State of New Jersey v. Michael J. Figueroa

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: February 1, 2024
• Docket: A-1649-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1649-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL J. FIGUEROA, a/k/a MICHAEL FIGUEROA,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Argued January 9, 2024 – Decided February 1, 2024

Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 21-07-0552.

Zachary Gilbert Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Zachary Gilbert Markarian, of counsel and on the briefs).

Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Robert J. Carroll, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney; Tiffany M. Russo, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a motor

vehicle stop, defendant Michael J. Figueroa pleaded guilty to second-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). Defendant appeals,

claiming the motion judge erred in denying his motion. Based upon our review

of the parties' arguments, the record, and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

I.

During the evening of February 21, 2021, Florham Park Police

Department Patrol Officer Christopher Heredia was in his stationary vehicle on

Columbia Turnpike when he observed a white van traveling eastbound in the

left lane. Heredia observed the driver, later identified as defendant, "decrease

his speed" and the van's "front bumper dip pretty harshly." When the van passed

Heredia, from approximately 150 feet away, he noticed the driver appeared

"very rigid" at the wheel and estimated the vehicle was traveling "below the

speed limit." There were few vehicles on the road. Heredia followed the vehicle

upon observing "there was some sort of flapping where the license plate would

be," and "[t]here was no illumination on the license plate at the time." Defendant

continued in the left lane at a decreased speed, which caused at least one car to

pass in the right lane.

A-1649-22 2 Heredia followed defendant approximately "a mile or two up the road" for

"maybe a minute or two." He paced behind the vehicle and ascertained

defendant was driving approximately thirty-five miles per hour, which was

substantially below the fifty-mile-per-hour speed limit. He determined the

speed by "set[ting] the cruise control on [his] vehicle." Once close to the

vehicle, Heredia could read the license plate with patrol car headlights

illuminating it. Heredia followed defendant to an intersection, where he turned

left and then "turned into the McDonald's parking lot." Heredia then activated

his emergency lights and mobile vehicle recorder (MVR) and effectuated a

motor vehicle stop.

A backup police officer arrived at the scene. As Heredia requested

defendant's documents, he smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle

and, in plain view, observed "burnt marijuana cigarettes, or roaches" in an

ashtray in "the radio console area." Heredia requested a Sergeant respond to the

stop. Defendant relayed he was a security guard coming from Newark and was

going to McDonald's. Heredia commented it did not appear defendant was

coming from Newark, and defendant clarified he "went the wrong way." After

verifying defendant's information, Heredia asked him to exit the vehicle. Since

defendant identified himself as a security guard, Heredia asked if he had "any

A-1649-22 3 guns," and defendant responded "Yeah. No." Heredia advised defendant he

smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and asked whether there was

"anything else illegal." 1 Defendant volunteered a small bag of marijuana from

his pocket and admitted he was smoking marijuana just before the stop. A search

under the driver's side seat yielded a loaded nine-millimeter Smith and Wesson

handgun.

The officers placed defendant under arrest and provided his Miranda2

rights. Defendant received motor vehicle summonses for: maintenance of

lamps, N.J.S.A. 39:3-66; delaying traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-56; and traffic on

marked lanes, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(a).

A Union County grand jury indicted defendant on charges of second-

degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree

1 On February 22, 2021, the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, came into effect, stating, "the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis" cannot "constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c(a). However, at the time defendant's motor vehicle was stopped, "New Jersey courts . . . recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitute[d] probable cause 'that a criminal offense had been committed and that additional contraband might be present.'" State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 516-17 (2003)). 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-1649-22 4 unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); and second-

degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence challenging the motor vehicle

stop. Defendant argued Heredia did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion

to initiate the stop; therefore, the subsequent search and seizure was unlawful.

At a one-day suppression hearing, Heredia and defendant testified. After

argument, the motion judge issued an oral decision and entered an order denying

the suppression motion, finding the State demonstrated a reasonable articulable

suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. The judge also denied defendant's

reconsideration motion. Thereafter, in accordance with a plea agreement,

defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), and was sentenced to forty-two months with a forty-

two-month period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6(c).

On appeal defendant raises the following points:

POINT I

THE MOTOR VEHICLE CODE UNAMBIGOUSLY PERMITTED FIGUEROA TO DRIVE IN THE LEFT LANE IN PREPARATION FOR A LEFT TURN AND ILLUMINATE HIS LICENSE PLATE WITH TWO WORKING TAIL LAMPS AND ONE LAMP ABOVE HIS LICENSE PLATE.

A-1649-22 5 A. N.J.S.A 39:4-88[(a)] and 39:4-123 Authorized Figueroa's Driving in the Left Lane in Preparation for a Left Turn.

B. N.J.S.A 39:3-61 Authorized Figueroa to Drive With Two Working Taillights and One Separate Lamp Illuminating His License Plate.

II.

"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smart, 253 N.J.

156, 164 (2023) (quoting State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022)). "A lawful

roadside stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure under both the Federal and

New Jersey Constitutions." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017). It is

well established, "[l]aw enforcement officers 'may stop motor vehicles where

they have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation

has occurred.'" State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 2009)

(quoting State v. Murphy, 238 N.J. Super. 546, 553 (App. Div. 1990)). "To

establish reasonable suspicion, 'the officer must be able to point to specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,

reasonably warrant' the suspicion." State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 315

(App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 21 (2004)). "To justify

A-1649-22 6 a stop, an 'officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver

. . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation' or some other offense." State v.

Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 524 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)). The State bears the burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that a motor vehicle stop is supported by a

reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver is committing a motor vehicle

violation. See State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 446 (2018).

In determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the

judge must consider "the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture."

State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 431 (2014). Further, "[t]he State need not prove

that the suspected motor vehicle violation has in fact occurred." Barrow, 408

N.J. Super. at 518 (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999)). Rather,

"[c]onstitutional precedent requires only reasonableness on the part of the

police, not legal perfection. Therefore, the State need prove only that the police

lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict the driver of the motor -vehicle

offense." State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994).

Our review of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is

limited. We "must defer to the factual findings of the trial court on a motion to

suppress so long as its findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in

A-1649-22 7 the record." State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 297 (2023). We "defer[] to those

findings in recognition of the trial court's 'opportunity to hear and see the

witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot

enjoy.'" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244

(2007)). "Our deference to a trial court's findings of fact is not limited only to

those based on live testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing," as we a lso

give deference to the "court's fact finding based on its review of video and

documentary evidence." State v. Nieves, 476 N.J. Super. 405, 418-19 (App.

Div. 2023). "The governing principle, then, is that '[a] trial court's findings

should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of

justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540,

551-52 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15

(2009)). By contrast, we review de novo "a trial court's interpretation of the

law" and the legal "consequences that flow from established facts." Gamble,

218 N.J. at 425.

III.

Defendant's contention that the judge erroneously found Heredia validly

stopped defendant's vehicle, based on a reasonable articulable suspicion

defendant committed motor vehicle violations, is without merit. Sufficient

A-1649-22 8 credible evidence in the record supports the judge's finding that Heredia lawfully

stopped defendant for delaying traffic and improper license plate illumination.

We reject defendant's argument the judge erred in finding a reasonable

articulable suspicion existed under N.J.S.A. 39:4-56, delaying traffic. The

statute provides: "No person shall drive or conduct a vehicle in such condition,

so constructed or so loaded, as to be likely to cause delay in traffic." N.J.S.A.

39:4-56. As the title and the plain language of the statute clearly indicate, the

statute provides a person shall not drive a vehicle in a manner to cause a delay.

"If the text of a law is clear, the 'court's task is complete.'" Carter, 247 N.J. at

513 (quoting State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596, 613 (2021)).

The judge found Heredia had lawfully stopped defendant's vehicle

because "[h]e reasonably believed that defendant violated [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-56."

Specifically, the judge found Heredia's observations credible that the van's

"bumper dip[ped] harshly," and at least one vehicle in the left lane "had to move

into the right lane to pass . . . defendant" because he was estimated to be

traveling at least "[fifteen] miles per hour below the speed limit" for

"approximately one mile." We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments that

N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(a) and N.J.S.A. 39:4-123 precluded Heredia from reasonably

perceiving his reduced driving speed for approximately a mile was a delaying

A-1649-22 9 traffic violation. "Based on the facts alleged in the testimony," the judge

concluded Heredia was "credible and that he testified truthfully to the best of

his knowledge." The judge's finding that Heredia had a reasonable articulable

suspicion is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

Further, defendant's contention that the State conceded N.J.S.A. 39:4-

97.1, which states "[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed

as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except

when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law,"

would have been a more appropriate summons is not dispositive.

We reject defendant's argument that the judge "did not rule on whether

[the] police had a reasonable suspicion" defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:3 -66

because the record demonstrates otherwise. N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 requires "all

lamps, reflectors, and other illuminating devices . . . be kept clean and in good

working order." Relatedly, N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) requires a motor vehicle "be

equipped with adequate license plate illumination." Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3 -

61(k), an illuminated license plate "will be deemed . . . adequate when either a

tail lamp or a separate lamp is so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a

white light the rear license plate on a vehicle and render it clearly legible from

a distance of 50 feet to the rear." (Emphasis added). In his findings, the judge

A-1649-22 10 elucidated Heredia testified to observing "the rear license plate bulbs not

functioning," and that the license plate was flapping. The judge further found

Heredia credible on cross-examination when Heredia acknowledged in viewing

the MVR recording that it appeared only one license plate light bulb was not

working.

Heredia testified he "had to be very close to the vehicle in order to read

[the] license plate" and was only able to see the plate when he was approximately

ten feet away because the patrol vehicle's "headlights were illuminating the

license plate." The judge noted Heredia stated to defendant "your license plate

lamps [wer]en't illuminating," and inquired if he knew "they [were] not

working." In reviewing the testimony, the judge noted defendant's testimony

that the admitted photographs taken after his arrest depicted an operable "left

light bulb," and that the "license plate light [bulb] above the last two characters

. . . [wa]s not illuminated."

In finding a reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop based on the

suspected license plate illumination violation, the judge correctly rejected

defendant's argument that suppression was warranted because Heredia

committed a mistake of law in interpreting the unambiguous provisions in

N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. The judge found "[i]n this case[,] clearly the officer testified

A-1649-22 11 that the license plate was not illuminated for him to see," and there was no

"mistake of law." In finding the facts distinguishable from State v. Sutherland,

231 N.J. 429 (2018), the judge additionally noted the different statutory

applications. He observed Sutherland involved vehicle "lighting," but "[wa]s

certainly different than a finding of a violation of this statute." The judge

correctly observed the determination of whether the testimony "would support

the finding of fact . . . that there was a violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:3 -66 . . . [wa]s

not before [the c]ourt." Indeed, we observe the long-standing principle that the

State does not have the burden to prove the suspected violation occurred at the

suppression hearing. See Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. at 518.

We defer to the judge's finding that Heredia was "a credible witness"

based on his responsiveness in "answer[ing] questions," "not want[ing] to

estimate," and "calm" demeanor. See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526. Sufficient

credible evidence in the record supports the judge's conclusion that "the totality

of the circumstances led to the reasonable suspicion of the motor vehicle stop."

We discern no reason to disturb the judge's well-reasoned decision.

Any arguments presented by defendant we have not addressed are without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-1649-22 12