State of Tennessee v. Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Tennessee
DecidedFebruary 28, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-00046
StatusUnknown

This text of State of Tennessee v. Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC (State of Tennessee v. Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Tennessee v. Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC, (E.D. Tenn. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE DIVISION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ex rel. ) JONATHAN SKRMETTI, ATTORNEY ) GENERAL and REPORTER, and ) COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ex ) 3:23-CV-00046-DCLC-JEM rel. DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY ) GENERAL, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) IDEAL HORIZON BENEFITS, LLC d/b/a ) SOLAR TITAN USA, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter came before the Court on February 27, 2023 for a preliminary injunction hearing, during which all parties in interest appeared with counsel and presented oral argument on their position of whether the Temporary Restraining Order, issued by the Court on February 7, 2023, should be converted into a preliminary injunction. Based on the evidence contained in the record, the parties’ briefing, the arguments presented during the hearing, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds the entry of a preliminary injunction is warranted. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs State of Tennessee (“Tennessee”) and Commonwealth of Kentucky (“Kentucky”) by and through their respective Attorneys General commenced this civil enforcement action on February 6, 2023, alleging violations of federal and state consumer protection laws by Defendant Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC d/b/a Solar Titan USA (“Solar Titan”) and its two members and officer—Sarah Kirkland (“Kirkland”), Richard Atnip (“Atnip”), and Craig Kelley (“Kelley”) (collectively, “Individual Defendants”). Specifically Plaintiffs allege Solar Titan and the Individual Defendants engaged in acts or practices that violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq., the Consumer Review Fairness Act (“CRFA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45b, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 47-18-101 et seq., the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”), Ky. Rev. Stat § 367.110 et seq., the Tennessee Home Solicitation Sales Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-701 et seq., and the Kentucky Home Solicitation Sales Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.140 et seq. [Doc. 3]. Plaintiffs moved ex parte for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against Solar Titan and the Individual Defendants, for the appointment of a receiver over Solar Titan, and an asset freeze against Solar Titan and the Individual Defendants [Doc. 5]. The Court, finding good cause to believe that Solar Titan and the Individual Defendants had engaged in acts and practices that violate state and federal consumer protection laws and that immediate and irreparable harm would result to consumers due to those ongoing violations, granted the extraordinary relief sought by Plaintiffs. Namely, on February 7, 2023, the Court issued a TRO temporarily enjoining the acts

and practices complained of, freezing the assets of Solar Titan and the Individual Defendants, appointing a temporary receiver for Solar Titan, and granting ancillary relief [Doc. 21]. In accordance with the TRO, the Individual Defendants filed responses in opposition to Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction [Docs. 44, 46, 68]. Kirkland also moved to strike the injunctive relief sought in Plaintiffs’ Complaint to the extent it applied to her [Doc. 41] and moved to dissolve the TRO as it related to her [Doc. 52]. On February 26, 2023, however, Plaintiffs and Kirkland jointly moved for entry of an Agreed Order modifying the freeze of Kirkland’s assets, allowing Kirkland to withdraw her Motion to Dissolve the TRO, and memorializing Plaintiffs’ and Kirkland’s agreement as to her Motion to Strike [Doc. 73]. On February 27, 2023, the parties appeared before the Court to present argument as to why the Court should or should not enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the violations of law alleged by Plaintiffs, continuing the asset freeze, permanently continuing the Receivership, and imposing such additional relief as may be appropriate. The Court entered the Agreed Order

proposed by Plaintiffs and Kirkland. Thus, the sole remaining issue to be decided is whether a preliminary injunction should be issued as to Solar Titan, Atnip, and Kelley. II. LEGAL STANDARD “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 73 (6th Cir. 2000)). The factors to consider when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction in a civil enforcement action are whether the government has demonstrated a likelihood of success, whether the balance of equities tip in the government’s favor, and whether an injunction would be in the public interest. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Consumer Def.,

LLC, 926 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2019) (the irreparable harm showing normally required in private litigation is eliminated in cases involving statutory enforcement). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs assert that the Court should enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the violations of law alleged in the Civil Enforcement Complaint, continuing the Receivership, and continuing the freeze of the assets of Solar Titan, Atnip, and Kelley. Atnip and Kelley object to the entry of a preliminary injunction against them, including the continued asset freeze, and argue primarily that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to their personally liability for the alleged violations. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Plaintiffs allege the evidence before the Court leaves little doubt that Solar Titan engaged in violations of the aforementioned consumer protection laws and the Individual Defendants are personally liable for those violations. Namely, Plaintiffs claim Solar Titan misleads consumers

about the characteristics and benefits of their solar systems and omits material information related to consumer loans used to fund the projects, and the Individual Defendants knew or should have known of the wrongful acts and either participated directly in them or had the authority to control them. The likelihood of success on each of the alleged consumer protection violations are examined in turn, followed by an analysis of the Individual Defendants’ liability for those alleged violations. 1. Consumer Financial Protection Act The CFPA prohibits a “covered person or service provider” from “engag[ing] in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices” in the provision of financial services to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B). The parties do not dispute that Solar Titan is a “covered person or service

provider” under the CFPA. Thus, the focus is on whether Solar Titan engaged in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in the provision of financial services to its customers. An act or practice is unfair if it is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers” and “such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(c)(1).

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Bluebook (online)
State of Tennessee v. Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-tennessee-v-ideal-horizon-benefits-llc-tned-2023.