NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0120-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REGINALD W. ROACH, a/k/a REGINALD W. HOLMES,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted October 21, 2025 – Decided December 8, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 01-01- 0150.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Susan Brody, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Reginald W. Roach appeals the Law Division's August 13,
2024 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm because as PCR Judge Pedro J. Jimenez
determined, the petition was procedurally barred and otherwise lacked merit.
I.
On May 21, 2002, a jury found defendant not guilty of third-degree
burglary, fourth-degree theft by unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-
degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes for offenses occurring on
December 12, 2000. The jury was hung on the charges of third-degree theft by
unlawful taking and first-degree armed robbery.
Almost two years later, on August 6, 2004, defendant pled guilty to third-
degree theft by unlawful taking when the State agreed to dismiss first-degree
armed robbery charge and recommend a time-served sentence with no probation.
During his plea colloquy, defendant admitted to unlawfully taking control of
someone else's car. Defendant said he reviewed the plea form with his counsel,
voluntarily entered the plea agreement, and understood his guilty plea would
result in a criminal record. That same day, defendant was sentenced in
accordance with the plea agreement.
A-0120-24 2 Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. He also did not seek
PCR within five years of his conviction, as prescribed by Rule 3:22-12.
Defendant was convicted again on January 22, 2007, when a jury found
him guilty of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and related offenses
occurring on December 22, 2005. He was sentenced as a persistent offender,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), in part based on his guilty plea for third-degree theft by
unlawful taking and received a forty-year extended sentence. We affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence but remanded for merger of two of his
convictions. State v. Roach, No. A-1890-07 (App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011). The
Supreme Court upheld his conviction as well. State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58
(2014). Defendant unsuccessfully sought PCR petition in connection with the
2007 conviction in 2015 and 2021. State v. Roach, No. A-3252-20 (App. Div.
Oct. 6, 2022).
On August 17, 2023, nineteen years following his third-degree theft by
unlawful taking conviction, defendant filed a PCR petition alleging the
conviction should be vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He
contended counsel falsely advised him that his guilty plea for the offense would
not result in a criminal conviction. Defendant asserted that had he known "the
conviction would someday be used by the [S]tate as a predicate offense to
A-0120-24 3 impose an extended term on a subsequent conviction," he "would not have
accepted the plea and would have proceeded to trial for a second time." Further,
defendant alleged counsel was ineffective because counsel did not advise him
of his right to file for PCR, and failed to ensure that the factual basis for his plea
was provided under oath, in accordance with a recent change to Rule 3:9-2,
which became effective less than a month after his plea. 1 Defendant contended
his PCR claim should not be time-barred under Rule 3:22-12 for being filed
more than five years after his theft by unlawful conviction because the delay
was due to excusable neglect and enforcing the time bar would result in a
fundamental injustice.
Judge Jimenez rejected defendant's contentions and denied his petition
without an evidentiary hearing. The judge noted that defendant waited over
nineteen years to file his petition and held that defendant did not "allege any
facts amounting to excusable neglect that may preclude proper application of
[Rule] 3:22-12(a)." The judge also held that because Rule 3:9-2's amendment
1 Rule 3:9-2's requirement that pleas be taken "under oath or by affirmation" did not become effective until September 1, 2004. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, History and Analysis of Rule Amendments to R. 3:9- 2, ¶ 7.8, www.gannlaw.com (2024); see also, Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee 2002–2004 Term, 10–12 (Jan. 23, 2004) [hereinafter CPC Report].
A-0120-24 4 requiring pleas to be taken under oath did not become effective until after
defendant's plea, counsel did not "perform in a constitutionally deficient manner
under the Strickland 2 standard by failing to insist that [defendant] be placed
under oath prior to his plea."
Even putting aside the petition's time deficiency, the judge found no merit
to defendant's claims. The judge held that, even if counsel failed to notify
defendant of his right to file a PCR petition, Rule 3:21-4, which requires a
sentencing court to notify defendants of the time limit to file PCR petitions, did
not come into effect until more than five years after defendant's conviction.
Moreover, the judge found that the plea form clearly informed defendant that a
plea would result in a criminal record, and that defendant acknowledged
understanding the consequences of his plea. Accordingly, the judge, citing State
v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012), determined the record did not support
defendant's claim that "but for his [counsel's] allegedly deficient performance,
[defendant] 'would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.'"
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
A-0120-24 5 On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING A PROCEDURAL BAR.
POINT II
THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN REJECTING THE ARGUMENT THAT TRIAL COUNSEL HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN PROVIDING ERRONEOUS LEGAL ADVICE AND IN FAILING TO ENSURE THAT [DEFENDANT] GIVE HIS FACTUAL BASIS UNDER OATH.
After considering these arguments and applicable law, we affirm substantially
for the thoughtful reasons expressed by Judge Jimenez in his written decision.
Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief comments.
Defendant's contention that the five-year period to file for PCR should be
relaxed because of excusable neglect and to prevent a fundamental injustice, as
allowed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A), is not supported by the record. He asserts
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0120-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REGINALD W. ROACH, a/k/a REGINALD W. HOLMES,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted October 21, 2025 – Decided December 8, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 01-01- 0150.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Susan Brody, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Reginald W. Roach appeals the Law Division's August 13,
2024 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm because as PCR Judge Pedro J. Jimenez
determined, the petition was procedurally barred and otherwise lacked merit.
I.
On May 21, 2002, a jury found defendant not guilty of third-degree
burglary, fourth-degree theft by unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-
degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes for offenses occurring on
December 12, 2000. The jury was hung on the charges of third-degree theft by
unlawful taking and first-degree armed robbery.
Almost two years later, on August 6, 2004, defendant pled guilty to third-
degree theft by unlawful taking when the State agreed to dismiss first-degree
armed robbery charge and recommend a time-served sentence with no probation.
During his plea colloquy, defendant admitted to unlawfully taking control of
someone else's car. Defendant said he reviewed the plea form with his counsel,
voluntarily entered the plea agreement, and understood his guilty plea would
result in a criminal record. That same day, defendant was sentenced in
accordance with the plea agreement.
A-0120-24 2 Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. He also did not seek
PCR within five years of his conviction, as prescribed by Rule 3:22-12.
Defendant was convicted again on January 22, 2007, when a jury found
him guilty of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and related offenses
occurring on December 22, 2005. He was sentenced as a persistent offender,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), in part based on his guilty plea for third-degree theft by
unlawful taking and received a forty-year extended sentence. We affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence but remanded for merger of two of his
convictions. State v. Roach, No. A-1890-07 (App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011). The
Supreme Court upheld his conviction as well. State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58
(2014). Defendant unsuccessfully sought PCR petition in connection with the
2007 conviction in 2015 and 2021. State v. Roach, No. A-3252-20 (App. Div.
Oct. 6, 2022).
On August 17, 2023, nineteen years following his third-degree theft by
unlawful taking conviction, defendant filed a PCR petition alleging the
conviction should be vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He
contended counsel falsely advised him that his guilty plea for the offense would
not result in a criminal conviction. Defendant asserted that had he known "the
conviction would someday be used by the [S]tate as a predicate offense to
A-0120-24 3 impose an extended term on a subsequent conviction," he "would not have
accepted the plea and would have proceeded to trial for a second time." Further,
defendant alleged counsel was ineffective because counsel did not advise him
of his right to file for PCR, and failed to ensure that the factual basis for his plea
was provided under oath, in accordance with a recent change to Rule 3:9-2,
which became effective less than a month after his plea. 1 Defendant contended
his PCR claim should not be time-barred under Rule 3:22-12 for being filed
more than five years after his theft by unlawful conviction because the delay
was due to excusable neglect and enforcing the time bar would result in a
fundamental injustice.
Judge Jimenez rejected defendant's contentions and denied his petition
without an evidentiary hearing. The judge noted that defendant waited over
nineteen years to file his petition and held that defendant did not "allege any
facts amounting to excusable neglect that may preclude proper application of
[Rule] 3:22-12(a)." The judge also held that because Rule 3:9-2's amendment
1 Rule 3:9-2's requirement that pleas be taken "under oath or by affirmation" did not become effective until September 1, 2004. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, History and Analysis of Rule Amendments to R. 3:9- 2, ¶ 7.8, www.gannlaw.com (2024); see also, Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee 2002–2004 Term, 10–12 (Jan. 23, 2004) [hereinafter CPC Report].
A-0120-24 4 requiring pleas to be taken under oath did not become effective until after
defendant's plea, counsel did not "perform in a constitutionally deficient manner
under the Strickland 2 standard by failing to insist that [defendant] be placed
under oath prior to his plea."
Even putting aside the petition's time deficiency, the judge found no merit
to defendant's claims. The judge held that, even if counsel failed to notify
defendant of his right to file a PCR petition, Rule 3:21-4, which requires a
sentencing court to notify defendants of the time limit to file PCR petitions, did
not come into effect until more than five years after defendant's conviction.
Moreover, the judge found that the plea form clearly informed defendant that a
plea would result in a criminal record, and that defendant acknowledged
understanding the consequences of his plea. Accordingly, the judge, citing State
v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012), determined the record did not support
defendant's claim that "but for his [counsel's] allegedly deficient performance,
[defendant] 'would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.'"
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
A-0120-24 5 On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING A PROCEDURAL BAR.
POINT II
THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN REJECTING THE ARGUMENT THAT TRIAL COUNSEL HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN PROVIDING ERRONEOUS LEGAL ADVICE AND IN FAILING TO ENSURE THAT [DEFENDANT] GIVE HIS FACTUAL BASIS UNDER OATH.
After considering these arguments and applicable law, we affirm substantially
for the thoughtful reasons expressed by Judge Jimenez in his written decision.
Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief comments.
Defendant's contention that the five-year period to file for PCR should be
relaxed because of excusable neglect and to prevent a fundamental injustice, as
allowed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A), is not supported by the record. He asserts
no facts demonstrating an extenuating reason to wait nineteen years after his
2004 conviction for theft by unlawful taking to file for PCR to vacate the
offense. Defendant's bare allegations do not warrant relaxation of the time bar.
State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 594 (2002) (citing State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J.
A-0120-24 6 565, 580 (1992)). The lack of excusable neglect is further highlighted by the
fact that defendant filed a PCR petition in connection with his 2007 conviction
in 2015 and 2021 but did not file a PCR petition related to his 2004 conviction
until 2023.
Moreover, there is no fundamental injustice in denying defendant PCR,
since his 2004 conviction was not the sole basis for his persistent offender
sentence; defendant's sentence could have been extended due to prior third - and
second-degree convictions. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).
As for the merits of defendant's claim, his trial counsel was under no
obligation to inform defendant that his guilty plea could result in an enhanced
sentence if he was convicted of a subsequent offense. See State v. Howard, 110
N.J. 113, 122 (1988) (citing State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J. Super. 617, 622 (App.
Div. 1986)); State v. Wilkerson, 321 N.J. Super. 219, 227 (App. Div. 1999)
(holding that "the fact that [the defendant's] defense attorneys did not advise
[him] of possible or even potential enhancement consequences . . . [was] not
ineffective assistance of counsel"). Although a defendant has the right not to be
"misinformed . . . as to a material element of a plea negotiation, which [he] has
relied thereon in entering his plea," ibid. (quoting State v. Nichols, 71 N.J. 358,
361 (1976)), there is no evidence that trial counsel misinformed defendant about
A-0120-24 7 the consequences of his plea. Defendant's bald assertion of being misinformed
by trial counsel nineteen years ago is insufficient. More telling, defendant's plea
form acknowledged that a guilty plea would result in a criminal record and that
there were no "promises or representations made by . . . the defense attorney ."
As to defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to ensure his factual basis
was provided under oath, it is well established that "[i]n analyzing trial counsel's
performance, [reviewing courts] are required to examine the law as it stood at
the time of counsel's actions, not as it subsequently developed." State v. Fisher,
156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384
(1986)); accord Goodwin, 173 N.J. at 597–98. There is no dispute that at the
time of his plea, Rule 3:9-2 did not require defendant to be placed under oath
for his plea colloquy. Furthermore, the CPC Report recommending the
amendment to require defendants to be placed under oath before providing a
factual basis for a guilty plea explicitly stated:
The Committee was of the opinion that under the amended rule, the inadvertent failure to place the defendant under oath would not affect the validity of the guilty plea . . . . [T]he Committee was of the opinion that the amended rule should be made prospective only to avoid any attack on guilty pleas that were entered without placing the defendant under oath, even if the case was pending on direct appeal.
[CPC Report at 10–11.]
A-0120-24 8 Consequently, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for not
ensuring defendant's plea colloquy was made under oath.
Affirmed.
A-0120-24 9