Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
May 19, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59756-0-II
Respondent,
v.
ALEXANDER SEMAJ ISAIAH CARSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—In March 2023, Alexander Carson saw his acquaintance Treyvon Clark in
the parking lot of a smoke shop. Carson ordered the driver of the car he was in to pull over and
park. Carson pulled out a gun and placed it on his lap. After Clark left the smoke shop and started
driving home, Carson directed the driver to drive to Clark’s house. While Clark was walking from
his car to his house, Carson shot an automatic weapon in Clark’s direction from the passenger seat
of the car he was in, firing 19 bullets and hitting Clark once in the forehead. Clark had severe
injuries but survived.
A jury convicted Carson of several crimes, including attempted first degree murder. When
calculating Carson’s offender score, the trial court included felony convictions from when Carson
was a juvenile.
On appeal, Carson argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he acted
with premeditated intent to kill Clark, which is required to convict for attempted first degree
murder. Carson contends that, on its own, shooting a firearm 19 times in one burst does not
demonstrate intent to kill, and that the State failed to present other evidence of premeditation. No. 59756-0-II
Carson also argues that at his sentencing, the trial court should have applied a statutory amendment
that prohibits courts from including most juvenile offenses in offender score calculations.
We hold that there was sufficient evidence that Carson acted with premeditated intent to
kill Clark. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by including Carson’s juvenile offenses
in his offender score, as it properly complied with the sentencing requirements in effect when
Carson’s offenses were committed. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 25, 2023, Jeremy Vanzant-Volpe picked up Carson and another man from
Carson’s mother’s apartment complex. Carson sat in the front passenger seat of Vanzant-Volpe’s
car.
Vanzant-Volpe then drove to a smoke shop. There, Carson saw Clark, whom he
recognized. The record demonstrates that Clark and Carson knew each other when they were
younger and that Carson knew where Clark lived. The record also suggests that at some point they
stopped spending time together.
Clark went through the drive-through window at the smoke shop. Vanzant-Volpe’s car
started to go toward the drive-through window, then reversed and parked. Surveillance video from
the smoke shop shows both Vanzant-Volpe and Carson wearing balaclavas covering their faces.
The car eventually left the smoke shop area.
After leaving the smoke shop, Vanzant-Volpe drove to Clark’s house. At about 4:55 p.m.,
Clark parked his car across the street and started walking toward his house. As he was walking, a
passenger in Vanzant-Volpe’s car fired several rounds from an automatic gun, and one bullet hit
Clark in the forehead. A neighbor’s surveillance video shows a light-colored area in the front
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passenger’s side of Vanzant-Volpe’s car at this time, which could have been consistent with the
light emitted from a firearm when it is fired.
Clark’s mother and sister heard “rapid fire” gunshots and saw Clark on the ground,
bleeding from his head. 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (May 7, 2024) at 228. A neighbor also heard a
burst of gunfire for about two or three seconds.
Clark’s family called the police and Clark was transported to the hospital where he
underwent several surgeries for a single gunshot wound to the forehead. Clark survived the
shooting but had serious and lasting injuries and disabilities as a result.
Police found 19 firearm cartridge casings at the scene of Clark’s shooting, and forensic
testing revealed they were all fired from the same gun. However, police never found the gun that
was used in Clark’s shooting.
Vanzant-Volpe’s car fled the scene of the shooting through a nearby alley. About five
minutes after the shooting, Vanzant-Volpe’s car arrived at the same apartment complex where he
picked up Carson.
Three days later, police arrested Vanzant-Volpe and interviewed him.
Several weeks later, on July 3, 2023, police were at Carson’s apartment complex and saw
a car rapidly leaving the parking lot. Police pursued the car—which was stolen—in a high-speed
chase for several miles before the car hit another vehicle and stopped. Carson exited the car and
police chased him through a wooded area where they heard a single gunshot go off and later found
a magazine for a handgun. Police eventually detained Carson and found a box of ammunition in
the driver’s seat of the car he was driving. When searching Carson’s phone, police found what
appeared to be a chat between Carson and another person about switches that turned semiautomatic
handguns into fully automatic handguns.
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The State charged Carson with attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle, first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, drive-by shooting,
first degree assault with a firearm enhancement, and first degree attempted murder with a firearm
enhancement. Carson and Vanzant-Volpe were tried together as codefendants.
Vanzant-Volpe testified at trial. He said that as he pulled into the smoke shop, Carson
handed him a balaclava, which he put on. Carson also put a balaclava over his own face.
Vanzant-Volpe further testified that as he was pulling into the drive-through for the smoke
shop, Carson told him to back up and park the car. At this point, Carson pulled out a gun with an
automatic switch and put it on his lap. Vanzant-Volpe testified that after this, he drove away from
the smoke shop before Carson gave him directions to turn around. Carson initially told Vanzant-
Volpe to follow Clark’s car as it left the smoke shop, then directed him to Clark’s house.
At some point while Vanzant-Volpe was driving, he heard rapid gunfire from next to him.
He was directed to drive away, so he exited the street through an alley and dropped Carson and
the other passenger off back at Carson’s mother’s apartment.
During closing arguments, Carson’s defense counsel argued that the State did not present
sufficient evidence of Carson’s premeditated intent to kill Clark and claimed that Carson’s actions
demonstrated only the recklessness required for a drive-by shooting. Carson’s defense counsel
contended that the State’s evidence did not prove that Carson had a motive to kill Clark nor that
Carson shot the 19 rounds of gunfire specifically at Clark.
The jury found Carson guilty of all charged crimes, including attempted first degree
murder.
The trial court held Carson’s sentencing hearing on June 14, 2024. At the time of
sentencing, Carson had been convicted of several prior crimes, most of which he committed as a
4 No. 59756-0-II
juvenile. The trial court included Carson’s juvenile felony offenses when calculating his offender
score, though Carson’s defense counsel preserved an objection to the inclusion of these offenses.
The trial court ultimately sentenced Carson to 608 months. Carson appeals his conviction and
sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Carson argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that Carson acted with
premeditated intent to kill Clark, which is a required element of attempted first degree murder. We
disagree.
“The State bears the burden of proving all the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). When reviewing a claim of
insufficient evidence, this court asks whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, a rational trier of fact could find that all of the crime’s essential elements were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).
Under this standard, the defendant admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable
inferences that arise therefrom. Id. at 265-66. Both circumstantial and direct evidence are
considered equally reliable. Id. at 266. “However, inferences based on circumstantial evidence
must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309
P.3d 318 (2013).
A person commits attempted first degree murder when they have premeditated intent to
cause the death of another person and take a substantial step toward causing that person’s death.
RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a); RCW 9A.28.020(1).
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A. Intent to Kill
First, Carson argues that the act of firing multiple gunshots in rapid succession is not
sufficient to demonstrate premeditated intent to kill. Carson contends that a “wild, careless
discharge of bullets in extremely rapid succession,” only one of which hit Clark, does not, on its
own, demonstrate that Carson intended to kill Clark. Br. of Appellant at 26. Carson argues that the
evidence equally suggests that Carson’s intent was to commit a drive-by shooting or scare Clark
with gun shots. Carson further asserts that the State did not present evidence that he had a motive
to kill Clark. And Carson claims that no other evidence indicated that Carson intended to kill Clark.
“The crime of attempted murder requires specific intent to cause the death of another
person.” State v. Elmi, 138 Wn. App. 306, 313, 156 P.3d 281 (2007) ,aff’d, 166 Wn.2d 209, 207
P.3d 439 (2009). “Intent is rarely provable by direct evidence.” State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717,
729, 582 P.2d 558 (1978). Thus, a jury may infer intent to kill from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the event. Elmi, 138 Wn. App. at 313. “Proof that a defendant fired a weapon at a
victim is a sufficient basis for finding an intent to kill.” Id. (citing State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d
51, 84-85, 804 P.2d 577 (1991)).
In Elmi, the defendant and his estranged wife had a heated argument over the phone. Id. at
311. Later that night, the defendant went to the house where the wife was located. Id. Looking out
of the living room window, the wife saw the defendant arguing with people outside. Id. Seconds
later, she heard gunshots piercing the window. Id. Police found four shell casings within 10 feet
of the window, three bullet holes in the window, and bullet holes in the curtains, the television
screen, and a kitchen cabinet. Id.
Division One held that when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, “the location
and number of the bullet holes, the timing of the shots in relation to [the wife’s] appearance at the
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window, the proximity of the shell casings to the living room window, and the heated argument
earlier in the day strongly support an inference of intent to kill.” Id. at 314.
Here, Carson argues that there is insufficient evidence that he fired his weapon at Clark,
so there is insufficient evidence that he intended to kill Clark. See id. at 313 (“Proof that a
defendant fired a weapon at a victim is a sufficient basis for finding an intent to kill.”). However,
circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that Carson had intent to kill Clark. Carson saw
Clark at the smoke shop and initially directed Vanzant-Volpe to follow Clark’s car. He then
directed Vanzant-Volpe to Clark’s house and only fired his gun in Clark’s direction when Clark
was out in the open walking from his car to his house. In this position, Clark was more likely to
be hit by one of the 19 rounds that Carson fired from his automatic weapon. Unlike in Elmi, we do
not know the exact location of each of the rounds that Clark shot, but we do know that at least
some of the shots were aimed toward Clark because Clark was hit by one. Thus, the evidence that
Carson intended to shoot at Clark is perhaps even stronger than in Elmi, where the victim was
inside and was not hit by any bullets. 138 Wn. App. at 311.
Additionally, while the exact contours of Carson and Clark’s relationship are not included
in the record, there is evidence that they were once friendly but had a falling out such that Carson
recognized Clark at the smoke shop, pulled out a gun, gave Vanzant-Volpe a balaclava, and
directed him to follow Clark home. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
it is sufficient to show that Carson intended to kill Clark, even if we are uncertain as to the details
of his motive or reasons.
Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, the State presented sufficient evidence that Carson intended to kill
Clark.
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B. Premeditation
Carson also argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence showing that he acted
with premeditation. Carson argues that the presence of a weapon alone does not demonstrate
premeditation, and there was no evidence that Carson took aim or deliberated before firing. Carson
contends that the shooting was “a single, quick incident,” demonstrating no time for premeditation.
Br. of Appellant at 31. Carson claims that the State’s evidence of premeditation was purely
speculative.
To convict a defendant of attempted first degree murder, the State must prove that the
defendant had premeditated intent to cause the death of another person and took a substantial step
toward causing that person’s death. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a); RCW 9A.28.020(1). Premeditation
requires “more than a moment in point of time.” RCW 9A.32.020(1). The State must show “‘the
deliberate formation of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life’” with “‘thinking
beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short.’”
State v. Hummel, 196 Wn. App. 329, 354, 383 P.3d 592 (2016) (quoting Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at
82-83). “The ‘mere opportunity to deliberate is not sufficient to support a finding of
premeditation.’” Id. (quoting State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 644, 904 P.2d 245 (1995)). The State
may use circumstantial evidence to prove premeditation if the “inferences supporting
premeditation are reasonable and the evidence is substantial.” State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759,
817, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d
1134 (2014).
Washington courts have noted four factors that are particularly relevant when assessing
premeditation: method, procurement of a weapon, stealth, and motive. State v. Castro DeJesus, 7
Wn. App. 2d 849, 883, 436 P.3d 834 (2019). However, a “wide range” of other factors can also be
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relevant and can “support an inference of premeditation.” State v. Aguilar, 176 Wn. App. 264, 273,
308 P.3d 778 (2013) (citing State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 831, 975 P.2d 967 (1999)). Thus, we
consider the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Ollens, 107 Wn.2d 848, 855, 733 P.2d 984
(1987) (Callow, J., concurring in result) (describing the jury’s evaluation of whether a killing was
premeditated as “the evaluation of the totality of the evidence in the light of all of the surrounding
circumstances”).
Specifically in shooting cases, Washington courts have considered the transportation of a
firearm to the scene, a defendant’s use of stealth when approaching the victim, and the number of
shots fired as relevant factors demonstrating premeditation. See, e.g., State v. Rehak, 67 Wn. App.
157, 164, 834 P.2d 651 (1992) (finding sufficient evidence of premeditation where the defendant
“crept up behind the victim who was sitting quietly in his chair and not in a confrontational stance”
before shooting him several times); Elmi, 138 Wn. App. at 314 (finding sufficient evidence of
premeditation in part because of the defendant’s transportation of a firearm to the scene and the
number of shots fired at the victim); Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 83-85 (finding sufficient evidence of
premeditation where, among other factors, the defendants brought multiple weapons to the scene
of the shooting, hid from the victims, and fired multiple shots at the victims).
Carson argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence of premeditation because
there was no evidence that he took aim or deliberated immediately before firing his gun at Clark.
However, Carson does not acknowledge the significant evidence of his actions before the shooting,
starting at the smoke shop, that could reasonably show premeditation. In other words, Carson
seems to contend that the method of the crime, shooting 19 continuous rounds from an automatic
gun, alone does not demonstrate premeditation. However, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances when assessing premeditation. See Ollens, 107 Wn.2d at 855.
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While the presence of a weapon does not in itself prove premeditation, it can support an
inference of premeditation. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 83. Here, while it seems that Carson already
had a gun on his person before he saw Clark at the smoke shop, he pulled out that weapon and set
it on his lap after seeing Clark, several minutes before the shooting began. Carson then brought
the weapon with him to the scene of the shooting, keeping it ready to use until Clark got out of his
car. These facts support a finding of premeditation.
Evidence that the defendant attempted to hide himself from the victim prior to the attack
also may be considered as evidence supporting an inference of premeditation. State v. Barajas,
143 Wn. App. 24, 36-37, 177 P.3d 106 (2007). When Carson saw Clark at the smoke shop’s drive-
through, he directed Vanzant-Volpe to pull away from the drive-through and pull over. At this
point, Carson also handed Vanzant-Volpe a balaclava and donned one himself. Then, only after
Clark left the smoke shop, Carson told Vanzant-Volpe to turn around towards Clark’s car and
directed Vanzant-Volpe to Clark’s house. Thus, like the defendants in Hoffman and Rehak, Carson
took several actions to avoid detection by Clark before the shooting. This evidence of stealth also
points to premeditation.
Also, despite Carson’s contentions, the method of the shooting reasonably demonstrated
premeditation. Carson waited until Clark was walking unprotected to his house before the
shooting. Additionally, the number of shots fired is a relevant consideration when assessing
premeditation. See, e.g., Elmi, 138 Wn. App. at 314. Carson argues his use of an automatic weapon
shows recklessness and lack of premeditation, but we disagree that this was the only conclusion
the jury could draw. Instead, it was a reasonable inference that Carson knew the use of an automatic
weapon would substantially increase the chances that he would be able to hit Clark. Thus, Carson’s
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method of shooting 19 rounds continuously from an automatic weapon at Clark while Clark was
unprotected indicates premeditation.
Carson cites Hummel to support his assertion that the State failed to demonstrate that he
planned or deliberated before shooting at Clark. However, Hummel is distinguishable from this
case. In Hummel, Division One held that even where evidence supported the conclusion that the
defendant killed the victim, there was not sufficient evidence of premeditation because the State
presented no evidence regarding the method of killing or whether the defendant deliberated or
reflected before killing the victim. 196 Wn. App. at 354-58. In contrast, here, as described above,
there is significant evidence demonstrating Carson’s premeditation.
As a result, considering the totality of the circumstances, the State presented sufficient
evidence that Carson acted with premeditated intent to kill Clark.
C. Equal Protection
Embedded in his sufficiency of the evidence analysis, Carson contends that there are
several different crimes, including drive-by shooting, that could be proved by the same act of firing
multiple gunshots, so his conviction for attempted first degree murder violates equal protection
principles.
However, “where two crimes require proof of different elements, they do not violate the
right to equal protection of the laws.” State v. Armstrong, 143 Wn. App. 333, 341, 178 P.3d 1048
(2008). This is because where crimes require proof of different elements, a prosecutor’s discretion
for charging different crimes from the same actions is appropriately “constrained by the different
elements to be proved and the facts in each case.” Id. at 342.
Here, unlike any of the other crimes Carson lists, attempted first degree murder requires
premeditated intent to kill. See RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a); RCW 9A.28.020(1). Accordingly, because
11 No. 59756-0-II
attempted first degree murder requires a unique element, Carson’s charge and conviction for
attempted first degree murder do not violate equal protection.
II. OFFENDER SCORE
Carson argues that the trial court erred by including Carson’s juvenile offenses in the
calculation of his offender score for sentencing.
Effective July 23, 2023, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.525(1), thereby prohibiting
trial courts from including a criminal defendant’s juvenile convictions in their offender score
except for the most serious crimes. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 2. Carson committed the offenses for
which he was convicted in this case on March 25 and July 3, 2023, before the amendment regarding
juvenile convictions and offender scores. However, Carson was sentenced on June 14, 2024, after
the amendment’s effective date.
Under RCW 9.94A.345, except as otherwise provided in the statutory scheme for criminal
sentencing, “any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the
law in effect when the current offense was committed.” And RCW 10.01.040, the saving clause,
states:
Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or repealed, all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared in the amendatory or repealing act, and every such amendatory or repealing statute shall be so construed as to save all criminal and penal proceedings, and proceedings to recover forfeitures, pending at the time of its enactment, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared therein.
Carson argues that because the RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) amendment was in effect before his
sentencing, the trial court should have excluded his juvenile convictions from his offender score.
However, even where a criminal defendant was sentenced after a statutory amendment governing
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sentencing, RCW 10.01.040 and RCW 9.94A.345 require that criminal sentences be determined
by the law in effect at the time of the offense, and we are bound by these provisions. State v. Jenks,
197 Wn.2d 708, 715, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).
No language in the amendment to RCW 9.94A.525 expressly indicated that it would apply
retroactively or avoid application of RCW 10.01.040 and RCW 9.94A.345. See Jenks, 197 Wn.2d
at 720. Although Carson asserts that the legislative findings associated with the 2023 amendment
to RCW 9.94A.525 establish retroactive intent, we have concluded that the legislature did not
make its 2023 amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) retroactive. See State v. Solomon Gibson, 33
Wn. App. 2d 618, 620, 563 P.3d 1079, review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1035 (2025); State v. Boyce, No.
40700-4-III, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2026)1; State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592,
599-600, 546 P.3d 458, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1016 (2024). We have also concluded that the
remedial nature of a statute is irrelevant when it is subject to the saving clause statute. State v.
Tester, 30 Wn. App. 2d 650, 658-59, 546 P.3d 94, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1019 (2024).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by including Carson’s juvenile convictions in his offender
score.
CONCLUSION
We affirm.
1 https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/407004_pub.pdf
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J. We concur:
CRUSER, J.
PRICE, A.C.J.