State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedOctober 4, 2019
DocketM2018-00264-CCA-R3-CD
StatusPublished

This text of State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks (State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

10/04/2019 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE March 20, 2019 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRANDON E. BANKS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 2015-C-1517 Monte Watkins, Judge ___________________________________

No. M2018-00264-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Brandon E. Banks, for five counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. After trial, a jury convicted the defendant of one count of each offense. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his cell phone, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated rape, and several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined. NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Mark Scruggs, Katie Hagan, Richard McGee, and Kevin McGee, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brandon Eric Banks.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; James E. Gaylord, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Glenn Funk, District Attorney General; and Roger Moore and Jan Norman, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History In the early morning hours of June 23, 2013, the defendant participated in the thirty-two-minute sexual assault of the victim as she lay unconscious on the floor of a dormitory room on the campus of Vanderbilt University. A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant and his three co-defendants, Brandon Vandenburg, Corey Batey, and JaBorian McKenzie, for five counts of aggravated rape (counts 1-5) and two counts of aggravated sexual battery (counts 6 and 7).1 The trial court granted severance to the defendant on October 16, 2013, and subsequently addressed numerous pre-trial motions before trial began on June 19, 2017.

I. Motion to Suppress

The defendant filed a motion to suppress “all images and media contained on his cell phone.” According to the defendant, officers seized his cell phone on June 27, 2013, after an initial interview. The following day, officers executed a search warrant for electronic devices found in the defendant’s dorm room or on his person. Because the cell phone was not in either location during the search, the defendant argued the search warrant was inapplicable to the same. The defendant presented the following evidence supporting his position at a suppression hearing.

On June 27, 2013, Detective Jason Mayo of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) interviewed the defendant regarding his participation in the crimes committed against the victim. Detective Mayo told the defendant he was not under arrest and that he could leave the interview at any time. The defendant detailed a version of events with which Detective Mayo disagreed based upon his review of surveillance footage and a prior interview with Vandenburg, during which he learned the crimes were videoed and distributed. At the conclusion of the interview, the defendant refused to provide a DNA sample. Detective Mayo told the defendant he was no longer free to leave and stated he would obtain a search warrant in order to gather a DNA sample. The defendant reconsidered, signed a consent form, and provided the sample. Additionally, Detective Mayo seized the defendant’s cell phone, an Apple iPhone 4S with serial number DNPGQ4BCD2C1. The defendant did not provide consent to search the phone.

The following day, June 28, 2013, Detective Mayo executed numerous search warrants against the defendant and his co-defendants. One such warrant permitted the search and seizure of the defendant’s electronic devices found either on his person or in his dorm room, Room 614 of Gillette Hall located on the campus of Vanderbilt

1 As to the defendant, several counts of the indictment were based on a theory of criminal responsibility. Additionally, in the original indictment, Vandenburg was charged with unlawful photography (count 8). -2- University. The search rendered the following items: “HP laptop s/n: CNF0461WL2; Samsung Laptop s/n HPX791KC300675A; flip video camera; Microsoft thumb drive; DVD (10); 4GB thumb drive.” A copy of the search warrant was entered into evidence.

At the suppression hearing, Detective Mayo testified the search warrant did not actually cover the defendant’s cell phone as it was not in the defendant’s dorm room or on his person during the execution of the warrant. However, at the time of the execution of the warrant, Detective Mayo believed it did authorize a search of the defendant’s cell phone. Therefore, Detective Mayo asked the defendant for the “[passcode] for his phone” in order to “open it and search it.” He did not specifically discuss consent to search the cell phone with the defendant.

As the investigation progressed, the defendant hired counsel with whom Detective Mayo began communicating. He described one conversation with the defendant’s former counsel,2 as follows:

I spoke to [former counsel] and told him that the phone that his client had provided did not work. I asked him . . . The [passcode] to the phone did not work. I asked him if he would reach back out to [the defendant] and get the correct pass code. We then spoke again, and I believe he gave me two different [passcodes]. He said somewhere, somewhat of the conversation was he said, referring to [the defendant], it’s one of these two codes, and gave me those two [passcodes].

According to Detective Mayo, former counsel “knew that there was a search warrant” for the defendant’s cell phone when he requested the passcode for the same. Detective Mayo believed the request for the passcode operated as an indirect discussion of the defendant’s consent to search the phone as it was understood the passcode would be used “to unlock that specific phone.”

Detective Mayo, however, “never did obtain the correct [passcode].” He explained one of the provided passcodes “was tried and did not work, and there was a fear that if you enter too many wrong codes too many times into a phone, it will completely lock. So, after the first code was attempted and failed, I don’t believe the second code was attempted.” Instead, Detective Chad Gish, who was also investigating the case, bypassed the passcode security feature and searched the defendant’s cell phone through other means.

2 The defendant hired different counsel for trial; as such, we will refer to the defendant’s initial counsel as “former counsel.” -3- Former counsel also testified, stating the defendant retained him in July of 2013 before formal charges were filed but after detectives conducted an initial interview with the defendant, obtained a DNA sample from the defendant, and executed a search warrant against the defendant. He “distinctly remember[ed]” the conversation regarding Detective Mayo’s request for the passcode to the defendant’s cell phone. According to former counsel, Detective Mayo called him requesting the passcode to the cell phone because “he’d had trouble getting into [the defendant’s] phone.” Former counsel “specifically” recalled Detective Mayo stating he had “a search warrant for the phone” but he “just need[ed] the codes.” Former counsel contacted the defendant and subsequently provided two passcodes to Detective Mayo.

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State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-tennessee-v-brandon-e-banks-tenncrimapp-2019.