State v. Abney

2024 Ohio 983

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 15, 2024
• Docket: 2023-CA-49
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Abney, 2024-Ohio-983.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-49 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023-CR-0217 : CHRISTINE E. ABNEY : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on March 15, 2024

ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

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EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Christine E. Abney appeals from her convictions in the Greene County Court

of Common Pleas for domestic violence and vandalism. She argues that the trial court

erred in imposing prison sentences rather than community control. For the following

reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. -2-

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In April 2023, Abney was indicted on one count of domestic violence, a third-

degree felony, and one count of vandalism, a fourth-degree felony. The vandalism

charge related to damage she caused to a Fairborn police cruiser as she was being

transported to jail for domestic violence against her boyfriend. Abney appeared as

summoned on May 19, 2023, and she was released on her own recognizance.

{¶ 3} Approximately six weeks later, Abney pled guilty to both offenses pursuant

to a plea agreement. She also agreed to pay restitution which, according to the waiver

and plea form, amounted to $12,291.51. The State agreed to defer to a presentence

investigation report (PSI) on the sentence, but it would not be bound by that sentencing

recommendation if Abney failed to appear for sentencing. Upon accepting Abney’s plea,

the court ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled the sentencing hearing for

August 16, 2023.

{¶ 4} Prior to the hearing, defense counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum

advocating for community control. Counsel emphasized that Abney was receiving

battered woman treatment to address her mental health issues, was taking her prescribed

medication, had physical disabilities, and was no longer living with or near her boyfriend

(the victim of the offense). Counsel stated that Abney’s children provided a strong

incentive for her to comply with community control sanctions. Defense counsel further

noted that Abney was 33 years old, an age for which the recidivism rate was only two

percent. Attached to the memorandum was a letter from a victim advocate from Artemis

Center, which stated that Abney was a committed and eager participant in her intensive -3-

mandated domestic violence class. The victim advocate indicated that Abney was a

domestic violence survivor who was working to incorporate the lessons from the classes

to her own life.

{¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated that Abney had “quite

a history of mental health issues” and that she had two children under the age of ten who

were “her world.” Counsel requested community control or, alternatively, the most

lenient sentences. Speaking on her own behalf, Abney asked the trial court to consider

her children, noting that their fathers were not involved in their lives and she was all they

had. The prosecutor told the court that it was deferring to the PSI.

{¶ 6} The trial court imposed 18 months in prison on each count, to be served

concurrently. It also required Abney to pay restitution of $12,291.51 and court costs.

{¶ 7} Abney appeals from her convictions. Her sole assignment of error states

that “the trial court erred by sentencing Abney to prison time instead of community

control.”

II. Review of Abney’s Sentence

{¶ 8} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of

review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-

Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under that statute, an appellate court may increase,

reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing,

only if it “clearly and convincingly” finds either (1) that the record does not support certain

specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law. State v. Huffman,

2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-16, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6. -4-

{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not

provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view

that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State

v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39. “When reviewing

felony sentences that are imposed solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11

and R.C. 2929.12, we do not analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the

record.” State v. McDaniel, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2020-CA-3, 2021-Ohio-1519, ¶ 11, citing

State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18; Jones at ¶ 26-29.

Instead, “[w]e simply must determine whether those sentences are contrary to law.”

Dorsey at ¶ 18.

{¶ 10} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its

reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-

Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). “A sentence is contrary to law when it does

not fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the

purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99

N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 11} The record reflects that the trial court complied with its sentencing

obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. The trial court told Abney at

sentencing that it had considered the record, the oral statements, the PSI, and the

purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and that it had balanced the -5-

seriousness and recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 and the need for deterrence,

incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution. The court also informed Abney that it was

“guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, including protection of the public

from future crime by the Defendant and others, punishment of the Defendant, and to

promote effective rehabilitation of her using the minimum sanctions the Court determines

accomplishes those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local

government resources.” The court expressly found that, after considering R.C. 2929.12,

a prison sentence was consistent with the purposes of sentencing and Abney was not

amenable to community control.

{¶ 12} Moreover, the trial court was not required to impose community control for

vandalism in this case and, instead, it had the discretion to impose a prison sentence.

See R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a), (b). Abney had prior felony convictions for domestic

violence, felonious assault, and violating a protection order. She was on community

control for two of these felony offenses when the vandalism occurred, and she faced

sentencing on a third-degree felony offense (domestic violence) in this case. The 18-

month sentences fell within the authorized sentencing ranges for both of Abney’s

offenses. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) and (4). Abney’s sentences were not contrary to law.

{¶ 13} Abney argues that “[t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing in Ohio

would be better served if Abney is placed on community control sanctions instead of

placed in prison.” In essence, Abney argues that a prison sentence is not supported by

the record. Such an argument is precluded by Jones. We find no error in the trial court’s

imposition of concurrent 18-month prison sentences in this case. -6-

{¶ 14} Abney’s assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 15} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.