State of Washington v. Vincent Anthony Garrison

Opinion

FILED

AUGUST 25, 2026

In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40498-6-III )

Respondent, )

)

v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION )

VINCENT ANTHONY GARRISON, )

)

Appellant. )

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — A jury acquitted Vincent Garrison of controlled substance homicide but convicted him of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. On appeal, Garrison argues that his conviction violates the corpus delicti doctrine because there is no evidence beyond his statements to law enforcement that he delivered a controlled substance. We agree. We reverse Garrison’s unlawful delivery conviction and remand for the trial court to dismiss that charge with prejudice.

State v. Garrison

FACTS

To more cleanly present the corpus delicti issue, our statement of facts omits the incriminating statements Vincent Garrison made to law enforcement officers.

The State charged Garrison with controlled substance homicide and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. At trial, the State called Mike Harris, a firefighter who responded to the overdose death of Garrison’s girlfriend, Karina Cadengo. When Harris arrived at Garrison’s trailer, he saw emergency responders performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Cadengo. She did not have a pulse at the time, and they were unsuccessful in resuscitating her.

The State also called Cody Quantrell, a deputy sheriff who responded to the scene.

Deputy Quantrell saw Garrison at the scene and noted he was emotional and crying. Garrison told the deputy he had been dating Cadengo for six months, she and he had cleaned the trailer the day before, they fell asleep, and when he awoke he discovered that her face was blue.

The State called Detective Ramona Bolanos. She assisted with the execution of a search warrant for the trailer. Once inside, she noticed drug paraphernalia, including numerous empty “baggies,” pieces of foil, and an empty can of Narcan that had been used. Narcan reverses the effects of an opiate overdose. At trial, the detective identified

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several pictures, including pictures of the substances in the trailer that field-tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl.

Deputy Quantrell also assisted the search inside the trailer. He saw burnt foil, smoking devices, scales, and plastic baggies. In addition, deputies found a “big white bag . . . full of [a] white powdery substance” that field-tested positive for fentanyl. Rep. of Proc. (May 31, 2024) at 342.

The State’s witnesses included the forensic pathologist who performed Cadengo’s autopsy. He testified she died from lethal amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine, and fentanyl.

In closing arguments, the State argued that Garrison gave Cadengo the drugs that killed her. In rebuttal closing, the State argued that it made no difference whether Garrison gave the drugs to Cadengo or if he left them out for her use.

The jury acquitted Garrison of controlled substance homicide but found him guilty of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.

Garrison appeals to this court.

ANALYSIS

Garrison raises three issues on appeal. The first issue involves the corpus delicti doctrine and is dispositive. He argues the State failed to present independent evidence

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corroborating his statements to law enforcement, rendering his conviction a nullity. We agree and do not address the other two issues.

The corpus delicti doctrine “was established by courts to protect defendants from the possibility of an unjust conviction based on a false confession alone.” State v. Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d 356, 373, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022). The doctrine requires the State to produce more than a defendant’s incriminating statements; it must produce independent evidence to support the inference that a crime took place apart from the defendant’s own confession. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 252, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). The evidence must independently corroborate or confirm a defendant’s incriminating statement. State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 328-29, 150 P.3d 59 (2006).

The independent evidence must satisfy the sufficiency of the evidence standard and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 262-63. We assume the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. at 264. The independent evidence is sufficient if it supports a logical and reasonable inference of the facts the State seeks to prove. Id. Corpus delicti can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 655, 927 P.2d 210 (1996). Inferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation. State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318

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(2013). If the conviction rests solely on uncorroborated statements from the defendant, an appellate court must reverse and dismiss the conviction. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 260.

The State charged Garrison with delivery of a controlled substance.

Methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine are all controlled substances. RCW 69.50.206(b)(4), (c)(9), (d)(2). Therefore, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Garrison (1) delivered one or more of the controlled substances to Cadengo and (2) knew the substance delivered was a controlled substance. State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 849-50, 72 P.3d 748 (2003). The parties dispute whether the State proved the first element.

“Deliver” or “delivery” means the actual or constructive transfer from one person to another of a substance. Former RCW 69.50.101(q) (2023), recodified as RCW 69.50.101(17) (LAWS OF 2024, ch. 62, § 17, effective. Jan. 1, 2025). Transfer means “‘to cause to pass from one person or thing to another,’ as well as ‘to carry or take from one person or place to another.’” State v. Martinez, 123 Wn. App. 841, 846-47, 99 P.3d 418 (2004) (quoting State v. Campbell, 59 Wn. App. 61, 64, 795 P.2d 750 (1990)). Constructive transfer is “‘the transfer of a controlled substance either belonging to the defendant or under his direct or indirect control, by some other person or manner at the

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instance or direction of the defendant.’” Campbell, 59 Wn. App. at 63 (quoting Davila v. State, 664 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).

Cadengo’s autopsy results showed she had methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine in her blood. Therefore, if there is independent evidence that Garrison delivered any of those drugs to Cadengo, the corpus delicti doctrine might be satisfied. Both actual and constructive delivery require the transferor to “actively relinquish” possession and control to the transferee. State v. Morris, 77 Wn. App. 948, 951, 896 P.2d 81 (1995).

The State argues that independent evidence—the baggies, the scales, and the large amount of fentanyl—shows that Garrison was in the business of manufacturing drugs. Impliedly, the State argues that a person who manufacturers drugs actively relinquishes possession of the drugs to the user, thus satisfying the delivery requirement. We agree with the State’s implied argument. But we disagree, in this case, that the State has satisfied corpus delicti principles.

Recall, the corpus delicti doctrine requires independent evidence to corroborate a defendant’s incriminating statements. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328-29. Garrison’s incriminating statements involved how the drugs were purchased; he never said or implied that he manufactured the drugs found in Cadengo’s blood. Evidence that

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Garrison was in the business of manufacturing drugs does not corroborate his statements concerning the purchase of the drugs.

Moreover, no witness testified that Garrison was in the business of manufacturing drugs. Whether the presence of baggies, scales, and a large amount of fentanyl found inside Garrison’s trailer was consistent with manufacturing drugs is not something within a lay person’s general knowledge. Thus, only speculation supports the State’s argument that Garrison manufactured one or more of the drugs ingested by Cadengo.1 Speculation is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d at 16.

We reverse Garrison’s conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. Reversal for insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal and bars retrial for the same offense. State v. Wright, 165 Wn.2d 783, 792, 203 P.3d 1027 (2009). We thus remand for the trial court to dismiss the delivery charge with prejudice.

1 One might reasonably question whether the State is entitled to a favorable inference that Garrison manufactured any of the drugs ingested by Cadengo. Appellate courts grant the party who prevailed below favorable inferences from the evidence because a jury had considered the evidence at trial and presumably found it convincing. Here, however, the question of whether Garrison manufactured one of the drugs ingested by Cadengo was not considered by the jury because (1) this was not the State’s theory, (2) no evidence beyond speculation supported it, and (3) the notion that Garrison manufactured the drugs contradicted his statements concerning their purchase.

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Reverse and remand for dismissal with prejudice.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

_________________________________

Lawrence-Berrey, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________ _________________________________ Murphy, J. Hill, J.