State of Tennessee v. Larry Malone aka Larry Sallis

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMay 5, 2016
DocketW2015-00152-CCA-R3-CD
StatusPublished

This text of State of Tennessee v. Larry Malone aka Larry Sallis (State of Tennessee v. Larry Malone aka Larry Sallis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Tennessee v. Larry Malone aka Larry Sallis, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs at Nashville December 1, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LARRY MALONE aka LARRY SALLIS

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 13-03316 James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W2015-00152-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 5, 2016

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Larry Malone, of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and vandalism of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, Class C felonies. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, the appellant‟s conviction of felony theft is modified to theft of property valued $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The appellant‟s felony vandalism conviction is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court are Affirmed in Part and Modified in Part.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Phyllis Aluko (on appeal) and Michael Johnson (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Larry Malone.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Jose Leon, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

At trial, Michael Norman testified that his business, Advance Transmissions, was located at 2717 Lamar Avenue. About 4:00 a.m. on January 25, 2013, Norman was working and heard “a thumping sound, like footsteps” above his head. He said the noises “[s]ounded like a heavy person on top of the roof” and made him nervous. Norman got into his car and drove around the side of the building to see if anyone was on the roof. He could not see onto the roof but noticed a ladder propped against the building and telephoned the police. On cross-examination, Norman testified that he did not hear anything but the noises above his head and that he did not know how long the ladder had been leaning against the building.

Officer Jamal Holloway of the Memphis Police Department (MPD) testified that he responded to Norman‟s call and pulled up to the south side of the building. He saw an African-American male, who was the appellant, standing on a ladder, two or three rungs above the ground. Officer Holloway got out of his car, asked the appellant what was going on, and frisked the appellant. Officer Holloway felt a hard, metal object in the appellant‟s pocket. He reached into the pocket and pulled out a ratchet wrench with a socket attached, a screwdriver, identification, and several other items. When additional officers arrived, they searched the area and the roof but did not find anyone. Officer Holloway looked in an alleyway on the southwest side of the building and found several large coils on the ground. On cross-examination, Officer Holloway testified that when he first saw the appellant, he could not determine whether the appellant was going up or down the ladder.

Officer Nathaniel Vaughn of the MPD testified that he responded to a “prowler call” on Lamar Avenue on January 25, 2013. When he arrived, Officer Holloway had detained a suspect. Officer Vaughn saw a ladder leaning against the building, and he and two other officers went onto the roof. Officer Vaughn said that three or four air conditioner units were on the roof and that three of them had been damaged “as if someone had snipped them and stripped them, [taken] everything out.” A pair of bolt cutters was on the roof next to one of the larger units. Officer Vaughn walked to the edge of the roof and saw air conditioner coils and copper piping on the ground.

Officer Melissa Mahan of the MPD testified that she responded to the scene and went inside Advance Transmissions to make sure no one had entered the business from the roof. When she came outside, Officer Holloway told her that he had found a suspect coming off the roof. Officer Mahan saw the appellant in Officer Holloway‟s patrol car and did not see anyone else on the roof or walking around the building. She went into an alley and saw copper coils on the ground.

Otha Lee Broome testified that he owned commercial real estate for a living, including the building at 2711 Lamar Avenue. The building contained 10,000 square feet of space, and five businesses were in the building. He said the building had five commercial air conditioner units: one ten-ton package unit, one five-ton package unit, -2- and three condensing units. The units were “like ten years old, little newer” and were operating properly prior to January 25, 2013. However, on January 25, someone climbed onto the roof and “stripped down” the units. Broome explained,

Like the condensing unit, the package unit, it was all ripped up. Like the front part was pulled up and all the copper was snatched out. And then the condensing units it was just all tore up where it was just stripped down to nothing and all the copper was taken out. It was just trash.

He said that the copper and coils from the units were on the ground and that they were never returned to him. Broome notified his insurance company, paid his deductible, and received a check in the amount of $61,000 “and some change.” He used the money to purchase five new units.

On cross-examination, Broome testified that he had owned the building “[a] little over ten years,” that the building did not have air conditioning when he bought it, and that he installed the five units “as tenants moved in.” After someone destroyed the units, Broome used the $61,000 to pay for the new units and their installation. Defense counsel asked if Broome knew the value of the items found on the ground, and Broome answered, “[W]ell he had tore them up, so I can‟t say . . . how much [he] would get for copper.”

After Broome‟s testimony, the State rested its case. The appellant did not present any proof, and the jury convicted him as charged of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and vandalism of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, Class C felonies. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for each conviction. The trial court ordered that the appellant serve the sentences concurrently with each other but consecutively to a previous sentence.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to prove that he was the perpetrator, failed to prove the value of the stolen items, and failed to prove the value of the damaged air conditioners. The State argues that the evidence is sufficient. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant‟s conviction for Class C felony theft and modify it to misdemeanor theft. The appellant‟s conviction for Class C felony vandalism is affirmed.

-3- When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the standard for review by an appellate court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Dorantes
331 S.W.3d 370 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2011)
State v. Hanson
279 S.W.3d 265 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2009)
State v. Rice
184 S.W.3d 646 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2006)
State v. Hall
976 S.W.2d 121 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1998)
State v. Bland
958 S.W.2d 651 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1997)
State v. Tuggle
639 S.W.2d 913 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1982)
Marable v. State
313 S.W.2d 451 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1958)
State v. Cabbage
571 S.W.2d 832 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1978)
State v. Hamm
611 S.W.2d 826 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
State of Tennessee v. Larry Malone aka Larry Sallis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-tennessee-v-larry-malone-aka-larry-sallis-tenncrimapp-2016.