NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3118-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
April 4, 2022 v. APPELLATE DIVISION JASON M. O'DONNELL,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Argued March 21, 2022 – Decided April 4, 2022
Before Judges Fisher, DeAlmeida and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 21-02-0011.
Angela Cai, Deputy State Solicitor, argued the cause for appellant (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Jeremy Feigenbaum, State Solicitor, Angela Cai, and Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).
Leo J. Hurley, Jr. argued the cause for respondent (Connell Foley LLP, attorneys; Leo J. Hurley, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, P.J.A.D. N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 imposes criminal liability on "person[s]" who offer or
accept from another "[a]ny benefit as consideration" for, among many things,
the performance of official duties. A grand jury charged defendant Jason M.
O'Donnell with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 based on evidence that, during
his 2018 campaign for the office of Bayonne Mayor, he agreed to accept from
an attorney $10,000 in "street money" in exchange for becoming Bayonne's tax
attorney once defendant was elected. Defendant wasn't elected.
Because he never took office and was never able to perform his part of
this alleged corrupt bargain, defendant moved for a dismissal of the indictment,
claiming N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 does not criminalize an unsuccessful candidate's
acceptance of a bribe. In granting the motion, the trial judge agreed with
defendant's interpretation largely because that is how the statute was interpreted
in United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.N.J. 2012). In rejecting both
the trial judge's decision and the Manzo decision, we conclude N.J.S.A. 2C:27-
2's plain language reveals an intent to render unlawful what defendant is alleged
to have done and that the statute imposes criminal liability on bribe-accepting
but unsuccessful candidates for public office.
The statute's text suggests a broad application. It first lists what constitutes
an unlawful bargain by declaring that bribery occurs when a "person . . . directly
A-3118-20 2 or indirectly offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts
or agrees to accept [a benefit] from another." It then delineates in broad terms
the types of benefits included, such as those offered or accepted for:
a. . . . a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any public election; or
b. . . . a decision, vote, recommendation or exercise of official discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or
c. . . . a violation of an official duty of a public servant or party official; or
d. . . . the performance of official duties.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2].
Subsection (a) criminalizes the purchasing of the votes of public servants, party
officials and voters on "any" public issue or in "any" public election. Subsection
(b) criminalizes the same conduct when its purpose is to obtain a ruling in a
judicial or administrative proceeding. Subsection (c) applies when the unlawful
agreement seeks a public servant's or public official's violation of an official
duty. And subsection (d) criminalizes the offering or accepting of a benefit in
exchange "for the performance of official duties."
A-3118-20 3 To be sure, some of these categories are limited by their expressed terms.
For example, subsections (a) and (c) refer to agreements that seek action or
inaction by a "public servant" or a "party official." A "public servant" is defined
as "any officer or employee of government, including legislators and judges, and
any person participating as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing
a governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses." N.J.S.A.
2C:27-1(g). Who may be a "party official" is broadly defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:27-
1(e).
But other words and phrases undoubtedly reveal the Legislature's intent
that there be no artificial or implicit exceptions from the statute's reach. The
word "any," which appears in numerous instances, evinces an intent to include
all persons or agreements not specifically identified. And the statute's imposition
of criminal liability on "person[s]" – "[a] person is guilty of bribery if . . .,"
N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 – demonstrates a legislative intent that no individual or entity
is exempt from its reach. See N.J.S.A. 1:1-2.1
1 Defining "person" as including "corporations, companies, associations, societies, firms, partnerships and joint stock companies as well as individuals, unless restricted by the context to an individual as distinguished from a corporate entity . . . ." A-3118-20 4 Having expansively expressed the statute's parameters, the Legislature
included additional provisions to further amplify the statute's intended broad
reach. The Legislature did this by negating claims or defenses that might be
anticipated when a person accepts or agrees to accept a bribe even though not
then capable of fulfilling the purchased promise:
It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.]
The obvious import of this paragraph (hereafter the "no-defense provision") is
to explain that it behooves neither party to the corrupt bargain that the person to
be influenced "was not qualified to act in the desired way," just as here defendant
was not qualified to appoint the bribe giver as Bayonne's tax attorney because
defendant never attained the position that would allow him to fulfill the alleged
promise.
All these elements and declarations about what constitutes a bribe and
who may be held criminally liable for offering or accepting a bribe find their
genesis in the common law crime of bribery. More than 150 years ago, this
State's former Supreme Court recognized that some even older authorities
A-3118-20 5 recognized that the common law crime of bribery could "only be predicated [on]
a reward given to a judge or other official concerned in the administration of
justice." State v. Ellis, 33 N.J.L. 102, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1868). The court, however,
determined that the better rule was a broader rule proposed by authorities that
defined bribery as "the taking or giving of a reward for offices of a public
nature," and concluded that "[n]either upon principle nor authority can the crime
of bribery be confined to acts done to corrupt officers concerned in the
administration of justice." The court explained that limiting bribery to judicial
corruption would result in, for example, "votes of members of council on all
questions coming before them, could be bought and sold like merchandise in the
market." Id. at 103-04. The court emphatically declared "[t]he law is otherwise."
Id. at 104.
Ellis considered and rejected the argument that there is no offense if the
bribe is offered or accepted by a public official who lacked jurisdiction to do
that for which he was paid. Again, the court was clear in stating that the offense
is "complete when an offer of reward is made to influence the vote or action of
the official" and it "need not be averred, that the vote, if procured, would have
produced the desired result, nor that the official, or the body of which he was a
A-3118-20 6 member, had authority by law to do the thing sought to be accomplished." Id. at
105.
Rarely does one encounter a more apt opportunity to invoke Justice
Holmes's aphorism that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). Ellis's limning of the
common law offense of bribery is clearly reflected in every provision of N.J.S.A.
2C:27-2. Ellis held that the offense envelops and imposes criminal liability on
both the offeror and offeree, the crime is completed when the agreement is
reached, the public nature of the corrupt deal is not limited to narrow areas of
public interest such as judicial administration, and it doesn't matter that the
bribed individual was without jurisdiction or otherwise incapable of performing
his part of the bargain. The "gist" of the offense, the Ellis court held, is "the
tendency of the bribe to pervert justice in any of the governmental departments,
executive, legislative, or judicial." Id. at 105. So, what's past is prologue; the
meaning and scope of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 cannot be fully appreciated without
acknowledging the voice of our predecessors in declaring the traditionally wide
scope and reach of the crime of bribery.
As we have already observed – by merely quoting its words and phrases
– N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 casts a wide net. Despite that, defendant seeks to avoid the
A-3118-20 7 consequences of his alleged corrupt agreement by asserting the statute "does not,
on its face, apply to unelected political candidates." He first claims that the plain
text of the statute supports this view by alluding to the references in subsections
(a) through (d) to "public servant," "party official," "judicial or administrative
proceeding[s]," and "official duties," and by pointing out the absence of any
reference to candidates for office. Our response to this textual argument is to
repeat what we said in State v. Ferro, 128 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1974):
if the Legislature intended to criminalize the acceptance of bribes only by public
officials and public servants it would have directed its prohibition at public
officials and public servants rather than using the broader word "persons." See
also N.J.S.A. 1:1-2.
We also soundly rejected a similar argument twenty-five years ago in
State v. Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115, 138 (App. Div. 1997), when, in
speaking for this court, Judge (later Justice) Wallace held that under N.J.S.A.
2C:27-2 "neither the offeror nor the recipient of the bribe need be a public
official to prove bribery."2 Instead, we recognized it was "sufficient if the
recipient created the understanding with the briber that he could influence
2 In Schenkolewski, the defendant held a governmental position but was not a member of the township committee whose approval was the object of the bribe. We held it did not matter. 301 N.J. Super. at 138-39. A-3118-20 8 matters in connection with an official duty, whether or not he was capable of
actually effecting such an act." In other words, as held in State v. Sherwin, 127
N.J. Super. 370, 385 (App. Div. 1974), even though written about an earlier but
equally comprehensive version of our bribery laws, the offense of bribery does
not have as an element that the accused received the bribe "under color of his
office." Again, the Legislature imposed criminal liability on "person[s]," not just
public officials and public servants who offer or accept bribes.
Defendant also argues that the Legislature's delineation of the types of
unlawful agreements in subsections (a) through (d) reveals that an agreement
between a citizen and a candidate for office is not encompassed by N.J.S.A.
2C:27-2. As we understand the argument, defendant contends that in receiving
or being offered a benefit a candidate is not in a position to make "a decision,
opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a public servant,"
N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(a), or "perform[] . . . official duties," N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d). We
reject this myopic view of the statute because there is nothing about this
language that would suggest a requirement that the bribe receiver have the
ability – at the time of the crime – to perform his end of the deal.
Our obligation in ascertaining a statute's reach is to "discern and
effectuate" the legislative intent. Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J.
A-3118-20 9 581, 592 (2012). The "best indicator of that intent is the statutory language,"
which must be given its "ordinary meaning and significance." DiProspero v.
Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). The interpretive process is not an invitation to
find and employ loopholes or exceptions not plainly expressed, nor an
opportunity to engraft elements or considerations not plainly revealed in or
fairly implicated by the words used. The opportunity to engage in "judicial
surgery" is ordinarily limited to avoiding a constitutional infirmity in a
legislative enactment. See State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485-86 (2005); Plastic
Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 565, 575
(App. Div. 2019), aff'd o.b., 241 N.J. 112 (2012).
Notwithstanding those limitations, defendant would have us implant into
N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 an element that the bribe receiver possess the present ability
or give the impression to the bribe offeror that he was able to perform his part
of the bargain. This interpretation also animated the trial judge's decision in that
the judge granted the motion to dismiss because, in her view, defendant "was
incapable of performing his promised official duties at the moment of exchange"
(emphasis added). There is nothing in the statute to suggest the State is required
to prove a bribe receiver's present ability to perform. In fact, another portion of
the statute clearly expresses a contrary intent, declaring that it is no defense that
A-3118-20 10 the bribe receiver "was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because
he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason."
The parties dispute whether this no-defense provision applies here, and we will
turn to that momentarily, but its existence clearly reveals the legislative intent
that it is unnecessary that the bribe receiver have the present ability to perform
when the bribe occurs – or ever – to constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.
And we find nothing in the statute that would somehow exempt candidates
for office from its reach. In fact, we already held that candidates for office are
subject to the bribery statute, State v. Woodward, 298 N.J. Super. 390, 392 (App.
Div. 1997),3 and find further support for that conclusion in that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-
2 is derived from the Model Penal Code, 4 which was intended to criminalize a
3 Woodward involved an agreement between two candidates for the same office that one would withdraw in exchange for money and the promise of a job in the other's administration. Id. at 392. See also State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009). Despite our clear holding in Woodward that a candidate for office may be convicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, the trial judge found our holding inapplicable or distinguishable because the defendant there was the incumbent. That is a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the logical extension of the trial judge's view is that while Woodward might violate N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 by offering the corrupt bargain, his opponent would not violate the statute if he had made the offer. 4 See State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606 (2014) (holding that "[w]hen a provision of [our criminal code] is modeled after the MPC [Model Penal Code],
A-3118-20 11 candidate's receipt of a payment in exchange for a promise to perform some
future official act. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 240.1 cmt. 5(b) at 27.
To accept defendant's argument – without some clear legislative expression to
support it – would be to declare open season on the bribing of candidates for
public office. Defendant's interpretation that candidates are not made criminally
liable for accepting bribes in the performance of some future official act would
mean, if correct, that a candidate could be bribed before, during, and after being
elected, right up until taking the oath of office. 5 If the Legislature had intended
to except such corrupt individuals from the scope of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 it could
have, but did not, say so.
Defendant's argument would also, if accepted, create an unusual subset of
candidates who would be criminally liable while excusing others , because the
it is appropriate to consider the MPC and any commentary to interpret the intent of the statutory language"). 5 The absurdity of defendant's position is revealed by the consequences it would hold in the following example. Assume an individual, seeking to become a city's tax attorney, approached both the incumbent and his adversary in an election for the office of mayor and paid both to agree to appoint him on taking office. Despite committing the same reprehensible act, only the incumbent, who possessed the present ability to make the appointment, would violate N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, while the other candidate – whether he wins or loses the election – would not. There is absolutely no evidence or language in the current statute that would support such an illogical result. A-3118-20 12 argument suggests that a candidate who is already a public servant or public
official could be held criminally liable but not a candidate who holds no public
office at the time. For example, if defendant was a public servant of any sort,
even a position having no relation to the campaign in question or the bribe
offered or received, like the defendant in Schenkolewski, defendant's
interpretation would place him within N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2's reach. The argument
suggests that is only the happenstance that defendant held no other public office
or position that kept him out of the statute's reach. Considering the statute – by
its very language – allows no such exception, and since we have already held a
candidate for office is subject to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 without qualifying it in the
way defendant argues, see Woodward, 298 N.J. Super. at 392, we decline the
invitation to interpret the statute to reach the nonsensical conclusion, see N.J.
Repub. State Comm. v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574, 592 (2020) (holding that statutes
must be interpreted to avoid "absurd results"); State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318,
322 (1961) (recognizing that statutes cannot "be construed to lead to absurd
results" and that "[a]ll rules of construction are subordinate to that obvious
proposition"), that the Legislature intended to create a subset of candidates who
are entitled to accept bribes with impunity.
A-3118-20 13 To further support his argument that he is unanswerable for his alleged
corrupt agreement, defendant refers to the no-defense provision of N.J.S.A.
2C:27-2 quoted earlier. This provision reinforces our understanding that
defendant may be found criminally liable for the conduct alleged since it
forecloses the arguments that defendant was not a public servant or public
official when he allegedly accepted a bribe or that the law requires that he have
the ability at the moment of the alleged bribe to fulfill his part of the bargain by
declaring arguments like this are "no defense" to a bribery prosecution.
To view the no-defense provision as supportive of defendant's position
requires a distortion of what the Legislature clearly stated. Besides the trial
judge's decision here, this mangled view actually finds support in a reported
decision of one federal district judge, who interpreted this provision in a way
favorable to a bribed-but-unsuccessful candidate for office. See Manzo, 851 F.
Supp. 2d at 812. We can explain why the no-defense provision is unavailing to
defendant by explaining why Manzo is erroneous.
In that case, Manzo was charged with violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952, which required proof that Manzo had engaged in interstate commerce to
promote unlawful conduct, which was an alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2
that occurred while Manzo was unsuccessfully running to become mayor of
A-3118-20 14 Jersey City. Id. at 799. In considering the scope of the no-defense provision, the
district judge explained that it was clear to him
that the language addresses two distinct parties: the person whom the actor sought to influence, and the actor himself. The "actor" is presumably the individual prosecuted under the statute – in this case, Defendant Louis Manzo – and substituting the named Defendant with the term "actor" in the provision indicates that the provision was intended to exclude any "not qualified to act" defenses as made by bribe givers, rather than bribe receivers.
[Id. at 812 (emphasis in the original).]
In other words, the judge viewed the no-defense provision as describing the
defenses that are not available – which is accurate – but the judge then also
viewed the provision as depriving only the bribe giver of the potential d efense.
The logic of this escapes us. The Manzo decision interprets the no-defense
provision as if the words and phrases we have emphasized below were included:
It is no defense to prosecution of a bribe offeror or giver under this section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act . . . .
If the Legislature intended to qualify the reach of this provision, it certainly
knew how to express that thought. Indeed, an example of how to limit a similar
provision's reach is expressed in the statute's very next paragraph, which begins
"In any prosecution under this section of an actor . . ." (emphasis added).
A-3118-20 15 Because it failed to qualify the "prosecution" referred to in the opening phrases
of the no-defense provision, we must assume the Legislature intended that the
provision would apply to all prosecutions and that it would deprive both bribe
givers and bribe receivers of the argument that the bribe receiver lacked, for any
reason – including the failure to get elected – the ability to fulfill his part of the
bargain.
This conclusion not only flows from the Legislature's expression but by
the way our courts have always looked at bribery, recognizing as long ago as
Ellis that it is no defense to anyone charged with bribery that the bribe receiver
was incapable of performing his part of the bargain. 33 N.J.L. at 105
(recognizing that the defendant committed bribery even though the bribe was
paid to a member of the Jersey City council for an easement over city street that
the council had no authority to grant). Bribery has traditionally been a reciprocal
crime; the bribe giver is as culpable as the bribe taker. As it was in the common
law, see State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 48 (1961), this reciprocity concept became
a principal theme of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. The New Jersey Criminal Law Revision
Commission recognized that "[t]he offense is reciprocal: whenever it is a crime
to receive a bribe it is a crime to tender one." See 2 Final Report of N.J. Criminal
Law Revision Commission, cmt. to § 27-2 at 263 (1971). Even defendant does
A-3118-20 16 not argue otherwise. It therefore runs counter to everything our courts have ever
said about bribery to conclude that somehow the Legislature wanted to treat
bribe receivers better than bribe givers in this or any other instance.
Indeed, the provision expresses the very thing that defendant argues is
excluded. It not only renders irrelevant the fact that the bribe receiver was
incapable of fulfilling his end of the deal, but also that the bribe receiver had not
assumed the office needed to complete the deal, just like a candidate who does
not get elected. To be sure, the no-defense provision states that it is irrelevant
that the bribe receiver "had not yet assumed office" (emphasis added), but the
provision's remainder, which incorporates the bribe receiver's inability to fulfill
his promise because he "lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason" (emphasis
added), more than amply covers all those instances – such as a candidate's failure
to get elected, as here. There is nothing about this broad language to suggest that
somewhere in the provision's interstices lurked a legislative intent to give
candidates for office carte blanche to accept bribes without consequence up until
the moment they take office or if they never take office.
Instead, everything about N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 suggests a legislative intent to
criminalize in equal fashion both the giving and taking of bribes in all official
and political matters. There are no expressed exemptions. Despite our prior
A-3118-20 17 holdings, which we have cited, that clearly expressed this, we are obligated to
again examine N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 only because the trial judge found, like the
judge in Manzo, that somewhere in the statute a contrary intent could be found
between the lines when it comes to candidates who don't get elected. As we have
explained, there is no spoken or unspoken intention that would support
defendant's theory or Manzo's conclusion. To eradicate corruption in public
matters, the Legislature spoke only in broad and general terms that clearly
envelop what defendant has been accused of. The four bribery areas described
in subsections (a) through (d) are stated in the broadest of terms. And the no -
defense provision, which expresses the irrelevance of the bribe receiver's
inability to perform his part of the bargain, is equally as broad, declaring that it
is no defense that the bribe receiver "was not qualified to act in the desired way
whether because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any
other reason." N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 (emphasis added). Other than torturing the
statutory language to suit his position, defendant offers nothing other than
Manzo's erroneous interpretation, mistakenly followed by the trial judge here, 6
that only bribe givers are subject to the no-defense provision.
6 The decisions of our federal colleagues are entitled to respect, Teeters v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 387 N.J. Super. 423, 429 (App. Div. 2006), but
A-3118-20 18 Defendant alternatively argues that the rule of lenity requires dismissal of
the indictment. Not so. The rule of lenity vindicates an aspect of due process
that "[n]o one shall be punished for a crime unless both that crime and its
punishment are clearly set forth in positive law." In re De Marco, 83 N.J. 25, 36
(1980). As a general matter, the rule's application requires a determination that
the statute charged is ambiguous and its ambiguity should be resolved in the
defendant's favor. State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451-52 (2011). Because we find
no statutory ambiguity, the rule of lenity has no application. But, even if we
were to assume an ambiguity exists within N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, the rule doesn't
provide a defendant with a get out of jail free card. As Chief Justice Wilentz
said in De Marco, "[i]t does not invariably follow . . . that every time someone
can create an argument as to the meaning of a penal sanction" the rule of lenity
should excuse the conduct. 83 N.J. at 36. And it does no good for defendant to
assert that the statute is ambiguous because Manzo held that what he allegedly
did was not a crime. In Regis, the Court observed that the rule of lenity is not
available "simply because there are competing judicial interpretations of the
statutory language, in New Jersey or elsewhere." 208 N.J. at 452. To support a
their views are not binding in matters of New Jersey law, Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., 167 N.J. 191, 201 (2001). A-3118-20 19 lenity argument based on competing judicial interpretations, defendant can only
offer the trial court decision in Manzo whereas our binding decisions in
Schenkolewski, Ferro, and Woodward all would have, if consulted, counseled a
candidate for office in 2018 of the criminal jeopardy he was facing on accepting
a bribe. Although forcefully argued, we cannot take seriously the contention that
defendant acted under the assumption that he was not accepting a bribe within
the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, if what he is accused of is ultimately proven.
We lastly observe that the Legislature just passed a bill which, if signed
into law by the Governor, will both expand N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2's definition of
"public servant" to include candidates for public office and rephrase the scope
of the no-defense provision. See A. 2472 (passed by the Legislature on March
24, 2022). The commentary offered in support of the bill states, among other
things, that these amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 are "intended to respond" to
Manzo by "ensur[ing] that such future incidents involving persons seeking
public or political office are punishable as criminal acts."
This bill has no bearing on our decision. It reveals only the Legislature's
desire to avoid future decisions like Manzo. This bill is neither an admission
that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 is inadequate or ambiguous when applied to candidates
for public office nor is it evidence of the legislative intent when N.J.S.A. 2C:27-
A-3118-20 20 2 was enacted decades ago. In the same vein, we find no significance in the fact
that there were prior failed attempts to modify N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 in the wake of
Manzo. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 107 N.J. 307, 322
(1987) (quoting 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.10 (4th ed. 1984), in
observing that "[l]egislative inaction is 'a weak reed upon which to lean' . . . in
construing a statute").
The order dismissing the indictment is reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3118-20 21