 A defendant may be convicted of possessing criminal tools and acquitted of the offense underlying the criminal tools charge. See State v. Trammer, 2005-Ohio-3852, ¶ 26-28 (8th Dist.). Further, in prosecuting a possessing criminal tools charge the State need only prove that that defendant’s purpose was to violate the law. State v. Chappell, 2010-Ohio- 5991, ¶ 22.

9. (2) Possession or control of any substance, device, instrument, or

article designed or specially adapted for criminal use;

(3) Possession or control of any substance, device, instrument, or

article commonly used for criminal purposes, under circumstances

indicating the item is intended for criminal use.

{¶ 23} In addition to the statutory elements, to secure a criminal conviction an

action must be commenced in a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and proper

venue. State v. Burley, 2020-Ohio-4603, ¶ 16-17 (6th Dist.). Subject matter is the power

of the court to hear the matter while venue refers to the appropriate place for a criminal

prosecution. Id. Venue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt unless waived by the

defendant. State v. Jackson, 2014-Ohio-3707, ¶ 143, citing State v. Headley, 6 Ohio

St.3d 475, 477 (1983). It may be proven either directly or indirectly by all the facts and

circumstances of the case. Id. at ¶ 144, citing Headley at 477.

{¶ 24} The venue statute, R.C. 2901.12, relevantly provides:

(A) The trial of a criminal case in this state shall be held in a court

having jurisdiction of the subject matter, . . . in the territory of which the

offense or any element of the offense was committed.

...

(H) When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct,

commits offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all

of those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any

10. element of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation on the

evidence that may be used to establish the course of criminal conduct, any

of the following is prima-facie evidence of a course of criminal conduct:

(1) The offenses involved the same victim, or victims of the same

type or from the same group.

(2) The offenses were committed by the offender in the offender’s

same employment, or capacity, or relationship to another.

(3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or

chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective.

(4) The offenses were committed in furtherance of the same

conspiracy.

(5) The offenses involved the same or a similar modus operandi.

(6) The offenses were committed along the offender’s line of travel

in this state, regardless of the offender’s point of origin or destination.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 25} Alexander-Keels admits that he possessed his cell phone in Wood County

and the phone was alleged to have been used in furtherance of the counterfeiting charges.

This admission is sufficient to establish venue and the possession element of the charge.

See Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also State v. Draggo, 65

Ohio St.2d 88, 90 (1981); State v. Warden, 2004-Ohio-6306, ¶ 26-37 (6th Dist.).

11. {¶ 26} As to his conviction for possessing criminal tools, the analysis turns on

whether he intended to use the cell phone criminally. As set forth above, in reviewing the

factfinder’s determination an appellate court must review all of the evidence presented at

trial. Such evidence may be direct or circumstantial. “‘Circumstantial evidence has been

defined as testimony not grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the

facts in controversy, but of other facts from which inferences are drawn, showing

indirectly the facts sought to be established.’” State v. Schoewe, 2023-Ohio-1598, ¶ 21

(6th Dist.), quoting State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.); State v. Nicely, 39

Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). Circumstantial evidence carries the same weight as direct

evidence. State v. George, 2018-Ohio-4906, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Shabazz,

2016-Ohio-1055, ¶ 18; State v. Healey, 2015-Ohio-4630, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.).

{¶ 27} Reviewing the testimony of the OSHP troopers, particularly Trooper Craig,

the documents recovered from Alexander-Keels’ cell phone and admitted at trial, and the

debit cards with fictitious names correlating with the information recovered from the

phone and mailed to Alexander-Keels’ residence, the trial court could have reasonably

found that Alexander-Keels was engaged in criminal activity and used his cell phone to

facilitate the activity.

{¶ 28} Based on the foregoing, Alexander-Keels’ first assignment of error is well-

taken, in part, and his second assignment of error is not well-taken.

12. IV. Conclusion

{¶ 29} The August 21, 2023 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common

Pleas is reversed, in part. Alexander-Keels’ conviction for two counts of counterfeiting is

reversed and vacated, his possessing criminal tools conviction is affirmed. Pursuant to

App.R. 24, the State is ordered to pay the costs incurred on appeal.

Judgment affirmed, in part reversed, in part, and vacated.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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