State of West Virginia, et al. v. Letitia James, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. New York
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00168
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 1:25-cv-00168 (BKS/DJS)

v.

LETITIA JAMES, et al.,

Defendants.

Appearances:

For Plaintiff State of West Virginia: John B. McCuskey Attorney General of West Virginia Michael R. Williams Solicitor General Caleb B. David Deputy Solicitor General Spencer J. Davenport Assistant Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General of West Virginia State Capitol Complex Building 1, Room E-26 1900 Kanawha Blvd. E Charleston, WV 25301

For Plaintiff State of Alabama: Steve Marshall Attorney General of Alabama Robert M. Overing Deputy Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General of Alabama 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130

For Plaintiff State of Arkansas: Tim Griffin Attorney General of Arkansas Autumn Hamit Patterson Solicitor General Office of the Arkansas Attorney General 323 Center St., Suite 200 Little Rock, AR 72201

For Plaintiff State of Georgia: Christopher M. Carr Attorney General of Georgia Stephen J. Petrany Solicitor General Elijah O’Kelley Assistant Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General of Georgia 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, Georgia 30334

For Plaintiff State of Idaho: Raúl R. Labrador Attorney General of Idaho Michael A. Zarian Deputy Solicitor General Office of the Idaho Attorney General 700 W. Jefferson St., Suite 210, P.O. Box 83720 Boise, Idaho 83720

For Plaintiff State of Iowa: Brenna Bird Attorney General of Iowa Eric H. Wessan Solicitor General 1305 E. Walnut Street Des Moines, Iowa 50319

For Plaintiff State of Kansas: Kris W. Kobach Attorney General of Kansas Anthony J. Powell Solicitor General Office of the Kansas Attorney General Memorial Building, 2nd Floor 120 SW 10th Avenue Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597

For Plaintiff Commonwealth of Kentucky: Russell Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Victor B. Maddox Jason P. Woodall Kentucky Office of the Attorney General 310 Whittington Parkway, Suite 101 Louisville, KY 40222

For Plaintiff State of Louisiana: Liz Murrill Attorney General of Louisiana J. Benjamin Aguiñaga Solicitor General Office of the Louisiana Attorney General 1885 N. Third Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802

For Plaintiff State of Mississippi: Lynn Fitch Attorney General of Mississippi Justin L. Matheny Deputy Solicitor General Mississippi Attorney General’s Office P.O. Box 220 Jackson, MS 39205-0220

For Plaintiff State of Missouri: Andrew Bailey Attorney General of Missouri Louis J. Capozzi Solicitor General Office of the Missouri Attorney General 815 Olive Street St Louis, MO 63101

For Plaintiff State of Montana: Austin Knudsen Attorney General of Montana Christian B. Corrigan Solicitor General Montana Department of Justice 215 N. Sanders Street Helena, Montana 59601

For Plaintiff State of Nebraska: Michael T. Hilgers Attorney General of Nebraska Zachary A. Viglianco Principal Deputy Solicitor General Nebraska Department of Justice 2115 State Capitol Lincoln, Nebraska 68509

For Plaintiff State of North Dakota: Drew H. Wrigley Attorney General of North Dakota Philip Axt Solicitor General 600 E. Boulevard Ave., Dept. 125 Bismarck, ND 58505

For Plaintiff State of Ohio: Dave Yost Attorney General of Ohio Mathura Sridharan Solicitor General 30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215

For Plaintiff State of Oklahoma: Gentner Drummond Attorney General of Oklahoma Garry M. Gaskins, II Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General of Oklahoma 313 N.E. 21st Street Oklahoma City, OK 73105

For Plaintiff State of South Carolina: Alan Wilson Attorney General of South Carolina J. Emory Smith, Jr. Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General of South Carolina Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211

For Plaintiff State of South Dakota: Marty J. Jackley Attorney General of South Dakota Amanda J. Miiller Deputy Attorney General South Dakota Attorney General’s Office 1302 E. Highway 14, Suite 1 Pierre, South Dakota 57501 For Plaintiff State of Tennessee: Jonathan Skrmetti Attorney General and Reporter of Tennessee J. Matthew Rice Solicitor General Office of the Tennessee Attorney General P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202

For Plaintiff State of Texas: Ken Paxton Attorney General of Texas Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General Ralph Molina Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Austin Kinghorn Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Ryan G. Kercher Chief, Special Litigation Division Zachary Berg Special Counsel Kathleen T. Hunker Special Counsel Office of the Attorney General of Texas Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548

For Plaintiff State of Utah: Derek E. Brown Attorney General of Utah Gary T. Wight Assistant Attorney General 1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

For Plaintiff State of Wyoming: Keith G. Kautz Attorney General of Wyoming Ryan Schelhaas Chief Deputy Attorney General Office of the Wyoming Attorney General 109 State Capitol Cheyenne, WY 82002 For Plaintiff West Virgina Coal Association and America’s Coal Associations: Robert G. McLusky Christopher M. Hunter Jackson Kelly, PLLC 1600 Laidley Tower Post Office Box 553 Charleston, West Virginia 25322

For Plaintiff Gas and Oil Association of West Virginia, Inc.: Ivan L. London William E. Trachman Alexander Khoury Mountain States Legal Foundation 2596 South Lewis Way Lakewood, CO 80227

For Plaintiff Alpha Metallurgical Resources, Inc.: Michael W. Kirk Adam P. Laxalt Brian W. Barnes Megan M. Wold Cooper & Kirk, PLLC 1523 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C., 20036

For Defendants: Letitia James Attorney General for the State of New York Joya C. Sonnenfeldt Assistant Attorney General 28 Liberty Street New York, NY 10005

For Proposed Defendant-Intervenors West Harlem Environmental Action, Inc., Black Farmers United-New York State, Inc., Citizens Campaign for the Environment, and Catskill Mountainkeeper: Michelle Wu Mitchell S. Bernard Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 40 West 20th Street, 11th Floor New York, NY 10011

Dror Ladin Earthjustice 48 Wall Street, 15th Floor New York, NY 10005

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Judge: MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, representing twenty-two states and four industry groups, bring this action raising numerous federal and state constitutional challenges to New York State’s Climate Change Superfund Act (“the Act”). (Dkt. No. 125, at 1-2). Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants Letitia James, in her official capacity as Attorney General of New York, Amanda Lefton, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, and Amanda Hiller, in her official capacity as Acting Tax Commissioner of the New York State Department of Taxation. (Id.). On April 11, 2025, four nonprofit organizations – West Harlem Environmental Action, Inc., Black Farmers United-New York State, Inc., Citizens Campaign for the Environment, and Catskill Mountainkeeper – filed a motion for permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(b)(1)(B) to defend the Act. (Dkt. No. 130). Plaintiffs opposed the motion. (Dkt. No. 153). This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart who, on September 3, 2025, issued a Report-Recommendation and Order recommending that the motion be denied. (Dkt. No. 187). The proposed intervenors filed timely objections to the Report- Recommendation, to which Plaintiffs have responded. (Dkt. Nos. 194, 201). For the reasons that follow, the Report-Recommendation is adopted in its entirety. II. BACKGROUND In 2024, New York enacted the “Climate Change Superfund Act,” which establishes “a climate change adaptation cost recovery program that will require companies that have contributed significantly to the buildup of climate change-driving greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to bear a proportionate share of the cost of infrastructure investments and other

expenses necessary for comprehensive adaptation to the impacts of climate change in New York state.” See Climate Change Superfund Act, ch. 679, 2024 N.Y. Sess. Laws (S. 2129-B); see also N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law § 76-0103. Plaintiffs challenge the Act on the grounds that it is preempted under the Supremacy Clause and the Clean Air Act, and that it violates (1) the Commerce Clause, (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) the Due Process Clause of Article One § 6 of the New York Constitution, (4) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (5) the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, (6) the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and (6) the Takings Clause of Article One § 7 of the New York Constitution. (See Dkt. No. 125, at 40-84). Proposed intervenors are nonprofit organizations “devoted to addressing various aspects

of the climate crisis, including adaptation and resilience.” (Dkt. No. 130-1, at 6). Proposed intervenors assert that they “stand to benefit from implementation of the Act and seek intervention to defend their interests and aid the Court’s just and equitable adjudication of Plaintiffs’ efforts to strike down this important statute.” (Id.). Proposed intervenors argue that their “defense shares common questions of law with the main action[,]” and that they “intend to address the fundamental legal questions presented by Plaintiffs by showing the Climate Change Superfund Act is constitutional and is not preempted.” (Id. at 13-14). This action was recently consolidated with another action, Chamber of Com. v. James, No. 25-cv-01307 (N.D.N.Y. consolidated Oct. 20, 2025). (See Dkt. No. 204). In that action, Plaintiffs Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Petroleum Institute, National Mining Association, and the Business Council of New York State, Inc., similarly argue that the Act is preempted under the Supremacy Clause and the Clean Air Act, and that it violates the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Excessive Fines Clause, and the Takings

Clause. Chamber of Com. v. James, No. 25-cv-01307 (N.D.N.Y. consolidated Oct. 20, 2025) (Dkt. No. 1, at 39-88). A briefing schedule has been set for cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the preemption issues. (See Dkt. Nos. 193, 203, 204). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228-29 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A proper objection is one that identifies the specific portions of the [Report-Recommendation] that the objector asserts are erroneous and provides a basis for this assertion.” Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 976 F. Supp. 2d 290, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). Properly raised

objections must be “specific and clearly aimed at particular findings” in the report. Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Findings and recommendations as to which there was no properly preserved objection are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 487. IV. DISCUSSION As Magistrate Judge Stewart observed, “[t]he Second Circuit has recognized that a number of factors should be considered in evaluating intervention generally under Rule 24.” (Dkt. No. 187, at 3). Specifically, the Second Circuit has held that to be granted intervention as of right or by permission, “an applicant must (1) timely file an application, (2) show an interest in the action, (3) demonstrate that the interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action, and (4) show that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to the action.” (Id. at 3-4 (quoting Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1057 (2d Cir. 2014))). “In addition to the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), courts consider other factors in determining whether permissive

intervention is appropriate,” including: (1) whether the applicant will benefit by intervention, (2) the nature and extent of the intervenors' interests, (3) whether [the intervenors'] interests are adequately represented by the other parties, and (4) whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.

Kearns v. Cuomo, No. 19-cv-00902, 2019 WL 5060623, at *4, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175384, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2019) (quoting Ass'n of Conn. Lobbyists LLC v. Garfield, 241 F.R.D. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 2007)). Weighing those factors, Magistrate Judge Stewart reasoned that proposed intervenors’ application was “clearly timely,” and expressed “little doubt that [proposed intervenors] have a legitimate interest in the defense of this action.” (Dkt. No. 187, at 4). But Magistrate Judge Stewart concluded that other relevant factors, “in particular the extent to which the proposed intervenors’ interests are not already adequately represented in this case and the risk that permitting intervention may have on the orderly litigation of these important issues,” weighed against granting proposed intervenors’ motion. (Id.). Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that the proposed intervenors “offer[ed] no basis for finding that their intervention is necessary for resolution of [the] legal questions” concerning the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, and that the State Defendants would vigorously and competently pursue the proposed intervenors’ objective. (Id. at 5-6). Proposed intervenors object to several aspects of Magistrate Judge Stewart’s analysis in weighing these factors. (See generally Dkt. No. 194). The Report-Recommendation’s findings and conclusions are summarized as relevant throughout the Discussion. A. State Defendants’ Consent

Proposed intervenors argue that “a significant conclusion” in Magistrate Judge Stewart’s Report-Recommendation “was based on a factual error[.]” (Dkt. No. 194, at 4). On July 1, 2025, proposed intervenors brought Magistrate Judge Stewart’s attention to a “recent order granting two nonprofit organizations permission to intervene defensively in a challenge to Vermont’s Climate Superfund Act.” (Dkt. No. 175, at 1 (citing Chamber of Com. v. Moore, No. 24-cv- 01513, 2025 WL 1795803, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518 (D. Vt. June 30, 2025))).1 As relevant here, the Court in Moore noted that “[w]hile not dispositive, a state’s consent to intervention may be seen as an acknowledgement that [the proposed intervenors] might ‘be able to advocate for aspects of the case that are outside of the State’s purview, or beyond its area of expertise.’” Moore, 2025 WL 1795803, at *3, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518, at *15 (quoting Green

Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Torti, No. 05-CV-302, 2006 WL 8567240, at *5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119084, at *16-17 (D. Vt. May 3, 2006)). In his Report- Recommendation, however, Magistrate Judge Stewart distinguished Moore: he found that the court in that case “was clearly influenced by the consent of the state officials named as [the d]efendants to the request to intervene[,]” while the named Defendants in this action had not “noted their consent to the intervention request.” (Dkt. No. 187, at 7-8 (citing Moore, 2025 WL 1795803, at *3, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518, at *15)).

1 In Moore, the District of Vermont granted a motion for permissive intervention filed by organizations “who allege[d] their members have been harmed by climate change and could benefit from the implementation of [Vermont’s] Climate Superfund Act.” Moore, 2025 WL 1795803, at *1, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518, at *9. Proposed intervenors contend that Magistrate Judge Stewart “misapprehend[ded]” that the State Defendants did not consent to proposed intervenors’ motion, “when in fact the State Defendants did consent” to intervention. (Dkt. No. 194, at 4 (citing Dkt. Nos. 187, at 8)). Proposed intervenors cite to representations they made in their motion to intervene that

Defendants consented to the intervention requested. (Dkt. Nos. 130, at 2; 130-1, at 6 n.1). On September 17, 2025, following the issuance of the Report-Recommendation, State Defendants filed a letter “to confirm” that the State “did consent” to proposed intervenors’ motion. (Dkt. No. 195). Proposed intervenors argue that Magistrate Judge Stewart’s “misapprehension” of the State Defendants’ consent was a “material error.” (Dkt. No. 194, at 5). Plaintiffs argue that the “error was a minor one” because the Report-Recommendation “discussed consent only briefly” and “rested on multiple independent grounds[.]” (Dkt. No. 201, at 5-7). Further, Plaintiffs assert that consent “is neither dispositive nor particularly influential when other factors weigh against intervention, like they do here.” (Id. at 6). The Court does not read Magistrate Judge Stewart’s observation—that “the named

Defendants ha[d] not noted their consent to the intervention request”—as erroneous. (See Dkt. No. 187, at 8). While proposed intervenors’ motion and memorandum of law indicate the named Defendants’ consent to intervention, (see Dkt. No. 194, at 4-5 (citing Dkt. Nos. 130, at 2; 130-1, at 6 n.1)), Defendants did not note their consent on the record until after Magistrate Judge Stewart issued the Report-Recommendation, (see Dkt. No. 195). In any event, on de novo review, and considering the State Defendants’ consent, the Court does not find their consent dispositive. “Permissive intervention is wholly within the court's discretion,” Green v. Biden, No. 24- cv-1975, 2024 WL 4932751, at *3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217562, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2024), and “each intervention case is highly fact specific and tends to resist comparison to prior cases[,]” Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Pepsico, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 130, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 262 F.R.D. 348, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Plaintiffs correctly note that “other factors weighed in favor of intervention” in Moore:

“Vermont’s superfund scheme imposes a to-be-determined penalty” that is tied to the cost of certain harms caused by climate change, and therefore the intervening nonprofits in Moore “may be better situated to advocate for their members” who bear those costs. (Dkt. No. 201, at 6-7 (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 598(b), 599c)). Here, in contrast, proposed intervenors have not identified any such aspect of the New York Act that is specifically tied to their members, nor any other aspect that is “outside of the State's purview, or beyond its area of expertise[.]]” See Moore, 2025 WL 1795803, at *3, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518, at *15. Proposed intervenors have not shown that they are likely to possess information necessary to develop a factual record. They have not responded to Magistrate Judge Stewart’s concern that “given the nature of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims . . . significant discovery is

[not] likely to be necessary or beneficial in litigating the matter.” (Dkt. No. 187, at 5). The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart’s observation that proposed intervenors “offer no basis for finding that their intervention is necessary for resolution of” the particular legal questions arising out of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. (See id.). See also Kearns, 2019 WL 5060623, at *6, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175384, at *19 (“When viewed against the backdrop that the resolution of the pending motions will be driven by a legal analysis and application of the law—as opposed to the policy considerations advanced by the [ ] proposed intervenors in their motion papers—the Court is not persuaded that it should exercise its discretion and allow permissive intervention, at least at this stage of the litigation.”). B. Delay Proposed intervenors’ next two objections pertain to Magistrate Judge Stewart’s analysis of the effect of intervention on the “orderly litigation of these important issues[.]” (Dkt. No. 187, at 4). First, proposed intervenors argue that Magistrate Judge Stewart was wrong to reason that,

“because the subject of this litigation is of broad societal concern, granting [proposed intervenors’] motion would likely result in further applications for intervention that would delay the litigation and present case management concerns.” (Dkt. No. 194, at 5 (citing Dkt. No. 187, at 4-5)). Second, and relatedly, proposed intervenors disagree with Magistrate Judge Stewart’s reasoning that permitting intervention “would complicate the principal parties’ efforts to coordinate scheduling and move the case forward expeditiously.” (Id. at 6 (citing Dkt. No. 187, at 5-6)). Proposed intervenors assert they are “prepared to adhere to any court-ordered briefing schedule,” and that the Court “will have ample time to resolve the case before any obligations are imposed” because “the agency’s implementing regulations are not due until 2027, and cost recovery payments [ ] are not due until the end of 2028.” (Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted)).

Plaintiffs disagree on both counts. Plaintiffs argue that “intervention would complicate a process that is quickly becoming more complicated” because the Southern District of New York recently transferred a similar lawsuit to the Northern District, (see Dkt. No. 201, at 9), which has since been consolidated with this case, see Chamber of Com. v. James, No. 25-cv-01307 (N.D.N.Y. consolidated Oct. 20, 2025). Further, Plaintiffs assert that proposed intervenors are wrong to assume that the Court has “ample time to resolve the case before any obligations are imposed, (see Dkt. No. 194, at 7), because “targeted parties must factor New York’s punitive penalties into their current business planning[,]” (Dkt. No. 201, at 9). The Second Circuit has explained that “[t]he principal guide in deciding whether to grant permissive intervention is whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Additional parties always take

additional time which may result in delay, but this does not mean that intervention should be denied. The rule requires the court to consider whether intervention will ‘unduly delay’ the adjudication.” Ass’n of Connecticut Lobbyists LLC v. Garfield, 241 F.R.D. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 2007) (quoting 7C Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1913 (2d ed. 1986)). “Concerns about undue delay and complication resulting from permissive intervention are acute where[,]” as here, “the Government [ ] is a party to the underlying action.” See S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., No. 03-cv-2937, 2003 WL 22000340, at *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14611, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003). After weighing the relevant factors, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that permissive intervention is not appropriate in this case. Given that climate change is a subject of

interest to society writ large, Magistrate Judge Stewart’s concerns regarding further requests for intervention have real merit. (See Dkt. No. 187, at 4-5). Proposed intervenors argue that Kearns is distinguishable because in that case, “numerous third parties” had already “sought leave of court to become involved in various ways,” (Dkt. No. 194, at 5-6). But each intervention case is fact-specific. And, in any event, the court’s analysis in Kearns did not explicitly, nor solely, rely on the fact that other third parties had previously sought to intervene. See 2019 WL 5060623, at *6, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175384, at *18-19 (denying permissive intervention where, “[g]iven the significant interest of various third parties in this litigation, granting permissive intervention to the [ ] proposed intervenors would likely result in further requests for permissive intervention which may ultimately delay the litigation and present obstacles to its manageability” (emphasis added)). The Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that this case has already been complicated by its consolidation with Chamber of Com. v. James, No. 25-cv-01307 (N.D.N.Y. consolidated Oct. 20, 2025).2 Finally, as Magistrate Judge Stewart noted, “it is likely ‘that the ultimate objective of the

[ ] proposed intervenors [will be] vigorously and competently pursued by Defendants as represented by the New York State Attorney General and Solicitor General.’” (Dkt. No. 187, at 6 (citing Kearns, 2019 WL 5060623, at *6, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175384, at *19)). Having reviewed the proposed intervenors’ objections de novo, the Court declines in its discretion to grant permissive intervention. Because proposed intervenors’ interests will be vigorously defended by the State Defendants—as proposed intervenors themselves acknowledge, (see Dkt. No. 194, at 5)—and because, as noted above, proposed intervenors have not identified a specific aspect of this case that is outside the State’s purview or expertise, the Court agrees that the risk of delay and further complication weighs in favor of denying proposed intervenors’ motion in this case.

C. Amici Status Magistrate Judge Stewart reasoned that proposed intervenors could present their legal arguments “just as effectively in an amicus curiae capacity.” (Dkt. No. 187, at 7). Proposed intervenors argue that “amici status is a poor fit” because their “unique and substantial interests in the case [ ] are not limited to a single phase of this litigation or a single issue.” (Dkt. No. 194,

2 The Court is aware of another case, United States v. New York, 25-cv-03656 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 1, 2025), which is still pending in the Southern District and shares claims in common with this action, see United States v. New York, No. 25-cv-3656, 2025 WL 2208941, at *1, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149744, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025). The court in that case denied the State defendants’ motion to transfer the action to the Northern District. Id., 2025 WL 2208941, at *5, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149744, at *12. That court also recently denied a motion to intervene from several proposed intervenors in this case, including West Harlem Environmental Action, Inc., Citizens Campaign for the Environment, and Catskill Mountainkeeper. See United States v. New York, No. 25-cv-3656, 2025 WL 3022856, at *1, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216154, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2025). at 7). Plaintiffs disagree, asserting that proposed intervenors “do not explain why their ‘unique and substantial interests’ make amici status a poor fit.” (Dkt. No. 201, at 10). The Court agrees that proposed intervenors have not sufficiently explained why amici status would not permit them to adequately present their arguments to the Court. “The usual

rationale for amicus curiae submissions is that they are of aid to the court and offer insights not available from the parties.” Kearns, 2019 WL 5060623, at *5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175384, at *13 (quoting United States v. El–Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 957 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). This is precisely what proposed intervenors offer the Court in their original motion. (See Dkt. No. 130-1, at 18-19 (arguing that proposed intervenors will contribute to the equitable adjudication of the case “[g]iven their unique perspectives and deep experience with the issues the Act is designed to address[,]” and that they “will provide the Court with a ‘fuller picture’ of the public interest at stake” (citations omitted))). Granting proposed intervenors amici status could “ensure that the Court benefits from any additional information [proposed intervenors] may have, while avoiding the duplicative and unnecessary litigation that would arise” if the Court permitted proposed

intervenors to proceed as separate defendants. See Bldg. & Realty Inst. of Westchester & Putnam Ctys., Inc. v. New York, No. 19-cv-11285, 2020 WL 5667181, at *8, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174574, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., No. 96-cv-08414, 2009 WL 2972997, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84677, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009)).3 Proposed intervenors have not identified any other objection to Magistrate Judge Stewart’s recommendation that their motion to intervene be denied. The Court has therefore reviewed the remaining portion of the Report-Recommendation for clear error, and found none.

3 The Court notes that, if proposed intervenors seek to file an amicus curiae brief, they must seek leave of Court in compliance with this Court’s local rules. See generally L.R. 7.2. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. V. CONCLUSION For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Stewart’s Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 187) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons stated therein; and it is further ORDERED that Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ motion to intervene (Dkt. No. 130) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2025 Syracuse, New York AeA ab é. nnuBs Brenda K. Sannes Chief U.S. District Judge