State of New Jersey v. Tiffany R. Jones

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: A-1450-25
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1450-25

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIFFANY R. JONES,

Defendant-Respondent. _________________________

Argued March 24, 2026 – Decided May 11, 2026

Before Judges Gilson and Vinci.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Accusation No. 23-07-1277.

William Kyle Meighan, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel; William Kyle Meighan, on the brief).

Matthew W. Reisig argued the cause for respondent (Reisig Criminal Defense & DWI Law, LLC, attorneys; Matthew W. Reisig, of counsel; Jeffrey Zajac, on the brief). PER CURIAM

We granted the State leave to appeal an October 23, 2025 order, which

allowed defendant Tiffany Jones to withdraw her guilty plea to refusing to

submit to a chemical breath test in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. The trial

court reasoned that defendant had not provided a valid plea because she did not

expressly admit all the elements of a refusal charge. The record does not support

the trial court's determination and, therefore, we reverse, vacate the October 23,

2025 order, and reinstate defendant's refusal conviction.

I.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 30, 2022, several Jackson

Township police officers responded to a Wawa convenience store on a report of

a disruptive customer. 1 Once patrolman Zackary Rodina arrived, he observed

defendant who was "cursing, screaming, and waving her arms in an aggressive

manner." The officer tried to calm defendant down and when he spoke to her,

he saw that she had "bloodshot, glassy, and watery eyes" and he smelled a

"strong odor" of alcohol emanating from defendant's breath. Rodina also

observed that defendant was "slurring her words, unable to maintain her balance,

1 We discern certain of the facts from the reports prepared by two responding police officers. Those reports were submitted as part of the record and disclosed in discovery to defendant. Defendant does not dispute those facts. A-1450-25 2 and screaming at the top of her lungs all while her [young] daughter was

present."

Another responding officer, patrolwoman Jody Benecke, also observed

that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery. Several witnesses reported to

Benecke that defendant had become irate because her food was not prepared

properly, had been "belligerent" towards employees and customers, and had

attempted to leave in her red Lexus with her four-year-old child. Benecke also

observed that the red Lexus was "parked partially in a spot in front of the"

Wawa.

The officers placed defendant under arrest for disorderly conduct.

Officers also searched defendant's vehicle and found two small bottles of vodka.

Defendant was then taken to the township's police station, where she continued

to "act out," refused to be fingerprinted, and refused to engage in sobriety test s.

Defendant was then asked to provide breath samples so that she could be

chemically tested to determine the alcohol content of her blood. As part of that

procedure, Rodina read to defendant the New Jersey Attorney General's

Standard Statement for Motor Vehicle Operators (the Statement). The

Statement informed defendant (1) she had "been arrested for driving while

intoxicated," (2) she was required to submit breath samples to determine the

A-1450-25 3 alcohol content of her blood; and (3) the penalties for refusing to submit breath

samples.

After reading the Statement to defendant, Rodina asked defendant if she

would submit breath samples, but defendant refused. Rodina then read

defendant the additional paragraph in the Statement and defendant again refused

to provide breath samples, stating "F[] no."

While defendant was at the police station, a check of her motor vehicle

records revealed that she had a prior conviction for refusing to submit to a breath

test and she was required to have an ignition interlock device installed in her

car. Defendant was thereafter charged with three criminal offenses, including

second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). She

was also charged with eight motor vehicle offenses, including driving while

under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, failure to install an ignition interlock

device, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.19, and refusal to submit to a breath test.

The following year and with the assistance of an attorney, defendant

negotiated a comprehensive plea agreement. Under the agreement, defendant

waived her right to be indicted and agreed to plead guilty to an accusation

charging her with third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.

2C:24-4(a)(2). She also agreed to plead guilty to the refusal charge and a

A-1450-25 4 violation of probation. In return, the State agreed to recommend that defendant

be sentenced to probation, the standard penalties for refusal, and all other

charges be dismissed.

On July 24, 2023, defendant pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a

child and to a violation of probation. During the hearing on that date, the

prosecutor explained the plea agreement, including defendant's agreement to

plead guilty to the refusal charge at the time of her sentence. Defendant was

then placed under oath, and she testified (1) she had heard and understood the

terms of her plea agreement; (2) she had reviewed and signed the plea forms;

(3) she had reviewed her plea forms with her counsel, and he had answered all

her questions; and (4) she was pleading guilty because she was guilty.

On September 29, 2023, defendant appeared for sentencing on the

criminal conviction. Before being sentenced, defendant pled guilty to the refusal

charge. In pleading guilty, defendant was placed under oath, and she was asked

and answered the following questions:

Q I'm going to ask you some questions about an incident that happened on August the 30th of last year, 2022, in Jackson. Is it correct on that date, you were on North County Line Road?

A Correct.

A-1450-25 5 Q And that's around the area where the Wawa is located; is that right?

A That is correct.

Q And you had been driving a vehicle?

Q And at some point, officers stopped you and made contact with you; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And they had some suspicion that you were - - you had been operating the vehicle under the influence of - -

Q In this case, under the influence of alcohol, because they had seen, I think, a few shooters in the car.

Q So then am I right in saying you went back to the police station where the officers asked you to do a Breathalyzer test?

Q And at that point, you refused and said no?

Q They further gave you a piece of paper, a form, which basically explained the possible

A-1450-25 6 implications for saying no to that Breathalyzer; is that right?

A Yes, they did.

Q And, again, you said no at that point.

A. I did.

Q And you understand these actions, by refusing to submit to that Breathalyzer, is in violation of the motor vehicle code; is that right?

A Yes. I understand.

Q Specifically, your refusal to submit to a chemical test.

A I understand.

Q And you're pleading guilty to that motor vehicle ticket because you are guilty.

A Yes, I am.

The trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea to the refusal charge.

Defendant was then sentenced to two years of probation on the endangering

conviction. On the refusal charge, defendant was sentenced to the loss of her

driver's license for one year and to spend forty-eight hours in an educational

program to avoid intoxication while driving. Defendant was also required to

install an ignition interlock device in her primary motor vehicle for t wo years

A-1450-25 7 and to pay fines, assessments, and costs. The court thereafter dismissed all other

charges. Defendant did not appeal her convictions or sentences.

In 2025, defendant was indicted for driving while her license was

suspended in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). Because defendant's driver's

license had been previously revoked two times for refusing to submit to a breath

test, if convicted defendant will be sentenced to a mandatory prison term of at

least 180 days. See N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c). In May 2025, defendant filed a

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) under which she sought to withdraw

her guilty plea to the refusal charge that she had entered in September 2023.

Thereafter, defendant withdrew her PCR petition and filed a motion to withdraw

her guilty plea to the refusal charge.

On October 21, 2025, the same judge who had accepted defendant's plea

heard the motion to withdraw the plea. Two days later, on October 23, 2025,

the judge entered an order granting the motion. The judge also issued a written

decision explaining the reasons for the ruling.

In the decision, the judge determined defendant's refusal plea was not

supported by an adequate factual basis. The judge reasoned that defendant's

admission that the officers had "some suspicion" she was driving under the

influence, was insufficient to establish that before her refusal defendant had

A-1450-25 8 been arrested for driving while under the influence based on probable cause. In

that regard, the judge reasoned: "Probable cause requires specific and

articulable facts, where 'some suspicion' is vague, ambiguous, and insufficient

for establishing probable cause." Accordingly, the judge found that the first

element required for a refusal conviction was not met.

The judge also determined that the second element for a refusal conviction

— that is, that defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated — was also

not established. The judge reasoned: "Merely stating that defendant 'went back

to the police station' is not analogous to establishing that the [d]efendant was

arrested for DWI."

The judge also analyzed defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea

under the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). The judge

determined that defendant's assertion of a claim of innocence was established

because there was an insufficient factual basis for her plea. The judge also

determined that defendant had presented fair and just reasons for withdrawal

because the "words 'probable cause' was never mentioned during the plea

allocution."

The judge acknowledged that defendant had a heavy burden in seeking to

withdraw her guilty plea because it was part of a plea bargain. Nevertheless, the

A-1450-25 9 judge reasoned that factor should not be given great weight in the balancing

process. Finally, under the fourth Slater factor, the judge determined that the

withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea would not result in unfair prejudice to the

State, but the judge did not explain how or why there was no prejudice to the

State.

Based on the court's reasoning, the court entered an order granting

defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea to the refusal charge. On the

State's motion, we granted it leave to appeal the interlocutory order.

II.

The State argues that there was a sufficient factual basis for defendant's

guilty plea to the refusal charge. The State also contends that defendant did not

satisfy the requirements for withdrawing her guilty plea under State v. Slater.

In opposition, defendant asserts that she did not provide a factual basis for her

guilty plea to refusal. Specifically, she contends that she did not admit that there

was probable cause to believe that she had been driving while under the

influence and she did not expressly admit that she had been arrested for driving

while under the influence.

Generally, appellate courts review a trial court's decision to grant or deny

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. State

A-1450-25 10 v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 332 (2014). Where, however, the issue is solely whether

there is an adequate basis to support the plea, we conduct a de novo review

because "[a]n appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing

whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential

elements of an offense." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015).

In assessing the adequacy of a guilty plea, a court must determine that the

plea "(1) has a sufficient factual basis, (2) is offered voluntarily, and (3) is given

with a sufficient understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences

flowing from the plea." State ex rel. T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 325-26 (2001).

Accordingly, Rule 3:9-2 states, in relevant part:

The court, in its discretion, may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and shall not accept such plea without first questioning the defendant personally, [] and determining by inquiry of the defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is made voluntarily, not as a result of any threats or of any promises or inducements not disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained:

The specificity and rigor embodied in Rule 3:9-2 manifest a systematic awareness that a defendant waives significant constitutional rights when pleading guilty, which places an affirmative obligation on a court to reject a plea of guilty when the court is not

A-1450-25 11 independently satisfied that the Rule's prerequisites are met.

[T.M., 166 N.J. at 326 (citing State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 415 (1990)).]

The Court has also explained:

We have adopted the shorthand expression that the trial court 'must be "satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he [or she] committed the acts which constitute the crime"' . . . [t]hat does not mean that a court must follow a prescribed or artificial ritual. To the contrary, because different criminal charges and different defendants require courts to act flexibly to achieve constitutional ends, a factual basis, established either through inquiry of others, which a defendant acknowledges, or through direct admission by the defendant, should be examined in light of all surrounding circumstances and in the context of an entire plea colloquy.

[Id. at 327 (quoting State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989)).]

See also State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 420-21 (explaining "[s]imply put, a

defendant must acknowledge facts that constitute the essential elements of the

crime").

There are four elements to establish the charge of refusal to submit to a

breath test under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 503

(2010). Those elements are:

A-1450-25 12 (1) the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs;

(2) defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated;

(3) the officer requested defendant to submit to a chemical breath test and informed defendant of the consequences of refusing to do so; and

(4) defendant thereafter refused to submit to the test.

[Ibid.]

Defendant and the motion judge focused on the first and second elements.

Specifically, the judge reasoned defendant's admission that an officer had "some

suspicion" to arrest her did not establish that the officers had probable cause to

believe she had been driving while under the influence. Similarly, the motion

judge determined defendant's acknowledgment that she "went back to the police

department" did not establish that she had been arrested for driving while under

the influence.

We reject the motion judge's reasoning because it is inconsistent with the

entire record. Reading defendant's admissions during her plea in context

establishes that she knew and acknowledged each of the elements of a refusal

conviction. A defendant does not have to expressly admit probable cause,

A-1450-25 13 because probable cause is a determination made by the court. When defendant

pled guilty to the refusal charge, the record before the court clearly established

that there was probable cause for defendant's arrest on suspicion of driving while

under the influence. There was no dispute that defendant had been arrested.

There was also no dispute that defendant had been charged with driving while

under the influence. At no point did defendant or her plea counsel question

whether there was probable cause for her arrest. Thus, when she admitted that

there was "some suspicion" to arrest her, she sufficiently admitted she had been

arrested with probable cause.

There was also no issue with the fact that defendant had been arrested for

driving while under the influence. Defendant acknowledged that she had been

read the standard Statement. That Statement expressly told defendant that she

had been "arrested for driving while intoxicated." Consequently, when

defendant during her plea colloquy acknowledged under oath that she had "went

back to the police department" she sufficiently acknowledged that she had been

arrested for driving while under the influence.

Importantly, in pleading guilty, defendant candidly admitted that she was

guilty of refusal. She had been previously convicted of refusal to provide a

breath sample. Accordingly, the record establishes that she knowingly,

A-1450-25 14 voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty to the refusal charge. Indeed, that

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea is succinctly summarized in the

following exchange:

Q Specifically, you[] refused to submit to a chemical test.

Q And you're pleading guilty to that motor vehicle ticket [of refusal] because you are guilty.

In short, form does not trump the substance of defendant's knowing and

voluntary plea. See Barboza, 115 N.J. at 421 (explaining the factual basis

requirement "serves a variety of purposes," including preventing defendant from

entering an unknowing plea and providing a record for appellate review of the

plea conditions); see also State v. Taccetta, 200 N.J. 183, 198 (2009) (noting

this requirement serves to "ensure[] that innocent people are not punished for

crimes they did not commit").

We also reject the motion judge's alternative ground for vacating the plea

under the Slater factors. Following sentencing, a defendant seeking to withdraw

a guilty plea must show that the withdrawal will "correct a manifest injustice."

R. 3:21-1. Under that standard, "the burden rests on defendant . . . to present

A-1450-25 15 some plausible basis for [her] request, and [] good faith in asserting a defense

on the merits." Smullen, 118 N.J. at 416 (quoting State v. Huntley, 129 N.J.

Super. 13, 17 (App. Div. 1974)). In deciding whether to permit the withdrawal

of a guilty plea after sentencing, the court must consider the four factors set forth

in Slater:

(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal [will] result in an unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused.

[Slater, 198 N.J. at 157-58.]

In this matter, the motion judge did not correctly assess the Slater factors.

Instead, the judge used her reasonings concerning the inadequate plea to try to

satisfy the Slater factors. The record does not contain any evidence that

defendant has a colorable claim of innocence. Indeed, defendant does not claim

that she is innocent; rather she asserts the State did not establish her guilt. Nor

has defendant established the nature and strength of her reasons for withdrawing.

There clearly was a plea agreement and defendant clearly understood the

agreement. Finally, it would be prejudicial to the State if defendant was now

allowed to withdraw her guilty plea.

A-1450-25 16 Defendant candidly acknowledges the real reason she is seeking to

withdraw her guilty plea to the refusal charge. After her plea and sentence, she

was indicted for driving while her license was suspended. Defendant wants to

avoid the mandatory prison term if she is convicted of that offense because she

has at least two prior convictions for refusing to submit to a breath test.

While we understand defendant's motive, it is inconsistent with the public

policy of New Jersey. In adopting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26, the Legislature required

a mandatory period of incarceration as a deterrent to people who continue to

drive when their license had been suspended two or more times for driving while

intoxicated or for refusing to submit to a breath test. See State v. Harris, 439

N.J. Super. 150, 160 (App. Div. 2015); State v. Perry, 439 N.J. Super. 514, 522-

23 (App Div. 2015). It would, therefore, be inconsistent with New Jersey's

public policy to protect the public from the hazards of people driving while

under the influence, to allow defendant to withdraw her guilty plea to the refusal

conviction because she subsequently drove while her license was suspended for

that very conviction and a prior conviction.

In summary, defendant's plea was adequate, and she failed to establish

grounds for withdrawing her plea under the Slater factors. Accordingly, we

reverse and vacate the October 23, 2025 order and reinstate defendant's refusal

A-1450-25 17 conviction. On remand, the trial court is to enter an order denying defendant's

motion to withdraw her guilty plea to the refusal conviction.

Reversed, vacated, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1450-25 18