State Real Estate Commission v. Tice

190 A.2d 188, 200 Pa. Super. 553, 1963 Pa. Super. LEXIS 687
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 18, 1963
DocketAppeal, No. 16
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 190 A.2d 188 (State Real Estate Commission v. Tice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Real Estate Commission v. Tice, 190 A.2d 188, 200 Pa. Super. 553, 1963 Pa. Super. LEXIS 687 (Pa. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

Opinion by

Ervin, J.,

This is an appeal from the order of the court below setting aside a revocation by the State Real Estate Commission of appellee’s real estate broker’s license.

[555]*555Tlie commission found that the appellee, Tice, in arranging the sale of his own property, was guilty of violating §10(a, 1) of the Real Estate Brokers License Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 1216, as amended, 63 PS §440, in that he was guilty of knowingly making substantial misrepresentations; and also of subsection (7) in that he was guilty of acts or conduct in connection with a real estate transaction which demonstrated incompetency, bad faith or dishonesty.

Tice drew up a sales agreement dated October 5, 1956 covering a newly constructed residence in the Easton area, which he and his wife agreed to sell to John W. Bartron and Florence P. Bartron, his wife, for the sum of $14,700.00. The agreement also provided for a down payment of $1,200.00 on the signing of the agreement and a further sum of $1,800.00 in cash on or before November 5, 1956. The balance of $11,-700.00 was to be covered by an FHA mortgage for a period of thirty years. The Bartrons also agreed to pay the further sum of $300.00 on account of settlement costs. The agreement also provided that possession was to be given when the down payment of $3,-000.00 had been made. Notwithstanding the agreement, the Bartrons were permitted to go into possession immediately upon paying the $1,200.00 and signing the agreement of sale.

The parties agreed that the Bartrons were to pay $100.00 a month for eight months. Tice agreed to loan the Bartrons the remaining $1,000.00 of the down payment and to cover settlement costs on the security of a judgment note, which he took from the Bartrons in the sum of $2,000.00. The Bartrons had advised Tice that they had only $1,200.00 cash for the down payment. Tice advised the Bartrons that would be sufficient to enable them to make the purchase.

Tice sought to obtain the FHA insured mortgage provided for in the agreement of sale in March 1957, [556]*556approximately six mouths after . the execution of the agreement of sale. A meeting was arranged between the purchasers and an officer of Phillipsbdrg Trust Company for the purpose' of preparing an application to FHA to qualify the Barfcrons as eligible insured mortgagors. In accordance with the FHA regulations1 the Bartrons were asked a series of questions to determine whether or not the funds used .to pay both the down payment of $3,000.00 and the settlement costs of $300.00 specified in the agreement of sale, had been financed.

To implement the down payment requirement various procedures are employed by FHA. Before approving a mortgage insurance application, FHA requires the prospective mortgagor to execute a form entitled “Supplement to Mortgagee’s Application, and Mortgagor’s Statement,” sometimes referred to as FHA Form No. 2004(c). This form requires all costs and settlement expenses of the purchase to be itemized and the amount of cash invested by the mortgagor to be specified. With respect to this cash investment, the form asks the following questions: “Have you incurred or do you intend to incur any indebtedness, secured or unsecured, other than that of the mortgage loan applied for, for any purpose connected with this transaction . . . □ Yes □ No. If Answer is Wes’ give complete [557]*557details, including description of any security offered 55

The prohibition against financing the down payment is also enforced by requiring the borrower to execute a certification of the type given by the purchasers in the instant case. The certification which they signed provided as follows: “This is to certify that the cash payment of $3,000.00 that we made to Howard R. Tice represented:

“Cash on hand and in supplemental funds
“In making the above statement, we are aware of the conditions as outlined in Section #512(a) of the National Housing Act as it appears on the FHA application that we signed namely Form #2004.”

Should any representations concerning the down payment be falsely made in the certification or application, §1010 of Title IS, U.S.C.A.2 is applicable. This section makes it a crime for any person to make any false statement in applying for FHA mortgage insurance or to “aid or abet” such action.3

Tice, who had earlier directed the Bartrons “not to say anything” at this meeting, falsely answered these questions on their behalf. He stated that all of the amounts in question had been paid to him by the Bar-trons, in cash, out of assets on hand. In addition, he submitted a certification as to the source of funds required by FHA, duly signed by the Bartrons. Following this meeting the Bartrons, without the knowledge of Tice, talked to the bank officer in order to correct the misstatements which had been made at the meeting. Their application for the FHA mortgage was disapproved. About six months thereafter Tice arranged a second mortgage application meeting for the Bartrons at the Easton Trust Company. Without giving the de[558]*558tails of this second attempt to secure an FHA mortgage, suffice it to say that it did not go through because the Bartrons refused to sign a new agreement of sale for the purchase of the property and refused, upon the advice of their attorney, to be a party to any further attempt to circumvent the FHA regulations.

We are convinced that the record in this case clearly reveals that Tice purposely endeavored to sell his own property with secondary financing of a portion of the down payment axxd settlement costs, contrary to the statutes and regulations governing FHA mortgage insurance transactions. There can be no doubt that he made substantial misrepresen ta tion s to the bank officer concerning this transaction and there can be no doubt that he endeavored to indxxce the Bartrons to make misstatements in the form which they were required to sign.

Counsel for Tice argues that there was not adequate proof to show that these representations were “knowingly” made, as is required by the specific terms of the act above referred to. The record shows that Tice has been a broker since 1836 and a builder of many residential properties for many years. He had had negotiations for FITA loans, prior to the time when he met the Bartrons, for 58 houses in the same development. It is inconceivable that this experience would xiot have brought him in contact with the FHA procedure and regulations on the subject of financing down payments. His own testimony revealed this knowledge. In answer to a question as to whether the secondary financing would have been grounds for the refusal of the Bartron application for an FHA loan, he testified: “Well, there was to be no secondary papers, that is true. I know what you are arriving at.”

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Tice was ignorant of the requirements, sxxch ignorance would constitute the type of incompetence contemplated by [559]*559clause (7) of §10(a) of the Real Estate Brokers License Act. His actions in endeavoring to induce the Bartrons to make misstatements in the forms which they were required to sign is conduct in connection with a real estate transaction which demonstrates incompetence, had faith or dishonesty.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
190 A.2d 188, 200 Pa. Super. 553, 1963 Pa. Super. LEXIS 687, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-real-estate-commission-v-tice-pasuperct-1963.