RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1463-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KURT T. HARRIS,
Defendant-Respondent. __________________________
Argued October 20, 2021 – Decided November 19, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman, Geiger and Susswein.
On appeal before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Accusation No. 18- 07-0571.
Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of counsel and on the brief).
Joseph M. Mazraani argued the cause for respondent (Mazraani & Liguori, LLP, attorneys; Joseph M. Mazraani, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM The State appeals the trial court's order admitting defendant to Pre-Trial
Intervention (PTI), diverting defendant from prosecution for second-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), and fourth-degree
possession of hollow-nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(1). This is the second
time we have been tasked with reviewing the trial court's decision to admit
defendant to PTI over the prosecutor's objection. In our prior ruling, we held
that the trial court misapplied the patent-and-gross-abuse-of-discretion standard
of review by substituting its own judgment for that of the prosecutor. State v.
Harris, No. A-0202-19 (App. Div. Mar. 31, 2020) (slip op. at 4). We determined
that the prosecutor's only error was in failing to properly analyze two of the
seventeen PTI factors. Ibid. We therefore remanded for the prosecutor to
reevaluate those two factors. Ibid.
The prosecutor complied with our remand instructions, re-evaluated those
two factors, and determined that those re-weighed factors did not change the
prosecutor's overall conclusion that PTI was inappropriate. The trial court
rendered a lengthy opinion—substantially similar to its original written
opinion—ruling once again that the prosecutor had committed a patent and gross
abuse of discretion in applying and weighing all of the relevant PTI factors.
After carefully reviewing the updated record in light of the governing legal
A-1463-20 2 principles, we conclude that the trial court has once again substituted its own
judgment for the prosecutor's in weighing the factors militating for and against
admission to PTI. Because the prosecutor on remand did not commit a patent
and gross abuse of discretion in rejecting defendant's application, we now vacate
the trial court's latest order and remand with instructions for the trial court to
enter an order denying defendant's admission to PTI.
I.
At the risk of repeating large portions of our prior opinion, we recount the
facts and procedural history leading to this second appeal. On June 1, 2018,
defendant was driving from Dunmore, Pennsylvania to Seaside Heights, New
Jersey with his girlfriend. The record indicates that defendant and his girlfriend
intended to visit the beach, but it is unclear whether they intended to visit other
attractions in New Jersey.
Police pulled over defendant on Route 18 in Middlesex County for motor
vehicle violations, including improper lane changes and failing to wear a
seatbelt. Defendant appeared nervous and was touching his waistband. The
police then asked defendant to step out of his vehicle.
Defendant was asked if he had any items on him that would "stick or poke"
the officer. Defendant answered "no," but informed the officer that a weapon
A-1463-20 3 was "clipped" to his belt. The officer then secured a gun that was loaded with a
round in the chamber.
Defendant provided the officer with a valid Pennsylvania license to carry
a concealed firearm. The officer informed defendant that it was a violation of
New Jersey law to carry the weapon in this State without a New Jersey permit.
Defendant explained that he did not intend to violate our gun laws. It is not
disputed that defendant has no criminal history and no prior contacts with the
adult criminal or juvenile justice systems, either in this State or in Pennsylvania.
He is by all accounts a law abiding and hardworking individual who has two
jobs, working for a landscaping company and as a restaurant bartender and cook.
Defendant subsequently applied to PTI, and the Criminal Division
Manager recommended that he be admitted to the program. In August 2018, the
prosecutor submitted its initial statement of reasons explaining why the State
would not consent to PTI. Defendant filed an appeal to the Law Division
challenging the prosecutor's rejection. After hearing oral argument, the trial
court reserved decision and ordered the parties to return to court for another
hearing in January 2019. At that hearing, the trial court asked the State to
reconsider its decision to deny PTI. The First Assistant Prosecutor replied by
letter on January 15, 2019, explaining that he had reviewed the matter and that
A-1463-20 4 he concurred with the reasons and conclusion set forth in the State's initial
rejection letter.
In February 2019, the court convened another hearing at which the court
again asked the State to reconsider its decision. Eleven days later, the State
responded to that request, re-affirming that it would not consent to PTI. On
September 9, 2019, the court issued a twenty-six-page written decision
admitting defendant to PTI over the State's objection. The State appealed from
that decision.
We reversed the trial judge's ruling, noting that "the prosecutor's office
acted within the ambit of its discretion in analyzing and weighing the relevant
PTI factors." Harris, slip op. at 4. We agreed with the trial court, however, that
the prosecutor had misapplied two of the seventeen PTI factors: factor five,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(5) ("The existence of personal problems and character
traits which may be related to the applicant's crime and for which services are
unavailable within the criminal justice system, or which may be provided more
effectively through supervisory treatment and the probability that the causes of
criminal behavior can be controlled by proper treatment") and factor six,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(6) ("The likelihood that the applicant's crime is related to
A-1463-20 5 a condition or situation that would be conducive to change through his
participation in supervisory treatment").
We deemed it appropriate to remand "the matter for the prosecutor to
decide whether a proper application of these two PTI factors would lead the
prosecutor to reach a different outcome." Ibid.; see State v. Johnson, 238 N.J.
119, 129 (2019) (noting that when a defendant shows that the prosecutor erred
in considering certain PTI factors, a reviewing court may remand the matter to
the prosecutor; however, unless a reviewing court finds "a patent and gross
abuse of discretion," such remand is not an order admitting a defendant into PTI,
but rather an opportunity for the prosecutor to "rightly reconsider the
application").
On May 13, 2020, in response to our remand instructions, the prosecutor
issued a second letter explaining the reasons for its decision to again reject
defendant's admission to PTI. That second letter re-evaluated and re-weighed
the two PTI factors that we specified in our prior decision.
Defendant appealed the rejection to the trial court. On January 22, 2021,
the trial court admitted defendant to PTI over the State's objection. On February
2, 2021, the trial court issued its order, and on February 3, 2021, issued a thirty-
two-page written opinion. On that same day, the State filed the present appeal.
A-1463-20 6 II.
As in our prior opinion, we begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal
principles governing this appeal, focusing intently on the deference we owe, not
to the trial court, but rather to the prosecutor when deciding whether to divert
prosecution by admission to PTI. See State v. Nicholson, 451 N.J. Super. 534,
553 (App. Div. 2017) (citing State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 215, 226 (App.
Div. 2015)) (noting appellate courts review a trial court's decision on a PTI
application de novo).
"PTI is a 'diversionary program through which certain offenders are able
to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected
to deter future criminal behavior.'" Johnson, 238 N.J. at 127 (quoting State v.
Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015)). As the Court explained:
PTI is essentially an extension of the charging decision, therefore the decision to grant or deny PTI is a quintessentially prosecutorial function. As a result, the prosecutor's decision to accept or reject a defendant's PTI application is entitled to a great deal of deference. A court reviewing a prosecutor's decision to deny PTI may overturn that decision only if the defendant clearly and convincingly establishes the decision was a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
[Id. at 128–29 (citations and quotations omitted).]
A-1463-20 7 The contours of the abuse of discretion standard are well-defined, as is the
heightened requirement that such an abuse of discretion be patent and gross.
Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion will be manifest if defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment. In order for such an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of "patent and gross," it must further be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention.
[Id. at 129.]
A prosecutor's exercise of his or her discretion is guided by the criteria set
forth by the Legislature. If a prosecutor elects to deny a PTI application, the
prosecutor must provide a statement of reasons explaining the basis for that
decision. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The statement of reasons must consider the
following enumerated factors:
(1) The nature of the offense;
(2) The facts of the case;
(3) The motivation and age of the defendant;
(4) The desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution;
(5) The existence of personal problems and character traits which may be related to the applicant's crime and
A-1463-20 8 for which services are unavailable within the criminal justice system, or which may be provided more effectively through supervisory treatment and the probability that the causes of criminal behavior can be controlled by proper treatment;
(6) The likelihood that the applicant's crime is related to a condition or situation that would be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory treatment;
(7) The needs and interests of the victim and society;
(8) The extent to which the applicant's crime constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior;
(9) The applicant's record of criminal and penal violations and the extent to which he may present a substantial danger to others;
(10) Whether or not the crime is of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior;
(11) Consideration of whether or not prosecution would exacerbate the social problem that led to the applicant's criminal act;
(12) The history of the use of physical violence toward others;
(13) Any involvement of the applicant with organized crime;
(14) Whether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for prosecution;
A-1463-20 9 (15) Whether or not the applicant's involvement with other people in the crime charged or in other crime is such that the interest of the State would be best served by processing his case through traditional criminal justice system procedures;
(16) Whether or not the applicant's participation in pretrial intervention will adversely affect the prosecution of codefendants; and
(17) Whether or not the harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an offender into a supervisory treatment program.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1)–(17).]
The prosecutor's statement of reasons, moreover, "must demonstrate that
the prosecutor has carefully considered the facts in light of the relevant law."
State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 584 (1996). It is not sufficient for the prosecutor
merely to "parrot[] the statutory language, and present[] bare assertions
regarding [the defendant's] amenability to PTI." Roseman, 221 N.J. at 627.
"[P]rosecutors…must make an individualized assessment of the defendant,
taking into account all relevant factors." State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 202 (2015)
(citing State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2015)). This does not mean,
however, that the "prosecutor must provide a defendant with a detailed report
outlining every step taken en route to his [or her] decision." State v. Sutton, 80
N.J. 110, 117 (1979).
A-1463-20 10 Importantly for purposes of this case, a court reviewing a prosecutor's
denial of PTI "cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the prosecutor."
State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2008); see also State v.
Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 112–13 (App. Div. 1993) (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Von Smith, 177 N.J. Super. 203, 208 (App. Div. 1980))
(observing "that 'a trial [court] does not have the authority in PTI matters to
substitute [its own] discretion for that of the prosecutor'"). In State v. Lee, we
sustained the prosecutor's rejection of the defendant's application to PTI, noting
that the prosecutor's analysis was "sufficiently cogent and grounded in the facts
and the applicable PTI standards to be upheld, even though reasonable minds
might differ as to whether defendant is a suitable candidate for admission into
the program." 437 N.J. Super. 555, 569 (App. Div. 2014).
III.
We next focus our attention on the two PTI factors that we found in our
prior opinion to have been improperly addressed by the prosecutor. We consider
each of these factors in turn by summarizing what the prosecutor originally
decided, why that initial analysis was misguided or inadequate, and what the
prosecutor did on remand in response to our prior opinion.
A-1463-20 11 A.
As we have noted, factor five addresses "the existence of personal
problems and character traits which may be related to the applicant's crime and
for which services are unavailable within the criminal justice system, or which
may be provided more effectively through supervisory treatment and the
probability that the causes of criminal behavior can be controlled by proper
treatment." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(5). It is not disputed that defendant does not
appear to have any such personal problems or character traits relating to the
alleged offense that need to be addressed by any form of treatment or
rehabilitative services. The prosecutor initially determined that the absence of
any such personal problems or character traits militated against admission to
PTI. We noted in our prior opinion that, "[i]n support of this conclusion, the
prosecutor relied on the doctrine that ignorance of the law is not a defense ."
Harris, slip op. at 20. We agreed with the trial court that this "general principle
of criminal culpability…is inapposite to [a] factor five analysis," and we
therefore concluded that factor five did not "militate against diversion as the
prosecutor found." Id. at 20–21.
On remand, the prosecutor reevaluated factor five in view of our prior
decision and concluded:
A-1463-20 12 Based on all the pertinent information concerning defendant’s PTI application, there is no indication that his crimes were related to any "personal problems" or "character traits" for which services are unavailable in the criminal-justice system. Nor is there any indication that defendant’s crimes were related to any such problems or traits that would benefit from the supervisory treatment afforded in PTI. Of course, then, in the context of this factor, PTI’s supervisory treatment would be no more effective than the services available in the criminal-justice system. Accordingly, the State finds that this factor weighs neither for nor against defendant’s admission into PTI.
The trial court rejected the prosecutor's conclusion that this factor was
neutral, reasoning that defendant was "perfectly capable of possessing and
controlling a firearm as verified by the Pennsylvania authorities" and that there
was no indication "that PTI would be ill-equipped in any way to supervise this
law-abiding citizen …who maintains full time employment and is working his
way towards graduating college." The trial court also found that the prosecution
was mistaken in its analysis, reasoning that "if the defendant did suffer from
'personal problems' or 'character traits' resulting in misconduct which required
services or treatment, supervision through PTI cannot be disqualified as an
option."
We disagree with the trial court's analysis and conclude the prosecution
did not abuse its discretion in finding that factor five neither supported nor
A-1463-20 13 weighed against defendant's suitability for PTI. The trial court acknowledged
that "the State correctly recognize[d] that there are no 'personal problems' or
'character traits' this defendant suffers from which require any treatment." In
these circumstances—where no treatment is needed—we do not see how
supervisory treatment provided through the PTI program could be said to be
more or less effective than services available through the criminal justice system
following a criminal prosecution. Cf. K.S., 220 N.J. at 202–03 (recognizing that
mental health issues would be an appropriate consideration when evaluating a
PTI application).
In short, absent "personal problems and character traits which may be
related to the applicant's crime," this statutory PTI factor is inapposite and
inapplicable. Therefore, the prosecution did not err, much less patently and
grossly abuse its discretion by deciding that this factor neither militated for nor
against admission to PTI.
B.
We turn next to factor six—"[t]he likelihood that the applicant's crime is
related to a condition or situation that would be conducive to change through his
participation in supervisory treatment." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(6). The
prosecutor had initially concluded that factor six neither weighed in favor nor
A-1463-20 14 against defendant's application because he did not have an alcohol or drug
problem. Harris, slip op. at 21. In rejecting that conclusion, we held that factor
six was not "necessarily limited to a personal 'condition' such as substance
abuse. Rather, the applicant's crime in this case appears to be related to a
'situation' that might be conducive to change through PTI, namely, defendant's
ignorance of New Jersey's gun laws." Ibid.
On remand, the prosecution reevaluated factor six, concluding,
Defendant’s crimes do appear, however, to be related to a "situation"—his ignorance of New Jersey’s gun laws—that would be conducive to change through PTI’s supervisory treatment. This case surely has made defendant aware of those laws. His participation in supervisory treatment would reinforce that awareness and curtail the risk of him reoffending as a result of this situation. Thus, this factor supports his diversion, but the State affords it minimal weight.
In reevaluating factor six, the prosecutor followed our guidance and found
that it favored the defendant's application. The trial court nonetheless disagreed
with the amount of weight the prosecutor accorded to this factor, remarking that
factor six "has to favor the defendant without being modified." We see no abuse
of discretion, much less a patent and gross abuse, in the prosecutor's decision to
give only slight weight to this factor. As we noted in our prior opinion, "there
is no mathematical formula that guides the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."
A-1463-20 15 Harris, slip op. at 11. And as our Supreme Court made clear in Wallace, the
Legislature "intended to leave the weighing process to the prosecutor." 146 N.J.
at 585–86; see also Harris, slip op. at 22 (noting a reviewing court may not
supplant "the prosecutor's primacy in determining how much weight, if any, to
ascribe to these factors").
IV.
The trial court in its second opinion painstakingly examined every PTI
factor, essentially repeating much of its original analysis that we had rejected in
our prior opinion. We do not mean to suggest that the prosecutor's reevaluation
of factors five and six—as required by our remand order—could be done in
isolation from the prosecutor's overall assessment of defendant's suitability for
PTI. After reevaluating factors five and six, it was necessary for the prosecutor
to determine whether the revised weight accorded to those two factors would
change the outcome, and that required the new findings regarding factors five
and six to be considered in the context of the combined weight the prosecutor
had assigned to all other PTI factors. Prosecutors and reviewing courts, in other
words, must consider the totality of the factors, that is, the sum of the weights
accorded to all factors. A change to the weight assigned to any one factor,
A-1463-20 16 therefore, necessarily impacts the overall calculus, recognizing, of course, there
is no precise mathematical formula. See Harris, slip op. at 11.
But that self-evident proposition did not invite the trial court to revisit the
prosecutor's evaluation and weight accorded to the other factors that we
previously determined were properly considered by the prosecutor. Indeed, our
prior opinion made clear that aside from the misapplication of factors five and
six, "the prosecutor's office acted within the ambit of its discretion in weighing
the relevant PTI factors." Harris, slip op. at 4. That determination was not
subject to second-guessing by the trial court. Accordingly, the only issues
before the trial court on remand were (1) whether the prosecution patently and
grossly abused its discretion in reevaluating and assigning weight to factors five
and six, and (2) whether the prosecution patently and grossly abused its
discretion in determining that the new weight assessments for those two factors
were insufficient to change the prosecutor's overall weighing of the totality of
relevant factors.
This case boils down to, in other words, the weighing of the relevant PTI
factors. As we have noted both in this opinion and in our prior opinion, a
reviewing court may not supplant "the prosecutor's primacy in determining how
much weight, if any, to ascribe to these factors." Id. at 22; see Wallace, 146
A-1463-20 17 N.J. at 585–86 (reaffirming that the weighing process is left to the prosecutor,
not the trial court). We are satisfied the prosecutor did not commit a patent and
gross abuse of discretion in weighing the factors on remand, and we are
constrained therefore to conclude that the trial court once again substituted its
own judgment for the judgment of the prosecutor. See Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super.
at 216.
We would be remiss if we failed to note that the trial court in its second
written opinion addressed at length concerns regarding the state of policing in
New Jersey and throughout the nation. In particular, the trial court focused its
commentary on the lack of trust many citizens, and especially minority citizens,
have in the fairness and impartiality of police officers. Those comments were
offered in the context of explaining why defendant may not have volunteered
that he was carrying a loaded handgun at the outset of the motor vehicle stop —
a circumstance the State cited as support for its opposition to PTI for defendant
in accordance with a memorandum issued by the Attorney General. See
Attorney General, Clarification of the "Graves Act" 2008 Directive 1 with
1 Attorney General, Attorney General Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of the "Graves Act" (Oct. 23, 2008, as corrected Nov. 25, 2008) (2008 Attorney General Directive). A-1463-20 18 Respect to Offenses Committed by Out-of-State Visitors From States Where
Their Gun-Possession Conduct Would Have Been Lawful 7 (Sept. 24, 2014)
(2014 Attorney General Clarification or Attorney General memorandum).
Specifically, the memorandum offers prosecutors guidance for PTI
determinations involving out-of-state visitors. Consideration is given to
individuals who inadvertently violate New Jersey gun laws but are in lawful
compliance with their home jurisdiction's gun laws. Id. at 1. Specifically, the
trial court commented,
Today, many officers like the ones in this case go about their business in [a] professional fashion. However, we are long past the days when the norm is citizens exercising any sort of control to initiate dialogue with police officers, as equal parties to an event, during a police-citizen encounter. This remains especially true when that encounter is centered around a motor vehicle stop and a gun is present, even if the gun is lawfully owned and licensed by the motorist. The media, if nothing else, has illustrated for years now how there is nothing routine and normal about those encounters as they are often driven by chance, controlled by fate, and influenced by the diversity of the parties to the encounter or the environment within which they take place. Furthermore, with what is now perceived to be the ongoing militarization of law enforcement on all levels, compliance with an officer’s request can be realistically born out of fear in lieu of respect, with heightened anxiety and awareness of surroundings now replacing the comfort levels and feelings of safety once routinely associated with these types of encounters.
A-1463-20 19 The trial court further remarked,
We have also come to experience, in many communities, police viewing themselves as the embodiment of law and authority where even minimal assertions by word or conduct are subject to being interpreted as impeding of the administration of law or, in the worst[-]case scenario, resistance. Too often they are misinterpreted as challenges to police authority that become grounds for violence unnecessarily introduced as a responsive measure to regain control of the encounter. The cases of Philando Castile, Samuel DuBose, and Jonny Gammage (i.e., motor vehicle stops gone fatally wrong) serve as examples of this and of how times have changed. As represented in this case, the presence of police officers seemed to have triggered a level of psychological intimidation, pressure[,] and anxiety experienced by this defendant who, through his conduct, seemed incapable of knowing when was the right time to tell the officers about the firearm he was carrying, in addition to what was the appropriate means by which to do so. Failing to comply with the officer’s verbal commands could have been interpreted as verbal non-compliance, subsequently raising the level of this encounter to one of control and restraint and where the defendant’s actions could have been judged by the officers within the parameters of resistance. When viewed from the lens that in many instances police now seem to perceive themselves as law enforcers as opposed to peace-keepers, the manner in which the civilian population responds to them is no longer static but, instead, now guided by an infinite number of variables. In the worst[-]case scenario, a response by a motorist could result in the imposition of social order by force of arms regardless of how unjust or humiliating that social order may be, rather than a response filtered through a level of calm and civility while the police-citizen encounter is concluded. This
A-1463-20 20 remains especially true where the individual makes any attempt during an encounter to reach for a weapon simply to retrieve same and turn it over to the officers for safekeeping. Based on this, I must find that it most certainly is an error in judgement by the State, and conceivably one bearing classist undertones, that no consideration was given to the actualities of these encounters and that consistent with the Attorney General’s Clarifying memorandum preference is given in favor of PTI admission to an individual for being overtly outspoken so as to initiate a dialogue with an officer during a police-citizen encounter rather than to one who submits to, and is guided by, the officer’s exercise over the encounter who then, in doing so, stays safely within the parameters set by the officers as they direct the encounter towards its conclusion.
We wish to make clear that we in no way fault the trial court for using its
written opinion in this case to express concerns regarding the strained relations
between many police departments and officers and the communities they serve
and protect. These are important matters concerning our criminal justice system
that judges would do well to keep in mind when deciding a wide range of issues
arising in criminal cases. We note, however, that in this instance, we remanded
the case solely to require the prosecutor to reevaluate its initial decision with
respect to PTI factors five and six. We expressly held in our prior opinion that
the prosecution did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it considered
and weighed the other relevant factors and circumstances, including the nature
A-1463-20 21 of the offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1), and the facts of the case, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(e)(2).
We appreciate that the trial court earnestly believes that defendant—who
by all accounts has led a law-abiding life—should be afforded the opportunity
to avoid the stigma and other consequences of a criminal conviction.2 But under
our current PTI framework, that decision rests within the discretion of the
prosecutor, subject only to limited judicial review for a patent and gross abuse
of prosecutorial discretion. While we might not have arrived at the same
conclusion that the prosecutor reached were it our decision to make in the first
instance, see Lee, 437 N.J. Super. at 560 (recognizing reasonable minds might
differ on whether a defendant is a suitable candidate for PTI), we are constrained
to apply the law as it stands and afford substantial deference to the prosecutor.
We therefore reverse the trial court's order admitting defendant to PTI and direct
that the trial court issue an order denying defendant's application.
2 We were advised at oral argument that the prosecutor has tendered a plea offer whereby in exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State will file a motion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 to waive the forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility that applies to a Graves Act offense, and also will recommend that defendant be sentenced to noncustodial probation. A-1463-20 22 VI.
Finally, we address the State's request that we assign a new judge to the
case. We decline to do so. "[T]he appellate court has the authority to direct that
a different judge consider the matter on remand in order to preserve the
appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing, although such authority is
ordinarily exercised sparingly." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
cmt. 4(d) on R. 1:12-1 (2022); see also N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Serv. v.
A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617–18 (1986) (noting a new judge may be appropriate in
situations where evidence has already been heard and the court is committed to
its findings).
The record shows that throughout the pendency of this case, the trial court
has repeatedly expressed its belief that PTI is warranted. Because we are
remanding with instructions that the trial court enter an order denying
defendant's application for PTI, there will be no further opportunity, however,
for the trial court to express its views on defendant's suitability for PTI.
Accordingly, there is no need to have the case handled by another judge.
A-1463-20 23 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-1463-20 24