Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
January 22, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 58839-1-II
Respondent,
v.
ROCKY SINDARS, PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Rocky Sindars was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine
in 2008. The trial court found that he had the ability or future ability to pay and ordered him to pay
$4,274.61 in various legal financial obligations (LFOs). Sindars asked the court to permit him to
satisfy a portion of his LFOs via community service. The court granted the request but did not find
that he was indigent.
In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Blake1 that Washington’s strict
liability drug possession statute2 was void because it violated due process. Sindars then moved to
vacate his conviction and for an LFO refund under CrR 7.8. He asked the court to refund the cash
equivalent of the community service labor that he performed to satisfy his LFOs, in addition to
refunding his cash payments. The court granted the motion in part, vacated his conviction, and
1 197 Wn.2d 170, 174, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). 2 Former RCW 69.50.4013(1) (2017). We cite this version of the statute when referring to the court’s decision in Blake. No. 58839-1-II
ordered a refund of the cash he paid toward his LFOs, but declined to order reimbursement for
Sindars’ community service.
Sindars appeals the court’s partial denial of his CrR 7.8 motion. He argues that refusing to
reimburse him for his community service violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the privileges and immunities clause
of the Washington Constitution, and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s
prohibition against involuntary servitude. The State argues that we should not reach Sindars’
challenges because they are barred by sovereign immunity and CrR 7.8 was not the proper avenue
to seek relief. Although we disagree with the State’s threshold arguments, we affirm because on
this record, Sindars has not shown he is entitled to relief.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In 2008, Sindars pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine under former RCW
69.50.4013(1) (2003). The trial court checked a box waiving one fine due to indigency, but
otherwise found that Sindars “ha[d] the ability or likely future ability to pay” and ordered Sindars
to pay $4,274.61 in LFOs. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 91-93.
In 2010, Sindars moved to terminate his LFOs on the grounds that the LFOs placed an
undue burden on him as a result of his indigency. He submitted a financial affidavit stating that his
sole income was Social Security due to his disabilities. The trial court denied this motion after a
hearing that was not transcribed for our consideration. Instead, the court required total monthly
payments of $30 and placed the LFOs on the pay or appear program.
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In 2011, after a motion that is not in our record, the court ordered that Sindars “be allowed
to perform community service work hours and they will be converted at minimum wage to be
applied to defendant’s legal financial obligations.” CP at 76. The court then entered several orders
converting community service work to LFO credit. None of these orders contained a finding of
indigency or explained the basis for Sindars’ motion or the rationale behind the court’s rulings.
In total, the court applied $1,481.26 of community service credit toward the LFOs at issue
in this appeal. Sindars also paid $641 in cash toward his LFOs.
II. POST-BLAKE PROCEDURE
In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Blake that Washington’s strict
liability drug possession statute, former RCW 69.50.4013(1), violated due process. 197 Wn.2d at
174. Sindars moved to vacate his conviction under Blake and CrR 7.8(b)(4) and (5). Sindars also
requested reimbursement of $641 in cash he paid toward his LFOs and $1,481.26 for his
community service work that was applied as LFO credit. The court granted Sindars’ motion in
part, vacating his conviction and refunding the $641 in cash payments he made toward his LFOs.
The court denied Sindars’ request for reimbursement of his community service hours.
ANALYSIS
I. THRESHOLD ISSUES
As a threshold matter, the State argues that we should not consider Sindars’ claims because
his claim amounts to a civil claim for damages that is barred by sovereign immunity. We disagree.
The State maintains that Sindars’ claims should have been brought as a civil claim for
damages and that they cannot be considered in the context of his CrR 7.8 motion. Essentially, the
State contends that because RCW 10.01.160(4) does not specify that it authorizes reimbursement
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for community service credit, any claim for reimbursement of community service credit is a civil
claim. However, a panel of this court recently decided in State v. Nelson, ___ Wn. App. 2d. ___,
558 P.3d 197, 207-08 (2024), that CrR 7.8 is the only proper avenue for such a claim and adopted
the reasoning of Civil Survival Project v. State, 24 Wn. App. 2d 564, 572-78, 520 P.3d 1066
(2022), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1011 (2023). We agree with State v. Nelson and Civil Survival
Project that CrR 7.8 is the proper mechanism for Blake defendants to seek reimbursement of LFOs.
Thus, we conclude that Sindars’ claim was appropriately brought under CrR 7.8.
Having concluded that the request for reimbursement was properly raised under CrR 7.8,
we also reject the State’s argument that Sindars’ claim is barred by sovereign immunity. See Br.
of Resp’t at 6-21. Under article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution, “[t]he legislature
shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the state.”
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 26. But here, as the State v. Nelson panel explained when it rejected an
identical argument, “this is a criminal matter and there is no civil suit against the State.” 558 P.3d
at 208 n.11.
The State has not presented argument for why sovereign immunity would apply in the
context of a CrR 7.8 motion. The State has not provided, nor have we found authority under which
a procedurally proper motion for relief in a criminal case was treated as a civil claim for damages
and thereby barred under sovereign immunity. The State analogizes to federal case law for the idea
that “when the government is otherwise required to give back property taken in a criminal action
but for some reason could not, a defendant’s claim for compensation is barred by sovereign
immunity” Br. of Resp’t at 12 (citing Ordonez v. United States, 680 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)).
However, the federal cases cited do not apply here. See Hanson v. Carmona, 1 Wn.3d 362, 383,
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525 P.3d 940 (2023) (declining to analogize or apply federal cases applying the United States
Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to issues involving article II, section 26).
The State’s other arguments are similarly not convincing because they rely on an assumption that
CrR 7.8 motions amount to suits against the State, which they are not.
Therefore, we disagree with the State and hold that sovereign immunity does not bar
Sindars’ claim for reimbursement of his LFO credit.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Sindars argues that due process entitles him to a refund of the community service credited
toward his LFOs. We disagree.
A. Substantive Due Process Framework
The Fourteenth Amendment protects people from deprivations of “life, liberty, or property”
without “due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause provides
substantive and procedural protections. Romero v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 30 Wn. App. 2d
323, 345, 544 P.3d 1083 (2024). The two inquiries are distinct: substantive due process “requires
deprivations of life, liberty, or property to be substantively reasonable,” whereas procedural due
process entitles individuals to “‘notice . . . and an opportunity to be heard to guard against
erroneous deprivation.’” Id. at 339, 345 (quoting Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216,
143 P.3d 571 (2006)).
We review substantive due process challenges de novo. In re Adoption of K.M.T., 195 Wn.
App. 548, 559, 381 P.3d 1210 (2016). Our substantive due process inquiry begins with “‘the nature
of the right involved.’” Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 689, 451 P.3d 694 (2019)
(quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 219). If the government has interfered with a fundamental right,
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we apply strict scrutiny and ask whether “‘the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.’” Id. (quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 220). If the “‘state action does
not affect a fundamental right, the proper standard of review is rational basis.’” Id. (quoting
Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 222). The rational basis test asks whether the challenged deprivation was
“‘rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’” Id. (quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 222).
B. Sindars Has Not Identified a Fundamental Right
Sindars asserts that Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 197 L. Ed. 2d 611
(2017), created “a due process right to ‘the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction
subsequently invalidated.’” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6 (quoting Nelson, 581 U.S. at 139). But
as the State v. Nelson panel explained, Nelson v. Colorado was a procedural due process case and
does not create a fundamental right that is implicated by a trial court’s failure to reimburse
community service LFO credit. State v. Nelson, 558 P.3d at 203. Sindars relies on the fact that the
legislature has allowed fines and fees to be satisfied with community service hours in multiple
contexts, but he does not explain how this legislative judgment creates a fundamental right for
constitutional substantive due process purposes. And although Sindars maintains that the supposed
“right to be made whole” is “tied to the presumption of innocence,” he does not explain how the
trial court’s decision not to order reimbursement for community service hours directly violates the
presumption of innocence, outside of citations to Nelson v. Colorado. Appellant’s Opening Br. at
7.
We therefore conclude that here, as in State v. Nelson, Sindars has not identified a
fundamental right that would warrant strict scrutiny under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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C. Reimbursing Only Cash LFO Payments Survives Rational Basis Review
Because Sindars has not shown a threat to a fundamental right, we apply rational basis
review. See Chong Yim, 194 Wn.2d at 688. Sindars argues that the refusal to reimburse his
community service is supported only by economic justifications that are insufficient to survive
rational basis review. We disagree.
Under the rational basis test, the challenged state action must bear only a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 689. We “may assume the existence of any
necessary state of facts” that we “can reasonably conceive in determining whether a rational
relationship exists between the challenged law and a legitimate state interest.” Amunrud, 158
Wn.2d at 222.
Here, we examine whether a legitimate state interest supports the trial court’s partial denial
of Sindars’ CrR 7.8 motion and refusal to reimburse the cash equivalent of Sindars’ LFOs that
were completed via community service. We conclude that the State has a legitimate interest in
limiting reimbursement to those Blake defendants who paid their LFOs in cash. For one thing, the
distinction between LFOs paid in cash and those satisfied via community service serves to control
the flow of reimbursement requests and allows the state to efficiently refund all readily definable
monetary payments. See In re Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 449, 853 P.2d 424 (1993)
(holding that the State has a legitimate interest in “controlling the flow” of postconviction relief
when “[f]aced with a virtually unlimited universe of possible postconviction claims.”).
Additionally, it is rational to distinguish between community service and cash LFO payments
when ordering reimbursement from State funds because, unlike community service performed in
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lieu of payment, cash payments directly benefitted the State. See State v. Nelson, 558 P.3d at 206-
07.
Sindars relies on Willoughby v. Department of Labor & Industry, 147 Wn.2d 725, 57 P.3d
611 (2002) abrogated by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019), to
assert that preserving state funds cannot constitute a legitimate interest to satisfy rational basis
review. But Willoughby applied a different substantive due process standard, the now-rejected
“‘unduly oppressive’ test” that was formerly interpreted as an elevated level of scrutiny applied to
laws regulating the use of property. Chong Yim, 194 Wn.2d at 696. See Willoughby, 147 Wn.2d at
733. Moreover, it is well established that governments are entitled to make incremental decisions
about economic policy, something that refund allocation certainly is. See Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955). And here, unlike in
Willoughby, we are not confined to the State’s proffered justifications but “may assume the
existence of any necessary state of facts” that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 222. As a panel of this court explained, there are other reasons to
distinguish among LFOs paid in cash versus those paid in labor: it was reasonable to limit the
volume of reimbursements and prioritize cash payments that benefitted the State. State v. Nelson,
558 P.3d at 206-07.
Thus, we hold that the trial court’s refusal to reimburse Sindars’ community service
performed in lieu of paying his Blake LFOs survives rational basis review, and Sindars’ substantive
due process claim fails.
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION
Sindars argues that the trial court’s ruling violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state actors from
denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. “‘Equal protection requires that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.’” Romero, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. Legion
Post No. 149 v. Dep’t of Health, 164 Wn.2d 570, 608, 192 P.3d 306 (2008)).
To bring an equal protection challenge, an individual must make a threshold showing that
they “received disparate treatment because of membership in a class of similarly situated
individuals and that the disparate treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.” State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 484, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). If the individual does
not make this threshold showing, no equal protection analysis is required. State v. S.D.H, 17 Wn.
App. 2d 123, 141, 484 P.3d 538 (2021).
B. Sindars Has Not Shown Disparate Treatment Because of Indigency
To show a violation of the equal protection clause, Sindars must first “establish his
classification by showing he was treated differently from others who were similarly situated.”
Osman, 157 Wn.2d at 485. Sindars attempts to show that people who satisfy their LFOs through
community service hours are similarly situated to wealthier people who satisfy their LFOs through
cash payments, but people performing community service in this context are treated differently
because of their indigency. We disagree.
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Sindars’ claim rests on the assumption that indigent individuals satisfy their LFOs through
community service and wealthy individuals satisfy their LFOs by paying cash. He asserts that the
trial court’s ruling “privileges well-off offenders by reimbursing them for LFO payments while
withholding reimbursement from indigent offenders who paid their LFOs through their own
labor.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14. However, Sindars makes no attempt to show that the group
of individuals who performed community service in lieu of LFOs consists of exclusively or even
mostly indigent individuals.
Sindars may be correct that those who paid their LFOs in cash are, on the whole, wealthier
than those who performed community service in lieu of LFOs. But this does not establish that the
trial court permitted him to perform community service in lieu of payment because he was
indigent. And the record in this case does not establish that the trial court based its ruling on his
indigency. Indeed, the trial court found twice that Sindars would be able to pay LFOs: first, when
the LFOs were initially imposed, and second, when the trial court rejected Sindars’ motion to
terminate his LFOs due to his indigency. And when the court permitted community service work
upon Sindars’ motion, the record does not show that the court based its ruling on Sindars’
indigency or even considered his finances at all.3
Although the record does not reflect what authority the trial court relied on to permit
community service in lieu of Sindars’ LFOs, we note that RCW 10.01.160(4) allows a sentencing
3 Sindars relies on State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983) as an example of a case where the court found a classification based on wealth where some people could obtain pretrial release by paying bail and others could not. But the Phelan court was able to conclude that the inability to make bail in that case was a result of indigency. As explained above, we cannot reach the same conclusion on this record, namely that the different treatment alleged was because of indigency.
10 No. 58839-1-II
court to “modify the method of payment” of court costs “or convert the unpaid costs to community
restitution hours” if payment poses a “manifest hardship” to the defendant. RCW 10.01.160(4)
goes on to provide, “Manifest hardship exists where the defendant is indigent.” However, at the
time of the relevant orders, RCW 10.01.160(4) mentioned neither indigency nor community
restitution. See former RCW 10.01.160(4) (2010). And neither the current nor former statute
actually requires a finding of indigency to convert LFOs to community service, and we cannot
presume that the legislature actually meant to create a class of indigent defendants when it chose
to use a different term. See Densley v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 162 Wn.2d 210, 173 P.3d 885 (2007)
(“When the legislature uses two different terms in the same statute, courts presume the legislature
intends the terms to have different meanings.”). Thus, Sindars has not provided facts or law to
support his contention that the challenged state action “creates a classification based on wealth.”
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14.
On this record, Sindars cannot meet his burden to show that the trial court’s partial denial
of his CrR 7.8 motion was disparate treatment of similarly situated people because of indigency.
Because he has failed to make the threshold showing that he “received disparate treatment because
of membership in a class of similarly situated individuals and that the disparate treatment was the
result of intentional or purposeful discrimination,” our review of Sindars’ equal protection
challenge ends here and we need not address his argument for heightened scrutiny. Osman, 157
Wn.2d, at 484.
IV. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Sindars argues that refusing to reimburse his labor was a violation of Washington’s
privileges and immunities clause. We disagree.
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Washington’s privileges and immunities clause states, “No law shall be passed granting to
any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” Wash. CONST. art.
I, § 12. The Washington Supreme Court has “often construed article I, section 12 of the
Washington Constitution to be consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment” and “appl[ies] an independent state constitutional analysis only when the legislation
implicates a fundamental right to state citizenship.” Wash. Food Indus. Ass’n & Maplebear, Inc.
v. City of Seattle, 1 Wn.3d 1, 27, 524 P.3d 181 (2023) (plurality opinion); id. at 38 (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the lead opinion except as to the police power issue).
We apply a two-part test, first asking “whether a challenged law grants a ‘privilege’ or
‘immunity’ for purposes of our state constitution.” Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 196
Wn.2d 506, 519, 475 P.3d 164 (2020). State privileges and immunities are “‘those fundamental
rights which belong to the citizens of the state by reason of such citizenship.’” Maplebear, 1 Wn.3d
at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. Legion Post No. 149, 164 Wn.2d at 607).
We move on to the second part of the test only if the challenged state action implicates a state
privilege or immunity, and ask “whether there is a ‘reasonable ground’ for granting that privilege
or immunity” Martinez-Cuevas, 196 Wn.2d at 519.
Sindars argues that the refund of cash LFOs constitutes a special benefit that is given to
wealthy Blake defendants but not to indigent Blake defendants. But he fails to show that this
supposed benefit has any connection to a fundamental right of state citizenship. Therefore, Sindars’
privileges and immunities claim fails because absent a fundamental right of state citizenship, the
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analysis is identical to the equal protection clause analysis we performed above. See Maplebear,
1 Wn.3d at 27.
V. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Sindars argues that “[o]nce the court vacated his conviction pursuant to Blake, his
community service work was transformed into involuntary servitude by the court’s refusal to
provide restitution for his unpaid labor.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 23. We disagree.
The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Sindars’ claim rests on his assertion that he was “force[d]” to work by “[t]he machinery of
the state.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 23. But Sindars was not forced to perform any labor—he
affirmatively chose to perform community service in lieu of LFO payments when he moved the
trial court to permit him to do so. Sindars has not identified authority supporting his claim that
labor performed voluntarily can be retroactively treated as involuntary labor, as he asks us to do
here. Therefore, he has not shown a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Moreover, Sindars claims that he “faced physical restraint if he willfully declined to
perform community service.” Id. at 22. But a person who was indigent at the time they performed
the labor could not have been jailed for failing to satisfy LFOs. State v. Nason, 168 Wn.2d 936,
945, 233 P.3d 848 (2010). Sindars therefore could not have been compelled to perform labor under
threat of incarceration as a result of indigency, as he now claims.
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Finally, Sindars cites State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 41 Wn.2d 133, 247 P.2d 787
(1952), to argue that he was not “duly convicted” within the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 22-23; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (permitting
involuntary servitude “as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.”). Sindars contends that under Evans, his drug possession conviction should
retroactively be treated as “‘a legal nullity,’” including at the time he performed his community
service work. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 23 (quoting Evans, 41 Wn.2d at 143). In Sindars’ view,
this renders the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception for criminal punishments inapplicable.
However, when another Blake defendant made a similar argument based on Evans, the
Washington Supreme Court explicitly rejected the premise “that an unconstitutional statute is a
nullity, void ab initio.” State v. Olsen, ___ Wn.3d ___, 555 P.3d 868, 875 (2024). In Olsen, a Blake
defendant relied on Evans to argue that Blake retroactively rendered a guilty plea involuntary
because it rendered simple drug possession a “nonexistent crime.” Id. at 871, 874. The supreme
court rejected this argument because the Evans reasoning “has since been rejected” and concluded
that despite Blake’s retroactive effect, “simple drug possession was a valid crime” at the time of
the challenged guilty plea. Id. at 875. Therefore, even if Sindars could show that his labor was
involuntary, it would likely be permissible as a punishment for a crime.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm.
GLASGOW, J. We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
CHE, J.