State of Oregon v. Landis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 25-447
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF OREGON, No. 25-447 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 6:23-cr-00330-MC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* SAMUEL TROY LANDIS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael J. McShane, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 21, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, BEA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant State of Oregon appeals the federal district court’s order

which granted Defendant-Appellee Samuel Landis’ (“Landis”) motion to dismiss

the State’s charge for criminally negligent homicide on Supremacy Clause

immunity grounds. The State of Oregon seeks reversal of the order and remand to

the district court for further proceedings.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. The case arises out of an incident in which Landis, while on duty as a Special

Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration as part of an undercover Drug

Task Force charged with conducting surveillance on a suspected fentanyl trafficker,

ran a stop sign in a residential area in Salem, Oregon, and struck a bicyclist, who

was killed. The bicyclist had the right of way at the time, and Landis went through

the stop sign at approximately 18 miles per hour.

A Marion County Grand Jury returned a secret indictment against Landis,

charging him with one count of criminally negligent homicide in violation of Or.

Rev. Stat. § 163.145. Landis removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1) and moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 12(b), claiming that he was immune from the state charge because of the

Federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the

district court made findings of undisputed fact and ultimately concluded that because

Landis was acting within the scope of his authority at the time of the accident and

because Landis’ subjective belief that he had to “drive with a purpose” to catch up

with the other members of the Task Force was objectively reasonable, he was

entitled to federal Supremacy Clause immunity for the state charge.

We affirm the order of the district court.

1. In cases of Supremacy Clause immunity, it is the responsibility of the

federal district court judge, and not that of a jury, to make factual findings. See In

2 25-447 re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890) (finding that the judge of the lower court “was as

competent to ascertain the[] facts as any other tribunal, and it was not at all

necessary that a jury should be impaneled to render a verdict on them”); see also

West Virginia v. Laing, 133 F. 887, 891 (4th Cir. 1904) (“Congress certainly

intended, in cases of this character, that the judges of the United States should hear

the evidence, and without a jury proceed in a summary way to pass upon the

federal question involved.”).

If the judge finds that the facts are undisputed, the judge must then

determine whether the defendant’s actions were (1) within the scope of the federal

officer’s authority; and (2) “necessary and proper,” meaning that the actions were

both subjectively and objectively reasonable. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 75

(“[I]f the prisoner is held in the state court to answer for an act which he was

authorized to do by the law of the United States … and if, in doing that act, he did

no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a

crime under the law of the state…”); Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir.

1977) (“Determination of whether [a defendant’s action] was necessary and proper,

we find, must rest not only on the subjective belief of the officer but also on the

objective finding that his conduct may be said to be reasonable under the existing

circumstances. Proper application of this standard does not require a petitioner to

show that his action was in fact necessary or in retrospect justifiable, only that he

3 25-447 reasonably thought it to be.”).

2. Furthermore, if the district court judge finds that the facts are undisputed,

the Ninth Circuit reviews the district court’s determination of whether the

defendant’s actions were both objectively and subjectively reasonable for clear

error. See Clifton, 549 F.2d at 729 (finding that the Court could not “on the basis

of the overall record conclude that the[] findings [of the district court judge] are

clearly erroneous”).

3. The district court’s finding that Landis acted within the scope of his

authority is undisputed. The district court’s finding that Defendant’s conduct was

both objectively and subjectively reasonable under the circumstances is not clearly

erroneous. After conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding that the facts were

undisputed, the district court concluded first that Landis’ actions were subjectively

reasonable because he “honestly believed he could safely run the stop sign while

driving ‘with a purpose’ to catch up to the rest of his surveillance team.” The

district court also found that Landis’ behavior was objectively reasonable because

every agent testified that in order successfully to conduct a surveillance operation,

each agent must, at multiple points, violate traffic laws; it is critical that agents

without visual contact on the suspect remain close to those with such visual

contact; and Landis’ actions were not outside the bounds of what another agent

may have done under the circumstances. The district court’s conclusions are

4 25-447 heavily supported by the facts in the record and therefore not clearly erroneous.

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e will affirm a

district court’s factual finding unless that finding is illogical, implausible, or

without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” (footnote

omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

5 25-447