IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE August 9, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. MAY 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9808-CR-00290 Appellee, ) ) Hamblen County v. ) ) Honorable James E. Beckner, Judge TRAVIS E. SHARPE, ) ) (Sentencing) Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JANICE H. SNIDER PAUL G. SUMMERS 535 North Jackson Street Attorney General & Reporter Morristown, TN 37814 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. BERKELEY BELL, JR. District Attorney General 109 South Main Street, Suite 501 Greeneville, TN 37743
JOHN F. DUGGER, JR. Assistant District Attorney General Hamblen County Justice Center 510 Allison Street Morristown, TN 37814
VICTOR J. VAUGHN Assistant District Attorney General Hamblen County Justice Center 510 Allison Street Morristown, TN 37814
OPINION FILED: ___________________________________
AFFIRMED
ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Travis E. Sharpe, appeals as of right from the judgment of the
Hamblen County Criminal Court. The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and
was sentenced to eight years as a Range I standard offender, with a release eligibility date
of thirty percent. The defendant appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, arguing the
trial court erred in not sentencing him as an especially mitigated offender pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-109 (1997). Based upon our review of this matter, we affirm the
sentencing decision of the court below.
On December 2, 1997, the defendant committed aggravated robbery of a Little
Caesar’s Pizza restaurant in Morristown, Hamblen County, Tennessee. At approximately
10:00 p.m., he entered the restaurant and asked Chastity Ivy, the counter worker, if the
restaurant was still taking orders. Ivy called the manager, Robert Lassiter, to the front of
the store. Lassiter asked the defendant if he could help. The defendant replied, “Take this
order!” At this point, the defendant revealed a knife with a two- to four-inch blade. The
defendant followed Lassiter to the restaurant office where Lassiter gave him two metal
cash boxes containing a total of $600.
After the robbery, the defendant fled to Massachusetts where he wandered the
streets of Boston for a time. Sometime after arriving in Boston, the defendant abandoned
his truck, approached a police officer, and announced he had amnesia and needed to go
to a hospital.
The defendant was committed to the psychiatric ward of Massachusetts General
Hospital, where he remained a patient for approximately three weeks. The defendant
continued to feign amnesia, was given a new identity, and released to a halfway house.
The afternoon of his first day at the halfway house, the defendant attempted to commit
suicide by cutting his wrists and then overdosing on his medication. He was then
recommitted to Massachusetts General for approximately four weeks.
During his second stint at Massachusetts General, the defendant confessed to hospital personnel that he was aware of his real identity and thought he was suspected of
armed robbery in Tennessee. The defendant’s father reported the defendant’s
whereabouts to the police. After his release from Massachusetts General, the defendant
became disoriented and suicidal and returned to the hospital for a third time. After transfer
to a second mental hospital, the defendant was arrested and confessed to the Morristown
robbery. Shortly after his confession, the defendant was transferred to a third mental
hospital. The defendant waived extradition and returned to Tennessee in March 1998.
The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and was sentenced to eight
years as a Range I standard offender with a release eligibility date of thirty percent. He
now appeals that sentence.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
(1) Whether the trial court erred in its determination of the enhancement and mitigating factors applicable to this case.
(2) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to sentence the defendant as an especially mitigated offender.
When an accused challenges the length, range or manner of service of a sentence,
this Court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with the presumption
that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-401(d). This presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record
that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In conducting a de
novo review of a sentence, the Court must consider: (a) the evidence, if any, received at
the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report; (c) the principles of
sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics
of the criminal conduct involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f)
any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf; and (g) the potential or lack of
potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, & -210. See
State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
Because the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and agreed to an eight-year sentence, the trial court’s sentencing decision was limited to whether the
defendant should be sentenced as an especially mitigated offender. The sole issue on
appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not sentencing the defendant as
an especially mitigated offender.
The question of whether the defendant should be sentenced as an especially
mitigated offender rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Braden, 867
S.W.2d 750, 762 (Tenn. 1993). If the trial court finds the existence of an enhancement
factor, a defendant will not qualify as an especially mitigated offender. Braden, 867
S.W.2d at 763. Even if the trial court finds no enhancement factors applicable in a
particular case, the court may still exercise its discretionary authority and refuse to
sentence a defendant as an especially mitigated offender. Id.
The trial court found enhancement factor (3), the offense involved more than one
victim, to be applicable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (1991). The defendant argues this
finding was incorrect. We do not agree.
For the purposes of enhancement, the term victim “is limited in scope to a person
or entity that is injured, killed, had property stolen, or had property destroyed by the
perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Raines, 882 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
The trial court found Lassiter and Ivy were both victims. The evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing, however, reveals Ivy never saw the defendant’s knife, nor was she
held at knifepoint or robbed of any money. From the evidence available in the record, Ivy’s
role in the robbery was limited to calling Lassiter to the front of the store.
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE August 9, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. MAY 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9808-CR-00290 Appellee, ) ) Hamblen County v. ) ) Honorable James E. Beckner, Judge TRAVIS E. SHARPE, ) ) (Sentencing) Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JANICE H. SNIDER PAUL G. SUMMERS 535 North Jackson Street Attorney General & Reporter Morristown, TN 37814 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. BERKELEY BELL, JR. District Attorney General 109 South Main Street, Suite 501 Greeneville, TN 37743
JOHN F. DUGGER, JR. Assistant District Attorney General Hamblen County Justice Center 510 Allison Street Morristown, TN 37814
VICTOR J. VAUGHN Assistant District Attorney General Hamblen County Justice Center 510 Allison Street Morristown, TN 37814
OPINION FILED: ___________________________________
AFFIRMED
ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Travis E. Sharpe, appeals as of right from the judgment of the
Hamblen County Criminal Court. The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and
was sentenced to eight years as a Range I standard offender, with a release eligibility date
of thirty percent. The defendant appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, arguing the
trial court erred in not sentencing him as an especially mitigated offender pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-109 (1997). Based upon our review of this matter, we affirm the
sentencing decision of the court below.
On December 2, 1997, the defendant committed aggravated robbery of a Little
Caesar’s Pizza restaurant in Morristown, Hamblen County, Tennessee. At approximately
10:00 p.m., he entered the restaurant and asked Chastity Ivy, the counter worker, if the
restaurant was still taking orders. Ivy called the manager, Robert Lassiter, to the front of
the store. Lassiter asked the defendant if he could help. The defendant replied, “Take this
order!” At this point, the defendant revealed a knife with a two- to four-inch blade. The
defendant followed Lassiter to the restaurant office where Lassiter gave him two metal
cash boxes containing a total of $600.
After the robbery, the defendant fled to Massachusetts where he wandered the
streets of Boston for a time. Sometime after arriving in Boston, the defendant abandoned
his truck, approached a police officer, and announced he had amnesia and needed to go
to a hospital.
The defendant was committed to the psychiatric ward of Massachusetts General
Hospital, where he remained a patient for approximately three weeks. The defendant
continued to feign amnesia, was given a new identity, and released to a halfway house.
The afternoon of his first day at the halfway house, the defendant attempted to commit
suicide by cutting his wrists and then overdosing on his medication. He was then
recommitted to Massachusetts General for approximately four weeks.
During his second stint at Massachusetts General, the defendant confessed to hospital personnel that he was aware of his real identity and thought he was suspected of
armed robbery in Tennessee. The defendant’s father reported the defendant’s
whereabouts to the police. After his release from Massachusetts General, the defendant
became disoriented and suicidal and returned to the hospital for a third time. After transfer
to a second mental hospital, the defendant was arrested and confessed to the Morristown
robbery. Shortly after his confession, the defendant was transferred to a third mental
hospital. The defendant waived extradition and returned to Tennessee in March 1998.
The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and was sentenced to eight
years as a Range I standard offender with a release eligibility date of thirty percent. He
now appeals that sentence.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
(1) Whether the trial court erred in its determination of the enhancement and mitigating factors applicable to this case.
(2) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to sentence the defendant as an especially mitigated offender.
When an accused challenges the length, range or manner of service of a sentence,
this Court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with the presumption
that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-401(d). This presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record
that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In conducting a de
novo review of a sentence, the Court must consider: (a) the evidence, if any, received at
the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report; (c) the principles of
sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics
of the criminal conduct involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f)
any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf; and (g) the potential or lack of
potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, & -210. See
State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
Because the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and agreed to an eight-year sentence, the trial court’s sentencing decision was limited to whether the
defendant should be sentenced as an especially mitigated offender. The sole issue on
appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not sentencing the defendant as
an especially mitigated offender.
The question of whether the defendant should be sentenced as an especially
mitigated offender rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Braden, 867
S.W.2d 750, 762 (Tenn. 1993). If the trial court finds the existence of an enhancement
factor, a defendant will not qualify as an especially mitigated offender. Braden, 867
S.W.2d at 763. Even if the trial court finds no enhancement factors applicable in a
particular case, the court may still exercise its discretionary authority and refuse to
sentence a defendant as an especially mitigated offender. Id.
The trial court found enhancement factor (3), the offense involved more than one
victim, to be applicable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (1991). The defendant argues this
finding was incorrect. We do not agree.
For the purposes of enhancement, the term victim “is limited in scope to a person
or entity that is injured, killed, had property stolen, or had property destroyed by the
perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Raines, 882 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
The trial court found Lassiter and Ivy were both victims. The evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing, however, reveals Ivy never saw the defendant’s knife, nor was she
held at knifepoint or robbed of any money. From the evidence available in the record, Ivy’s
role in the robbery was limited to calling Lassiter to the front of the store. No evidence
exists in the record to show Ivy was present when the robbery took place. For this reason,
the defendant is correct in asserting Ivy does not qualify as a victim for purposes of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-114(3).
Sufficient evidence does exist to support a finding that both Lassiter and Little
Caesar’s Pizza, Inc. were victims. The money stolen was the property of Little Caesar’s
Pizza, Inc. A corporate entity that suffers a monetary loss qualifies as a victim for enhancement purposes. State v. Richard A. Nimro, No. 03C01-9207-CR-00232, 1993 WL
189944, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 4, 1993), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1993).
Lassiter was also a victim because he was threatened with the knife and forced to deliver
the money to the defendant.
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in finding enhancement factor (3) was
applicable. Because the trial court found the existence of an enhancement factor, the
defendant could not be sentenced as an especially mitigated offender. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-109(2) (1997).
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the decision
of the court below.
________________________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
____________________________________ JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE