Finley, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the Thurston County Superior Court granting defendants’ motion [504]*504for a partial summary judgment. We have concluded there are no material issues of fact, consequently, we affirm the trial court.
Plaintiff originally requested the Attorney General to bring an action to force the disclosure of the names of persons or organizations who allegedly contributed to the Dan Evans Committee subsequent to the effective date of Washington’s campaign financial disclosure act, Initiative 276.1 The Attorney General declined to bring any action under the act, and plaintiff initiated this citizen’s action, ostensibly pursuant to RCW 42.17.400.
Following the reelection of Governor Evans in 1972, the Dan Evans Committee — whose primary purpose was to support the reelection of Governor Evans — retained in a bank account surplus campaign funds in the amount of $32,575.96. From November 8, 1972, to December 31, 1973, the Dan Evans Committee disbursed approximately $13,577.97. A very substantial portion of the moneys were expended for travel and hotel expenses for various individuals, including Governor and Mrs. Evans, and for postage, Christmas cards, dinners, and entertainment. Insofar as relevant to plaintiff’s contentions in the instant case, the following specific expenditures were made: (1) $1,322.95 for the 1972 campaign workers’ party; (2) $1,502.36 for the Snohomish County Governor’s dinner; (3) $2,287.12 for Christmas cards and envelopes; (4) $500 to the Washington Republican Club, which represented Governor Evans’ contribution to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee.2
In order to formalize the management of these funds, a declaration of trust was made on December 18, 1973. The remaining funds were placed in a trust account under the name “Dan Evans Trust.” The terms of the trust provide [505]*505that funds may be disbursed to pay travel and other expenses of a noncampaign and nongovernmental nature; i.e., reasonable and necessary expenditures not properly chargeable as state expenses incurred by Governor and Mrs. Evans in connection with his position as a public official. The terms of the trust further provide that “funds shall not be used to pay political campaign expenses.” Upon the termination of the trust, either by declaration of the trustees or in the event Governor Evans no longer remains in public office the remaining funds are to be distributed for specified eleemosynary purposes.
The focus of plaintiff’s argument is that the Dan Evans Committee, although exempt from the act’s reporting requirements prior to January 1, 1973, became a “political committee” by accepting contributions and making expenditures in 1973 after it had achieved its purpose in obtaining the reelection of Governor Evans. Therefore, plaintiff claims that the Dan Evans Committee is required to file a report of expenditures and contributions with the Public Disclosure Commission as required by the act.3
With respect to this claim, plaintiff contends that material issues of fact exist whether the Dan Evans Committee became a political committee in 1973 because, (1) it accepted contributions in 1973 from Mr. Johanson and Mr. Bain, (2) it received additional donations in 1973 that allegedly were returned to the donors, (3) it expended sums in 1973 for the 1972 campaign workers party, for Christmas cards, et cetera, and (4) it contributed $500 to the Early Birds fund. Plaintiff also contends that the Dan Evans trust is a political committee because the trust is a sham, revokable at the will of trustees who are friends of or political associates of Governor Evans.
Plaintiff’s allegation that Mr. Johanson and Mr. Bain contributed in 1973 to the Dan Evans Committee is not set out and presented to the court in any affidavit of record. Rather, plaintiff merely makes the allegation in his brief on this appeal. Rebuttal affidavits of Mr. Johanson and Mr. [506]*506Bain state that they contributed $500 in 1973 to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee. This fact is further supported by the affidavit of the chairman of the Washington Republican Central Committee.
By affidavit, plaintiff states that his belief that contributions were made by unknown donors to the Dan Evans Committee after the effective date of the act is based on “conversations with news and T.Y. reporters.”
CR 56 (e) prescribes the nature of the affidavits required to be submitted in order to substantiate the existence of material issues of fact. It provides in part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
(Italics ours.)
It is apparent that the allegations are not based upon personal knowledge and do not provide facts that would be competent evidence that a trial court should consider in ruling on-a motion for partial summary judgment. Welling v. Mount Si Bowl, Inc., 79 Wn.2d 485, 489, 487 P.2d 620 (1971); Charbonneau v. Wilbur Ellis Co., 9 Wn. App. 474, 512 P.2d 1126 (1973).
With respect to the expenditures made by the Dan Evans Committee for the 1972 campaign workers party, Christmas cards, et cetera, plaintiff argues that the committee became a “political committee” because the moneys were expended to benefit Governor Evans’ political career.
By affidavit, plaintiff stated that he “believes” that Governor Evans currently is a candidate for public office. The affiant states that this fact is based on a statement made by the Governor at the 1974 Republican State Convention as reported by a news reporter. On the other hand, Governor Evans, by affidavit, stated that he was not a candidate for election to any public office during the period from January 1, 1973, to September 30, 1974. First, it is apparent from the [507]*507record that plaintiff’s allegation is not based on personal knowledge, but upon evidence, hearsay in its nature. Therefore, this allegation does not create a material issue of fact. Secondly, it is clear from the record that Governor Evans during this period of time did not fall within the definition of a “candidate” as defined by RCW 42.17.020 (5) .4 There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the expenditures were made “with intent to promote [Governor Evans’] candidacy for office,” or that Governor Evans publicly had announced his candidacy or filed for office. Thus, these expenditures by the Dan Evans Committee during 1973 could not have resulted in transforming it into a “political committee” because the moneys were not expended to promote Governor Evans’ candidacy for office.
Plaintiff finally contends that the committee became a “political committee” because it contributed $500 to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee.
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Finley, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the Thurston County Superior Court granting defendants’ motion [504]*504for a partial summary judgment. We have concluded there are no material issues of fact, consequently, we affirm the trial court.
Plaintiff originally requested the Attorney General to bring an action to force the disclosure of the names of persons or organizations who allegedly contributed to the Dan Evans Committee subsequent to the effective date of Washington’s campaign financial disclosure act, Initiative 276.1 The Attorney General declined to bring any action under the act, and plaintiff initiated this citizen’s action, ostensibly pursuant to RCW 42.17.400.
Following the reelection of Governor Evans in 1972, the Dan Evans Committee — whose primary purpose was to support the reelection of Governor Evans — retained in a bank account surplus campaign funds in the amount of $32,575.96. From November 8, 1972, to December 31, 1973, the Dan Evans Committee disbursed approximately $13,577.97. A very substantial portion of the moneys were expended for travel and hotel expenses for various individuals, including Governor and Mrs. Evans, and for postage, Christmas cards, dinners, and entertainment. Insofar as relevant to plaintiff’s contentions in the instant case, the following specific expenditures were made: (1) $1,322.95 for the 1972 campaign workers’ party; (2) $1,502.36 for the Snohomish County Governor’s dinner; (3) $2,287.12 for Christmas cards and envelopes; (4) $500 to the Washington Republican Club, which represented Governor Evans’ contribution to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee.2
In order to formalize the management of these funds, a declaration of trust was made on December 18, 1973. The remaining funds were placed in a trust account under the name “Dan Evans Trust.” The terms of the trust provide [505]*505that funds may be disbursed to pay travel and other expenses of a noncampaign and nongovernmental nature; i.e., reasonable and necessary expenditures not properly chargeable as state expenses incurred by Governor and Mrs. Evans in connection with his position as a public official. The terms of the trust further provide that “funds shall not be used to pay political campaign expenses.” Upon the termination of the trust, either by declaration of the trustees or in the event Governor Evans no longer remains in public office the remaining funds are to be distributed for specified eleemosynary purposes.
The focus of plaintiff’s argument is that the Dan Evans Committee, although exempt from the act’s reporting requirements prior to January 1, 1973, became a “political committee” by accepting contributions and making expenditures in 1973 after it had achieved its purpose in obtaining the reelection of Governor Evans. Therefore, plaintiff claims that the Dan Evans Committee is required to file a report of expenditures and contributions with the Public Disclosure Commission as required by the act.3
With respect to this claim, plaintiff contends that material issues of fact exist whether the Dan Evans Committee became a political committee in 1973 because, (1) it accepted contributions in 1973 from Mr. Johanson and Mr. Bain, (2) it received additional donations in 1973 that allegedly were returned to the donors, (3) it expended sums in 1973 for the 1972 campaign workers party, for Christmas cards, et cetera, and (4) it contributed $500 to the Early Birds fund. Plaintiff also contends that the Dan Evans trust is a political committee because the trust is a sham, revokable at the will of trustees who are friends of or political associates of Governor Evans.
Plaintiff’s allegation that Mr. Johanson and Mr. Bain contributed in 1973 to the Dan Evans Committee is not set out and presented to the court in any affidavit of record. Rather, plaintiff merely makes the allegation in his brief on this appeal. Rebuttal affidavits of Mr. Johanson and Mr. [506]*506Bain state that they contributed $500 in 1973 to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee. This fact is further supported by the affidavit of the chairman of the Washington Republican Central Committee.
By affidavit, plaintiff states that his belief that contributions were made by unknown donors to the Dan Evans Committee after the effective date of the act is based on “conversations with news and T.Y. reporters.”
CR 56 (e) prescribes the nature of the affidavits required to be submitted in order to substantiate the existence of material issues of fact. It provides in part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
(Italics ours.)
It is apparent that the allegations are not based upon personal knowledge and do not provide facts that would be competent evidence that a trial court should consider in ruling on-a motion for partial summary judgment. Welling v. Mount Si Bowl, Inc., 79 Wn.2d 485, 489, 487 P.2d 620 (1971); Charbonneau v. Wilbur Ellis Co., 9 Wn. App. 474, 512 P.2d 1126 (1973).
With respect to the expenditures made by the Dan Evans Committee for the 1972 campaign workers party, Christmas cards, et cetera, plaintiff argues that the committee became a “political committee” because the moneys were expended to benefit Governor Evans’ political career.
By affidavit, plaintiff stated that he “believes” that Governor Evans currently is a candidate for public office. The affiant states that this fact is based on a statement made by the Governor at the 1974 Republican State Convention as reported by a news reporter. On the other hand, Governor Evans, by affidavit, stated that he was not a candidate for election to any public office during the period from January 1, 1973, to September 30, 1974. First, it is apparent from the [507]*507record that plaintiff’s allegation is not based on personal knowledge, but upon evidence, hearsay in its nature. Therefore, this allegation does not create a material issue of fact. Secondly, it is clear from the record that Governor Evans during this period of time did not fall within the definition of a “candidate” as defined by RCW 42.17.020 (5) .4 There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the expenditures were made “with intent to promote [Governor Evans’] candidacy for office,” or that Governor Evans publicly had announced his candidacy or filed for office. Thus, these expenditures by the Dan Evans Committee during 1973 could not have resulted in transforming it into a “political committee” because the moneys were not expended to promote Governor Evans’ candidacy for office.
Plaintiff finally contends that the committee became a “political committee” because it contributed $500 to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee.
RCW 42.17.020(22) defines political committee to mean
any person (except a candidate or an individual dealing with his own funds or property) having the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures in support of, or opposition to, any candidate or any ballot proposition.
Initiative 276 was designed to inform the public and its elected representatives of expenditures made by persons5 whose purpose is to influence or affect the decision-making [508]*508processes of government. See Young Americans for Freedom v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 728, 733, 522 P.2d 189 (1974); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 310, 517 P.2d 911 (1974); cf. Comment, Financial Disclosure in Washington: Election Campaigns under Initiative No. 276, 11 Willamette L.J. 99 (1974). By its definition the legislature provided .a skeletal outline of the salient characteristics of a political committee. The definition, though, was not drafted to ensnare indiscriminately all persons seeking to influence governmental decision making by their contributions given in support of or opposition to candidates or ballot propositions.
A fundamental guide to statutory construction is that the spirit or intention of the law prevails over the letter of the law. Department of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wn.2d 549, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973). Statutory provisions are interpreted in a manner so as to avoid strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal reading. Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wn.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963).
In interpreting this legislation we must keep in mind the purpose of Initiative 276 as it relates to the basic function of persons who should properly be brought within the ambit of the term “political committee.” The act seeks to ferret out, as we previously have mentioned, those whose purpose is to influence the political process and subject them to the reporting and disclosure requirements of the act in the interest of public information.
In the instant case, the Dan Evans Committee made a single contribution of $500 to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee, a political committee obligated to disclose the contribution. The record reflects no expenditures for the purpose of supporting or opposing a specific candidate or ballot proposition. No other contributions of a similar nature were made. There is no competent evidence in the record to indicate that the Dan Evans Committee solicited, received, or even had the expectation of receiving contributions to be used in support of or in opposition to candidates or ballot propositions. To [509]*509require reporting and disclosure by the Dan Evans Committee or other persons who make a single contribution to a political committee under these circumstances (in the absence of other qualitative facts) would result in an unnecessary and unreasonable duplication and extension of the act’s detailed and somewhat lengthy reporting requirements. Where the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate that the primary or one of the primary purposes of the person making the contribution is to affect, directly or indirectly, governmental decision making by supporting or opposing candidates or ballot propositions, then that person becomes a “political committee” and is subject to the act’s disclosure requirements. See Attorney General Opinion, June 8, 1973. The primary purpose of the Dan Evans Committee was not to influence the political process by supporting or opposing candidates or ballot propositions through expenditures of its funds, but to pay for miscellaneous expenses incurred by Governor Evans and his staff in connection with his position as a public official. Plaintiff’s contention to the contrary creates no material issue of fact.
Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the Dan Evans Committee was a political committee, plaintiff has raised no material issues of fact. It voluntarily reported all expenditures in its statement filed with the Public Disclosure Commission on January 31, 1974. There is no competent evidence in the record to support plaintiff’s allegation that the Dan Evans Committee received contributions subsequent to the effective date of Initiative 276. Not having received any contributions it would have no duty to report them.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Stafford, C.J., Hamilton and Utter, JJ., and Ryan, J. Pro Tern., concur.