FILED DECEMBER 3, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39861-7-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) NATASHA MAE JACKSON, ) ) Appellant. )
PENNELL, J. — Natasha Jackson appeals her convictions for first degree burglary
and second degree malicious mischief. We affirm.
FACTS
Robert Kunzer arrived at his Klickitat County residence to discover his home had
been ransacked and burglarized. In addition to property damage, numerous items were
missing. Among them was a muzzleloader rifle.
Mr. Kunzer’s home was equipped with a video surveillance system. The system
captured Natasha Jackson breaking into his home, along with two accomplices. A law
enforcement investigation revealed property belonging to Mr. Kunzer at a residence
associated with Ms. Jackson. However, Mr. Kunzer’s rifle was never recovered. The State No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
charged Ms. Jackson with first degree burglary while armed with a deadly weapon and
second degree malicious mischief.
Ms. Jackson was arrested several months after the burglary, at which point she
appeared in court for a preliminary hearing. She was not accompanied by an attorney. The
court advised Ms. Jackson of her rights, appointed counsel, and set bail.
Ms. Jackson appeared with counsel for the remainder of her court proceedings.
Counsel was able to lower Ms. Jackson’s bail from $75,000 to $35,000, but Ms. Jackson
remained in custody as she was never able to post the required amounts. At trial, the State
presented testimony from Mr. Kunzer and two law enforcement officers. The jury
convicted Ms. Jackson as charged.
Approximately one hour after the jury returned its verdict, counsel learned of an
anonymous voicemail message that appears to have been intended for Ms. Jackson’s
attorney.1 The message stated as follows:
[T]here is something that I have to tell you. There were two jurors on the Natasha Jackson case today who did not disclose that they knew the victim of the burglary. I don’t know who else to turn to, but I want you to know that there may have been a miscarriage of justice on one of your clients, Natasha Jackson.
1 The voicemail message was left with a local attorney whose name resembled that of Ms. Jackson’s attorney. The local attorney forwarded the message to the prosecutor.
2 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Rep. of Proc. (July 14, 2023) at 334.
The parties brought the voice message to the attention of the court. Ms. Jackson’s
attorney believed the message might have been left by one of the jurors and suggested
two possible names. The State’s attorney disagreed that the message appeared to have
been left by one of the jurors, instead raising the concern that it might have been left by
Ms. Jackson’s brother. The court decided to release phone contact information for the two
jurors identified by Ms. Jackson’s attorney and directed the parties to work together to
make follow-up phone calls. Counsel for Ms. Jackson and the State attempted to call the
jurors, but were unsuccessful. No further action was taken.
Ms. Jackson received a total sentence of 41 months. She timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Jackson makes three arguments on appeal: (1) insufficient evidence supports
her first degree burglary conviction, (2) the trial court violated her right to a fair and
impartial jury by conducting an inadequate investigation into potential juror bias, and
(3) the trial court violated her right to counsel by holding the bail hearing without
counsel. We reject these arguments and address each in turn.
3 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Sufficiency of the evidence
In assessing sufficiency of the evidence, we “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666,
679, 57 P.3d 255 (2002). “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s
evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” State v. Salinas,
119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “Circumstantial evidence is considered to be
as reliable as direct evidence.” State v. Stewart, 141 Wn. App. 791, 795, 174 P.3d 111
(2007).
Ms. Jackson contends the State presented insufficient evidence that she or an
accomplice was “armed with a deadly weapon” as required for first degree burglary.
RCW 9A.52.020(1)(a). Ms. Jackson recognizes that evidence of the missing rifle tended
to show that either she or one of her accomplices had possessed the weapon and removed
it from Mr. Kunzer’s residence. But she argues that under State v. Brown this is not
sufficient because first degree burglary requires evidence the firearm was “easily
accessible and readily available for use.” 162 Wn.2d 422, 431, 173 P.3d 245 (2007).
Ms. Jackson misreads Brown. The facts in Brown were unusual in that the
firearm giving rise to the first degree burglary charge was never taken from the residence.
4 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Instead, the homeowner merely discovered that the weapon had been moved from a
closet to the top of a bed. According to Brown, these circumstances were insufficient to
show the defendant had been armed for purposes of first degree burglary. Id. at 432.
Brown specifically did not address whether a first degree burglary charge could be
sustained based on evidence that a firearm had been removed from the home. Id. at 434
n.4.
As explained in State v. Hernandez, 172 Wn. App. 537, 290 P.3d 1052 (2012),
Brown’s analysis is limited to its facts. When a firearm is removed from a residence
during a burglary, Brown does not apply. Instead, the defendant will be considered armed
for purposes of first degree burglary, regardless of whether the firearm was loaded or the
defendant exhibited a willingness to use the firearm. Id. at 543-44.
This case falls under Hernandez, not Brown. Although there was no direct
evidence linking Ms. Jackson or her accomplices with Mr. Kunzer’s rifle, the
circumstantial evidence showed that either Ms. Jackson or one of her accomplices had
taken the rifle from Mr. Kunzer’s home. This was sufficient to justify Ms. Jackson’s first
degree burglary conviction.
5 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Investigation of juror bias
Judges have an ongoing duty to investigate allegations of juror bias and “to excuse
jurors who are found to be unfit.” State v. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d 758, 773, 123 P.3d 72
(2005). “A presumption of bias arises when a juror deliberately withholds material
information in order to be seated on a jury.” State v. Cho, 108 Wn. App. 315, 317,
30 P.3d 496 (2001).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED DECEMBER 3, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39861-7-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) NATASHA MAE JACKSON, ) ) Appellant. )
PENNELL, J. — Natasha Jackson appeals her convictions for first degree burglary
and second degree malicious mischief. We affirm.
FACTS
Robert Kunzer arrived at his Klickitat County residence to discover his home had
been ransacked and burglarized. In addition to property damage, numerous items were
missing. Among them was a muzzleloader rifle.
Mr. Kunzer’s home was equipped with a video surveillance system. The system
captured Natasha Jackson breaking into his home, along with two accomplices. A law
enforcement investigation revealed property belonging to Mr. Kunzer at a residence
associated with Ms. Jackson. However, Mr. Kunzer’s rifle was never recovered. The State No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
charged Ms. Jackson with first degree burglary while armed with a deadly weapon and
second degree malicious mischief.
Ms. Jackson was arrested several months after the burglary, at which point she
appeared in court for a preliminary hearing. She was not accompanied by an attorney. The
court advised Ms. Jackson of her rights, appointed counsel, and set bail.
Ms. Jackson appeared with counsel for the remainder of her court proceedings.
Counsel was able to lower Ms. Jackson’s bail from $75,000 to $35,000, but Ms. Jackson
remained in custody as she was never able to post the required amounts. At trial, the State
presented testimony from Mr. Kunzer and two law enforcement officers. The jury
convicted Ms. Jackson as charged.
Approximately one hour after the jury returned its verdict, counsel learned of an
anonymous voicemail message that appears to have been intended for Ms. Jackson’s
attorney.1 The message stated as follows:
[T]here is something that I have to tell you. There were two jurors on the Natasha Jackson case today who did not disclose that they knew the victim of the burglary. I don’t know who else to turn to, but I want you to know that there may have been a miscarriage of justice on one of your clients, Natasha Jackson.
1 The voicemail message was left with a local attorney whose name resembled that of Ms. Jackson’s attorney. The local attorney forwarded the message to the prosecutor.
2 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Rep. of Proc. (July 14, 2023) at 334.
The parties brought the voice message to the attention of the court. Ms. Jackson’s
attorney believed the message might have been left by one of the jurors and suggested
two possible names. The State’s attorney disagreed that the message appeared to have
been left by one of the jurors, instead raising the concern that it might have been left by
Ms. Jackson’s brother. The court decided to release phone contact information for the two
jurors identified by Ms. Jackson’s attorney and directed the parties to work together to
make follow-up phone calls. Counsel for Ms. Jackson and the State attempted to call the
jurors, but were unsuccessful. No further action was taken.
Ms. Jackson received a total sentence of 41 months. She timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Jackson makes three arguments on appeal: (1) insufficient evidence supports
her first degree burglary conviction, (2) the trial court violated her right to a fair and
impartial jury by conducting an inadequate investigation into potential juror bias, and
(3) the trial court violated her right to counsel by holding the bail hearing without
counsel. We reject these arguments and address each in turn.
3 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Sufficiency of the evidence
In assessing sufficiency of the evidence, we “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666,
679, 57 P.3d 255 (2002). “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s
evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” State v. Salinas,
119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “Circumstantial evidence is considered to be
as reliable as direct evidence.” State v. Stewart, 141 Wn. App. 791, 795, 174 P.3d 111
(2007).
Ms. Jackson contends the State presented insufficient evidence that she or an
accomplice was “armed with a deadly weapon” as required for first degree burglary.
RCW 9A.52.020(1)(a). Ms. Jackson recognizes that evidence of the missing rifle tended
to show that either she or one of her accomplices had possessed the weapon and removed
it from Mr. Kunzer’s residence. But she argues that under State v. Brown this is not
sufficient because first degree burglary requires evidence the firearm was “easily
accessible and readily available for use.” 162 Wn.2d 422, 431, 173 P.3d 245 (2007).
Ms. Jackson misreads Brown. The facts in Brown were unusual in that the
firearm giving rise to the first degree burglary charge was never taken from the residence.
4 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Instead, the homeowner merely discovered that the weapon had been moved from a
closet to the top of a bed. According to Brown, these circumstances were insufficient to
show the defendant had been armed for purposes of first degree burglary. Id. at 432.
Brown specifically did not address whether a first degree burglary charge could be
sustained based on evidence that a firearm had been removed from the home. Id. at 434
n.4.
As explained in State v. Hernandez, 172 Wn. App. 537, 290 P.3d 1052 (2012),
Brown’s analysis is limited to its facts. When a firearm is removed from a residence
during a burglary, Brown does not apply. Instead, the defendant will be considered armed
for purposes of first degree burglary, regardless of whether the firearm was loaded or the
defendant exhibited a willingness to use the firearm. Id. at 543-44.
This case falls under Hernandez, not Brown. Although there was no direct
evidence linking Ms. Jackson or her accomplices with Mr. Kunzer’s rifle, the
circumstantial evidence showed that either Ms. Jackson or one of her accomplices had
taken the rifle from Mr. Kunzer’s home. This was sufficient to justify Ms. Jackson’s first
degree burglary conviction.
5 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
Investigation of juror bias
Judges have an ongoing duty to investigate allegations of juror bias and “to excuse
jurors who are found to be unfit.” State v. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d 758, 773, 123 P.3d 72
(2005). “A presumption of bias arises when a juror deliberately withholds material
information in order to be seated on a jury.” State v. Cho, 108 Wn. App. 315, 317,
30 P.3d 496 (2001). Our courts grant trial judges “broad discretion” to investigate issues
pertaining to juror bias. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d at 773.
Ms. Jackson claims the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct an
investigation of juror bias beyond what was requested by the parties. We disagree.
Ms. Jackson’s argument rests on the flawed assertion that the trial court “knew”
“at least two jurors knew the alleged victim personally but hid that relevant fact from the
court and the parties.” Br. of Appellant at 24. Contrary to Ms. Jackson’s assertion, there is
no competent evidence in the record that any of the jurors knew the victim, let alone
evidence that the jurors hid this information from the court. The only information
regarding bias was an anonymous phone call. Outside of corroborating circumstances,
this type of information is not considered reliable. See State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940,
943, 530 P.2d 243 (1975). Given the lack of reliable evidence, it was not an abuse of
6 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
discretion for the trial court to refrain from conducting an independent and unrequested
investigation into possible juror bias.
Right to counsel
A defendant charged with a crime has the right to assistance of counsel at all court
hearings. State v. Heng, 2 Wn.3d 384, 388-89, 539 P.3d 13 (2023). “[C]ounsel ‘shall’ be
provided ‘as soon as feasible after the defendant has been arrested, appears before a
committing magistrate, or is criminally charged.’” Id. (quoting CrR 3.1(b)(1)). The
requirement to provide counsel applies, regardless of whether a court hearing is an initial
appearance. The failure to provide counsel at an initial or preliminary hearing is an error
that not only violates court rules, but also constitutional protections. Id. at 394-95.
Ms. Jackson correctly argues that the State’s failure to provide counsel at her
preliminary hearing was constitutional error. The only question is whether she is entitled
to a remedy. If the preliminary hearing constituted a “critical stage of the prosecution,”
then the failure to provide counsel will be deemed a “structural error requiring automatic
reversal.” Id. at 392. But if the hearing was not at a critical stage, then reversal turns on
application of the constitutional harmless error test.
As was true in Heng, the failure to provide counsel at Ms. Jackson’s preliminary
hearing does not require automatic reversal because the hearing was not at a critical stage
7 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
of the prosecution. “[A] critical stage is one where a defendant’s rights were lost,
defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or where the outcome of the
case was otherwise substantially affected.” Id. at 394. A hearing where a judge simply
“appoint[s] counsel, set[s] bail, and . . . enter[s] a not guilty plea” does not meet this
standard—at least when the defendant does not “lose [the] ability to challenge bail.” Id. at
395. Like Heng, Ms. Jackson’s preliminary hearing involved the appointment of counsel
and a preliminary bail decision. She did not lose any rights, waive any defenses or
privileges, or give up the opportunity to challenge the judge’s bail decision. Heng
mandates that we reject Ms. Jackson’s claim of structural error.
Because the preliminary hearing was not at a critical stage of the prosecution, we
turn to the constitutional harmless error test. Under this analysis, reversal is required
unless the State can demonstrate “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the absence of counsel
“did not contribute to the verdict.” Id.
Ms. Jackson argues that the State cannot establish harmless error because the
deprivation of counsel at her preliminary appearance caused the trial judge to become
inalterably biased against her. This argument is not well taken. Judges are presumed to act
with “honesty and integrity.” State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 38, 162 P.3d 389
(2007). Ms. Jackson cites no evidence to overcome this presumption. Rather, she relies
8 No. 39861-7-III State v. Jackson
entirely on speculation. This is not sufficient to preclude the State from meeting its
burden. See State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 309, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007) (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt “‘does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt’”);
United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1033 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] ‘reasonable doubt is a
doubt based upon reason and common sense and is not based purely on speculation.’”
(quoting NINTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3.5 (2010 ed.)))
Putting aside Ms. Jackson’s meritless argument regarding judicial bias, we find the
violation of the right to counsel harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ms. Jackson’s guilty
verdict was rendered by a jury, not a judge. There is no indication that the jury was aware
of what happened at Ms. Jackson’s preliminary hearing or that the outcome of the
preliminary hearing had an impact on trial. Furthermore, the trial evidence
overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict. The surveillance video linked Ms. Jackson
to the burglary and stolen property was located at a residence associated with Ms.
Jackson. As was true in Heng, the absence of counsel at Ms. Jackson’s preliminary
hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
9 No. 39861-7-111 State v. Jackson
CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Pennell, J.
WE CONCUR:
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