Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
August 25, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 61598-3-II
Respondent,
v.
JEAN PAUL UNGUREANU, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.
GLASGOW, J. — Jean Paul Ungureanu pleaded guilty to second degree assault, felony harassment, and felony violation of a no-contact order, all with domestic violence designations. In lieu of a standard sentence, the parties stipulated to Ungureanu’s participation in felony mental health court. The parties’ agreement provided that if Ungureanu was terminated from mental health court, he would be sentenced to 84 months of confinement followed by 18 months of community custody.
Ungureanu was later terminated from mental health court and sentenced according to the parties’ stipulation. Ungureanu appeals, arguing that there was not a sufficient factual basis to support the felony harassment plea, and that this court must remand to allow withdrawal of his entire plea. Ungureanu also filed a statement of additional grounds for review (SAG).
We affirm.
FACTS
I. INITIAL CONDUCT
Ungureanu was prohibited from having contact with his father, Gheorghe Ungureanu1, per a domestic violence no-contact order. In January 2024, police were called to investigate a potential violation of the no-contact order. Upon arrival, the officer talked with Gheorghe and his wife, who indicated Ungureanu had left their home shortly before officers arrived. Gheorghe stated that Ungureanu had been living with them for a while.
Gheorghe reported that the day before, he was home alone with Ungureanu. Gheorge was sitting in his recliner when Ungureanu picked up a kitchen knife from the counter and approached Gheorghe from behind. Gheorghe reported that Ungureanu wrapped his arm around Gheorghe’s neck, held the knife against his throat, and said something to the effect of, “‘I could kill you.’” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2. At the time, Gheorghe thought Ungureanu was joking, but Gheorghe told police that he then believed Ungureanu was practicing and might actually try to kill him.
The officers left after taking Gheorghe’s statement. When Ungureanu returned, Gheorghe again called 911. Officers returned and arrested Ungureanu for violating the no-contact order. The State charged Ungureanu with second degree assault, felony harassment, and felony violation of a no-contact order, all with domestic violence designations.
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we respectfully refer to Gheorghe Ungureanu by first name throughout this opinion.
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II. MENTAL HEALTH COURT ALTERNATIVE Ungureanu pleaded guilty to all three charges. The parties stipulated to Ungureanu’s participation in the felony mental health court in lieu of a standard range sentence.
Ungureanu submitted a signed statement on plea of guilty. Ungureanu’s statement read in part, “I did put my arm around the neck of my father and indicate[d] to him that I could kill him. I lived with my father in violation of a court order of protection. My father’s breathing was obstructed during the assault.” CP at 44. The plea statement said Ungureanu fully understood the charges he was facing and the elements of those charges. Rather than listing the elements of each crime, the statement read, “see information.” CP at 33. The information submitted by the prosecuting attorney’s office listed all the elements of felony harassment as follows:
That [UNGUREANU] . . . did knowingly threaten to cause [GHEORGHE] bodily injury, immediately or in the future, the threat was communicated to [GHEORGHE], the defendant’s words or conduct put [GHEORGHE] in reasonable fear the threat would be carried out; further, the threat was a threat to kill [GHEORGHE], thereby invoking the provisions of RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b) and increasing the classification of the crime to a felony . . ., AND FURTHERMORE, the Defendant did commit the above crime against a family or household member.
CP at 6.
At the plea hearing, defense counsel indicated that he had reviewed the plea form with Ungureanu. Defense counsel further represented, “[Ungureanu] fully understands what he’s doing by asking the Court to get into Mental Health Court.” 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 4. “I believe he’s initialed all the paragraphs that pertain to him, and he has signed the plea form in my presence. I believe that this is a knowing and voluntary plea.” 1 VRP at 6.
Then, the trial court conducted the plea colloquy, confirming that Ungureanu had read and understood the plea documents, including the elements of the charges, and that counsel had
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answered all his questions about the documents. The trial court concluded that Ungureanu’s plea was made “voluntarily, willingly, and knowingly.” 1 VRP at 11. The trial court made an express written finding that there was a factual basis for Ungureanu’s plea.
Then, the trial court reviewed the parties’ stipulation and agreement for Ungureanu to participate in mental health court. Ungureanu agreed that if he was terminated from the program, the court would sentence him to the high end of his sentence range, 84 months in custody followed by 18 months of community custody. Per this agreement, Ungureanu was released to an inpatient facility.
III. TERMINATION
In August 2024, the trial court issued a bench warrant for Ungureanu because he had absconded from inpatient treatment. Ungureanu eventually reentered treatment in October 2024.
In November, Ungureanu had failed to reengage with the program, and he was unsuccessful in treatment. The inpatient treatment program discharged him. Because of these violations, the trial court terminated Ungureanu from the felony mental health court program. Based on the earlier stipulation, the trial court sentenced Ungureanu to 84 months in custody followed by 18 months of community custody.
Ungureanu appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA Ungureanu argues there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his felony harassment plea. Ungureanu asserts that there was no evidence in the record at the plea hearing showing Gheorghe, Ungureanu’s father, was placed in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out,
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and as a result, this court must reverse his conviction for felony harassment and remand for withdrawal of the entire plea.
The State asserts that the factual basis requirement of CrR 4.2(d) is not a constitutional requirement that would entitle Ungureanu to withdraw his guilty plea. It also reasons that because the factual basis may be drawn from any reliable source, there was a sufficient factual basis to support the guilty plea. A. Legal Principles At the outset, we note that Ungureanu did not assert below after his termination from mental health court that his guilty plea to felony harassment lacked a factual basis. Thus, unless this issue involves a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right,” he may not raise it for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). In this case, for an error to be “manifest” the defendant must be able to show actual prejudice and that the alleged error affected the defendant’s constitutional rights. State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001).
There is no doubt that the “[a]lleged involuntariness of a guilty plea is the type of constitutional error that a defendant can raise for the first time on appeal.” State v. Knotek, 136 Wn. App. 412, 422-23, 149 P.3d 676 (2006); RAP 2.5(a)(3). However, unlike the voluntariness of a plea, which can be reviewed for the first time on appeal, the superior court’s procedural obligations under CrR 4.2 generally do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 642, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996) (“the procedural requirements of CrR 4.2 are not constitutionally mandated”); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. 723, 727, 695 P.2d 596 (1985) (“The duty imposed by court rule that the judge must be satisfied of the plea’s factual basis should not be confused with the constitutional requirement that the accused have an
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understanding of the nature of the charge.”). By failing to object below, Ungureanu failed to preserve error based on procedural requirements in CrR 4.2, and we instead focus on constitutional requirements.
Due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). Thus, “[a]n involuntary plea can amount to manifest injustice.” State v. Codiga, 162 Wn.2d 912, 922, 175 P.3d 1082 (2008). Courts determine whether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary from a totality of the circumstances. Branch, 129 Wn.2d at 642. A plea is presumptively valid when the charging document accurately describes the elements of the offense charged. State v. Snider, 199 Wn.2d 435, 444, 508 P.3d 1014 (2022). A defendant may overcome this presumption with a showing they were affirmatively misled. Id. at 449.
To the extent CrR 4.2(d)’s factual basis requirement ensures a constitutionally voluntary plea, a factual basis exists if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant is guilty. State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 370, 552 P.2d 682 (1976). The trial court may consider any reliable source of information to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the plea, but it must be made part of the record at the time of the plea to be considered. State v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 95, 684 P.2d 683 (1984). Reliable sources can include, for example, witness statements, police reports, and the affidavit of probable cause. Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 725-26. B. Analysis Here, Ungureanu challenges the factual basis for his harassment conviction. A defendant commits felony harassment if they knowingly threaten “to kill the person threatened or any other
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person” and the person is placed in “reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.” RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a), (b), (2)(b)(ii).
The plea statement indicated that Ungureanu fully understood the charges he was facing and directed a reader to refer to the information for the elements of the charges. The information, in turn, contained all the required elements, including that he put Gheorghe “in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out.” See CP at 6. Because the information accurately described the elements of felony harassment, including the fear element, Ungureanu’s plea is presumptively valid. Snider, 199 Wn.2d at 444. Thus, the burden shifts to Ungureanu to prove he was affirmatively misled. Id. at 449.
Ungureanu cannot meet this burden. On appeal, Ungureanu does not even allege he was misled. And at sentencing, defense counsel and Ungureanu both asserted that Ungureanu read and understood the entire plea agreement.
It is true that the plea statement failed to explicitly state that Gheorghe was placed in reasonable fear that the threat could be carried out. But the plea statement directed the reader to refer to the information, which in turn made it plain that this was a required element of felony harassment. See CP at 6, 33. Further, the trial court could infer reasonable fear from the plea statement itself: Gheorghe had been concerned enough in the past to obtain a protection order, Ungureanu violated the protection order, and during the same incident when the threat to kill occurred, Ungureanu assaulted Gheorghe severely enough that his father’s breathing was obstructed. Relying on these statements, a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty of felony harassment. Newton, 87 Wn.2d at 370. Thus, the factual basis requirement was
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established through the facts stated in the plea agreement, which was within the record at the time of the sentencing hearing. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d at 95.
We conclude that Ungureanu was aware of and understood all the necessary elements of harassment before he pleaded guilty to that crime and a factual basis for reasonable fear could be inferred from the plea statement. Thus, the plea itself was voluntary. As such, Ungureanu has not established a deficiency under CrR 4.2(f) that rises to the level of a manifest error affecting a constitutional right, and Ungureanu cannot withdraw the plea.
II. SAG
Ungureanu filed a SAG, which included three allegations: (1) the prosecutor made it seem like he left treatment several times when he only left once; (2) he did not do what the police report alleged; and (3) he showed up for his November court date, but the security guard told him to leave. These arguments do not entitle Ungureanu to relief.
First, Ungureanu appears to argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the record. Specifically, he argues that the State falsely represented that Ungureanu left treatment multiple times when he only left treatment once. However, the State only alleged Ungureanu fled treatment once—the second time he left treatment was due to the fact he was discharged because treatment was unsuccessful. The State’s verbal assertions at the termination hearing echoed its written assertions. Thus, this claim fails.
Second, Ungureanu alleges he did not do what the police report alleges. But “[w]hen a defendant completes a plea statement and admits to reading, understanding, and signing it, this creates a strong presumption that the plea is voluntary.” State v. Smith, 134 Wn.2d 849, 852, 953 P.2d 810 (1998). Generally, a defendant may not appeal from their guilty plea unless collateral
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questions are raised. Young v. Konz, 91 Wn.2d 532, 536, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979). Collateral questions include “the validity of the statute violated, the sufficiency of the information, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which the plea was made.” State v. Saylors, 70 Wn.2d 7, 9, 422 P.2d 477 (1966).
At the plea hearing, Ungureanu admitted the factual allegations underlying his charges.
The trial court concluded Ungureanu made the plea “voluntarily, willingly, and knowingly,” and this court has affirmed that determination above. 1 VRP at 11. Because Ungureanu admitted to the factual basis for his plea and does not raise any collateral questions, he cannot challenge the underlying facts supporting his plea to either assault in the second degree or felony violation of a no-contact order. Accordingly, this claim also fails.
Third, Ungureanu alleges he showed up for a November court date, but the security guard told him to leave. His failure to appear at this hearing was one of the reasons cited by the State in support of their motion to terminate Ungureanu’s participation in felony mental health court. This claim relies on facts outside the record and is therefore improper for a direct appeal. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
In sum, none of the claims in Ungureanu’s SAG merits reversal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm.
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J.
We concur:
VELJACIC, C.J.
CHE, J.