State of New Jersey v. Johnny Santiago

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3983-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHNNY SANTIAGO,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________

Argued February 25, 2026 – Decided March 10, 2026

Before Judges Gummer and Jacobs.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 23-09-1922.

Frank J. Ducoat, Deputy Chief Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and on the briefs).

Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Michael Denny, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

The State appeals from a July 11, 2025 order suppressing defendant's

recorded statement to police, concluding his waiver of Miranda rights was not

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.1 We affirm.

I.

On June 29, 2023, police conducted a welfare check on Oscar Escobar at

his apartment. Escobar's wife, who was out of the country and unable to reach

him by phone, requested the check.

Officers entered the apartment and found Escobar deceased on the floor,

shoeless, with a knife lodged in the left side of his neck. A broken bottle lay

nearby, and blood was smeared on the walls. Members of the Essex County

Prosecutor's Office Crime Scene Unit photographed bloody sneaker prints at the

scene. Investigators determined that several items were missing from the

apartment, including Escobar's television, a shopping cart, a shopping bag, and

his cell phone. An autopsy concluded Escobar had died from blunt force trauma

and ligature strangulation. The cause of death was determined to be homicide.

Building surveillance footage showed an individual, later identified by

witnesses as defendant, entering the apartment complex, where defendant also

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-3983-24 2 lived, on June 27, 2023, at approximately 9:49 a.m. The footage showed

defendant leaving the building at approximately 10:09 a.m., while pushing a

shopping cart containing a television, sneakers, and other items.

On July 6, 2023, defendant reported to probation, where officers detained

him pursuant to a search warrant issued by a Superior Court judge. Detectives

transported him to the Essex County Prosecutor's Office, where they video

recorded execution of the search, seizing defendant's clothing, including his

black sneakers. Investigators determined the soles of the sneakers matched the

bloody shoeprints found at the homicide scene.

Later that afternoon, Detectives Michael DePrimio and Xavier Valentin

outfitted defendant with a jumpsuit to replace his clothing. They informed him

he had been charged with murder, felony murder, burglary, and possession of a

weapon for an unlawful purpose. 2 Defendant said he understood the charges.

At approximately 3:00 p.m., Detective DePrimio advised defendant of his

Miranda rights, reading from a Miranda form. Defendant acknowledged he

understood his rights but refused to sign or initial the form.

2 Defendant was later indicted for two counts of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2), 2C:11-3(b)(4)(g); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). A-3983-24 3 Detective DePrimio asked defendant to read a written acknowledgment of

his rights, first inquiring whether defendant could read and write English.

Defendant said he could and that he had obtained his GED after reaching twelfth

grade. However, defendant said he could not read the acknowledgment portion

of the form because without his eyeglasses it was "blurry." Detective DePrimio

proceeded to read aloud the following:

I have been advised, and I have read the statement of my rights shown above. I understand what my rights are, and I am willing to answer questions and make a statement. I do not want a lawyer at this time, but understand that I may have one at any time I so desire. I also understand that I may stop answering questions at any time. I understand and know what I [am] doing. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure of any kind has been used against me.

The detective then asked defendant whether he understood "all this" and

"everything," referring to the form. Defendant responded, "yeah, yeah."

In the interrogation that followed, detectives provided defendant with

food and water. Defendant acknowledged the sneakers he wore to the

interrogation were the same pair he wore on June 27. Although he denied guilt,

defendant identified himself in still images taken from the surveillance video,

including images showing him pushing the shopping cart with the television.

A-3983-24 4 At 4:27 p.m., detectives stated on video that the interview had concluded.

However, they continued speaking with defendant on the recording. During this

exchange, detectives noticed defendant appeared unwell. Defendant stated he

was "dope sick." Detectives told defendant they wanted to show him "one more

thing" and that they would call EMS. They then asked, "do you want us to not

show you?"

Between 4:37 p.m. and 4:55 p.m., detectives swabbed defendant for DNA

and escorted him from the room for fingerprinting. When EMS personnel

arrived, the interrogation room's equipment continued to record. Defendant told

personnel he was experiencing heroin withdrawal symptoms, including body

pain and nausea. One medic asked defendant if he "threw up." Defendant

responded, "twice," "right before" detectives brought him into the interrogation

room.

The State indicated its intention to introduce defendant's recorded

statement at trial pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b). A N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing was

held on April 24, 2025, where defendant's recorded statement was played in

open court. Detective DiPrimio was the sole witness to testify. 3 Counsel filed

3 On the date of testimony, Detective DiPrimio gave his rank as sergeant, assigned to the financial crimes unit of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office.

A-3983-24 5 written submissions; however, there is no transcript in the record to reflect

whether oral argument was held.

The motion judge issued an order dated July 11, 2025, with a fourteen-

page statement of reasons denying the State's application. In her decision, the

judge noted both sides had conceded defendant was subject to a custodial

interrogation and Miranda applied. She found Detective DiPrimio's testimony

credible. However, in considering the totality of the circumstances, the judge

concluded the State had not met its burden to show defendant's Miranda rights

waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. In

particular, the judge found questionable whether defendant "was of sufficient

clear mind to understand the Miranda waiver."

In support of this conclusion, the judge cited four instances at the start of

interrogation where defendant stated variations of, "I'm not signing no papers."

The judge also noted defendant did not have his eyeglasses available to read the

form. Accordingly, the judge found,

[f]rom the record it is unclear if the defendant understood his Miranda rights and what he meant with his express refusal to sign the Miranda waiver form. If defendant's statements refusing to sign the Miranda

Throughout the hearing, he was referred to interchangeably as sergeant and detective. For ease of reference and comprehension, he is referred to as detective in this opinion. A-3983-24 6 waiver form were interpreted as a vague acquiescence, Det[ective] DiPrimio should have followed up with a clarifying question, as required under State v. Rivas, 251 N.J. 132 (2022)[,] to determine whether the defendant made a Miranda waiver under the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard articulated in State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512 (2023). Furthermore, though the defendant possessed sufficient education to read the Miranda waiver, he was physically unable to see the waiver that Det[ective] DiPrimio provided him, as he was missing his glasses and stated as much. This is an additional indication that the defendant did not make a knowing waiver.

Next, the judge found,

defendant was ill. The defendant told EMS he vomited right before his interview with police and showed signs of medical distress during and toward the end of the interview. Even while showing signs of medical distress and after indicating he was dope sick, law enforcement still tried to show him "one more thing" to continue the interview. The detectives did not verify with the defendant whether despite appearing ill, the defendant was of sufficient clear mind to understand the Miranda waiver. As such, considering the totality of the circumstances here, the State has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to giving the subject statement. Accordingly, defendant's statement to police on July 6, 2023 is inadmissible at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(b).

On appeal, the State maintains the motion judge was incorrect to find

defendant's statement that he would not sign any papers was ambiguous or

A-3983-24 7 constituted a "vague acquiescence" requiring clarification. Rather, it maintains

"[e]verything that defendant said and did, when viewed as a whole, indicated a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver." In support of its position, the State

highlights these portions of the interrogation:

DET. DIPRIMO: . . . if you're not willing to sign do you still want to proceed and talk?

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah.

DET. DIPRIMIO: . . . Do you want to proceed forward?

DET. DIPRIMIO: Okay. So you understand all this, but you just don't -- you don't want to sign.

[DEFENDANT]: I'm not signing nothing.

DET. DIPRIMIO: Okay. So I'm going to sign. You . . . so you understand everything? [Are] there any questions?

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah. I'm not -- I'm not signing nothing.

DET. DIPRIMIO: I understand. But do you understand everything?

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah, yeah.

DET. DIPRIMIO: Okay. But you do not want a lawyer at this time?

[DEFENDANT]: No, . . . not at this time, no.

A-3983-24 8 DET. DIPRIMIO: Okay. So --

[DEFENDANT]: We'll -- we'll see. Maybe going down the line. We'll see what happens, bro.

DET. DIPRIMIO: Okay. That's -- that's your right.

[DEFENDANT]: But as of right now -- as of right now, no, I don't want no lawyer.

The State also disputes the motion judge's conclusion that defendant's

illness casts reasonable doubt as to whether he knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The State contends there was "no

evidence" to support defendant's claims of illness as defendant did not testify at

the Miranda hearing. It further argues that "even if true, this one fact does not

outweigh the totality of the circumstances supporting a knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent waiver."

II.

"Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings in support

of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. S.S., 229

N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). This

is because the trial court has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and

to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v.

A-3983-24 9 Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161

(1964)). "Thus, appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's

determination is so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand

intervention and correction." Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).

"A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences

that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. " Ibid.

(citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010); Manalapan Realty v. Twp.

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). "Therefore, a trial court's

legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid. (citing Gandhi, 201 N.J. at 176).

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held law enforcement must

advise a suspect in custodial interrogation: (1) of his "right to remain silent";

(2) "that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law"; (3) "that

he has the right to the presence of an attorney"; (4) "that if he cannot afford an

attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires";

and (5) that he can exercise his rights at any time during the interrogation. 384

U.S. at 479.

"[A] defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 444. Waiver

A-3983-24 10 may be express or implied and is determined by considering the totality of the

circumstances. State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019). Courts may consider,

among other things, a defendant's intelligence, age, education, familiarity with

the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, drug and alcohol

problems, language barriers, and time lapse between the reading of Miranda

rights and the incriminating statement. Id. at 317 (first citing 46 Geo. L.J. Ann.

Rev. Crim. Proc. 3, 230-33 (2017) (footnotes omitted); and then citing State v.

A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019)).

"[W]hen 'determining the validity of a Miranda waiver,' trial courts must

decide 'whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the

consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so

if he wished.'" A.M., 237 N.J. at 397 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383,

402 (2009)). "Accordingly, 'a valid waiver does not require that an individual

be informed of all information useful in making his decision.'" Id. at 398

(quoting Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 407). Neither does Miranda "require that 'the

police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self -

interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights' because 'the

additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not

its essentially voluntary and knowing nature.'" Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 407

A-3983-24 11 (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1987)).

"Instead, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver is determined by

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation based

on the fact-based assessments of the trial court." A.M., 237 N.J. at 398. See

State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 468-70 (2005) (holding the defendant's waiver

was valid because he freely gave an incriminating murder-related statement to

police, considering he attended college for a year, was informed of his rights

several times, was familiar with the criminal justice system, and did not request

an attorney at any time); State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51, 64 (App. Div.

1994) (holding the defendant's waiver was valid despite his refusal to sign a

waiver form because he willingly discussed the matter with law enforcement

and answered their questions). The State bears the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that a defendant's waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently. Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316.

At the outset, we note the motion judge did not find dispositive defendant's

refusal to sign the Miranda waiver form. To do so would have been legal error.

See Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. at 62-63 (holding a suspect's refusal to sign a

written acknowledgment of Miranda warnings "does not preclude a finding of

waiver"); State v. Burno-Taylor, 400 N.J. Super. 581, 603-04 (App. Div. 2008)

A-3983-24 12 (holding a defendant's refusal to sign a waiver form is one factor to be

considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis but "does not

necessarily equate to an assertion of the right to remain silent").

The motion judge, however, found defendant's repeated refusal to sign the

waiver form compelled detectives to seek clarification of defendant's

understanding and intention with respect to waiver. In Rivas, cited by the

motion judge, our Supreme Court held:

Under our state law privilege against self- incrimination, a suspect need not be articulate, clear, or explicit in requesting counsel; any indication of a desire for counsel, however ambiguous, will trigger entitlement to counsel. Thus, if a suspect's words amount to even an ambiguous request for counsel, the questioning must cease, unless the officer makes additional neutral inquiries that clarify that the suspect desires to waive the presence of counsel.

[251 N.J. at 154 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).]

On review of the interrogation recording, we perceive no error in the

judge's determination that defendant's strident refusal to initial the waiver and

sign the acknowledgment of those rights called for deeper clarification rather

than simple repetition of conclusory questions: "[d]o you want to proceed

forward?"; "[b]ut do you understand everything?"; "[b]ut you do not want a

lawyer at this time?" Rather, the detectives were obligated to explore why

A-3983-24 13 defendant refused to sign. They also needed to make clear that by continuing to

speak to them, even though he had refused to sign, defendant would still be

waving his rights.

The judge's findings regarding defendant's illness are also supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record. Granted, the judge did not pointedly

find defendant to be a credible witness and defendant did not testify at the

N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. However, it was within the motion judge's capacity to

assess evidence in the form of defendant's video-recorded statement, giving it

the weight merited within her reasonable discretion, whether or not corroborated

by other evidence in the record. S.S., 229 N.J. at 374 (quoting Gamble, 218 N.J.

at 424).

As cited above, among the factors commonly considered regarding the

validity of a waiver, including, a defendant's "physical and mental condition,

and drug and alcohol problems . . . , [c]ourts may take into account other factors

that are pertinent to a given case." Tillery, 238 N.J. at 317. Thus, it was likewise

within the judge's capacity to extrapolate on defendant's physical condition ,

including onset of illness.

Even were we to disagree with the motion judge's findings, the presence

of even one valid factor would permit the conclusion reached. See State v.

A-3983-24 14 Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 534 (2023) ("the presence of even one of those factors

may permit the conclusion that a confession was involuntary") (quoting State v.

Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 384 (2014)).

Following careful review of the record, we are satisfied the motion judge

relied on sufficient, credible evidence and properly applied valid factors in

concluding the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's

waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Affirmed.

A-3983-24 15