State v. Alejandro Cortez Estrada

• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 1, 2013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40154

STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 383 ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: March 1, 2013 ) v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk ) ALEJANDRO CORTEZ ESTRADA, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY )

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Renae J. Hoff, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of concurrent, unified thirteen- year sentences with three-year determinate terms for two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM Alejandro Cortez Estrada was convicted of two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), reduced from two counts of trafficking. The district court imposed concurrent, unified thirteen-year sentences with three-year determinate terms, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentences and placed Estrada on supervised probation. Subsequently, Estrada admitted to violating several terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentences. Estrada appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that the sentences are excessive.

1 It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871- 73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id. Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Estrada’s original sentences without modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Estrada’s previously suspended sentences is affirmed.