NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3766-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RODNEY GREEN, a/k/a TYRONE GREEN, RODNEY SMITH, DARRYL MILES, FRANK THOMAS, FRANK WHITE, MILES GREEN, RODNEY SMITH and RODNEY GRAHAM,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted on January 6, 2026 – Decided April 29, 2026
Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 20-12- 0501.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Kimberly P. Will, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A jury convicted defendant Rodney Green of second-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), and he was sentenced as a persistent offender to fifteen
years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility term and three-
year parole supervision pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2. Defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence. Having
reviewed his contentions in light of the record and applicable law, we reverse
and remand for a new trial.
I.
We discern the facts from the trial record. Between September 26 and
September 29, 2020, defendant was hospitalized due to back pain, referred to as
"flank pain." Around 6:30 p.m. on September 29, he left the hospital against
medical advice. Later that evening, he entered a pharmacy in Millville,
approached the cashier, and demanded money or he would kill her and everyone
in the store. The cashier turned over the money, which included "tracking
money" described as a roll of bills with a GPS tracker placed in between the
A-3766-23 2 bills. Defendant was located that evening in a wooded area near the pharmacy
and arrested.
At trial, the State presented testimony from five witnesses: the pharmacy
cashier and shift supervisor Belinda Dority; assistant store manager, Robert
Kinzel; Millville law enforcement officers: Sergeant Brandon Kavanagh,
Officer Louis Torres, and Officer Rodney Yamasaki. The State introduced
various surveillance footage from the pharmacy and body-worn camera footage
from some of the officers.
Defendant elected not to testify, but called two witnesses: Dr. Shannon
Harrington, one of the hospital's treating physicians, and Zakiya Mutcherson, a
hospital case manager. Defendant's medical records from his hospital stay were
admitted.
Dority testified that at about 10:30 p.m. on September 29, an individual
approached the register and told her to "give him all the money in the register
or he was going to kill [her] and everyone in there." She explained that at first,
she did not take him seriously although, "at the same time," she was trying to
get the security guard's attention who was standing in a nearby aisle. In
response, defendant stated, "I see you're trying to get your people. I'm not
A-3766-23 3 playing. I will kill you and everyone in here. Give me the money." Dority then
handed him the money, and he left the store.
Dority felt "kind of scared because [she] didn't know whether or not . . .
he was on drugs [or] had any . . . hypodermic needles." Dority acknowledged
that defendant did not brandish a weapon while demanding money.
Robert Kinzel, the assistant store manager, testified that as he entered the
store that evening to begin his shift, he passed defendant leaving the store.
Kinzel confirmed that the store had surveillance cameras both inside and
outside. On the evening of the incident, he burned the surveillance footage from
the various cameras for the officers. Kinzel identified a total of five surveillance
videos. He explained that the first video showed the "exterior side lot camera,"
and captured people entering the store, including defendant. Kinzel identified
another video from inside the store, showing the entrance, and other videos
showing the store registers, which also included defendant standing at Dority's
register.
After defendant left the pharmacy with the money, the police were
contacted. They arrived shortly thereafter and began searching the area.
Sergeant Kavanagh testified that defendant was found in a "thick, overgrown
area . . . . pretty close" to the pharmacy. Officer Torres searched defendant,
A-3766-23 4 finding "rubber-banded money" inside his pocket. Although Kinzel testified
that $244 was missing from the register, only $161 was found on defendant. The
parties stipulated that no other money was found in the area. According to
Torres, after being arrested, defendant, who had a "hospital band" on his wrist,
was able to answer questions, although he seemed "jittery" and unfocused at
times. After being processed, defendant was taken back to the hospital for
further treatment.
Defendant called Dr. Shannon Harrington, his treating physician during
his hospital stay, to testify. Prior to trial, the court conducted oral argument on
the State's motion in limine to bar expert testimony because no expert report had
been provided. The State acknowledged, however, that defendant's medical
records had been produced. The court granted the State's motion in part, barring
"[a]ll expert testimony" but permitting "[t]estimony regarding defendant's
hospital records and any known side effects of the prescribed medications."
Dr. Harrington testified that defendant came to the emergency room
complaining of flank pain, which she explained refers to "pain on the lateral side
of the abdomen." Defendant was also "diagnosed with hypocalcemia and
hypokalemia." Dr. Harrington testified that the "working diagnosis" for flank
pain was "Loin Pain Hematuria Syndrome." Defendant was admitted to the
A-3766-23 5 hospital on September 26. Dr. Harrington testified that she saw defendant on
September 29, and noted in the medical chart, "[p]atient not medically stable for
discharge at this time." Nonetheless, defendant left the hospital on that day
against medical advice.
Dr. Harrington testified regarding the medications defendant received for
pain, which included narcotic and non-narcotic medications. Specifically,
defendant received benzodiazepine and opioid medications during his three-day
hospital stay. After seeing defendant, Dr. Harrington concluded that defendant's
pain was not being controlled, so she converted the pain medication to "a basal
amount of pain medication" administered through an IV as a means to
"potentially increase the pain medication[']s" efficacy. Dr. Harrington testified
to some of the "published" side effects of these medications, which included
"respiratory depression . . . sedation, . . . [and] altered mental status."
The final defense witness, Mutcherson, testified regarding the discharge
planning meeting she had with defendant on September 28. According to
Mutcherson, defendant stated he would need a bus ticket or some form of
transportation to get home. At this meeting, Mutcherson described defendant's
demeanor as "[a]ppropriate, calm and cooperative."
A-3766-23 6 After deliberating, the jury convicted defendant of second-degree robbery.
Before sentencing, the court conducted oral argument on defendant's motion for
a new trial. Defendant argued that he was "denied the opportunity to be provided
with an expert to substantiate [his] intoxication pathological defense."
Defendant contended that he was prejudiced by the "absence of [] expert
testimony." The court denied defendant's motion and granted the State's motion
for a discretionary extended term as a persistent offender.
On December 5, 2023, the court sentenced defendant to fifteen years
imprisonment subject to the parole disqualifier and supervision requirements of
NERA.
Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY THAT WENT TO THE HEART OF [DEFENDANT]'S INVOLUNATRY INTOXICATION DEFENSE DEPRIVED HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL.
A. The Trial Court's Decision Barring Any Expert Testimony On [Defendant]'s State Of Mind At The Time Of The Offense Deprived Him Of A Fair Trial.
B. The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Testimony Regarding The Side Effects Of The Combination Of Benzodiazepines And Opioids Deprived [Defendant] Of A Fair Trial.
A-3766-23 7 POINT II THE STATE ELICITED INADMISSABLE LAY OPINION TESTIMONY FROM THE [PHARMACY] STORE MANAGER REGARDING WHAT THE SURVEILLANCE SHOWED, WHICH IMPERMISSIBLY BOSTERED THE STATE'S THEORY THAT [DEFENDANT] COMMITTED A ROBBERY.
POINT III THE COURT'S STATEMENT THAT [DEFENDANT] COULD BE IMEPACHED WITH ALL OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS WAS CONTRARY TO RULE 609(B) AND COULD HAVE PREVENTED [DEFENDANT] FROM TESTIFYING ON HIS OWN BEHALF, THUS DEPRIVING HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT IV THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED [DEFENDANT] DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT V RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE: A) SENTENCING [DEFENDANT] TO AN EXTENDED TERM AS A PERSISTENT OFFENDER VIOLATED HIS FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS: AND B) THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR THE SENTENCE IMPOSED.
A. Sentencing [Defendant] To An Extended Term As A Persistent Offender Violated His Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
A-3766-23 8 B. The Trial Court Failed to Explain The Reasons For The Sentence Imposed.
Having reviewed the record and governing law, we reverse defendant's
conviction for two reasons. First, the trial court erred by barring any opinion
testimony from the hospital treating physicians. Second, the trial court erred in
advising defendant that any of his prior convictions could be used to impeach
him if he decided to testify. Moreover, these errors were cumulative and, in
combination, deprived defendant of a fair trial.
II.
A. Expert Opinion
We first address defendant's argument that the trial court erred by
excluding the treating physician's opinion about defendant's condition on the
date of the incident or thereafter thus depriving him of a fair trial. Defendant
also contends that the court unduly restricted his treating physician's testimony
on the central element of the offense—his mens rea—and those improper
limitations undermined defendant's involuntary intoxication defense.
We begin our analysis with the governing legal principles for the
admission of expert testimony and lay opinion. The admissibility of expert
testimony is a matter left to the trial court's sound discretion. Townsend v.
Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015). We will not "substitute [our] own judgment for
A-3766-23 9 that of the trial court, unless the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark that
a manifest denial of justice resulted." State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)
(quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (last citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). "A trial court's 'discretion is abused when relevant
evidence offered by the defense and necessary for a fair trial is kept from the
jury.'" State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting State v. Cope, 224 N.J.
530, 554-55 (2016)).
N.J.R.E. 701 provides for the admission of lay opinion testimony:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it:
(a) is rationally based on the witness’ perception; and
(b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or determining a fact in issue.
"[I]n a variety of circumstances, see [Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 582 (2001)],
[] '[a] lay witness may give an opinion on matters of common knowledge and
observation.'" State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 586 (2006) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 294 (1990) (citation omitted)). One such circumstance
arises when a treating physician testifies "regarding the diagnosis and treatment
of a patient." Delvecchio v. Township of Bridgewater, 224 N.J. 559, 563 (2016)
(citing Stigliano v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 140 N.J. 305, 314 (1995)).
A-3766-23 10 Under N.J.R.E. 701, treating physicians are permitted to testify about their
"observations, diagnosis and treatment" even when they are not testifying as
expert witnesses. Delvecchio, 224 N.J. at 578. A treating physician who
testifies regarding "their observations, diagnosis and treatment" of their patient
is "offering [both] factual evidence and opinion evidence governed by N.J.R.E.
701." Ibid., (quoting Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of
Evidence, cmt. 4 on N.J.R.E. 701 (2015)). As the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized, under certain circumstances, "the characterization of the treating
doctors' testimony as 'fact' or 'opinion' creates an artificial distinction."
Stigliano, 140 N.J. at 314. Indeed, to testify about a patient's diagnosis and
treatment, the doctor's testimony "partakes of both fact and opinion." Ibid.
Therefore, a properly qualified treating physician may be permitted to testify
more as a hybrid fact-expert witness.
At a pretrial hearing on August 16, 2022, the court stated that Dr.
Harrington, or any testifying treating physician, would not be permitted to give
any opinion testimony because defendant had not identified the treating
physicians as experts and no expert report had been submitted. However,
defendant's medical records had been turned over prior to trial.
The court explained:
A-3766-23 11 They can testify as to . . . why they gave him the drug. They can testify as to how the drug affected him, from their observations. But they're not going to opine about what those drugs could do; you understand?
In the August 24, 2022 order, the court barred "[a]ll expert testimony," and
limited the medical testimony to "defendant's hospital records and any known
side effects of the prescribed medications."
At the outset of Dr. Harrington's direct testimony, the court reiterated its
ruling barring any opinion testimony, stating, "[j]ust keep it to the facts, keep
opinion out of it and I don't see any issues." The court further stated that Dr.
Harrington,
[] is purely a fact witness. She's just communicating basically the basics from the medical records as to the length of the visit, what he was there for, what treatment he received.
When counsel asked the doctor to describe flank pain, the court sua sponte
reminded counsel that this is "exactly the type of question you can't ask." The
court limited the questioning to "how [] the flank plain manifest[ed] itself,
according to the records[.]" Counsel was also prohibited from asking Dr.
Harrington to define loin pain. In response to counsel's question, the court
responded:
A-3766-23 12 No, you shouldn't be doing that. Her opinion as to what loin pain is may be different from some other doctor's opinion as to loin pain.
The court erred in unduly restricting the doctor's testimony in this manner. Dr.
Harrington, as a treating physician, could properly testify concerning
defendant's diagnosis and treatment during his hospitalization. Such testimony
may include opinion testimony in the form of an explanation of the presenting
complaints and diagnosis. Stigliano, 140 N.J. at 314 (A treating physician may
testify about the cause of a patient's disease or injury and that testimony, while
factual, may be in the form of opinion).
The court further erred by prohibiting Dr. Harrington from testifying
regarding the side effects of "any particular drug" and "whether or not [the
doctor] think[s] that [a person] . . . could have suffered from" those side effects.
The court explained further that any testifying doctor could only "testify to . . .
any side effect that they actually observed." Initially, the court permitted Dr.
Harrington to testify as to the "side effects of benzos and opioids," but later, the
court sustained an objection when asked if these medications "can [] also impair
a person's judgment[.]" The court then ruled that Dr. Harrington could only
testify as to any "published side effects," stating she could only "refer to those
side effects that are identified by the manufacturer."
A-3766-23 13 During the trial, Dr. Harrington testified to the medications defendant
received on September 29, noting that the last medication was given to him at
4:58 p.m. Those medications included opioids as well as benzodiazepines.
When asked on direct if she believed defendant was "not medically fit to be
discharged at that time she saw him" on September 29, the court initially
sustained an objection to this question. However, the court permitted Dr.
Harrington to read from the medical records in the addendum, which noted that
defendant was not fit to be discharged.
These conflicting limitations unduly constrained defendant's treating
physician from testifying regarding his diagnosis and the treatment he received,
which included both narcotic and non-narcotic medications. Subject to
discovery requirements, which may include a summary of an expert's findings,
Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I), a treating physician may offer "testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences" provided the testimony is "rationally based on the
perception of the witness" and "will assist in understanding the witness'
testimony or in determining a fact in issue." Delvecchio, 224 N.J. at 576-77
(quoting N.J.R.E. 701).
Here, Dr. Harrington's testimony, including her testimony concerning
defendant's chief complaint of flank pain and diagnosis of loin syndrome and
A-3766-23 14 the medications prescribed to treat his pain, was well within the scope of
N.J.R.E. 701. Said another way, Dr. Harrington's opinion testimony, which the
court prohibited, was rationally based on her perceptions as defendant's treating
physician and would have assisted the jury in understanding her testimony and
determining whether defendant had the requisite mens rea to commit the offense
charged. In restricting the doctor's testimony in this fashion, the court
misapplied its discretion thereby effectively preventing defendant from
asserting the intoxication defense.
B. The Use of Defendant's Prior Convictions
We turn next to defendant's argument that the court erred when it
incorrectly advised him that he could be impeached with any of his prior
convictions. Defendant contends the court's misstatement was contrary to
N.J.R.E. 609, "could have impacted [defendant's] decision to testify," and
because the case hinged on his state of mind, "the court's error was clearly
capable of producing [an] unjust result." Defendant avers that had the court
engaged in the proper Rule 609(b) analysis, "none of [his] prior convictions
would have been admissible to impeach him."
N.J.R.E. 609 governs the use of prior convictions to impeach the
credibility of a witness. The rule provides that "the witness's conviction of a
A-3766-23 15 crime, subject to Rule 403, shall be admitted unless excluded by the court
pursuant to paragraph (b) of this rule." N.J.R.E. 609 (b)(1):
provides that if, at the time of trial, over [ten] years have passed since the conviction or the witness's release from confinement for that conviction, whichever is later, the conviction 'is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof.
[State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333, 368 (2023).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court "declared that '[t]he key to exclusion is
remoteness' but also noted that '[r]emoteness cannot ordinarily be determined
by the passage of time alone.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (citing State v.
Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978)).
In making an admissibility determination under N.J.R.E. 609(b), the court
first conducts a Sands/Brunson hearing. Ibid. (citing Sands, 76 N.J. 127; State
v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377 (1993)). Under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2), a court may
consider:
(i) whether there are intervening convictions for crimes or offenses, and if so, the number, nature, and seriousness of those crimes or offenses,
(ii) whether the conviction involved a crime of dishonesty, lack of veracity or fraud,
(iii) how remote the conviction is in time, [and]
A-3766-23 16 (iv) the seriousness of the crime.
"The court must then engage in the weighing process under [N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1)],
to determine whether the State has carried its burden of proving that evidence
of the remote conviction would not be more prejudicial than probative." State
v. Hedgespeth (Hedgespeth I), 464 N.J. Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 2020)
(quoting State v. R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. 261, 270 (App. Div. 2018)).
We use an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's decision
to admit a defendant's prior convictions. Higgs, 253 N.J. at 367 (citing State v.
Hedgespeth (Hedgespeth II), 249 N.J. 234, 250 (2021)). However, "we do not
defer to a ruling that is based on a mistaken interpretation of an evidence rule,
or that misapplies the rule." Hedgespeth I, 464 N.J. Super. at 430 (quoting
R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 266).
On the first day of trial, defendant raised the issue of using a prior
conviction for impeachment purposes against one of the State's witnesses. In
addressing this, albeit different, issue, the court noted that "if [] [d]efendant is
going to testify, there will have to be a [Sands/Brunson][1] [hearing]."
Then, as the State's case came to a close, the court questioned defendant
regarding his right to testify:
1 Sands, 76 N.J. at 127; Brunson, 132 N.J. at 377. A-3766-23 17 THE COURT: We're reaching the end of the State's case and in a few minutes when they rest, it will be the defense's or your opportunity to present evidence to the jury in this case. Do you understand, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Part of that is the potential that you would testify in this case. Do you understand?
THE COURT: Okay. Now, if [] the decision of whether you testify or not is completely your own. You do it in consultation with your attorney. You understand, sir?
THE COURT: Now, if [] you have the right to not testify and so if you decide not to testify, there's another decision you have to make, which I'm going to go over with you in a minute.
Now, if you do decide that you're going to testify, you should understand that the Prosecutor will be permitted to explore in front of the jury any prior offenses for which you have been convicted. Do you understand, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay? That's something you could consider in making your determination. I'm sure you'll have those conversations with your attorney. And they may consider your prior convictions as being on your credibility, along with other – all other factors on credibility.
A-3766-23 18 And I will instruct them that they cannot consider your prior convictions as evidence of predisposition to commit an offense. Do you understand, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: (No audible response)
THE COURT: They can only do it for the purposes of credibility; all right?
[(Emphasis added).]
Defendant did not request a ruling on the admissibility of his prior
convictions, nor did the court conduct a Sands/Brunson hearing on whether his
prior convictions would be admitted if he chose to testify. The State contends
that "the issue of [defendant's] prior convictions' admissibility simply never
came up," and nothing in the record indicates that defendant would have
testified. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that all of defendant's eleven prior
convictions were over ten years old. Therefore, under Rule 609(b)(1), those
convictions would have been admissible "only if the court determine[d] that
[their] probative value outweigh[ed] [their] prejudicial effect, with the
proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof." N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1)
(emphasis added); see also Higgs, 253 N.J. at 368-71. In other words, the rule
"creates a presumption that a conviction more remote than ten years is
inadmissible for impeachment purposes, unless the State carries the burden of
A-3766-23 19 proving 'that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.'" Hedgespeth
I, 464 N.J. Super. at 431 (quoting R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 266-67). The court
did not explain nor undertake this analysis, but rather, misadvised defendant by
oversimplifying this important consideration.
The State argues that this alleged error should be reviewed under the plain
error standard because defendant did not object to the court's incorrect
statement. We are not persuaded by this argument. The trial court's statement
was clearly erroneous, and while impactful, it was not a formal ruling likely to
prompt an objection for purposes of invoking the plain error standard of review.
The State further contends that at sentencing, defendant stated he did not
remember that evening except for "some officers all around me, waking me up
off the ground." Thus, defendant could not have refuted the robbery nor
explained his state of mind; and any error relative to the court's misstatement
was harmless.
The trial court mistakenly advised defendant that any of his convictions
would be used to impeach his credibility if he decided to testify. Thereafter,
defendant elected not to testify. The court's statement was a misreading of
N.J.R.E. 609(b) and our case law regarding the admissibility of prior
convictions. See Sands 76 N.J. at 127; Brunson, 132 N.J. at 377; Hedgepath,
A-3766-23 20 249 N.J. at 234; Higgs, 253 N.J. at 333. Defendant's most recent conviction for
fourth-degree joyriding dated back to 2011, for which he was sentenced to
eighteen months incarceration. Before that, defendant was convicted in 2008 ,
for third-degree conspiracy to possess CDS and was sentenced to one-year
probation. At the time of defendant's trial in 2022, his most recent convictions
were eleven and fourteen years ago.
This case hinged on defendant's culpable mental state. The key disputed
issue at trial was whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant acted purposefully or knowingly, that is, that he harbored the mental
culpable state required to convict for robbery. Defendant does not contest that
he entered the pharmacy and stole money from the cashier. He claims, however,
that due to his involuntary intoxication stemming from the various narcotics he
received while hospitalized, he did not act purposefully or knowingly. Said
differently, defendant contended that he was intoxicated by prescription
medications "so as [] not [to] know the nature of and quality of what he was
doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was
wrong, and that the intoxication was not self-induced."
During his motion for a new trial, defendant contended that when he was
arrested following the incident, he was woken up off the ground by the officers.
A-3766-23 21 The State, however, did not offer the officer's body-cam video. Thus,
defendant's testimony regarding his lack of memory except for being woken up
by the officers, may have "influenced the outcome" of defendant's trial on the
issue of intent. See R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 271; (citing R. 2:10-2; State v.
Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 483-84 (2017); State v. Murphy, 412 N.J. Super. 553, 561
(App. Div. 2010)). As our Supreme Court has explained, the "[e]xclusion of
testimony, however, which is central to a defendant's claim or defense, 'if
otherwise admissible, cannot be held to be harmless error.'" Scott, 229 N.J. at
484 (2017) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202-03 (1984)).
"Ordinarily, we review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion." R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 266. However, "a ruling based on
mistaken interpretation of an evidence rule, or that misapplies the rule" is not
entitled to such deference. Ibid.
Although the trial court did not make a formal "ruling" on the use of
defendant's prior convictions, it misadvised defendant on an important
consideration in balancing the benefits and risks of his decision whether or not
to testify on his own behalf. The trial court erred by generalizing the use of
defendant's remote convictions in such a manner that it neglected to explain the
robust analysis that must be undertaken to "determine whether the State ha[d]
A-3766-23 22 carried its burden of proving that evidence of remote conviction would not be
more prejudicial than probative." Id. at 270 (citing N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1)).
By advising defendant that the State could use any of his prior convictions
against him for impeachment purposes if he elected to testify, the court
oversimplified the required Sands/Brunson analysis. The court's truncated
explanation of the use of his prior convictions may have chilled defendant's right
to testify, or at a minimum, improperly influenced his decision not to testify. In
this context, we cannot conclude that the court's erroneous statement was
harmless error.
C. Cumulative Effect of the Errors
"[I]f the combined effect of multiple errors deprives a party of a fair trial,
an appellate court should order a new trial." State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 29
(2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167, 191
(2016) (citation omitted)). If there is a strong probability that the combination
of errors resulted in an unfair trial, "cast[ing] sufficient doubt on a verdict," a
new trial is warranted. Torres, 225 N.J. at 191, (quoting State v. Jenewicz, 193
N.J. 440, 473 (2008)).
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors,
including Kinzel's improper narration of the surveillance footage depicting
A-3766-23 23 defendant as planning the robbery, weakened his involuntary intoxication
defense, and deprived him of a fair trial.
When faced with the decision whether or not to testify, defendant had
already been prejudiced by the court's preclusion of any opinion testimony from
his treating physician. That error was then compounded by the trial court's
erroneous statement concerning the State's use of any of defendant's prior
convictions. The court's oversimplification of the Sands/Brunson analysis may
have had a direct impact on defendant's decision not to testify, and his testimony
may have provided important evidence in support of his involuntary intoxication
defense.
We hold that these errors in combination struck at the heart of defendant's
defense, undermining his involuntary intoxication defense. The court's error in
precluding any opinion testimony from defendant's treating physician combined
with its misstatement regarding the use of his remote convictions are sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt about the fairness of defendant's trial. We are
satisfied that these errors demonstrate that defendant should receive a new trial.
Consequently, we reverse defendant's conviction. Given this holding, we
need not address defendant's remaining alleged trial error that the pharmacy
store manager gave improper lay opinion testimony regarding the surveillance
A-3766-23 24 footage. Nor do we need to reach the sentencing issue. This matter is remanded
for a new trial or further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3766-23 25