State of New Jersey v. Odeanne S. Lawes

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 2, 2025
• Docket: A-0478-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0478-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ODEANNE S. LAWES,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________

Argued March 11, 2025 – Decided April 2, 2025

Before Judges Gilson, Firko, and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 23-05-0614.

Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Monica do Outeiro, of counsel and on the brief).

Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Alyssa Aiello, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

On leave granted, the State appeals from an order suppressing evidence of

a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) seized by law enforcement pursuant to

defendant Odeanne Lawes's consent to search his motor vehicle after a lawful

traffic stop. After a review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we

conclude that given the totality of the circumstances, detectives had a reasonable

suspicion defendant had committed a crime, possession of a CDS, to justify a

request for consent to conduct a warrantless search his vehicle. We, therefore,

reverse the September 20, 2024 order granting defendant's suppression motion,

vacate the stay, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

We glean the relevant facts from the testimony of New Jersey State Police

(NJSP) Detectives Derek Jenkins and Joshua Bernard during the two-day

evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. On November 28, 2021,

detectives from the NJSP Drug Trafficking Unit (DTU) learned from a

confidential informant (CI) that defendant had allegedly been selling CDS—

"cocaine, heroin, and pills" in Ocean County because the CI claimed he

previously purchased heroin from defendant. The CI provided information

about defendant: his phone number; his employment at a restaurant in Brick

A-0478-24 2 Township; and a description of his vehicle, a 2015 black Audi with New York

license plates. The CI also told detectives how defendant obtained the drugs.

According to the CI, "[defendant drove] to a source in [New York City] to pick

up his large quantities of drugs when he [traveled][,] . . . he [used] his black

Audi . . . to make the trip."

The detectives corroborated defendant's telephone number and the

vehicle's registration to defendant. When shown a photograph of defendant by

detectives, the CI confirmed defendant's identity as the "right suspect." The

detectives then determined the CI was "credible and reliable." Further

investigation revealed where defendant was employed or was a part owner of

the Caribbean restaurant in Brick Township.

During the week of November 28, 2021, detectives surveilled defendant

and his vehicle in the restaurant's parking lot. On a single night, detectives

observed defendant engage in what "appeared to be [] narcotics transaction[s]"

with two separate vehicles that had "pulled up" into the parking lot. Each time

defendant exited the restaurant's rear door, retrieved "something from inside his

vehicle" parked in the parking lot, approached the other vehicles, and

"interact[ed]" with the occupants. Detectives did not see any "hand-to-hand"

transactions because the observations were made at night, and the detectives

A-0478-24 3 were located in the "dark" in the rear of the parking lot. Based on their training

and experience, each interaction "appeared to be a narcotics transaction"

because "multiple things" were given to defendant, money transactions were

"perceived," and "an item was thrown into the passenger seat of the vehicles

before the vehicle departed by [defendant]."

Also, during that same week, detective saw the Audi driven by another

person pickup defendant from the rear of the restaurant. Defendant locked the

back door and got in the rear passenger seat. Defendant's vehicle traveled from

the restaurant in Brick to an automotive garage in Toms River. The vehicle

drove into the garage and a "short time" later, defendant exited the garage and

drove to Jackson. Defendant traveled through neighborhoods and took "multiple

turns" and "alternate paths that weren't the most fast or the fastest or the most

direct route."

Detectives applied for and obtained a thirty-day warrant to place a GPS

tracking device on defendant's car. That warrant was granted on December 9,

2021, and the tracker was installed on defendant's vehicle.

The detectives then had the CI set up a "controlled buy" of CDS with

defendant in the rear of the restaurant. They saw defendant exit the restaurant,

go to his vehicle, "pop" the hood, retrieve a "small item," and enter the

A-0478-24 4 passenger's side of the CI's vehicle. Defendant and the CI interacted for a "few

moments." Defendant exited the CI's vehicle and entered the rear of the

restaurant. The CI exited the parking lot, met with detectives, confirmed the

transaction had occurred with the detectives, and turned over the "suspected

CDS."

On December 17, 2021, detective saw defendant's vehicle leave the

restaurant and tracked it as it traveled directly to and from the Bronx within two-

and-a half hours. Jenkins testified that he found defendant's actions particularly

suspicious because the CI had previously informed the detectives that defendant

would drive to New York to buy CDS. Jenkins testified that based on his

training and experience, "it [is] a common habit where traffickers will go to

source cities to supply the large quantities of drugs, enter the city [,] and then

try to exit before being noticed."

Jenkins notified all members of the DTU that defendant was traveling to

New York. Unable to quickly get close to New York, the detectives were

"staggered" along the Garden State Parkway (GSP) in separate, unmarked

vehicles after learning defendant had departed New York and crossed the

George Washington Bridge at approximately 2:30 p.m. Jenkins, along with two

other detectives, began to follow defendant at mile post 120, Laurence

A-0478-24 5 Harbor/Matawan, on the GSP. Jenkins was approximately a quarter of a mile

ahead of defendant as he traveled south and approached exit 105. Jenkins,

however, did not see whether defendant was driving the vehicle.

Bernard testified that he was present during the surveillance of the

restaurant and the controlled buy of the CDS with the CI. He also testified

Jenkins advised the DTU that the GPS tracker monitored defendant's travel from

Brick to the Bronx with a "very quick turnaround[,]" returning to New Jersey.

Bernard drove north on the GSP and positioned his vehicle at mile post 120.

Like Jenkins, Bernard was unable to see if defendant was driving the Audi

because of the tinted windows.

According to Bernard, the Audi drove past his unmarked car traveling

southbound on the GSP around exit 105. Defendant was "erratically" driving—

speeding and slowing down. When the car neared exit 105, defendant was in

"the far[-]left lane," "switch[ed] over two lanes abruptly" to the right without

signaling, "[drove] over a solid white line," and exited the GSP at exit 105

towards Highway 36. Bernard saw a "civilian" vehicle already exiting 105

"slam" on the brakes and "quickly" slow down to avoid a collision.

The "collective" DTU, supervisors and other detectives at the scene,

determined defendant was a "danger on the roadway." Based on Bernard's

A-0478-24 6 proximity to defendant's vehicle and that his vehicle has the "best light package,"

it was decided that Bernard would stop defendant's vehicle. Defendant was

stopped on Highway 36 at the Tinton Falls/Eatontown border. Bernard

positioned his vehicle right behind defendant's vehicle. Another officer stopped

his unmarked vehicle behind Bernard's vehicle. None of the detectives' vehicles

were equipped with a motor vehicle recorder. Nor were the detectives wearing

body-worn cameras because it was not standard operating procedure at that time.

Bernard, in plain clothes, approached defendant's vehicle on the

passenger's side. After identifying himself as a NJSP officer, Bernard asked

defendant for his driving credentials. Defendant complied, which enabled

Bernard to identify defendant as the suspect in their investigation. Defendant

was told he was stopped for his "erratic driving," his "careless speed," "not using

his signals," and for almost causing a motor vehicle accident as he exited the

GSP. Bernard described defendant's demeanor as "nervous" and not making eye

contact "at all" during the interaction.

When defendant was asked where he was coming from, he replied: "New

York." When asked what he was doing in New York, defendant stated that he

went to New York to pick up beef patties. Bernard followed with further

questions why defendant would travel to New York for beef patties when there

A-0478-24 7 was a Restaurant Depot minutes away from their motor vehicle stop. Defendant

then became "agitated." At that point, Bernard read defendant his Miranda1

rights from a Miranda waiver card. Defendant stated that he understood those

rights.

Defendant then offered to show Bernard the beef patties in his vehicle. In

response to defendant's offer, Bernard asked defendant for consent to search his

vehicle before Bernard looked in his vehicle. Bernard pulled out the NJSP

consent to search form from his vest pocket. When defendant said "yes" that he

would grant consent, Bernard asked defendant to step out of his vehicle.

While standing in front of his vehicle with defendant, Bernard completed

the NJSP consent form and reviewed it with him. Defendant "looked [the form]

over," confirmed that he understood the form, and signed the form. The consent

form permitted detectives to conduct a "complete search" of the Audi, which

included "any bags, containers, trunk, and engine compartment." The form

noted the search began at 4:11 p.m. and ended at 4:45 p.m.

Thereafter, another detective conducted a search of defendant's vehicle

and found cocaine in the engine compartment. Defendant was arrested and taken

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

A-0478-24 8 into custody. He was charged with and subsequently indicted for first-degree

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1), and

third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1).

Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine seized from his vehicle. After

hearing the testimony from Jenkins and Bernard and the parties' arguments, the

trial court issued a written opinion on September 10, 2024, granting defendant's

motion to suppress. The court credited the detectives' testimony regarding the

traffic stop but nonetheless concluded that the cocaine had been unlawfully

seized in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In doing so, the

court found "[d]efendant was detained due to the officers' reasonable suspicion

that the [d]efendant had violated laws regarding the operation of a motor

vehicle." Relying on State v. Carty, the court explained the first prong was not

satisfied—a request for consent to search made during a motor vehicle stop be

supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant

motorist . . . has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity." 170

N.J. 632, 647 (2002). The court further explained: "Given the totality of the

circumstances, the [detectives'] request to search the vehicle was not based on

information obtained during the motor vehicle stop." This appeal followed.

A-0478-24 9 II.

On appeal, the States argues the trial court's suppression order should be

reversed. The State contends the trial court limited its factual analysis to only

those facts following the motor vehicle infractions observed by the detectives

and failed to conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis, thereby

misapplying Carty.

Our review of a motion to suppress is deferential. State v. Nyema, 249

N.J. 509, 526 (2022). "When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny

a suppression motion, appellate courts '[ordinarily] defer to the factual findings

of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence

in the record.'" State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164 (2023) (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017)). "Those findings warrant

particular deference when they are 'substantially influenced by [the trial judge's]

opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case,

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440

(2013) (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J.

574, 594-95 (2020); see also State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).

Factual findings "should be overturned 'only if they are so clearly

mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State

A-0478-24 10 v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 426 (2017) (State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)).

"A . . . court's legal conclusions, however, and its view of 'the consequences that

flow from established facts,' are reviewed de novo." Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526-27

(citing State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).

The parties do not dispute the lawfulness of the traffic stop based on

defendant's "erratic" driving and motor vehicle infractions. Accordingly, we

focus our analysis on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a

reasonable and articulable suspicion existed at the time defendant provided the

consent to search his vehicle.

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution equally guarantee '[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 532 (alteration in

original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 7). During a

motor vehicle stop due to a traffic violation, "[a]uthority for the seizure ends

when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed." Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). To prolong

the stop "beyond the time required to complete the stop's mission," an officer

A-0478-24 11 must possess an "articulable reasonable suspicion independent from the reason

for the traffic stop." Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 540.

In Carty, our Supreme Court established the reasonable and articulable

suspicion standard governing consent searches of vehicles. The Court

explained:

consent searches following a lawful stop of a motor vehicle should not be deemed valid . . . unless there is reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist or passenger has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity. In other words, . . . unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional.

[170 N.J. at 647.]

The Court further explained the reasonable suspicion requirement has the

"prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop

into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop." Ibid.

Reasonable suspicion is defined as "a particularized and objective basis

for suspecting [a] person stopped of criminal activity." State v. Pineiro, 181

N.J. 13, 22 (2004) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)). "There

must be 'some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about

to be engaged in criminal activity.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (citation and

A-0478-24 12 internal quotation marks omitted). "Although reasonable suspicion is a less

demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either "inarticulate hunches" nor

an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's

constitutionally guaranteed rights.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 399

(2022) (quoting Stovall, 170 N.J. at 372 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part)).

Thus, a reviewing court must consider "the totality of the circumstances—

the whole picture" when determining whether reasonable suspicion existed at

the time of the traffic stop. State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554 (2019) (quoting

Stovall, 170 N.J. at 361). It "must not engage in a 'divide-and-conquer' analysis

by looking at each fact in isolation." Id. at 555 (citation omitted). Additionally,

the reasonable suspicion inquiry weighs the officers' background and training

that permits them "'to draw on their own experience and specialized training to

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information

available to them that "might well elude an untrained person."'" Ibid. (quoting

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

In considering the lawfulness of the consent search here, the trial court

found Bernard's request for consent to search defendant's vehicle ran "afoul" of

defendant's rights. The court also found that the first prong in Carty had not

A-0478-24 13 been satisfied because the consent request was not based on information

obtained during the traffic stop given the totality of the circumstances. We hold

the court erred in reaching that legal determination.

We defer to the factual findings made by the trial court accrediting the

detectives' testimony regarding the basis for the traffic stop. However, we

disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion finding the totality of the

circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that

defendant had engaged in criminal behavior under Carty. We conclude

Bernard's request for defendant's consent to search the vehicle was based on a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had engaged in criminal

wrongdoing.

In reaching that conclusion, we consider together all of these facts in the

record concerning defendant's: (1) suspected activity as a dealer of CDS in the

Brick Township area; (2) participation in and the detectives' observations of two

separate suspected drug transactions in the rear of the restaurant parking lot; (3)

alternate routes taken by the Audi between Brick and Toms River; (4) actions

providing probable cause for the GPS tracking device; (5) sale of CDS to the CI

in a controlled buy; (6) "quick turnaround" travel from Brick to the Bronx in

two-and-and one-half hours; (7) erratic driving on the GSP; (8) near collision

A-0478-24 14 with another vehicle when abruptly exiting the GSP; (9) nervousness and

inability to maintain eye contact when interacting with Bernard; and (10)

agitation when questioned about traveling to New York to purchase beef patties.

The detectives' testimony established a link between defendant, his vehicle, the

suspected drug activity in New York, as well as defendant's actions and

responses during the traffic stop. Thus, Bernard's reasonable and articulable

suspicion and request for defendant's consent to search the vehicle was based on

objective "cumulative factors in a totality of [the] circumstances." Elders, 192

N.J. at 250.

Having reviewed the record and considered the totality of the

circumstances, we conclude both detectives provided a timeline and context for

the investigation, surveillance, GPS tracking, and defendant's consent to search

request. We further conclude the trial court mistakenly focused only on facts

learned after the vehicle stop. The totality of the of the circumstances can

include, and in this case should have included, facts already know to the police

officers. See Stovall, 170 N.J. at 357 (explaining that the reasonable suspicion

analysis involves a consideration of "the events which occurred leading up to

the stop").

A-0478-24 15 Accordingly, we reverse the order granting defendant's suppression

motion and direct that the trial court enter an order denying the motion to

suppress. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We

also vacate the stay of the trial court proceedings pending this appeal.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-0478-24 16