IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86741-5-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MARCUS BRADLEY WILLIAMS,
Appellant.
FELDMAN, J. — Marcus Bradley Williams appeals his convictions and
sentence for second degree felony murder predicated on second degree assault
with a deadly weapon, two counts of drive-by shooting, and two counts of first
degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He asserts (a) the State presented
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the
charged offenses, (b) the felony murder conviction violates substantive due
process, (c) the trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it included his
juvenile convictions in calculating his offender score, and (d) the trial court’s
restitution order is unconstitutionally excessive. Because sufficient evidence
supports the convictions and Williams has not otherwise established an entitlement
to relief, we affirm. No. 86741-5-I
I
The charges at issue here stem from three different incidents over a span
of 18 days in January 2021. First, the State alleged that on January 6, Williams
and an accomplice shot at two young men who had been playing basketball near
Othello Park in Seattle. Second, the State alleged that on January 7, Williams and
an accomplice shot and killed Jovan Satterwhite in Kent. Third, the State alleged
that on January 23, Williams and an accomplice shot at two young men, wounding
them, following an automobile collision in Shoreline. As discussed in detail below,
law enforcement investigated these shootings and marshalled compelling
evidence connecting Williams to each of the alleged crimes.
The State ultimately charged Williams with second degree felony murder
predicated on second degree assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of drive-
by shooting, and two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The
ensuing trial was bifurcated into two phases. In the first phase, the jury found
Williams guilty of felony murder and two counts of drive-by shooting and returned
a special verdict that Williams was armed with a firearm when he committed the
felony murder. Prior to the second phase, Williams stipulated he “had previously
been convicted of a serious offense.” The jury was then provided with additional
instructions regarding the two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and found
Williams guilty of those counts as well.
During sentencing, the trial court included Williams’ three juvenile
convictions in determining his offender score and imposed a standard range
sentence totaling 457 months in prison. The court also ordered Williams to pay
-2- No. 86741-5-I
$40,000 in restitution, with interest, to the Crime Victims Compensation Program
(CVCP). This timely appeal followed.
II
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Williams argues the State failed to prove he committed the charged
offenses either as a principal or as an accomplice. We disagree.
The jury was instructed that to convict Williams of felony murder, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams committed assault and, in
furtherance of the assault, caused the death of Satterwhite. The jury was
instructed on liability as a principal and as an accomplice, and that an intentional
shooting of another person with a firearm amounted to second degree assault.
Additionally, the jury was instructed that to convict Williams of drive-by shooting,
the State must prove he recklessly discharged a firearm in a manner that created
a substantial risk of death or serious injury to another person from the immediate
area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport him to the area. Lastly, the jury
was instructed that to convict Williams of first degree unlawful possession of a
firearm, the State must prove he knowingly owned or had possession or control of
a firearm while having been previously convicted of a serious offense.
In determining whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we
must assess “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Zghair, 4 Wn.3d 610, 619-20, 567
P.3d 1 (2025) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). Our standard of review in a challenge to the sufficiency -3- No. 86741-5-I
of the evidence is “‘highly deferential to the jury’s decision.’” In re Pers. Restraint
of Arntsen, 2 Wn.3d 716, 724, 543 P.3d 821 (2024) (quoting State v. Davis, 182
Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014)). “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the
evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against
the defendant.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
Also, “[c]ircumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable, and we defer to the
trier of fact on conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of
the evidence.” State v. Raleigh, 157 Wn. App. 728, 736-37, 238 P.3d 1211 (2010).
Applying this deferential standard, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict as to each of the charges.
Starting with the felony murder charge, surveillance videos admitted at trial
show a silver Mazda sedan and a white Crown Victoria sedan following Satterwhite
driving his Buick into his apartment complex in Kent near midnight on January 7,
2021. The video also shows that Williams drove the silver Mazda, which was
owned by his girlfriend, Katherine Brostrom, and Kyrie Jackson, Williams’ close
friend, drove the white Crown Victoria. Witnesses at the apartment complex heard
three gunshots followed by tires squealing and an engine accelerating and saw a
silver sedan speeding away. Surveillance videos also captured the silver Mazda
and white Crown Victoria fleeing the scene of the shooting.
When law enforcement responded to the shooting, they found Satterwhite
dead in his Buick with an obvious gunshot wound on the left side of his head. They
found a fired 9 mm bullet lodged in the Buick’s passenger seat pad. Washington
State Patrol (WSP) firearms specialist Renee Hudson examined the fired 9 mm
bullet and determined it could have been fired from eight possible firearms, -4- No. 86741-5-I
including a Canik 9 mm pistol. This is significant because, approximately 13
minutes before Satterwhite’s murder, Williams had taken a video of two pistols, a
two-tone Canik 9 mm SPX and an Fabrique Nationale (FN) Five-seveN 5.7 x 28
caliber pistol, lying on his lap as he was driving. Also, Williams’ Snapchat location
data placed his phone just west of the Kent crime scene about three minutes before
Satterwhite was killed. This data also showed Williams’ phone traveling away from
the murder scene immediately after the shooting. Moreover, Williams made a
“selfie” video less than 10 minutes after Satterwhite was shot which reveals he was
then just a few miles from the murder scene.
Law enforcement also determined that about an hour before Satterwhite’s
murder on January 7, Williams messaged an unknown person about selling his
gun: a “Canik 9” that was “2 tone black and grey.” At 10:40 p.m., Williams
messaged the person, “I got it on me.” A few days later, Jackson had a
conversation with someone to sell Williams’ Canik pistol, and it was never
recovered by law enforcement. Williams’ phone also revealed searches made in
the days after Satterwhite’s murder for “shooting in Kent,” “Kent shooting,” and
“Q13 news.” Law enforcement also found on Williams’ phone a cached image of
Satterwhite’s Buick surrounded by crime scene tape from a news story, which
meant the news story had been viewed on Williams’ phone. Viewed favorably to
the State, this is sufficient evidence to support the conviction for felony murder.
Turning to the Othello Park drive-by shooting on January 6, the evidence at
trial shows that Jordon King and Kadeem Hinton were sitting in King’s vehicle
around 7:20 p.m. when King noticed someone staring into his vehicle from a silver
Mazda on his left. When King started driving Hinton home, “bullets just started -5- No. 86741-5-I
flying at [his] car” from the silver Mazda. While no one was injured, King’s vehicle
was damaged by the bullets. King saw two people standing by the silver Mazda,
one of whom was standing and shooting at him from the driver’s side of the car.
Law enforcement recovered 13 10 mm cartridge casings, 15 9 mm cartridge
casings, and a 9 mm fired bullet from the scene, and determined the 9 mm bullet
was fired from the same firearm as the 9 mm bullet found in Satterwhite’s Buick.
Snapchat location data established that Williams’ phone was near the shooting
around 7:21 p.m. Additionally, there was a January 6 search on Williams’ phone
for “Seattle shooting,” “Q13,” and “KIRO.” Viewed favorably to the State, sufficient
evidence supports the conviction for the Othello drive-by shooting.
As to the Shoreline drive-by shooting on January 23, witnesses heard a
vehicle crash, male voices yelling, and gunshots near midnight, and a witness saw
the silhouettes of young men near two vehicles when the shooting occurred.
Meron Hailemariam and Lahraj Garrett were shot and received severe injuries
requiring medical attention. The Toyota Prius they were driving at the time was
damaged by several bullet holes and had white paint transfer on its bumper and
blood on its exterior. Law enforcement found three spent shell casings, one of
which was a 5.7 x 28 caliber casing, and collision debris in the road. WSP firearms
specialist Hudson determined that Brostrom’s FN pistol—the same pistol pictured
on Williams’ lap in the above-described video—had fired the 5.7 x 28 caliber
cartridge casing recovered from the scene. Although Brostrom owned the FN
pistol pictured in the video, Williams would often carry it without Brostrom’s
permission, the pistol had Williams’ DNA on it, and law enforcement recovered it
from a vehicle Williams had driven and parked at Harborview Medical Center. -6- No. 86741-5-I
Also, cell tower location data placed Williams’ phone near the collision and
shooting shortly after midnight, and a GPS tracker that law enforcement had
attached to Jackson’s white Crown Victoria for an unrelated matter placed the
vehicle near the scene when the collision and shooting occurred. This is sufficient
evidence to support the conviction for the Shoreline drive-by shooting.
Lastly, as to the first degree unlawful possession of a firearm on January 7
and January 23, Williams stipulated he “had previously been convicted of a serious
offense” that would make it illegal for him to knowingly own, possess, or control a
firearm. As detailed above, Williams’ phone contained pictures of a Canik pistol
and Brostrom’s FN pistol on his lap on January 7. Additionally, Brostrom’s FN
pistol, the firearm used to shoot and injure Hailemariam and Garrett during the
Shoreline shooting on January 23, was recovered from the vehicle that Williams
drove to Harborview and had Williams’ DNA on it. Accordingly, the State
presented sufficient evidence—including ballistics evidence, location data, text
messages, videos, photos, and witness testimony—to persuade a rational jury that
Williams was guilty of all the charged offenses.
Despite the foregoing evidence, Williams argues the State presented no
direct evidence that he committed any of the offenses and instead relied solely on
speculative inferences. But the jury was instructed that circumstantial evidence is
just as reliable as direct evidence, and “[i]t is the province of the finder of fact, not
the appellate court, to determine what conclusions reasonably flow from the
particular evidence in a case.” Zghair, 4 Wn.3d at 624. Williams also argues that
while some evidence exists that could support the jury’s verdict, other evidence
suggests he was innocent. But the State’s evidence supporting the convictions -7- No. 86741-5-I
“need not be inconsistent with a hypothesis of innocence.” See State v. Couch,
44 Wn. App. 26, 30, 720 P.2d 1387 (1986). “An essential function of the fact finder
is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact
is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and
the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d
832 (1999). We decline to disturb the jury’s resolution of these issues.
B. Substantive Due Process
Williams argues Washington’s felony murder doctrine, as applied to him,
violates fundamental fairness and substantive due process. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we may properly review Williams’ due process claim even
though he raises it for the first time on appeal. Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), this court
may address such an issue for the first time on appeal if the claimed error is a
“manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” Washington courts have long held
that “being charged, convicted, and sentenced pursuant to an unconstitutional
charging statute qualifies as a manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” State
v. Rice, 174 Wn.2d 884, 893, 279 P.3d 849 (2012); State v. Ruff, 122 Wn.2d 731,
733 n.1, 861 P.2d 1063 (1993). Consistent with these legal principles, Williams
argues that the felony murder statute is unconstitutional and that his corresponding
conviction therefore qualifies as a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. He
asserts three such arguments, each of which is discussed in turn below.
First, Williams argues the felony murder statute violates due process
because it purportedly creates a strict liability crime as the State need not prove
any mental state as to the killing. But strict liability crimes do not necessarily violate
due process. See State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 179, 481 P.3d 521 (2021) (“the -8- No. 86741-5-I
legislature can still create strict liability crimes” as “‘our legislature has the plenary
power to criminalize conduct regardless of whether the actor intended
wrongdoing’”) (quoting State v. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d 155, 163, 456 P.3d 1172
(2020)). Moreover, unlike strict liability crimes, which have no requisite mental
state, State v. Rivas, 126 Wn.2d 443, 452, 896 P.2d 57 (1995), a conviction of
felony murder requires the State to prove the requisite mental state of the predicate
felony. See State v. Bolar, 118 Wn. App. 490, 504, 78 P.3d 1012 (2003) (citing
State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 615, 801 P.2d 193 (1990)). Because the State
charged Williams with second degree felony murder predicated on assault in the
second degree, the State was required to prove Williams possessed the requisite
mental state to be guilty of assault in the second degree. This did not criminalize
innocent conduct; therefore, as applied to Williams, the felony murder statute does
not violate due process.
Second, Williams also raises several policy arguments against the felony
murder statute, including that Washington’s felony murder statute is harsh, heavily
criticized, the broadest in the country, and leads to disproportionate punishment.
Williams’ arguments generally reflect his disagreement with the legislature’s
decision to allow the crime of assault to serve as a predicate felony for felony
murder. He claims his concerns “persist because the legislature explicitly stated
that any felony assault is a valid predicate to felony murder.” But “[i]t is the
legislature’s purview to decide what one can and cannot be punished for.” In re
Postsentence Review of Leach, 161 Wn.2d 180, 183, 163 P.3d 782 (2007). Thus,
“whether the felony murder statute makes sound policy . . . is better directed to the
legislature.” State v. Armstrong, 143 Wn. App. 333, 343, 178 P.3d 1048 (2008). -9- No. 86741-5-I
Indeed, several members of our Supreme Court have urged the legislature to
reconsider the felony murder statute, 1 yet the legislature has consistently rejected
such pleas. See LAWS OF 2003, ch. 3, § 1.
Lastly, Williams claims that Washington’s felony murder statute increases
the subjectivity of the State’s charging decision and allows the State to
disproportionally charge Black defendants with murder by decreasing the State’s
burden of proving a defendant’s mental state. On this point, State v. Gregory, 192
Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018), is instructive. In Gregory, our Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of our state’s death penalty. The court admitted as
evidence a study on the effect of race on the imposition of the death penalty and
ordered its commissioner to conduct additional fact-finding as part of its statutorily
required review under RCW 10.95.100 (repealed by LAWS OF 2023 ch. 102 § 21).
Id. at 12-13. The Supreme Court commissioner subsequently issued formal
findings. Id. at 13. Reviewing those findings, the court held “Washington’s death
penalty [was] unconstitutional, as administered, because it [was] imposed in an
arbitrary and racially-biased manner.” Id. at 35.
1 See, e.g., State v. Tamalini, 134 Wn.2d 725, 744-45, 953 P.2d 450 (1998) (Sanders, J., dissenting)
(“Washington has by far the broadest felony murder practice of any state in the union” and “stands virtually alone in allowing assault to serve as the predicate felony in a felony murder prosecution.”); In re Pers. Restraint of Andress, 147 Wn.2d 602, 56 P.3d 981 (2002), superseded by LAWS OF 2003, ch. 3, § 1; State v. Gamble, 154 Wn.2d 457, 470-71, 476, 114 P.3d 646 (2005) (Madsen, J., concurring) (noting that Washington’s felony murder rule is an “exceedingly harsh statutory scheme” and “encourag[ing] the legislature to take a closer look” and “consider altering” the felony murder statutory scheme); Id. at 476-77 (Chambers, J., concurring) (expressing specific concern with the “double standard” created by the legislature in that the felony murder statute “explicitly allows two people who commit the same offense to be charged and convicted of different crimes, perhaps because of their different background or socioeconomic status or merely the county in which they live”); In re Pers. Restraint of Bowman, 162 Wn.2d 325, 334-35, 172 P.3d 681 (2007) (“while the felony murder can, and does in some circumstances, result in unfairly harsh treatment that is not commensurate with the defendant’s culpability, the legislature has expressed its intent to maintain the felony murder statutes”). - 10 - No. 86741-5-I
Although Williams raises serious concerns about the racially
disproportionate impact of the felony murder statute in Washington and these
concerns are shared by numerous scholars and advocates, 2 the record before this
court does not include findings similar to those in Gregory because Williams did
not raise this issue below. Nor can this court conduct a hearing to make such
findings itself because former RCW 10.95.100 (relied on by the Supreme Court in
Gregory) does not apply here and, as our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated,
“appellate courts are not fact-finders.” Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Tr. Servs.,
Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 54, 534 P.3d 339 (2023) (citing Garcia v. Henley, 190 Wn.2d
539, 544, 415 P.3d 241 (2018)). Without such a record, we cannot properly
address the merits of this argument.
C. Offender Score Calculation
Williams next argues the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority
when it included his juvenile convictions in his offender score calculation. We
disagree.
RCW 9.94A.525 governs a sentencing court’s calculation of a defendant’s
offender score. Under the previous version of RCW 9.94A.525, courts considered
juvenile offenses subject only to the same limitations that applied to adult
convictions. See State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592, 597, 546 P.3d 458
2 See PERRY MORIEARTY, ET AL., Race, Racial Bias, and Imputed Liability Murder, 51 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 675 (2024); NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, ET AL., Felony Murder: An On-Ramp for Extreme Sentencing, Sentencing Project 24 (2022); G. BEN COHEN, ET AL., Racial Bias, Accomplice Liability, and the Felony Murder Rule: National Empirical Study, 101 Denv. L. Rev. 65, 113 (2023); Data: Washington, The Felony Murder Reporting Project. See also State v. Morgan, 4 Wn.3d 261, 282 n.1, 562 P.3d 360 (2025) (Knodell, J., concurring) (noting the felony murder doctrine has been criticized as “morally indefensible. . . and discriminatory,” and that some studies conclude prosecutors charge felony murder disproportionately as a tool against defendants of color). - 11 - No. 86741-5-I
(2024); RCW 9.94A.598(1)(a). Effective July 23, 2023, the legislature amended
RCW 9.94A.525 and added subsection 1(b) prohibiting the inclusion of juvenile
convictions which are not murder in the first or second degree or class A felony
sex offenses from a defendant’s offender score calculation. RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b);
LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 2. The issue presented here is which version of this
statute applies to Williams’ sentencing in May 2024 for offenses he committed in
January 2021.
Troutman is instructive on this issue. There, we addressed arguments
similar to those Williams presents here regarding offender score calculations. We
noted that under RCW 9.94A.345, 3 the timing statute, and RCW 10.01.040, 4 the
general savings clause statute, sentences imposed under the Sentencing Reform
Act “‘are generally meted out in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the
offense.’” Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 597-98 (quoting State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d
708, 714, 487 P.3d 482 (2021)). Any exception to this general rule must be
apparent by express legislative intent “‘in words that fairly convey that intention.’”
Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 720 (quoting State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220, 238, 95 P.3d
1225 (2004)). We held the plain language of RCW 9.94A.525, as amended, is
unambiguous and does not establish the legislature’s intent for the statute to apply
retroactively. Troutman, 30 Wn.2d at 599-600. In accordance with RCW
3 RCW 9.94A.345 provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.” 4 RCW 10.01.040 provides: “Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or repealed,
all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared in the amendatory or repealing act, and every such amendatory or repealing statute shall be so construed as to save all criminal and penal proceedings, and proceedings to recover forfeitures, pending at the time of its enactment, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared therein.” (Emphasis added.) - 12 - No. 86741-5-I
9.94A.345 and RCW 10.01.040, we concluded the law in effect at the time of the
offense applies to a defendant’s sentence. Id. Here too, the sentencing court did
not err in counting Williams’ juvenile convictions when calculating his offender
score in accordance with the law in effect when Williams committed the offenses
at issue.
D. Excessive Fines Clause
Lastly, Williams argues the restitution order requiring him to pay $40,000,
with interest, to the CVCP is grossly disproportionate and thus unconstitutional.
We again disagree.
As a preliminary matter, the State argues Williams cannot challenge the
restitution order on appeal because he agreed to it in the trial court. A defendant
waives the right to challenge an alleged sentencing error for the first time on appeal
“if the error involves agreement to facts, or the exercise of discretion.” State v.
Cosgaya-Alvarez, 172 Wn. App. 785, 790, 291 P.3d 939 (2013) (citing In re Pers.
Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 873-74, 50 P.3d 618 (2002)). But a legal
error in a sentence, including a legal error relating to restitution, can be raised for
the first time on appeal. State v. Ramos, 24 Wn. App. 2d 204, 214, 520 P.3d 65
(2022) (citing Cosgaya-Alvarez, 172 Wn. App. at 790). Moreover, even in the
absence of this legal principle, RAP 2.5(a)(3) would independently permit the court
to address Williams’ argument. Id. at 214-15 (court “will consider [Ramos’s]
indigency-based constitutional claims under RAP 2.5(a)”).
Turning to the merits of Williams’ excessive fines argument, State v. Ellis, 5
Wn.3d 549, 579 P.3d 37 (2025), is instructive. There, the defendant was ordered
to pay restitution to the Crime Victims Compensation fund. Id. at 553-54. The total - 13 - No. 86741-5-I
amount of restitution ordered represented a portion of the funeral expenses for the
defendant’s victim. Id. at 554. On appeal, Ellis argued the imposition of restitution
and interest violated the excessive fines clause of the United States and
Washington constitutions because he was indigent and unable to pay the
restitution. 562-63. Our Supreme Court disagreed, concluding Ellis’s claim did not
satisfy the first step of the excessive fines analysis because the restitution ordered
was solely compensatory. Id. at 563-64. The court acknowledged that restitution
can be both punitive and compensatory but concluded the restitution order was not
punitive because “the amount ordered . . . was only the amount needed to
compensate the CVC.” Id. at 564. Thus, the court did not reach the second step
of the inquiry to determine whether the fine was constitutionally excessive. Id.
Likewise here, Williams’ claim does not satisfy the first step of the excessive
fines inquiry because the entire amount of restitution ordered solely reimburses
the CVCP for amounts it paid to cover Satterwhite’s funeral costs and amounts it
paid as pension benefits to Satterwhite’s children. Thus, as in Ellis, the restitution
ordered was not punitive. Additionally, the interest on the restitution amount is not
subject to an excessive fines analysis. See Ramos, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 228
(“Because the legislature did not intend for interest to be a penalty and because
interest accruing on restitution is paid to crime victims rather than to the
government, interest on restitution awards is not punishment and not subject to an
excessive fines clause analysis.”). Williams’ excessive fines argument thus fails.
Despite this, Williams argues the fact that the restitution ordered is payable
to the CVCP does not make its impact on him any less punitive. Williams relies on
Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 564 (2026), but such reliance - 14 - No. 86741-5-I
is misplaced. In Ellingburg, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed whether restitution
ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause because the defendant committed the crime for which
restitution was ordered before the enactment of the MVRA. 146 S. Ct. at 566. The
Court held that determining whether a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
requires courts to evaluate whether the underlying statute imposes a criminal or
penal sanction as opposed to a civil remedy. Id. at 566-67. Applying this test, the
Court determined that restitution under the MVRA is “plainly criminal punishment
for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause” in part because the MVRA labels
restitution as a “penalty” for a criminal offense and restitution is imposed at
sentencing together with or in lieu of other criminal punishments. Id. at 567.
By contrast here, Williams’ restitution claim was brought under the
excessive fines clause, not the Ex Post Facto Clause. Additionally, the restitution
order compensating the CVCP for amounts paid to Williams’ victim and the victim’s
family was ordered pursuant to Washington’s Crime Victims’ Compensation Act
(CVCA), chapter 7.68 RCW, and Washington’s restitution statute, RCW
9.94A.753. Under the CVCA, chapter 7.68 RCW, “[e]ach victim injured as a result
of a criminal act . . . or the victim’s family or beneficiary in case of death of the
victim, are eligible for benefits in accordance with this chapter.” RCW 7.68.070(1).
And under RCW 9.94A.753(7), the trial court is required to order restitution “in all
cases where the victim is entitled to benefits under the crime victims’ compensation
act, chapter 7.68 RCW.” Accordingly, the CVCA “provides the framework to
determine the amount of benefits a victim is entitled to, and the restitution statute,
RCW 9.94A.753, mandates that a court order restitution in that amount.” State v. - 15 - No. 86741-5-I
Morgan, 4 Wn.3d 261, 278-79, 562 P.3d 360 (2025). Unlike restitution ordered
under the MVRA and analyzed in the context of an Ex Post Facto Clause analysis,
restitution ordered under the CVCA and RCW 9.94A.753(7) solely to compensate
and reimburse the CVCP for amounts paid to victims and their families is not
punitive criminal punishment and not subject to an excessive fines clause analysis.
See Ellis, 579 P.3d at 45-46. Williams’ contrary argument fails.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
- 16 -