NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2433-14T31 A-2434-14T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent/ APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION Cross-Appellant, June 24, 2015 v. APPELLATE DIVISION CHARLES PURYEAR,
Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Respondent. ___________________________________________
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARKUS BROWN,
Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________________________
Argued May 11, 2015 – Decided June 24, 2015
Before Judges Sabatino, Leone, and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 12-02-00556, 12-02-00557, and 12-02-00558.
1 These appeals originally calendared back-to-back are consolidated for purposes of this opinion only. James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant/ cross-respondent Charles Puryear (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Smith, of counsel and on the brief).
Andrew R. Burroughs, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (A-2433-14)/appellant (A-2434-14) State of New Jersey (Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Burroughs, of counsel and on the brief).
Deborah C. Collins, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent Markus Brown (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILSON, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
These related interlocutory appeals raise questions
concerning the admissibility of custodial statements given by
co-defendants to law enforcement. Defendant Charles Puryear
(Puryear) and defendant Markus Brown (Brown) were charged with
crimes related to a fatal shooting that took place on November
26, 2011, in Newark, and an armed robbery that took place
several days later in a motel in Sussex County. Each defendant
gave two custodial statements to law enforcement on December 5,
2011. After a hearing, the trial court in Essex County
ultimately suppressed the first statement given by Puryear,
which concerned the robbery in Sussex County, and admitted
2 A-2433-14T3 Puryear's second statement, which concerned the Essex County
shooting. The trial court admitted Brown's first statement,
which concerned the Sussex County robbery, and ultimately
suppressed his second statement, which concerned the shooting in
Essex County.
On these interlocutory appeals, Puryear argues that his
second statement also should have been suppressed, and the State
argues that the trial court erred in suppressing Puryear's first
statement and Brown's second statement. Given the related facts
and procedural history, we issue this consolidated opinion
addressing all of the interlocutory appeals.
Having conducted a thorough review of the record in each
case, and having considered all of the arguments, we affirm the
well-reasoned decision by Judge Michael L. Ravin, and his
companion order, issued on December 17, 2014, which suppressed
one of the statements given by each defendant, but admitted the
other statements.
I.
The State alleges that on November 25, 2011, at
approximately 10:00 p.m., Puryear and Brown approached a group
of people on a street in Newark, New Jersey. Puryear pointed a
.22 caliber handgun at the group, and shouted, "Don't move."
The group of people attempted to run away, and Puryear fired
3 A-2433-14T3 nine shots, hitting and killing one person. Later, nine .22
caliber shell casings were recovered at the scene.
Concerning the Sussex County incident, the State alleges
that on December 4, 2011, Puryear and Brown committed an armed
robbery at the Rolling Hills Motel in Sussex County. A gunshot
was fired during that robbery, and the State Police were
notified. When State troopers arrived, they encountered Brown,
who fled. Following a search, Puryear and Brown were eventually
apprehended in the early morning hours of December 5, 2011, near
the motel.
When defendants were apprehended, they were both arrested
and advised of their Miranda rights.2 Thereafter, defendants
were taken to the State Police barracks. While at the State
Police barracks, each defendant was separately interviewed twice
by law enforcement officers. Puryear was first interviewed by a
State Police detective and a State trooper. That interview
began shortly after 5:00 a.m. on December 5, 2011, and primarily
focused on the alleged robbery at the motel in Sussex County. A
number of hours later, beginning at approximately 5:44 p.m. on
December 5, 2011, Puryear was interviewed by two Essex County
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
4 A-2433-14T3 detectives. That interview primarily focused on the alleged
shooting in Newark.
Brown was first interviewed on December 5, 2011, beginning
at approximately 7:00 a.m., by the same State Police detective
and State trooper who had interviewed Puryear. Several hours
later, beginning at approximately 3:59 p.m. on December 5, 2011,
Brown was interviewed by the same two Essex County detectives
who would later interview Puryear.
At the beginning of all four interviews, the officers
advised each defendant of his Miranda rights and each defendant
signed Miranda waiver forms. The interviews were audio and
video recorded. During each interview, Puryear and Brown made a
number of incriminating statements.
II.
Puryear and Brown were both indicted and charged with a
number of crimes in Essex and Sussex Counties. In Essex County,
they were charged under three different indictments. The
charges against Puryear in Essex County included first-degree
murder, first-degree robbery, and weapons-related offenses. The
charges against Brown in Essex County included first-degree
felony murder, first-degree robbery, and weapons-related
offenses. The charges in Sussex County against both defendants
5 A-2433-14T3 included first-degree robbery, second-degree burglary,
aggravated assault, and weapons-related offenses.
In Essex County, defendants moved to suppress their
statements, and the State moved to admit all four statements.
The State also moved to use portions of those statements that
did not directly relate to the charges in Essex County under
N.J.R.E. 404(b).
The trial court conducted a three-day hearing. During that
hearing, all four law enforcement officers who participated in
the four interviews of defendants testified. The State also
introduced and played at the hearing the audio and video
recordings of each of the four statements. Transcripts of those
statements were also provided to the trial court. The State
also introduced into evidence copies of the Miranda waiver forms
signed by each defendant. Defendants elected not to testify at
the hearing and did not call any witnesses.
III.
The trial court twice addressed the motions to suppress and
admit the statements. Initially, the trial court issued a
written opinion and order, dated September 8, 2014, and ruled
that all four statements were admissible. The court reserved on
the Rule 404(b) portion of the motion, which concerned whether
the portions of the statements that did not directly relate to
6 A-2433-14T3 the Essex County charges could be used as evidence of motive or
intent. The court stated that it would address at trial
limitations and possible redactions under Rule 404(b).
Defendants then moved for reconsideration. On December 17,
2014, the court granted partial reconsideration and issued a
written decision and order. The trial court found that each of
the defendants' Miranda rights had been violated in connection
with one of the statements given by each defendant. The court
also found that the other statement given by each defendant was
admissible.
With regard to Puryear, the trial court ruled that his
first statement was inadmissible. The trial court focused on a
statement made by a State Police detective when Puryear first
came into the interview room. Specifically, the detective told
Puryear that he could not hurt himself by giving the statement,
but he could only help himself:
DET. PAULIS: The only thing you can possibly do here is help yourself out. You cannot get yourself in any more trouble than you're already in. You can only help yourself out here.
So you've been helping yourself out with Trooper Donnelly. I just want to hear what you have to say as far as the explanation as to what happened tonight, all right.
7 A-2433-14T3 After making that statement, the detective then read
Puryear his Miranda rights, and Puryear agreed to speak with the
officers.
The trial court reasoned that the statement by the
detective was incorrect and misleading. The court went on to
reason that the statement by the detective "neutraliz[ed]" the
Miranda warning that Puryear was given immediately after the
detective's statement. The court then found that because of the
detective's incorrect statement, the State had failed to show
that Puryear made a knowing waiver of his Miranda rights.
Turning to Puryear's second statement, given to Essex
County detectives, the trial court ruled that statement was
admissible. The court found that Puryear was correctly advised
of his Miranda rights and that Puryear knowingly, voluntarily
and intelligently waived those rights.
The trial court also considered, but rejected, a number of
other arguments put forth by Puryear. In that regard, the trial
court found that when Puryear asked to speak to the mother of
his child, he was not invoking his right to silence or counsel.
The court also rejected Puryear's contention that his failure to
respond immediately when the detective asked if Puryear wished
to speak was not an invocation of his right to silence. In that
regard, Puryear was twice asked if he wished to speak and he
8 A-2433-14T3 delayed responding for approximately four seconds and seven
seconds. When Puryear did not immediately respond, the
detective reminded Puryear that he had the right not to speak.
Thereafter, Puryear stated that he wished to speak to the
officers. The court also found that Puryear had not been
effectively ordered to sign the Miranda form. Finally, the
court found that Puryear had been properly informed that there
was a warrant out for his arrest.
Concerning the statements given by Brown, the trial court
ruled that Brown's first statement was admissible, but his
second statement was not admissible. The first statement, which
was given to a State Police detective and trooper, concerned the
Sussex County robbery. The court found that the officers
properly advised Brown of his Miranda rights and that Brown
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights and
agreed to speak with the officers. The court noted, however,
that it was reserving "on whether this statement, which concerns
that Sussex County robbery, is admissible [in the Essex County
matters] under N.J.R.E. 404(b)."
As to Brown's second statement, the trial court found that
Brown had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights. Specifically, the court focused on an explanation
provided by an Essex County detective when Brown asked for
9 A-2433-14T3 clarification of what it meant that his statements could be used
against him in a court of law. In response, the detective told
Brown that it meant that if Brown lied, his statement could be
used against him. In that regard, the second recorded interview
of Brown had the following exchange:
DET. MCENROE: Okay. "Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law." You understand number - - number (2)?
MR. BROWN: "Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law." So that means I may have to stand up in their court and say this again.
DET. GONZALEZ: Well, what that's saying is anything you say can be used against you, - -
MR. BROWN: (Indiscernible.)
DET. GONZALEZ: - - meaning if you lie, it can be used against you.
MR. BROWN: (Indiscernible.) Okay.
The court reasoned that the detective's explanation was an
incorrect and misleading explanation of one of the Miranda
warnings. The court then found that the State had not shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown understood all of his
Miranda rights and he had not knowingly waived his rights.
IV.
We granted the State leave to appeal the suppression of
Brown's second statement. We also granted Puryear and the State
10 A-2433-14T3 leave to appeal the rulings concerning Puryear's statements. On
appeal, Puryear makes two arguments:
POINT I
BECAUSE THE AUTHORITIES NEVER WITHDREW OR CORRECTED THE ADVICE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT THAT "YOU CAN ONLY HELP YOURSELF OUT" BY GIVING A STATEMENT, HIS SECOND STATEMENT, MADE ONLY HOURS LATER, ALSO HAD TO BE SUPPRESSED AS NOT KNOWING OR INTELLIGENT.
POINT II
THE STATE FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR DEFENDANT'S CLEAR INDICATION THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO MAKE A STATEMENT UNTIL AFTER HE HAD SPOKEN TO HIS BABY'S MOTHER, THUS VIOLATING HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND OUR STATE CONSTITUTION.
The State argues that the trial court was correct in
initially ruling that both statements by Puryear were admissible
and it erroneously granted Puryear's motion for reconsideration.
With regard to Brown, the State argues that the trial court
erred in suppressing Brown's second statement.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees all persons with the privilege against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, in New Jersey, there is a
common law privilege against self-incrimination, which has been
11 A-2433-14T3 codified in statutes and rules of evidence. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19;
N.J.R.E. 503; State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993).
Accordingly, it has long been established that when a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom
that person is entitled to certain warnings before he or she can
be questioned. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at
1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.
Before any questioning, the defendant must be advised that
she or he has the right to remain silent, that anything she or
he says can be used against her or him in a court of law, that
she or he has the right to have an attorney present during
questioning, and that if she or he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for her or him before any questioning if she
or he so desires. Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d
at 726. These warnings are commonly referred to as "Miranda
warnings."
After receiving Miranda warnings, a suspect may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. Ibid. The State, however, must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a waiver of the Miranda
rights was intelligent, voluntary and knowing. State v.
Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 831, 130
12 A-2433-14T3 S. Ct. 65, 175 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2009); State v. Presha, 163 N.J.
304, 313 (2000); State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993).
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, courts
consider the totality of the circumstances, including the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the questions.
State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005) (citing Galloway,
supra, 133 N.J. at 654). "Relevant factors include the
defendant's age, education, intelligence, advice concerning his
[or her] constitutional rights, [the] length of detention, and
the nature of the questioning." State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 135
(1988) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93
S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)).
If a suspect invokes his or her right to silence or legal
counsel, law enforcement must "scrupulously honor" that
assertion, and all questioning must cease. See Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326, 46 L. Ed. 2d
313, 321 (1975); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-
85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981)
(applying the same standard); State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 624
(2011) (same).
When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to
suppress statements, appellate courts generally defer to the
fact-findings of the trial court when they are supported by
13 A-2433-14T3 sufficient credible evidence in the record. See Nyhammer,
supra, 197 N.J. at 409 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224,
243-44 (2007)); see also State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 603 n.4
(2011) ("As the finding of compliance with Miranda and
voluntariness turned on factual and credibility determinations,
we need only find sufficient credible evidence in the record to
sustain the trial judge's findings and conclusions." (citing
Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 242-44)). Moreover, we defer to a
trial court judge's findings "'which are substantially
influenced by [the judge's] opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing
court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10
(2010) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). When a defendant's
statement is videotaped, however, and "the trial court's factual
findings are based only on its viewing of a recorded
interrogation that is equally available to the appellate court
. . . deference to the trial court's interpretation is not
required." State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 566 (2012). We
review de novo the trial court's legal conclusions that flow
from established facts. See State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 337
(2010).
14 A-2433-14T3 VI.
A.
We first address the trial court's decision to grant
reconsideration. The State argues that the trial court erred in
changing its decision on a motion for reconsideration. We
reject that argument. The court has the discretion and right to
reconsider an interlocutory ruling at any time before the entry
of final judgment in "'the sound discretion of the [] court to
be exercised in the interests of justice.'" See State v.
Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 554 (1999) (quoting Pressler,
Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on R. 1:7-4 (1995), and
noting that there is not an explicit rule for motions for
reconsideration in criminal matters, but holding that such
motions are permitted in criminal matters), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001). See also
State v. Campbell, 436 N.J. Super. 264, 273 (App. Div. 2014)
(explaining that "the court can even reconsider its previous
decision to admit the evidence, if subsequent developments
support such reconsideration" (citing Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.
Super. 374, 384-88 (App. Div. 1996))).
Reconsideration is not to be granted lightly and the
grounds for reconsideration are generally limited. The proper
object of reconsideration is to correct a court's error or
15 A-2433-14T3 oversight. Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App.
Div. 2010). As we have explained, a motion for reconsideration
is
not appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion, but "should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."
[Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).]
See also R. 1:7-4(b) (governing reconsideration of final orders
or judgments); Cummings, supra, 295 N.J. Super. at 384
(explaining the grounds appropriate for reconsidering a final
judgment).
Here, the trial court candidly found that it had failed to
appreciate the significance of the explanation given by the
detective to Brown during his second interview concerning his
second Miranda warning; that second warning being that his
statements could be used against him in a court of law. The
trial court also found that it failed to appreciate the
significance of the introductory statement made by the State
Police detective to Puryear in his first interview advising
Puryear that he could not hurt himself by answering the
16 A-2433-14T3 detective's questions. Given the facts of these interviews, we
find no abuse of discretion and no error by the trial court in
its decision to grant reconsideration.
Indeed, it is entirely appropriate for a judge to
reconsider a prior ruling given the right set of circumstances.
Judges are not infallible. Judges who are willing to admit that
they overlooked competent evidence, or failed to appreciate such
evidence, should be commended because they are doing just what
good judges do in the very limited circumstances where
reconsideration is appropriate. Obviously, that is why there
are rules for reconsideration. See R. 1:7-4(b); R. 4:42-2; R.
4:49-2.
We also will address the court's ultimate substantive
decisions concerning the suppression or admission of each of the
statements given by defendants. Our grant of interlocutory
appeal included appeals from all aspects of the order on
reconsideration.
B.
We turn to the rulings on Brown's second statement. As
already noted, the trial court admitted Brown's first statement,
which principally concerned the Sussex County robbery. Brown
has pled guilty to the charges in Sussex County, and he has not
appealed the decision to admit his first statement. As
17 A-2433-14T3 previously pointed out, when the case is tried in Essex County
the trial judge will address whether and how much of the first
statement can be used under Rule 404(b).
The State appeals the decision to suppress Brown's second
statement, which was given to Essex County detectives and which
concerned the murder in Essex County. Specifically, the State
argues that when Brown's second interview is reviewed in full
context, Brown's inquiry about his second Miranda right - - that
his statements could be used in court - - was really a concern
that Brown did not want to testify in court.3 In other words,
the State argues Brown understood and knowingly waived all his
Miranda rights, including Miranda Right No. 2, but he made it
clear that he did not intend to testify at trial.
The State also argues that Brown had a prior criminal
record and, therefore, he already understood his Miranda rights
because of his prior interactions with the criminal justice
system. See Knight, supra, 183 N.J. at 463 (explaining that it
is relevant to consider a defendant's "previous encounters with
law enforcement" in determining the voluntariness of a
defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights). In addition, the
3 The trial court and the parties have referred to Miranda Right No. 2. Though it might be more accurate to describe that as a warning (that is, the statements can be used in court), for consistency, we will also refer to it as Miranda Right No. 2.
18 A-2433-14T3 State argues that the trial court erred in relying on this
court's decision in State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 268
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 572 (2003).
In Pillar, the defendant's conviction was reversed "due to
the improper admission of a highly incriminating statement made
by [the] defendant to police at the time of his arrest." Id. at
257. The defendant in Pillar was charged with sexually abusing
a child. When questioned by law enforcement, the defendant
invoked his right to have an attorney before providing a
statement. Id. at 262. The defendant then stated that he
wanted to "say something 'off-the-record.'" Ibid. After the
detectives who were interviewing the defendant in Pillar agreed
to listen, the defendant confessed to fondling the minor victim.
This court held "that the statement, made immediately following
administration of Miranda warnings and after an assurance from
an officer that [the] defendant could make a statement 'off-the-
record,' was not only obtained in violation of Miranda but was
involuntary." Id. at 257.
The trial court correctly found that the detective's
explanation of the Miranda Right No. 2 was incorrect. While the
trial court acknowledged that Brown's request for clarification
may have stemmed from a concern about testifying at trial, the
court found that did not change that Brown was given an
19 A-2433-14T3 incorrect explanation of his Miranda Right No. 2. It is the
"responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform
defendants of their rights [] with the proper administration of
Miranda warnings." State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 448 (1992)
(citing State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47 (1968)). "A police
officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his
mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other."
Pillar, supra, 359 N.J. Super. at 268. See also United States
v. Ramirez, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1269-70 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(telling a defendant if he or she did not answer questions "it
would be worse" contradicted the Miranda safeguards).
The trial court also correctly found that the detective's
incorrect explanation of Brown's Miranda rights was not cured by
Brown's prior contact with the criminal justice system. Here,
the State showed only that Brown had been arrested in 2005 and
pled guilty in 2008, but did not offer proof that such prior
experience enabled him to understand his Miranda rights despite
the detective's incorrect explanation of his Miranda Right No.
2. Absent a more specific showing by the State, the trial court
did not err in making such a finding.
The focus of a Miranda analysis should be on whether the
defendant had a clear understanding and comprehension of his or
her Miranda rights based on the totality of the circumstances.
20 A-2433-14T3 Nyhammer, supra, 197 N.J. at 402. Moreover, as already pointed
out, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant's waiver is knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent. The trial court here found that the State had not
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown understood the nature
of his Miranda Right No. 2 and the consequences of waiving that
right. We defer to such "factual findings made by the trial
court[.]" Id. at 409.
Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the
trial court's findings that the State failed to prove that Brown
completely understood all of his Miranda rights are adequately
supported by credible evidence in the record. Moreover, our
independent review of the video of Brown's second interview does
not lead us to a different conclusion. Consequently, the trial
court's decision to suppress Brown's second statement is
affirmed.
C.
We now review the rulings on Puryear's statements. The
State argues that we should reverse the trial court's ruling on
reconsideration, which held that Puryear's first statement
concerning the Sussex County robbery was inadmissible. Puryear
argues that the trial court correctly suppressed his first
statement, but erred in not suppressing his second statement
21 A-2433-14T3 concerning the Essex County murder. We find neither of these
arguments persuasive.
1.
On appeal, the State argues that "there is no credible
evidence that [Puryear] did not understand his Miranda rights."
The trial court, however, ultimately found otherwise. The court
focused on the instruction given by the State Police detective
that Puryear could not hurt himself and could only help himself
by providing a statement. The court found that instruction was
incorrect and directly contradicted the Miranda warning that
anything the suspect says can be used against him in a court of
law. The court then found that the detective's incorrect
explanation of the consequences of giving a statement was not
cured by Puryear's prior contact with the criminal justice
system. Thus, the court found that the State had not carried
its burden of proving that Puryear knowingly waived his Miranda
rights.
The factual findings by the trial court are supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record. The State contends
that "while awkwardly phrased," the detective's instruction
simply informed defendant that the evidence against him was
overwhelming. That characterization of the instruction does not
change the fact that the instruction contradicted a key Miranda
22 A-2433-14T3 warning. Moreover, the instruction by the detective was not a
permissible interrogation technique. See Pillar, supra, 359
N.J. Super. at 268; cf. State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 31,
46 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 (2003) (explaining
that New Jersey courts allow some "trickery" in interrogation
techniques, but do not allow fabrications of evidence). That
the State seeks to admit Puryear's statement against him shows
that Puryear could hurt himself by giving the statement.
The State also points out that in its initial decision
admitting Puryear's first statement, the trial court relied upon
State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978), but on reconsideration it
did not explain how Miller was distinguishable. In Miller, the
Supreme Court held that it was not a violation of Miranda for a
police officer to "[a]ppeal[] to a person's sense of decency and
urg[e] him to tell the truth for his own sake." Miller, supra,
76 N.J. at 405. The Court went on to recognize, however, that
depending on the context, such techniques can move into a
"shadowy area." Id. at 403-04. Consequently, Miller is
distinguishable on the specific facts of this case.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has clarified the fact-sensitive
basis of motions to suppress because in another case, the Court
upheld the suppression of a statement because the defendant was
advised that by answering questions she "would actually benefit"
23 A-2433-14T3 herself. State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 151 (2010). In
A.S., the Court held that advice "contradicted the Miranda
warning provided to [the defendant]: that anything she said in
the interview could be used against her in a court of law."
Ibid. (citing Pillar, supra, 359 N.J. Super. at 268).
In short, it is well-established that the question of
whether Miranda rights are knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waived is a fact-specific analysis. Based on the
specific facts found by the trial court, we find no error in the
court's decision to suppress Puryear's first statement.
2.
We also find no error in the trial court's decision to
admit Puryear's second statement. The second statement was
given several hours after the first statement and primarily
focused on a different crime. Importantly, the second statement
was given to different law enforcement officers, who gave
Puryear fresh Miranda warnings and had Puryear execute a
separate written Miranda waiver form. Thus, the trial court
found that that second statement was given after Puryear
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda
Puryear argues that the second statement was contaminated
by the incorrect instruction given during the first statement.
24 A-2433-14T3 Puryear goes on to assert that his situation is analogous to an
impermissible "question first and warn later" technique. See
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-12, 124 S. Ct. 2601,
2610, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 655 (2004). In Seibert, the police
interrogators adopted an official policy of inducing confessions
prior to providing Miranda warnings and then eliciting the same
confession to the same crime. The United States Supreme Court
stated that such a procedure "render[ed] Miranda warnings
ineffective." Id. at 611, 124 S. Ct. at 2610, 159 L. Ed. 2d at
654. The facts in Seibert are clearly distinguishable.
Moreover, the trial court here found that there was a clear
break between the two separate interviews and that fresh Miranda
warnings cured any problem with the instruction given at the
beginning of the first interview. Again, those fact-findings
are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
Puryear also argues that because he repeatedly asked to
speak with the mother of his child, he was effectively
expressing a desire to remain silent. Puryear, however, told
the detectives that he wanted to tell the mother of his child
that she should move on without him. The trial court reviewed
the video of the interview and found that the request by Puryear
to speak with the mother of his child was not an invocation of
his right to remain silent. Our independent review of the
25 A-2433-14T3 recorded interview supports that same finding. In short,
Puryear's request to speak with the mother of his child was not
an invocation of his right to remain silent. See Diaz-Bridges,
supra, 208 N.J. at 567 (holding that "requests by an adult to
speak with someone other than an attorney . . . do not imply or
suggest that the individual desires to remain silent" (citing
State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 228-32 (1993))).
VII.
In summary, we find no reversible error in the trial
court's decision to suppress Brown's second statement and
suppress Puryear's first statement. We also find no reversible
error in the trial court's decision to admit Puryear's second
statement.
26 A-2433-14T3