NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0450-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAZMERE HOPPS,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Argued December 12, 2023 – Decided February 9, 2024
Before Judges Haas and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 21-11-3048.
Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Tamar Yael Lerer, of counsel and on the briefs).
Rachel Maureen Lamb, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Kevin Jay Hein, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant Jazmere Hopps
pled guilty to second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b)(1), and was sentenced to a three-year custodial term with a one-year
period of parole ineligibility. He appeals the court's decision denying his
suppression application, raising the following issues for our consideration:
THE POLICE ACTIONS IN THIS CASE WERE BASED ON A TIP FROM A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHOSE RELIABILITY, VERACITY, AND BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE WERE INSUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATED, AND THE TIP WAS INADEQUATELY CORROBORATED. THE EVIDENCE FOUND MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
A. The police unlawfully stopped the car.
B. The police unlawfully ordered the men out of the car and frisked them.
Because we conclude the court erred in determining there was reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The events leading to defendant's arrest were described in detail at the
suppression hearing at which Camden County Police Department (CCPD)
Detective Krispin Jackson testified. Det. Jackson explained he and his partner
were sent to patrol the Parkside neighborhood in south Camden on September
A-0450-22 2 15, 2021, during the daytime shift in response to a tip he received from a
confidential informant (CI) about a possible retaliatory shooting related to an
ongoing feud between individuals in the McGuire Gardens and Parkside
neighborhoods. As detailed further, infra, Det. Jackson never testified
specifically as to when the tip was received, and his two written reports indicated
police were in the area in response to unspecified "recent violence and
shootings."
The CI identified the shooter as a man called "Nunu," who Det. Jackson
testified was later identified as co-defendant Ronald H. Brown. Det. Jackson
characterized the CI as "very reliable," and noted his information had led to five
to ten arrests in the past. One of Det. Jackson's written reports specified the
information "resulted in multiple firearm arrests." Det. Jackson added another
detective had received the same information from a different CI, who he learned
"had been reliable" on "previous occasions." The court later found the testimony
regarding the second CI not credible and did not consider it, in part, because
none of the reports ever mentioned the existence of the second CI.
After receiving the tip, Det. Jackson explained he engaged CCPD's
Strategic Analysis Unit (SAU) Analyst Daniel Bogas to determine "Nunu's"
identity and "known associates." Although the investigation revealed Brown
A-0450-22 3 had never been charged with a firearms offense, Det. Jackson did not testify if
defendant had a criminal record.
Det. Jackson stated he and Analyst Bogas utilized public and law
enforcement databases as well as social media to gather additional information,
which led Analyst Bogas and other SAU members to discover a live video
broadcast on the social media application Instagram by Jaylin Pierson, 1 one of
"Nunu's" purported "associates." Det. Jackson acknowledged he did not observe
the video directly. Instead, Analyst Bogas conveyed to him by radio what the
video detailed in real time. Because the live broadcast was only seconds long,
and the police had not been prepared to record it, Det. Jackson stated CCPD did
not save the video or take a screenshot.
Det. Jackson described the Instagram Live video as depicting five men
inside a car, four of whom he and Analyst Bogas identified as defendant,
Pierson, Brown, and co-defendant Rahkease Seawright. According to Det.
Jackson, "Jaylin Pierson commented on … [the] … video saying, 'we're on the
1100 block . . . [and] if they try to stop us, we're not going to stop,'" which he
understood to mean the car would not stop if police attempted to pull it over.
1 At times, Pierson's name is spelled "Pearson" in the record. We utilize the spelling provided in the police reports and the court's orders. A-0450-22 4 Approximately thirty minutes after learning about the Instagram Live
video, Det. Jackson testified he saw a red Hyundai stopped across the
intersection of Empire Avenue and Park Boulevard. Through the windshield of
the Hyundai, he stated he saw and recognized the five men from the Instagram
Live video based on pictures to him sent by SAU. 2 Det. Jackson testified he also
recognized Seawright from past arrests involving illegal firearms. Det. Jackson
then began to follow the red Hyundai in his unmarked car and requested a
marked patrol car conduct a traffic stop.
Other CCPD officers stopped the red Hyundai near the intersection of
Haddon Avenue and Liberty Street, an area which Det. Jackson described as
"known for a multitude of crimes, violent crimes, [and] CDS[controlled
dangerous substance]-related crimes." After searching the car, the driver, co-
defendant Tyron W. Lee, and each of the passengers, the police seized two
firearms—one from defendant and the second from the vehicle.
Det. Jackson confirmed he wrote two reports, dated September 19, 2021
and March 9, 2022, neither of which stated when the CI's tip was received, or
2 Because Det. Jackson admitted he did not directly observe the Instagram Live video and CCPD was not able to capture screenshots from it, it is unclear how Det. Jackson recognized the men from the video or which pictures SAU sent to him.
A-0450-22 5 that two CIs were involved. He also admitted the tip advised simply that "Nunu"
would be in the Parkside neighborhood, which is where Brown lived. It did not
state: "Nunu" was armed, what clothes he was wearing, how he was traveling,
or the make or model of any vehicle involved. Further, Det. Jackson stated when
he saw the red Hyundai, it was heading in the opposite direction of McGuire
Gardens. He also confirmed neither CI mentioned defendant, that he would be
with "Nunu," or that he was armed, or in any way involved in any prior shooting.
A Camden County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant
with: second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(b)(1); fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d);
second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(b)(1); third-degree possession of parts to manufacture a firearm without a
serial number, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(k); and third-degree possession of a
manufactured firearm without a serial number, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(n).
Defendant moved to suppress, arguing the police did not possess sufficient
grounds to stop the car. After the State filed its opposition and defendant his
reply, the State filed a supplemental brief and disclosed for the first time Det.
Jackson's March 2022 report. That report provided new details about Det.
A-0450-22 6 Jackson's observation of the car turning without properly signaling 3 and the CI's
tip. According to this second report, the CI specifically identified Brown as
"Nunu" and stated he and an individual called "Sav," identified as Rayquan
Newman, "were shooting at each other." Det. Jackson indicated the CI informed
him "Brown would be in the Parkside area of Camden city" but also that "Brown
was going to McGuire Gardens or . . . the 'McGuire boys' were coming to
Parkside to 'shoot it up.'" The report further stated CCPD had been conducting
"undercover surveillance" in Parkside "due to the recent violence, and
shootings," but did not point to any particular, specific event giving rise to
"Nunu's" purported motive to retaliate.
The court granted an adjournment of the suppression hearing over
defendant's objection to permit Det. Jackson to testify. At the close of the
hearing, defendant argued there was insufficient information to justify the stop
because the State had not demonstrated that the tip was reliable, nor that it was
adequately corroborated. Specifically, he claimed Det. Jackson's "simple
conclusory statement" was not enough to show the CI's reliability, the Instagram
3 The State did not rely on this alleged traffic violation to justify the stop in the court or before us and the court made no factual findings regarding the purported motor vehicle infraction. We accordingly do not consider that purported violation as part of our Fourth Amendment analysis. A-0450-22 7 Live video did not corroborate anything regarding the tip, the car was driving
away from McGuire Gardens contrary to the CI's statement, nothing in the tip
"was about anyone other than 'Nunu' who was later identified as . . . Brown,"
and Det. Jackson's claim that a second CI had given consistent information was
not credible because it was "never put in his report[s]" and was "newly added in
testimony today."
In response, the State argued there was sufficient information to stop the
car because the basis for the tip could "be inferred by the details that the CI was
given" and the CI's tip was "corroborated independently by the other CI's
information." Additionally, it asserted the court should credit Det. Jackson's
testimony about the second CI because his previous omission of same in his
reports was based on his attempt to protect the CIs' identities.
The court questioned why Det. Jackson felt "comfortable enough to
identify one CI, and then in his second report call him confidential informant,
but somehow not feel like it was a good idea to use the fact that he had a second
one." The prosecutor responded she would "attribute that to him obviously just
giving lack of information," but noted the second CI's similar tip could be
independently corroborated by another witness. The prosecutor then requested
A-0450-22 8 to reopen and adjourn the hearing to call that witness, to which defendant and
Brown objected. The court declined to reopen or adjourn the matter.
The court issued an order denying defendant's application and explained
its decision in a written opinion. It found Det. Jackson's testimony about the
first CI's reliability credible, but the testimony about the second CI limited in
trustworthiness because the second CI was "not previously included in the prior
[police] reports" and the testimony was "layered in hearsay."
In finding a sufficient basis to stop the car, the court explained "[a]n
investigatory stop is justified when the police have particularized suspicion,"
under State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545 (2019). Relying upon State v. Coles,
218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014), the court noted particularized suspicion requires
"articulable facts," more than "arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective
good faith, or a mere hunch," but reliable and corroborated information from a
CI can provide the basis for an investigatory stop under State v. Smith, 155 N.J.
83, 92 (1998).
To determine a CI's reliability, the court continued, it looks to the totality
of the circumstances, particularly the CI's "veracity" and "basis of knowledge ,"
under Smith, 155 N.J. at 93. Relying on State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 110-11
(1998), the court explained a "strong showing" on one factor, or "other indicia
A-0450-22 9 of reliability" can outweigh a shortcoming in either factor. As to veracity, the
court noted "past instances of reliability are probative," but not conclusive, and
their weight may vary in the overall calculus under Smith, 155 N.J. at 94. The
court next explained the CI's basis of knowledge may be discerned from details
and the nature of the tip itself, ibid., but independent corroboration by police is
necessary and essential under State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 390 (2004). It also
cited State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127-28 (2002) for the proposition the
level of corroboration required depends on the totality of circumstances.
The court found the CI was reliable, based on Det. Jackson's testimony
the CI had provided information leading to arrests in the past, and the tip was
adequately detailed. Specifically, the court noted the tip included "the name of
the suspect, the means and nature of the crime, the location of the crime, and the
motive for the crime." The court also found CCPD corroborated the tip by
determining the identity of "Nunu," finding Brown's "known associates," and
observing the Instagram Live video with Pierson's comments. Based on the
totality of the circumstances the court concluded the CI's tip demonstrated "a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant Brown would be involved in
a retaliatory shooting" and because Brown was a passenger in the car, "Det[.]
Jackson had a constitutional basis to initiate a motor vehicle stop."
A-0450-22 10 Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing the new facts alleged in
Det. Jackson's supplemental report and testimony at the suppression hearing
were "plainly not credible" and should not have been considered. In any event,
he contended the totality of circumstances did not support the stop because the
CI's tip lacked veracity or a sufficient basis of knowledge.
In opposing reconsideration, the State primarily relied upon its prior
arguments. It argued the tip was adequately corroborated by the Instagram Live
video and Det. Jackson's observations which, combined with the CI's history of
tips leading to arrests in the past, overcame any deficiency in the CI's basis of
knowledge.
The court declined to reconsider its ruling, finding its decision was not
"based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis" nor did it fail to "consider,
or . . . to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence," under
State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 294 (App. Div. 2015). The court
acknowledged the tip provided was not as detailed as those in State v. Keyes,
184 N.J. 541 (2005), Smith, 155 N.J. at 92, or other cases relied upon by
defendant, but noted the basis of knowledge required to establish reasonable
suspicion was less than that necessary to show the probable cause required in
those cases.
A-0450-22 11 The court again rejected defendant's claim the tip was not properly
corroborated. It found Det. Jackson credibly testified he "utilized law
enforcement sources" including "public and law enforcement data bases" to "'put
the alias ["Nunu"] with the name and identification' of defendant Brown"
(alteration in original) and to identify the co[-]defendants as "Nunu's"
"associates." Finally, the court noted the tip, combined with the Instagram Live
video, Det. Jackson's observation of Brown in a vehicle, and the location of that
vehicle, gave police reasonable suspicion that, at a minimum, "the occupants of
the vehicle unlawfully possessed a firearm."
Defendant pled guilty to second-degree possession of a handgun without
a permit in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts against him and an
unrelated indictment. The State also agreed to a Graves Act waiver and to
recommend a downward departure in the sentencing range to that of a third-
degree offense. As noted, the court sentenced defendant to a three-year
custodial sentence with one year of parole ineligibility. This appeal followed.
II.
Defendant contends the court erred in denying his suppression motion
because the police lacked (1) reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which he
was a passenger, (2) a basis for heightened caution to justify removing him from
A-0450-22 12 the car, and (3) a particularized, reasonable suspicion that he was armed and
dangerous to permit frisking him. We agree the record does not establish the
police had reasonable suspicion to stop the Hyundai, mandating suppression of
the subsequent warrantless seizure. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963). As such, we deem it unnecessary to address the underlying facts
and the constitutional propriety of the police officers' subsequent removal of
defendant from the car and his frisk.
The "standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential." State v.
Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022). "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to
suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision
so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "defer[] to those
findings in recognition of the trial court's 'opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy.'" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). We review
"[a] trial court's legal conclusions . . . and its view of 'the consequences that flow
from established facts,' . . . de novo." Id. at 526-27 (quoting State v. Hubbard,
222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).
A-0450-22 13 Turning to the substantive legal principles, warrantless searches and
seizures "are presumptively invalid as contrary to the United States and the New
Jersey Constitutions." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004). If a search or
seizure is conducted without a warrant, "the State bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure falls
within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."
State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Chisum,
236 N.J. at 546).
One such exception is an investigatory stop, which must be "'justified at
its inception' by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity."
State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 276 (2017) (quoting State v. Dickey, 152 N.J.
468, 476 (1998)). A suspicion of criminal activity is reasonable only if it is
based on "some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about
to be engaged in criminal activity." Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22 (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). The reasonable suspicion
standard is "less demanding" than that of probable cause. Nyema, 249 N.J. at
527.
In determining whether the police had reasonable suspicion, a court must
consider the "totality of the circumstances." Ibid. The inquiry "takes into
A-0450-22 14 consideration numerous factors, including officer experience and knowledge."
State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 394, 400 (2022).
"An informant's tip is a factor to be considered when evaluating whether
an investigatory stop is justified." State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 213 (2003).
The reliability of a CI's tip is also analyzed under "the totality of the
circumstances." Zutic, 155 N.J. at 110. "An informant's 'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge' are two highly relevant factors under the totality of the
circumstances." Ibid. (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 93). "A deficiency in one of
those factors 'may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of
a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.'"
Id. at 110-11 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983)).
An informant's veracity may be established by "past instances of
reliability." Smith, 155 N.J. at 93. The Court has cautioned, however, "[a] few
past instances of reliability do not conclusively establish an informant's
reliability." Id. at 93-94. "Similarly, a statement that the police believe the
informant is reliable because [they] 'did a job for [an officer] in the past,' without
additional information, will not firmly establish veracity." Keyes, 184 N.J. at
555 (second alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 96-97).
A-0450-22 15 Further, the basis of an informant's knowledge may be established when
"the tip itself relates expressly or clearly how the informant knows of the
criminal activity." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 213 (2001) (quoting Smith,
155 N.J. at 94). "In the absence of such explicit disclosure, 'the nature and
details revealed in the tip may imply that the informant's knowledge of the
alleged criminal activity is derived from a trustworthy source.'" Ibid. (quoting
Smith, 155 N.J. at 94).
"[I]ndependent corroboration is necessary to ratify the informant's
veracity and validate the truthfulness of the tip." Smith, 155 N.J. at 95. Where
a tip "has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required
to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip
were more reliable." Golotta, 178 N.J. at 213-14 (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J.
at 127-28). Additionally, "without the corroboration of suspicious detail there
can be no inference that defendant was engaged in criminal activity." Zutic, 155
N.J. at 112.
Applying these principles, we are satisfied the State failed to meet its
burden of proof. We agree with defendant the totality of the circumstances did
not support a finding of "a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity," as the CI's unverified tip was entitled to limited weight and nothing
A-0450-22 16 about the remaining circumstances, independently or cumulatively,
corroborated criminal activity. Ibid.
At bottom, the credible evidence in the record fails to establish the
informant's basis of knowledge or "some other indicia of reliability," as required
under Zutic. 155 N.J. at 110-11. Indeed, the tip did not state how the CI became
aware of the alleged shooting and lacked sufficient details to imply the CI "had
knowledge of concealed criminal activity." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 276.
For example, the CI in State v. Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. 552 (2006),
provided detailed information about defendant and the alleged criminal activity,
including his name; address; physical description; the make, model, and license
plate number of his car; the time defendant would leave his home to make a
marijuana delivery; and how he would transport the marijuana. Id. at 561. Even
with such specificity, however, this tip only gave rise to reasonable and
articulable suspicion once corroborated by law enforcement. Ibid.
In contrast to the details provided in Birkenmeier, the tip here is far less
specific. Based on Det. Jackson's testimony at the suppression hearing, all that
was relayed to police was that a man called "Nunu" may be involved in a
retaliatory shooting, and that he "was going to McGuire Gardens or . . . the
'McGuire boys' were coming to Parkside to 'shoot it up.'" The CI did not provide
A-0450-22 17 a description of "Nunu's" appearance, his clothing, his address, the car he would
be in, or any details about the time or specific location of the shooting. The
record also does not indicate specifically when police received the tip, when the
events giving rise to a motive to retaliate occurred, or how much time passed
between receiving the tip and the motor vehicle stop. Such lack of specificity
was insufficient to imply a basis of knowledge. Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 213.
Further, Det. Jackson never explained why he did not inquire further to
obtain additional detail from the CI regarding "Nunu," the underlying events
giving rise to the "retaliatory shooting," or the shooting itself, including when it
was going to occur. Additionally, nothing in the tip mentioned, identified, or
provided any details at all about "Nunu's" "associates." Rather, the CI provided
generalized information that could be characterized as mere "casual rumor[s]
circulating in the underworld," Smith, 155 N.J. at 94, particularly in an area Det.
Jackson testified was "known for a multitude of crimes, violent crimes, [and]
CDS-related crimes." Because the CI failed to provide predictive or "hard to
know" information about "Nunu's" behavior, the State did not meet its burden
in establishing the CI's basis of knowledge. "Without knowing the facts that led
the informant to believe defendant was engaged in illegal activity, we cannot
A-0450-22 18 make an independent determination of whether that conclusion was reasonable."
Id. at 98.
Although Det. Jackson's March 2022 supplemental report stated the CI
specifically identified Brown as "Nunu," Det. Jackson testified at the
suppression hearing, consistent with Analyst Bogas' report, the tip provided the
alias "Nunu," and police used public and law enforcement sources to determine
"Nunu's" true identity was Brown. Likewise, the March 2022 report indicated
"Nunu" and an individual called "Sav" were "shooting at each other," but Det.
Jackson never mentioned "Sav" at the suppression hearing, nor did the court
make specific factual findings as to the reliability of the CI's identification of
"Sav." Further, Det. Jackson never confirmed the accuracy of "Sav's" identity
or his criminality, despite being able to do so with respect to "Nunu" and his
"associates."
In any event, we are convinced those circumstances do not alter our
analysis or conclusion reached. Indeed, the State failed to establish "the tip itself
relate[d] expressly or clearly how" the CI knew Brown's or "Sav's" identities or
their relationship, Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 213 (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 94), or
that "'the nature and details revealed in the tip . . . impl[ied] that the informant's
A-0450-22 19 knowledge . . . is derived from a trustworthy source,'" ibid. (quoting Smith, 155
N.J. at 94).
Even under the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard, Det.
Jackson's and Analyst Bogas' observations were insufficient to "validate the
truthfulness of the tip," Smith, 155 N.J. at 95, or justify the stop. Despite the
court's finding the tip contained "the name of the suspect, the means and nature
of the crime, the location of the crime, and the motive for the crime," unlike the
specific criminal activity police observed in Birkenmeier, here, any
corroboration of the CI's tip was of "purely non-suspicious detail." Zutic, 155
N.J. at 112. Indeed, all police confirmed was "Nunu's" identity, his known
"associates," and that they were in a vehicle together, none of which indicated
criminality or "Nunu's" involvement in a retaliatory shooting.
Further, prior to the stop, police simply observed Brown in a car with four
other men in the neighborhood where he lived. The CI stated nothing about a
car or the involvement of anyone other than "Nunu." Although police identified
defendant and the car's other occupants as "Nunu's" "associates," nothing in the
record explained what that term meant, or how those "associates" were in any
way involved in the purported retaliatory shooting. In fact, what the police did
observe was contrary to the CI's information as reflected in Det. Jackson's March
A-0450-22 20 2022 report. Indeed, rather than heading toward McGuire Gardens to "shoot it
up," the red Hyundai was driving in the opposite direction.
Similarly, the evidence regarding the Instagram Live video failed to
confirm anything about a shooting or "Nunu's" potential involvement. Pierson's
vague statement "if they try to stop us, we're not going to stop" does not
necessarily indicate criminal activity and, in any event, does not validate
anything in the CI's tip to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The video did not reveal any weapons in the vehicle, nor did it suggest the
occupants were involved in a retaliatory shooting, or other criminal activity.
Pierson was not identified by the CI nor does the record show he, or anyone else
in the car aside from "Nunu," was otherwise suspected in the "retaliatory"
shooting, knew the "McGuire boys," or had any motive to retaliate. Not only
could the statement have various innocent explanations, but in fact, the red
Hyundai stopped when signaled and made no attempts to evade police.
Moreover, the record fails to demonstrate the police corroborated any
events giving rise to a retaliatory motive. Det. Jackson failed to obtain from the
CI any details about any shooting that would cause "Nunu" or defendant to
retaliate. The record contains no confirmation that the shooting allegedly
motivating "Nunu" to retaliate ever happened. Even considering the reference
A-0450-22 21 in Det. Jackson's March 2022 report to "recent violence, and shootings" in the
high-crime area of Parkside, there is no explanation, if, or how these shootings
were related to "Nunu" or the purported Parkside-McGuire Gardens feud.
Det. Jackson's observation of the car and men shown in the Instagram Live
video in a high crime area in the Parkside neighborhood was similarly
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Our Supreme Court "has held that
'[j]ust because a location to which police officers are dispatched is a high-crime
area does not mean that the residents in that area have lesser constitutional
protection from random stops.'" Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 399 (quoting Chisum,
236 N.J. at 549). Although "officers need not ignore the relevant characteristics
of a neighborhood, . . . more is required to find reasonable suspicion." Id. at
400-401 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).
We acknowledge the court found credible Det. Jackson's testimony,
including that the CI had provided information leading to five to ten arrests in
the past. Even accepting Det. Jackson's representation in his March 2022 report
that those arrests involved firearms, we are unconvinced this limited information
about CCPD's prior success with this CI is sufficient to overcome the lack of
detail or corroboration of the tip warranting the stop of the vehicle under the
totality of the circumstances.
A-0450-22 22 In light of the failure of the State to establish the basis of knowledge of
the CI's tip and Det. Jackson's observations of solely commonplace behaviors,
we are satisfied the credible evidence in the record demonstrates the stop was
not "'justified at its inception' by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 276. Accordingly, the physical evidence
seized from the stop and the subsequent frisk of defendant must be suppressed.
Id. at 277 (citing State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J. 308, 330 (2012) ("The exclusionary
rule generally bars the State from introducing evidence of the 'fruits' of an illegal
search or seizure.")).
As noted, because we find no proper justification for the investigatory
stop, we do not reach the remaining points on appeal. We reverse the court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We vacate defendant's guilty
plea and conviction and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Because we are concerned that the judge would have a
commitment to his previous view of the evidence, in fairness to the judge and
the parties, we direct that the proceedings on remand occur before a different
judge.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0450-22 23