FILED
NOV. 21,2013
In tbe Office of tbe Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30763-8-III ) Respondent and ) Cross-Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) SALVADOR GARCIA SANCHEZ, )
)
Appellant. )
KULIK, J. - Salvador Garcia Sanchez appeals his convictions for intimidating a
witness, harassment, second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon, and riot
while armed with a deadly weapon. He contends the trial court exceeded its authority in
allowing the jury to consider gang aggravator evidence and that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to timely move to bifurcate the gang enhancement from the trial on
the substantive offenses. Additionally, he contends the State failed to prove the witness
intimidation charge and that the charging documents and ''to convict" instructions were
constitutionally deficient for failing to include the ''true threat" element. In a pro se
statement of additional grounds, he contends insufficient evidence supports his No.30763-8-II1 State v. Garcia Sanchez
convictions for felony riot and second degree assault. Finally, the State cross appeals the
trial court's pretrial dismissal of a gang enhancement. We conclude that all of Mr. Garcia
Sanchez's contentions are without merit and accordingly affirm the trial court.
FACTS
The charges in this case arose from four incidents that occurred over a six-month
period. The first incident occurred on October 31, 2010, when Salvador Garcia Sanchez,
Jose Nieves, Eduardo Cruz, and Luis Enrique Flores Martinez attended a Halloween party
in Othello, Washington. Around 11:00 p.m., the four men left together in Mr. Martinez's
car to meet up with some young women in Soap Lake. Later, as Mr. Martinez was
driving the group back to Othello, a police officer saw him make an illegal U-turn. The
police officer attempted to make a traffic stop. However, Mr. Martinez then heard gun
shots and saw Mr. Nieves holding a gun. He accelerated and drove down a dead-end
street where he stopped the car. Everyone got out of the car and hid for several hours.
The next day, Mr. Martinez went to the police, confessed to the incident, and told
them of Mr. Nieves's involvement. After the identification of Mr. Nieves as the shooter,
police went to his mother's house and arrested him. The State filed seven felony charges
against him.
No.30763-8-II1 State v. Garcia Sanchez
About two months later, Mr. Martinez and a friend were driving around Royal
City. Mr. Garcia Sanchez saw them and ran into the middle of the street to stop them.
They slowed down and Mr. Garcia Sanchez ran to the passenger side of the car where Mr.
Martinez was sitting and unsuccessfully tried to open the door. He then attempted to
break the window, called Mr. Martinez "a snitch," and threatened to kill him. Report of
Proceedings (RP) at 351. Mr. Martinez and his friend were able to drive away. About 30
minutes later, Mr. Martinez saw Mr. Garcia Sanchez again as they continued their drive
through town. When Mr. Garcia Sanchez saw them, he threw rocks at their car.
On January 14,2011, Ricardo Coria and his son Mario went to Mr. Coria's
nephew's house in Royal City. At some point, he walked out to his car to recharge his
telephone battery. He then saw a group of five or six men walking toward him, including
Mr. Garcia Sanchez. Mr. Coria stood between the approaching men and his nephew's
house. Mr. Garcia Sanchez then walked up to him and said something about the "south
side" and some of the men in the group flashed gang signs. RP at 799. As Mr. Coria
looked back at the house to tell his son to go back in the house, he felt something metallic
hit him on his forehead. He fell to the ground and Mr. Garcia Sanchez hit him four or
five times on the head with the metal object. Mr. Coria's son came out of the house and
No. 30763-8-111 State v. Garcia Sanchez
pushed Mr. Garcia Sanchez offhis father. A group fight ensued. The group dispersed
when police arrived.
A few months later, Mr. Coria was talking on his telephone in his car in a parking
lot. After a few minutes, he noticed a group of four young men, including Mr. Garcia
Sanchez, standing about 100 yards away, staring at him and throwing gang signs. The
men called out to Mr. Coria to get out of the car, but he ignored them. The men
approached his car, knocked on his window, and began calling him a "northerner."
RP at 804. He rolled down his window and the men urged him to get out and fight. Mr.
Garcia Sanchez then reached through the window and hit Mr. Coria on the head a few
times with his fist. Mr. Coria had bruises on his head, but was not seriously hurt. The
men ran away when police arrived.
The State charged Salvador Garcia Sanchez with witness intimidation, felony
harassment, two counts of first degree assault with deadly weapon enhancements, and two
counts of riot with deadly weapon enhancements. I It also alleged that the crimes were
committed to benefit a street gang under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa) and to advance gang
standing under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s). Before trial, the court granted Mr. Garcia
I The State also charged Mr. Garcia Sanchez with bail jumping, but that is not at issue in this appeal.
Sanchez's motion to sever the witness intimidation and felony harassment charges from
the other charges. Two separate jury trials followed.
Mr. Garcia Sanchez also filed a Knapstacf motion to dismiss the gang aggravators
under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s) and RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa). He argued in part that the State
could not produce evidence that he was motivated to advance his gang status. The court
granted his motion as to the aggravator alleged under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s), finding
there was "no evidence beyond speculation regarding an intent of the defendant to
enhance his status within his gang, a status which, according to the state, he already
occupied prior to the first of the incidents that is charged, with the incarceration of Mr.
Nieves." RP at 34.
At the first trial, the State's theory was that Mr. Garcia Sanchez threatened Mr.
Martinez to benefit his gang by discouraging Mr. Martinez from testifYing against Mr.
Nieves, the jailed leader of the gang. Mr. Martinez testified as detailed above. He
explained that he hung out with the "South Side Locos" (SSL) gang and that he believed
Mr. Garcia Sanchez had threatened to kill him because he had reported Mr. Nieves to the
police. Mr. Martinez believed that if Mr. Garcia Sanchez had been able to open the car
door, he would have tried to kill him.
2 State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986).
Deputy Ryan Rectenwald, a police officer with the Grant County Sheriff's Office,
testified that he was assigned to investigate the Halloween 2010 incident. He stated that
Mr. Martinez gave him the information that provided the basis for the search warrant for
Mr. Nieves's home and eventually led to Mr. Nieves's arrest. He further testified that he
included Mr. Martinez's name in the probable cause statement and police report and that
"[d]efendants always read my reports if they're charged with a crime." RP at 143.
To establish the gang enhancement under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa),3 the State
presented witnesses to testify about the characteristics of criminal street gangs. Officer
Korey Judkins, a gang intelligence officer for the Royal City Police Department, testified
that he had had anywhere from 15 to 20 contacts with Mr. Garcia Sanchez. He testified
that on January 14,2011, he received a call about a fight in progress. When he arrived at
the scene, he saw Mr. Garcia Sanchez with known SSL gang members running from the
yard of a rival gang member. Mr. Garcia Sanchez had a bloody face. Officer Judkins
also testified that he witnessed Mr. Garcia Sanchez and other SSL members burning a
blue bandana in August 2010. When he asked Mr. Garcia Sanchez why they were
burning the bandana, Mr. Garcia Sanchez told him that the bandana had fallen on the
3 RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa) provides: "The defendant committed the offense with the intent to directly or indirectly cause any benefit, aggrandizement, gain, profit, or other advantage to or for a criminal street gang as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, its reputation,
ground and it would "disrespect ... their colors" if they did not burn it. RP at 203.
Officer Judkins also testified that in August 2010, police discovered a large amount of
graffiti on police department buildings and other buildings around town. A security video
showed SSL gang members spray painting graffiti on the side of one of the police
department buildings. The court admitted numerous photographs of the graffiti.
Deputy Joe Harris testified as an expert on street gangs. He explained that people
join gangs for a number of reasons, including socioeconomic reasons, a need for
protection and community, and a need for respect. Deputy Harris testified that in gang
culture "respect equates to fear. If you fear me, then you will respect me." RP at 297.
According to Deputy Harris, gang members gain respect by "putting in work," which he
explained meant "committing crimes to the benefit of the gang, doing things like
residential burglaries or vehicle prowls to steal pawnable items that the gang can then go
pawn and make money." RP at 298. He elaborated that "putting in work" could also
include drive-by shootings, selling drugs, and beating up a rival gang member. RP at 298.
Deputy Harris also explained that gang members identify themselves by wearing
certain colors, tattoos, and using hand signals. According to Deputy Harris, the number
13 is indicative of the SSL gang. He explained, "[t]he 13 represents the letter M in the
influence, or membership."
7 No. 30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
alphabet, it's the 13th letter of the alphabet, the letter M then represents the Mexican
mafia which would be kind of the overseer of Sureno gangs." RP at 301. He also
explained that a "NK" tattoo on Mr. Garcia Sanchez's leg signified "Norteno killer" and
is a very common tattoo among Hispanic street gangs. RP at 302. Deputy Harris also
testified that gang members view "snitches" as "[t]he lowest form of existence on the
planet." RP at 308.
The State then admitted numerous exhibits depicting Mr. Garcia Sanchez's tattoos,
which included the number 13, and dots on another SSL gang member's hands that
allegedly represented the number 13. The State also admitted a video that showed a
September 2010 fight at a high school between Mr. Garcia Sanchez and his gang
members and a rival gang member. The State presented evidence that SSL gang members
had a history of criminal activity, including a juvenile court disposition for fourth degree
assault for Jesus Torres, a SSL gang member, an information for Eric Haro, another SSL
member, alleging riot and fourth degree assault, and an information charging Mr. Nieves
with second degree assault.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on the intimidating a witness charge and the
nonfelony harassment charge and answered "yes" on the special verdict form as to the
gang aggravator.
During the second trial, Mr. Coria testified as detailed above. Eyewitnesses to the
January 14,2011 incident corroborated Mr. Coria's testimony. His son, Mario Ricardo
Coria, testified that he saw Mr. Garcia Sanchez, accompanied by four other "south
siders," approach his father, and then hit him with brass knuckles, knocking his father to
the ground. RP at 680,682-83. He stated that Mr. Garcia Sanchez then approached him
with the brass knuckles and "started swinging." RP at 684. Victor Bahena, Mr. Coria's
nephew, and Jesus Valentin, both testified that a group of "south siders" approached Mr.
Coria and that Mr. Garcia Sanchez hit Mr. Coria on the head several times. RP at 714,
756. They stated that when they intervened to help, the other "south siders" started
attacking them. The fighting lasted until police arrived, at which point the SSL gang
members left.
Officer Reynaldo Rodriguez corroborated Mr. Coria's testimony regarding the
second incident. He testified that on May 14, 2011, he saw Mr. Garcia Sanchez walking
across a street in Royal City with three other males. He testified that two of the males
were affiliated with the SSL street gang. Shortly thereafter, Officer Rodriguez saw the
males "jumping and punching" into Mr. Coria's vehicle. RP at 163.
As at the first trial, Deputy Harris testified about gang culture. He opined that the
January and May incidents were gang related because the actors were gang members,
used gang slurs, wore gang attire, and were members of rival gangs with a history
between them. He also believed the May and January assaults were related, explaining
"[r]etaliation is a huge motivator in gang-related crime." RP at 965.
Over repeated defense objections, Officer Judkins recited the extensive criminal
histories of SSL members. The court ruled that the evidence was relevant to show the
SSL gang qualified as a "criminal street gang" under the statute. RP at 597. However,
the court noted the prejudicial nature of the evidence:
[O]nce a criminal defendant is believed to be a member of a gang, every crime ever committed by any member of that gang is admissible into evidence. That is so contrary to the notion of a fair trial and so contrary to the principles of Evidence Rule 404 that we don't allow prior bad acts to come into evidence, that it's actually chilling to a trial judge to say, all you have to do to make this allegation is show that the defendant is a member of the gang, and then all of this stuff comes into evidence.
RP at 597-98.
The judge then stated that he would grant a defense motion to bifurcate the trial,
explaining, "[This] sentencing enhancement is being used to dump truckloads of
otherwise inadmissible evidence into a trial that is supposed to determine guilt or
innocence." RP at 599.
The next day, Mr. Garcia Sanchez moved to bifurcate his trial, arguing the jury's
consideration of the substantive evidence of his charges should be separated from the
No.30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
evidence supporting the gang aggravator. However) the court denied the motion as
untimely) noting "the jury has already heard considerable evidence that in my view would
not be admitted absent the gang aggravator." RP at 610-11.
As to the January charges) the jury found Mr. Garcia Sanchez not guilty of first
degree assault) but guilty of the lesser included crime of second degree assault. The jury
also found Mr. Garcia Sanchez guilty of riot while armed with a deadly weapon. As for
the May charges) the jury found Mr. Garcia Sanchez guilty of fourth degree assault and
simple riot.
At sentencing) Mr. Garcia Sanchez argued that the court did not have
the authority to impose an exceptional sentence because the aggravator at issue)
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa») is not specifically listed in RCW 9.94A.537(4). The court
overruled the objection) concluding it had the statutory authority to submit the aggravator
to the jury. However) the court imposed a standard range sentence of 79 months)
concluding an exceptional sentence would be excessive in view of Mr. Garcia Sanchez)s
conduct.
ANALYSIS
Aggravating Circumstance Under RCW 9. 94A. 535(3) (aa). Mr. Garcia Sanchez
argues that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to consider whether he committed
the crimes "with the intent to directly or indirectly cause any benefit, aggrandizement,
gain, profit, or other advantage to or for a criminal street gang[,] its reputation, influence,
or membership" under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa). He contends that it was improper because
RCW 9.94A.537(4) states that "[e]vidence regarding any facts supporting aggravating
circumstances under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a) through (y) shall be presented to the jury
during the trial of the alleged crime," but the aggravating factor at issue here was not
listed in (a) through (y).
This contention presents an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de
novo. State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186, 194, 102 P.3d 789 (2004). The purpose of
statutory interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent. Id. To do that, this court
looks first at the plain language of the statute. Id. If the statute's meaning is plain on its
face, then we must give effect to that plain meaning. State v. Theilken, 102 Wn.2d 271,
275, 684 P.2d 709 (1984). We discern the plain meaning of a statute from "the ordinary
meaning of the language at issue, as well as from the context of the statute in which that
provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." State v.
Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
A trial court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range only if
it finds that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. RCW 9.94A.535.
12 No.30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
RCW 9.94A.535(3) sets forth "Aggravating Circumstances - Considered by a Jury-
Imposed by the Court." That provision includes "an exclusive list of factors that can
support a sentence above the standard range." RCW 9:94A.535(3). And that list includes
the aggravating factor at issue here. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa).
Our Supreme Court has concluded that "trial courts lack authority during trial to
submit special interrogatories to juries in deviation from the [Sentencing Reform Act of
1981, chapter 9.94A RCW (SRA)],s exceptional sentencing procedures." State v. Davis,
163 Wn.2d 606,611, 184 P.3d 639 (2008). The SRA requires that facts supporting
aggravating circumstances should be found "by procedures specified in RCW
9.94A.537." RCW 9.94A.535(3). RCW 9.94A.537(4) provides that "[e]vidence
regarding any facts supporting aggravating circumstances under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a)
through (y) shall be presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime." Relying
on that statute, Mr. Garcia Sanchez contends that the trial court lacked authority to allow
the jury to consider the aggravating factor at issue here, which is not listed in (a) through
(y).
However, that statute does not address what a jury can and cannot consider.
Instead, it addresses whether a jury must consider certain issues at trial or whether it may
consider them in a separate proceeding. RCW 9.94A.537(4). It states:
13 No. 30763-8-111 State v. Garcia Sanchez
Evidence regarding any facts supporting aggravating circumstances under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a) through (y) shall be presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime, unless the jury has been impaneled solely for resentencing, or unless the state alleges the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(e)(iv), (h)(i), (0), or (t). If one of these aggravating circumstances is alleged, the trial court may conduct a separate proceeding if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact is not part of the res geste of the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise admissible in trial of the charged crime, and if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence to the aggravated fact is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury's ability to determine guilt or innocence for the underlying cnme.
RCW 9.94A.537(4) (emphasis added). While that provision does not clearly state
whether a jury is required to consider RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa) at trial, it does not give or
deprive the court of the authority to submit RCW 9.94A.535(3)(aa) to a jury.
RCW 9.94A.535 clearly provides that a jury may consider the aggravating
circumstance. The trial court correctly allowed the jury to consider it.
Inetfective Counsel-Motion to Bifurcate. Mr. Garcia Sanchez next contends that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to bifurcate his trial to
separate the jury's consideration of the evidence supporting the gang enhancement from
that supporting the substantive offenses. He argues that most of the evidence offered in
support of the aggravator was not relevant to prove the substantive offenses and was
unfairly prejudicial. The State responds there was no reason to bifurcate proceedings
because the gang aggravator evidence was admissible during the guilt phase of the trial to
prove motive.
Effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.
U.S. CONST. amend VI; CONST. art. I, § 22. To prevail on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Mr. Garcia Sanchez must show that counsel made errors serious enough as
to make his performance nonfunctional and that this performance prejudiced the defense
enough to deprive him ofa fair trial. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). "Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of
counsel were unreasonable, ... the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse
effect on the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Courts engage in a strong
presumption that counsel's representation was effective. State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136,
198,892 P.2d 29 (1995) (quoting State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 22,226, 743 P.2d 816
(1987)). To rebut this presumption, a defendant bears the burden of establishing the
absence of any "conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel's performance." State v.
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have differed absent the deficient performance. Thomas, 109
Wn.2d at 226 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undennine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. The burden is on the defendant to show ineffective assistance based on the trial
record. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322,335,899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
The legislature has mandated the procedure for establishing aggravating
circumstances. As noted in the preceding section, RCW 9.94A.537(4) provides that
"[e]vidence regarding any facts supporting aggravating circumstances ... shall be
presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime ... unless the state alleges the
aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a)(iv), (h)(i), (0), or (t)." With
regard to these listed exceptions, the statute states that the court "may conduct a separate
proceeding if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact is not part of the res geste of
the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise admissible in trial of the charged
crime, and if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence to the aggravated fact
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury's ability to detennine guilt
or innocence for the underlying crime." RCW 9.94A.537(4) (emphasis added).
In failing to request bifurcation, trial counsel was simply following the statutorily
prescribed procedure for proving aggravating circumstances. However, citing State v.
Monschke, 133 Wn. App. 313, 334-35, 135 P.3d 566 (2006), Mr. Garcia Sanchez points
out that trial courts have discretion to bifurcate trials if the evidence supporting the
16 No.30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
sentencing enhancement would prejudice the defendant during the guilt phase of the trial,
and that the trial court here would have done so had trial counsel filed a timely motion.
Despite the trial court's indication that it would have granted a timely motion to
bifurcate, Mr. Garcia Sanchez fails to establish deficient performance. Bifurcation is not
necessary when there is overlap between the evidence necessary to establish the
aggravating circumstance and the substantive offense. Id. at 335.
In Monschke, the defendant moved to bifurcate his trial into a murder phase and an
aggravating circumstances phase, arguing that bifurcation was necessary to keep the jury
from considering his white supremacist beliefs when deliberating on the first degree
murder elements. Id. at 322. Noting the "current statutes do not provide for bifurcated
trials on first degree murder and the alleged aggravating circumstance," the court
acknowledged that bifurcated trials may sometimes be necessary. Id. at 334. However, it
also noted that "[b] ifurcation is inappropriate ... if there is a substantial overlap between
evidence relevant to the proposed separate proceedings." Id. at 335. The Monschke court
ultimately determined that the defendant's white supremacist beliefs were relevant to
establish motive and that he intended to cause an "inferior" person's death. Id.
Here, there is a substantial overlap between the gang evidence and the evidence
relevant to establish the substantive crimes. Evidence that Mr. Garcia Sanchez was a
No. 30763-8-II1 State v. Garcia Sanchez
member of a criminal street gang, that gang members exact revenge on "snitches," and
that they fight with rival gang members was relevant to motive in both trials. During the
first trial, the State introduced evidence that Mr. Garcia Sanchez's attack on Mr. Martinez
was motivated by his allegiance to his gang. The relationship between Mr. Garcia
Sanchez and Mr. Nieves was central to establishing the State's theory of the case and
proving the motive for the attack. Motive was also at issue in the second trial. Mr.
Garcia Sanchez's gang membership explained his attacks on Mr. Coria, allegedly a rival
gang member.
Thus, in both trials, motive would have been at issue even if the case had been
bifurcated. To the extent the evidence supporting the gang enhancement would have been
admissible to establish motive during the guilt phase of trial, it was not unreasonable for
defense counsel to fail to request bifurcation. Defense counsel's choice was well within
the range of professionally competent assistance.
Even if we were to decide that defense counsel's strategy was unreasonable and
that he should have moved to bifurcate the trial, Mr. Garcia Sanchez would still have to
show prejudice. He argues that even if some of the gang evidence would have been
admissible at trial, the most damaging evidence-the evidence of prior, unrelated criminal
No. 30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
acts committed by Mr. Garcia Sanchez and other gang members-would not have been
admissible.
Mr. Garcia Sanchez is correct that the evidence of unrelated crimes would
generally not be admissible during the guilt phase of a trial. Prior conviction evidence is
considered inherently prejudicial because it tends to shift the jury's focus "from the merits
of the charge to the defendant's general propensity for criminality." State v. Jones, 101
Wn.2d 113, 120,677 P.2d 131 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 113
Wn.2d 520, 782 P.2d 10 13 (1989). Nevertheless, Mr. Garcia Sanchez cannot show that
there was a reasonable probability he would have been acquitted absent this evidence.
During the first trial, the State presented uncontroverted evidence that Mr.
Martinez had reported Mr. Nieves to police and that Mr. Garcia Sanchez, a member of
Mr. Nieves's gang, later called Mr. Martinez a "snitch" and threatened to kill him. There
was no evidence suggesting someone else threatened to kill Mr. Martinez. In the second
trial, Mr. Coria testified that Mr. Garcia Sanchez, accompanied by other gang members,
hit him on the head four or five times with a metallic object, causing Mr. Coria to fall to
the ground unconscious. There were multiple eyewitnesses to the attack. The jury
acquitted Mr. Garcia Sanchez of first degree assault, finding him guilty of the lesser
included crime of second degree assault. This verdict undermines Mr. Garcia Sanchez's
assertion that defense counsel's performance adversely affected his trial.
Moreover, in both trials, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that any
evidence relating to unlawful acts of Mr. Garcia Sanchez or others on occasions other
than the dates of the substantive crimes could only be used in resolving the alleged
aggravating circumstance. A jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.
Carnation Co. v. Hill, 54 Wn. App. 806, 811, 776 P.2d 158 (1989) (quoting Tennant v.
Roys, 44 Wn. App. 305, 315, 722 P.2d 848 (1986)), aff'd, 115 Wn.2d 184, 796 P.2d 416
(1990).
In view of the strength of the State's evidence to support the jury verdicts, Mr.
Garcia Sanchez fails to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trials would
have been different if the evidence of the unrelated criminal acts had been presented at a
separate proceeding.
Defense counsel's decision not to request bifurcation of trial was not ineffective
assistance. Even assuming that a reasonably professional level of performance would
have included this request, Mr. Garcia Sanchez cannot show that there was a reasonable
probability of a better outcome if the request had been made.
Sufficient Evidence-Witness Intimidation. Mr. Garcia Sanchez next contends that
the evidence is insufficient to establish any of the alternative ways to commit witness
intimidation because the State failed to prove his specific intent in making the threat. He
argues that calling Mr. Martinez a "snitch" and threatening to kill him does not establish
that he was attempting to influence Mr. Martinez's testimony, induce him to absent
himself from an official proceeding, or withhold evidence relevant to the police
investigation. He asserts that, at most, the evidence shows that he was angry with Mr.
Martinez for reporting Mr. Nieves to police. The State responds that the evidence was
sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Mr. Garcia Sanchez intended to induce
Mr. Martinez's absence from future proceedings, even though Mr. Garcia Sanchez did not
explicitly make a statement to that effect.
We review a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by asking
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 831,975 P.2d 967 (1999) (quoting
State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 643, 904 P.2d 245 (1995)). In answering this question,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the State's favor. State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 817, 147 P.3d 1201
(2006) (quoting State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 769, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001)). We consider
circumstantial and direct evidence equally reliable. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821,
874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
Here, the court instructed the jury that to convict Mr. Garcia Sanchez of
intimidating a witness, it had to prove that "by use of a threat against a current or
prospective witness [Mr. Garcia Sanchez] attempted to:"
(a) influence the testimony of that person; or (b) induce that person to absent himself from an official proceeding; or (c) induce that person not to report the information relevant to a criminal investigation; or (d) induce that person not to give truthful or complete information.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 97.
The State provided evidence that Mr. Martinez went to police and informed them
about Mr. Nieves's involvement in a shooting. Officer Rodriguez testified that based on
that information~ he obtained a search warrant for Mr. Nieves's home. He also testified
that Me. Martinez was named in the police report and certificate of probable cause in Mr.
Nieves's case. There was evidence that Mr. Nieves's defense counsel had the police
report and that criminal charges resulted from the incident. Moreover, the State
established that Mr. Nieves and Mr. Garcia Sanchez were members of the same gang and
that about two months after Mr. Martinez reported Mr. Nieves to police, Mr. Garcia
Sanchez approached Mr. Martinez in a car, tried to break a window, called him a
22 No.30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
"snitch," and threatened to kill him, all in the context ofMr. Nieves's pending criminal
charge.
Under these circumstances, the trier of fact could infer that Mr. Garcia Sanchez
intended to intimidate Mr. Martinez from testifying against Mr. Nieves. In considering
charges of intimidating a witness, jurors must ascertain the inferential meaning of
statements alleged to be threats, because the literal meaning of words is not necessarily
the intended communication. State v. Gill, 103 Wn. App. 435, 445, 13 P.3d 646 (2000)
(quoting State v. Scherck, 9 Wn. App. 792, 794, 514 P.2d 1393 (1973)). Considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the State's favor, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for intimidation of
a witness.
Sufficient evidence supports Mr. Garcia Sanchez's conviction for intimidation of a
witness.
Charging Documents and "To Convict" Instructions. For the first time on appeal,
Mr. Garcia Sanchez argues that (1) a "true threat" is an essential element of felony
harassment and witness intimidation, and (2) the respective charging documents and "to
convict" instructions were constitutionally deficient because they did include this
essential element of the offense. Mr. Garcia Sanchez fails to meet the RAP 2.5(a)(3)
exception for our consideration of this unpreserved issue for the first time on appeal.
Generally, we do not review issues raised for the first time on appeal unless the
issue involves a "manifest error affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2.5(a)(3). Under
this standard, the defendant has the initial burden of showing that the error was of
constitutional magnitude and manifest. State v. Grimes, 165 Wn. App. 172, 185-86,267
P.3d 454 (2011), review denied, 175 Wn.2d 1010,287 P.3d 594 (2012). If the defendant
can show that a claim raises a manifest constitutional error, then the burden shifts to the
State to prove that the error was harmless. Id. at 186.
Both the United States and Washington Constitutions require that all "essential
elements" of a crime be pleaded in the information and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Allen, 176 Wn.2d 611,627 n.lO, 294 P.3d 679 (2013). The trial court's
"to convict" instruction must also contain all the essential elements of the offense, and its
failure to do so constitutes "automatic reversible error." State v. Smith, 131 Wn.2d 258,
263,265,930 P.2d 917 (1997).
After Mr. Garcia Sanchez filed his opening brief, the Washington Supreme Court
decided the issue before us and rejected Mr. Garcia Sanchez's argument, holding that the
definition of a true threat is not an essential element that needs to be included in an
infonnation or to convict instruction. Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 629-30. The court clarified
that the constitutional concept of a "true threat" is merely definitional and is "not itself an
essential element of the crime." Id. at 630 (quoting State v. Tellez, 141 Wn. App. 479,
484, 170 P.3d 75 (2007». It also explained that because the true threat requirement is
merely definitional, it is not error if the true threat requirement is not included in the
infonnation or "to convict" instruction "so long as the jury [is] instructed as to the true
threat requirement." Id. In Allen, because the jury received a separate instruction
explaining the true threat requirement, the court held that the defendant's First
Amendment rights were protected and he failed to demonstrate that a "manifest error
affecting a constitutional right" had occurred. Id.
Allen is dispositive here. While the charging documents and "to convict"
instructions for the felony harassment and witness intimidation charges did not mention
the true threat requirement, the trial court gave the jury a separate instruction, identical to
the one given in Allen. This instruction read, in part:
To be a threat, a statement or act must occur in a context or under such circumstances where a reasonable person, in the position of the speaker, would foresee that the statement or act would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to carry out the threat rather than as something said in jest or idle talk.
CP at 98.
Because the jury instruction included a separate instruction explaining the "true
threat" requirement, the instructions as a whole were sufficient.
In view of Allen, no constitutional error occurred warranting our review for an
unpreserved alleged error under RAP 2.5(a)(3).
Statement ofAdditional Grounds (SAG) Issues. In his pro se statement of
additional grounds, Mr. Garcia Sanchez first contends insufficient evidence supports his
conviction for felony riot because the State failed to prove that he was anned with a
deadly weapon. Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if the trier of fact has a factual
basis for finding each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green,
94 Wn.2d 216,221-22,616 P.2d 628 (1980).
The riot statute provides:
A person is guilty of the crime of riot if, acting with three or more persons, he or she knowingly and unlawfully uses or threatens to use force, or in any way participates in the use of such force, against any other person or against property.
RCW 9A.84.010(1).
Guilt for riot is predicated on group conduct: '" [a] person ... acting with three or
more other persons.'" State v. Montejano, 147 Wn. App. 696, 700, 196 P.3d 1083 (2008)
(quoting RCW 9A.84.01O(1)). The crime of riot becomes a felony if "the actor is anned
with a deadly weapon." RCW 9A.84.010(2)(b). The Montejano court clarified that for
the commission of felony riot, "the accused must be the one with the deadly weapon."
Montejano, 147 Wn. App. at 700. Here, the evidence at trial established that Mr. Garcia
Sanchez approached Mr. Coria with a group of five or six other young men. Mr. Coria's
son testified that Mr. Garcia Sanchez was holding brass knuckles when he attacked Mr.
Coria. And Mr. Coria testified that Mr. Garcia Sanchez hit him several times with brass
knuckles. The evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Garcia Sanchez of felony riot.
Mr. Garcia Sanchez next contends the evidence was insufficient to establish
second degree assault because there was no evidence that Mr. Coria suffered "substantial
bodily harm," as required under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a). He argues, "[n]owhere in any
police report, nor in Ricardo Coria Lara's testimony does it refer [t]o or relate to any
fracture [or] loss of impairment of any bodily organ." SAG at 3.
Mr. Garcia Sanchez overlooks the fact that the second degree assault charge was a
lesser included of count three, which alleged that Mr. Garcia Sanchez or an accomplice,
with intent to cause great harm, assaulted Mr. Coria with a deadly weapon. In order to
prove that Mr. Garcia Sanchez committed the crime of second degree assault, the State
was required to prove that he assaulted the victim "with a deadly weapon."
RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). The jury was instructed that to convict Mr. Garcia Sanchez of the
lesser included offense it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that "the defendant or an
accomplice assaulted Ricardo Coria Lara with a deadly weapon." CP at 154. Asjust
detailed, there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Garcia Sanchez assaulted Mr. Coria with
a deadly weapon.
Sufficient evidence supports Mr. Garcia Sanchez's convictions for felony riot and
second degree assault.
State's Cross Appeal-Knapstad Motion. In its cross appeal, the State contends
that the trial court erred in granting the defense's Knapstad motion to dismiss the gang
aggravator under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s). It argues that sufficient evidence established
that Mr. Garcia Sanchez committed the offenses to advance his position in the gang. Mr.
Garcia Sanchez counters that any error was harmless because the trial court would not
have imposed an exceptional sentence even if the aggravator had been presented to the
JUry.
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s) allows for an exceptional sentence when "[t]he defendant
committed the offense to obtain or maintain his or her membership or to advance his or
her position in the hierarchy of an organization, association, or identifiable group." Here,
the trial court dismissed this aggravator pursuant to a pretrial Knapstad motion,
concluding there was no evidence of the defendant's intent to advance his gang status.
Under Knapstad, a trial court may grant a pretrial motion to dismiss a criminal
charge ifthere are no disputed facts and the undisputed facts are insufficient to support a
finding of guilt. State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346,356,729 P.2d 48 (1986). However,
it is well settled that the trial court'" shall not dismiss a sentence enhancement or
aggravating circumstance unless the underlying charge is subject to dismissal under this
section.'" State v. Meacham, 154 Wn. App. 467, 473-74,225 PJd 472 (2010) (quoting
CrR 8J(c)(3)). The Meacham court explained that "CrR 8J(c)(3) permits a defendant to
move to dismiss an 'aggravating circumstance' allegation, but only when the underlying
charge is also subject to dismissal. The court may not separate the aggravating
circumstances from the underlying charge." Id. at 474.
Here, in the absence of a motion to dismiss the underlying charges, the trial court
did not have the authority to separately dismiss the special gang allegation pursuant to a
Knapstad motion. Nevertheless, any error was harmless. As Mr. Garcia Sanchez points
out, it is unlikely the trial court would have imposed an exceptional sentence even ifthe
gang aggravator had been submitted to the jury and the jury had answered ''yes.'' As
detailed above, the State presented extensive gang-related evidence at trial and the jury
answered "yes" on the special verdict form related to the "status" gang aggravator under
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s). Despite this evidence, the court imposed a standard range
29 No.30763-8-III State v. Garcia Sanchez
sentence, finding an exceptional sentence would be "excessive in light of [Mr. Garcia
Sanchez's] conduct." RP (April 3, 2012) at 75. Nothing in the record suggests the court
would have changed its opinion about the seriousness of the crimes even if the State had
been allowed to submit the "status" aggravator to the jury.
Any error in dismissing the gang aggravator under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(s) was
harmless.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Kulik, J.
WE CONCUR:
c.., Brown, J. Korsmo, C.J.