State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman - Concurring

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman - Concurring

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee

DecidedApril 19, 2005

DocketM2003-00806-CCA-R3-CD

StatusPublished

This text of State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman - Concurring (State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman - Concurring) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman - Concurring, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs February 16, 2005

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD LYNN CHATMAN

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County No. 01-0494 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2003-00806-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 19, 2005

DAVID G. HAYES, J., separate concurring.

The majority concludes that application of enhancing factor (21), adjudication of a delinquent act by a juvenile which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, is inapplicable in this case under the holding of Blakely. I respectfully disagree. The decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004), applied Apprendi, which recognized the Almendarez-Torres holding permitting sentencing enhancement based upon a prior guilty plea, as opposed to the necessity of a jury conviction, because guilty pleas are “entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2361 (2000). Similarly, I find that juvenile adjudications in this state are entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards and constitutional protections of their own. A panel of this court recently concluded that enhancement factor (21) is not implicated under Blakely. The panel reasoned:

The constitutional protections of due process and a finding that the delinquent charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 512 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S. Ct 1219, 1230 (1998), are integral to an adjudication of delinquency in this state. State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d 912, 921 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-129(b) (2003); Tenn. R. Juv. P. 28(d)(2).

State v. Cornelius Boales, No. W2003-02724-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 3, 2005).

The question, as I perceive it, is not whether a juvenile adjudication constitutes a criminal conviction, but whether the adjudication process was afforded constitutional and procedural safeguards. Subscribing to the view that these safeguards were afforded, I find enhancing factor (21) applicable in this case. In all other respects, I concur.

____________________________________ David G. Hayes, Judge -2-

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs February 16, 2005

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD LYNN CHATMAN

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County No. 01-0494 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2003-00806-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 19, 2005

DAVID G. HAYES, J., separate concurring.

The majority concludes that application of enhancing factor (21), adjudication of a delinquent act by a juvenile which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, is inapplicable in this case under the holding of Blakely. I respectfully disagree. The decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004), applied Apprendi, which recognized the Almendarez-Torres holding permitting sentencing enhancement based upon a prior guilty plea, as opposed to the necessity of a jury conviction, because guilty pleas are “entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2361 (2000). Similarly, I find that juvenile adjudications in this state are entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards and constitutional protections of their own. A panel of this court recently concluded that enhancement factor (21) is not implicated under Blakely. The panel reasoned:

The constitutional protections of due process and a finding that the delinquent charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 512 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S. Ct 1219, 1230 (1998), are integral to an adjudication of delinquency in this state. State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d 912, 921 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-129(b) (2003); Tenn. R. Juv. P. 28(d)(2).

State v. Cornelius Boales, No. W2003-02724-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 3, 2005).

The question, as I perceive it, is not whether a juvenile adjudication constitutes a criminal conviction, but whether the adjudication process was afforded constitutional and procedural safeguards. Subscribing to the view that these safeguards were afforded, I find enhancing factor (21) applicable in this case. In all other respects, I concur.

____________________________________ David G. Hayes, Judge -2-

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