NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-5867-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH KEARSTAN,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted September 9, 2019 – Decided September 20, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 18- 006.
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer PA, attorneys for appellant (John Edmund Hogan, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).
Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paula Cristina Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Kenneth Kearstan appeals from his conviction for driving
while intoxicated, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He entered a conditional guilty
plea in the Washington Township municipal court specifically preserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress the alleged unconstitutional
entry into his home by the police and his subsequent incriminating statements
made without the benefit of Miranda1 warnings. R. 7:6-2(c). The Law Division
affirmed the municipal court's suppression determinations on de novo review
and this appeal followed. We affirm.
I.
The following facts elicited at the suppression hearing are substantially
not in dispute. At the time of the events at issue, defendant and his wife were
in the midst of divorce proceedings and had been separated for nine months. On
April 18, 2017, at approximately 5:00 p.m., defendant arrived at the marital
home with damage to his car, including a missing mirror. Defendant's wife
called 911, and while on the phone with the operator she learned that defendant
had used a key to unlock the door to the house and entered the basement. She
reported that defendant had an alcohol issue and believed he was intoxicated, as
he was slurring his words and "smell[ed] a little too."
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) A-5867-17T3 2 Washington Township Patrolman Michael Thompson was dispatched to
the residence to conduct a welfare check. Defendant's wife met Thompson at
the front door and invited him into the home. Thompson testified that prior to
entering the home he too noticed the damage to defendant's vehicle. He also
stated that he had previously been at the residence on an alarm call and met
defendant's wife, who had shown him the security system. Thompson's testified
that defendant's wife was upset when he arrived and noted that the parties' young
children were present.
As soon as Thompson entered the home, defendant's wife advised him that
defendant was in the basement. She believed defendant had taken medication
and was intoxicated. She repeatedly stated her concern for defendant's well-
being but was upset regarding defendant's presence in the home, as she had
previously informed defendant that he was not permitted in the home when
inebriated.
Thompson testified that he stood at the top of the stairs and called down
to defendant to come up from the basement. When defendant entered the
stairway he was off balance, staggering, and his pants were falling down.
Thompson testified that defendant had difficulty pulling up his pants and he
detected an odor of alcohol emanating from defendant. He stated it was clear
A-5867-17T3 3 that defendant was "extremely intoxicated" and he needed assistance simply to
stand up. Thompson told defendant he wanted to speak with him outside, away
from the children.
Throughout Thompson's encounter with defendant, he expressed concern
for defendant's well-being, which he described as his "top priority." He also
advised defendant that his wife was worried about his drinking and prescription
drug use, as well as the circumstances surrounding the damage to his car.
Thompson testified that he asked defendant to exit the home so they could
speak outside in order to avoid an altercation between defendant and his wife
and so defendant's children would not witness their interaction. While on the
porch, Thompson began questioning defendant and observed that defendant's
eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. Thompson testified that he
again smelled alcohol emanating from defendant.
Defendant told Thompson that he had no memory of being involved in an
accident. After initially denying drinking that day, defendant eventually
admitted to consuming three small airplane-sized bottles of alcohol. Defendant
also admitted to engaging in an argument with his wife earlier in the week
regarding paying their taxes and stated he came to the home to finish a basement
construction project.
A-5867-17T3 4 In light of his observations and defendant's statements, Thompson
attempted to administer Standard Field Sobriety Tests. After defendant stated
he was unable to complete the walk-and-turn test, Thompson decided to cease
administrating the remainder of the field sobriety tests out of concern that
defendant's condition would cause him to fall and injure himself.
Defendant was placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated.
Thompson and another officer requested that a first aid squad meet them at
police headquarters, as Thompson was concerned defendant was exhibiting
signs of an overdose. Defendant was subsequently transported to Hackettstown
Hospital where a blood draw revealed defendant had a blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) of 0.29%, well above the legal limit.
Before the municipal court, defendant moved to suppress the results of his
blood alcohol test and the incriminating statements he made to Thompson
claiming the police violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution and corresponding rights under the New Jersey
Constitution. Specifically, defendant maintained that Thompson improperly
entered his home without consent and failed to administer Miranda warnings.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing in which Thompson was the
only testifying witness, the municipal court judge denied defendant's motions,
A-5867-17T3 5 concluding that defendant's wife knowingly and willingly invited Thompson
into the family home. The judge also concluded that the warrantless entry was
justified under the community-caretaker and emergency-aid doctrines. Finally,
the judge determined that the subsequent questioning of defendant did not
constitute a custodial interrogation warranting Miranda warnings. Instead, the
judge characterized Thompson's questioning as similar to the preliminary,
roadside investigation of an individual suspected of drunk driving.
Because this was defendant's second DWI conviction, he was assessed the
appropriate mandatory fines and penalties, his driving privileges were revoked
for a period of two years, and the court sentenced defendant to a forty-eight hour
minimum treatment in the Intoxicated Driver's Resource Center. Defendant was
also required to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle for one year
upon restoration of his driving privileges. Finally, the court stayed defendant's
sentence pending appeal. 2
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division. On de novo
review, the Law Division affirmed the municipal court's suppression ruling and
similarly concluded the police did not violate defendant's Fourth or Fifth
2 In addition, as part of defendant's conditional plea, the State dismissed summonses for leaving the scene of an accident, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4 - 129, and failure to report an accident, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-130. A-5867-17T3 6 Amendment rights. Specifically, the court determined Thompson had a lawful
right to be in the home based on valid consent obtained from defendant's wife,
and appropriately questioned defendant without the need for Miranda warnings.
The court imposed the same sentence as the municipal court, similarly stayed
the sentence, but ordered that defendant abstain from using alcohol and appear
periodically in court for compliance monitoring.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues for our consideration:
POINT I
THE REMOVAL OF DEFENDANT FROM HIS HOME WAS IMPROPER AND, THEREFORE, THE EVIDENCE GATHERED THEREAFTER MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
POINT II
THE INCULPATORY STATEMENTS MADE BY MR. KEARSTAN AFTER BEING REMOVED FROM HIS HOME WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF- INCRIMINATION AND MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
We disagree with both of defendant's arguments. Thompson lawfully
entered defendant's home as a result of the informed and voluntary consent
granted to him by defendant's wife. Defendant's subsequent incriminating
responses and BAC results were the consequence of a proper investigatory
interrogation similar to that occurring on a roadside and to which Miranda
A-5867-17T3 7 warnings are not required. Consequently, we discern no violation of defendant's
federal or state constitutional rights and, accordingly, affirm.
II.
When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we defer
to the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by sufficient
evidence in the record. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (citing State
v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). Further, our review of the Law Division
order here “is limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible
evidence present in the record to support the findings of the Law Division judge,
not the municipal court.” State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639
(App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161–62 (1964)). Finally,
we review the Law Division's legal determinations or conclusions based upon
the facts on a de novo basis. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
III.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures performed without a warrant issued based on probable
cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, § 7. A warrantless search or
A-5867-17T3 8 seizure is presumptively invalid under both the federal and state constitutions.
State v. Piniero, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004) (citing State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7
(1980)). Further, we have long recognized that the home is the most highly
protected area against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Vargas, 213
N.J. 301, 312–13 (2013).
A warrantless search or seizure is nonetheless valid if it "falls within one
of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v.
Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 (2001) (quoting State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272,
278 (1998)). These exceptions include consent as well as the community-
caretaking and emergency-aid doctrines. See State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 315
(2014) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)) (consent
exception); State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 130–31, 41–42 (2012) (citing Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)) (community-caretaking and
emergency-aid exceptions); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009)
(emergency-aid exception).
As noted, consent, whether express or implied, is an exception to the
warrant requirement at both the federal and state level. See United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); State v. Douglas, 204 N.J. Super. 265, 275–
76 (App. Div. 1985); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 262 (1988). Any consent,
A-5867-17T3 9 however, must be knowing and voluntary. State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639
(2002). The State bears the burden to establish that the consent was voluntary,
meaning that the person providing consent was aware they “had a choice in the
matter.” State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975). The person providing
consent, however, need not be informed of the right to refuse entry where the
entry does not include a Fourth Amendment search. See State v. Williams, __
N.J. Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2019) (slip op. at 22–23) (citing State v. Padilla,
321 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Piniero, 369 N.J. Super. 65, 73
(App. Div. 2004)).
A third party's consent binds a defendant if the third party has authority to
provide consent. Douglas, 204 N.J. Super. at 276; see also State v. Miller, 159
N.J. Super. 552, 556–57 (App. Div. 1978). A third party may have such
authority where cohabitants share use or have common authority over the space
searched. Lamb, 218 N.J. at 315 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171); State v.
Cushing, 226 N.J. 187, 200 (2016) (citing State v. Suazo, 133 N.J. 315, 320
(1993)). Where there is "mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control . . . it is reasonable to recognize" that either cohabitant
may consent to entry into the home. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
A-5867-17T3 10 Relying primarily on a series of United States Supreme Court and federal
cases including Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740 (1984), and United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir.
1984), defendant argues that Thompson improperly entered his home because
"absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless entries of [a]
home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." After a thorough review of the
authorities cited by defendant in the context of the record on appeal, we conclude
they are factually distinguishable, as the police in those cases did not have
consent to enter the defendants' homes.
For example, in Payton, the United States Supreme Court resolved two
separate appeals involving officers' warrantless entries into defendants' homes.
Notably, in neither case did the police obtain consent before entering or satisfy
any other exception to the warrant requirement. As the Court noted:
[I]n both cases we are dealing with entries into homes made without the consent of any occupant. In Payton, the police used crowbars to break down the door and in Riddick, although his 3 year old son answered the door, the police entered before Riddick had an opportunity either to object or to consent.
[Payton, 445 U.S. at 583.]
Similarly, in Welsh, the Supreme Court held that an officer may not justify
a warrantless entry into a home to arrest a suspect on the grounds that "evidence
A-5867-17T3 11 of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police
obtained a warrant." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754. The Welsh Court explicitly noted
that it "assume[d] that there was no valid consent to enter the petitioner's home."
Id. at 743 n.1.
Finally, in Morgan, the Sixth Circuit invalidated an arrest where nine
police officers surrounded the defendant's home and set up spotlights and
bullhorns to coerce him outside, where he was arrested. Ibid. The court held
that "the warrantless arrest of [defendant], as he stood within the door of a
private home, after emerging in response to coercive police conduct, violated
[defendant]'s [F]ourth [A]mendment rights." Id. at 1166.
Here, Thompson did not coerce defendant or his wife before entering the
home. Rather, defendant's wife, who Thompson knew from a previous
encounter, actually invited Thompson's into the home after calling 911.
Consequently, the court's finding that Thompson obtained valid consent from
defendant's wife, and thus did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights,
was fully supported by the record and did not constitute error or an abuse of
discretion.3
3 In light of our conclusion that Thompson had consent to enter defendant's home, we need not address the community-caretaking exception and the emergency-aid exceptions relied upon by the municipal court. A-5867-17T3 12 IV.
Defendant next argues that both the municipal and Law Division judges
committed error in refusing to suppress his incriminating statements and BAC
results because Thompson failed to provide Miranda warnings prior to
questioning him, and thus any subsequently obtained evidence was the “fruit of
the poisonous tree . . . .” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
Again, we disagree. Thompson was not required to administer Miranda warnings
here because he merely engaged in a preliminary fact-gathering investigation
akin to a routine roadside DWI traffic stop. See State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super.
1, 9 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Baum, 393 N.J. Super. 275, 291 (App. Div. 2007).
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees all
persons the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V. This
privilege applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Further, New
Jersey recognizes a common law privilege against self-incrimination, which has
been codified in statutes and rules of evidence. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A–19; N.J.R.E.
503; State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993). That privilege affords any person
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom, to be provided
certain warnings before questioning can commence. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
A-5867-17T3 13 The requirement that an individual be provided with Miranda warnings is
triggered by a “‘custodial interrogation,’ which is ‘questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of . . . freedom of action in a significant way.’” State v. Smith, 374
N.J. Super. 425, 430 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). An
individual is deemed to be in custody if "the action of the interrogating officers
and the surrounding circumstances, fairly construed, would reasonably lead a
detainee to believe he [or she] could not leave freely.” State v. Coburn, 221 N.J.
Super. 586, 596 (App. Div. 1987) (citing State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168,
176 n.1 (App. Div. 1974)). Under this objective test, courts consider the time,
location, and duration of the detention, the nature of the questioning, and the
conduct of the officers in evaluating the degree of restraint. See e.g., Smith, 374
N.J. Super. at 431; State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 1988).
Conversely, “Miranda is not implicated when the detention and
questioning is part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial
interrogation.” Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. at 66 (citing United States v. Booth, 669
F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981)). Such an investigatory procedure has included
detention and questioning during a traffic stop or a field investigation. See
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437–38 (1984) (holding that because a
A-5867-17T3 14 vehicle stop is “presumptively temporary and brief” and “public, at least to some
degree[,]” it does not automatically trigger the Miranda requirement); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that officers may briefly detain a
person to investigate circumstances that provoke reasonable suspicion). In such
circumstances, even though an individual's freedom of action is clearly
restrained to a degree, Miranda warnings are only required if, under the totality
of the circumstances, the detention becomes “the functional equivalent of an
arrest.” Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442); see
also State v. Nemesh, 228 N.J. Super. 597, 606–07 (App. Div. 1988).
Our state courts have applied the Berkemer reasoning in analyzing
whether Miranda warnings are required during a routine traffic stop. In Ebert,
we held that a DWI suspect, like defendant here, was not entitled to the
administration of Miranda warnings prior to the officer’s preliminary
questioning during the fact gathering process. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. at 9.
Relying on Berkemer, we noted that “a police officer asking a defendant a
modest number of questions and requesting the defendant to perform a field
sobriety test in a public place” was not equivalent to a formal arrest and did not
require the administration of Miranda warnings. Ibid. (citing Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 442); see also State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 631 (App. Div.
A-5867-17T3 15 2000) (“Roadside questioning of a motorist is not transformed into ‘custodial
interrogation’ that must be preceded by Miranda warnings simply because a
police officer’s questioning is accusatory in nature or designed to elicit
incriminating evidence.”).
Thus, in the context of a field investigation, “[t]he question is whether a
reasonable person, considering the objective circumstances, would understand
the situation as a de facto arrest or would recognize that after brief questioning
he or she would be free to leave.” Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 432. Here,
Thompson responded to the home in response to defendant's wife's 911 call and
made preliminary inquiries of defendant, who appeared visibly intoxicated
shortly after operating a motor vehicle. Thompson’s initial questioning of
defendant was brief, occurred inside and then outside the home, and took place
only after he was expressly invited into the residence by defendant's wife.
Defendant was neither handcuffed nor placed under arrest during the initial
investigation. Under the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the Law
Division that defendant was subject only to a "brief investigative detention . . .
conducted in a . . . reasonable" manner which was not the functional equivalent
of an arrest, and Thompson was authorized "to conduct the interrogation in the
way that he did, in the context that he did, without having to give Miranda
A-5867-17T3 16 warnings." See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 443; Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. at 9; State v.
Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1997).
Accordingly, we conclude the court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to suppress. Defendant's conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 is
affirmed and the stay issued by the Law Division of defendant's sentence is
dissolved. Defendant shall appear before the municipal court within twenty days
to surrender his driver's license and arrange for implementation of his sentence.
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining arguments,
we find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-5867-17T3 17