State of New Jersey v. George E. Norcross, III

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: A-1833-24
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1833-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION January 30, 2026 GEORGE E. NORCROSS, III, APPELLATE DIVISION PHILIP A. NORCROSS, WILLIAM M. TAMBUSSI, DANA L. REDD, SIDNEY R. BROWN, and JOHN J. O'DONNELL,

Defendants-Respondents. _______________________________

Argued November 5, 2025 – Decided January 30, 2026

Before Judges Gooden Brown, Rose and Torregrossa- O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 24-06-0111.

Michael L. Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for appellant (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Michael L. Zuckerman, Tim Sheehan, Michael T. Breslin, Michael Grillo, and Andrew Wellbrock, Assistant Attorneys General, Adam D. Klein, Diana L. Bibb, and Amanda E. Nini, Deputy Attorneys General, of counsel and on the briefs). Anthony J. Dick (Jones Day) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent George E. Norcross, III (Critchley & Luria, LLC and Anthony J. Dick, attorneys; Michael Critchley, Thomas E. Hopson (Jones Day) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, Mario E. Fiandeiro (Jones Day) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Anthony J. Dick, of counsel and on the brief).

Kevin H. Marino argued the cause for respondent Philip A. Norcross (Marino, Tortorella, & Boyle, PC, attorneys; Kevin H. Marino, John D. Tortorella and Erez J. Davy, on the brief).

Lee Vartan argued the cause for respondent William M. Tambussi (Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, attorneys; Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Lee Vartan, Jeffrey P. Mongiello, Kathryn Pearson, and Nathan A. Muller, of counsel and on the brief).

Henry E. Klingeman argued the cause for respondent Dana L. Redd (Klingeman Cerimele and Law Offices of Thomas R. Ashley, attorneys; Henry E. Klingeman, Ernesto Cerimele, Emma M. R. Enright, and Thomas R. Ashley, on the brief).

Lawerence S. Lustberg argued the cause for respondent Sidney R. Brown (Gibbons PC, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg, Noel L. Hillman, Anne M. Collart, Kelsey A. Ball, and Jessica L. Guarracino, on the brief).

Gerald Krovatin argued the cause for respondent John J. O'Donnell (Krovatin Nau LLC, Jacobs & Barbone, PA and Arseneault & Fassett, LLC, attorneys; Gerald Kovatin, Edwin J. Jacobs, Jr., and David W. Fassett, on the brief).

A-1833-24 2 Robert E. Levy argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey NAACP State Conference, New Jersey State AFL-CIO, and New Jersey Building and Construction Trades Council (Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Donald Scarinci and Robert E. Levy, of counsel and on the brief; Matthew F. Mimnaugh, on the brief).

Eric Robert Breslin argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, PC, attorneys; Rubin M. Sinins, on the brief).

Robert C. Scrivo argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Mandelbaum Barrett PC, attorneys; Robert C. Scrivo, Andrew Gimigliano, and Austin W.B. Hilton, on the brief).

David R. Kott argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (Norberto A. Garcia, of counsel; Geoffrey N. Rosamond, David R. Kott, and Benjamin T. Klein, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSE, J.A.D.

The State appeals from a February 26, 2025 Law Division order

dismissing a 111-page, thirteen-count, "speaking indictment"1 that charged

1 A "speaking indictment" is a discretionary instrument, distinguished from a conventional indictment, in that it "provides a significant amount of detail as to

A-1833-24 3 George E. Norcross, III, Philip A. Norcross, William M. Tambussi, Dana L.

Redd, Sidney R. Brown, and John J. O'Donnell – purported members of the

alleged "Norcross Enterprise" – with conspiracy to violate the New Jersey

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or racketeering),

N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2, and other offenses. At its crux, the June 13, 2024 State

indictment alleged the Enterprise members exerted pressure on private

individuals and entities, and public officials, to advance the Enterprise's goals

related to redeveloping the City of Camden. One of those goals allegedly was

accomplished by obtaining three redevelopment projects: (1) L3 Complex; (2)

Triad1828 Centre and 11 Cooper; and (3) Radio Lofts – the first two of which

yielded some Enterprise members lucrative tax credits.

More particularly, all six defendants were charged with committing:

• first-degree racketeering conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d), (count one), between 2012 and June 13, 2024;[2]

the [g]overnment's theory of the case and the nature of the proof." 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.3(c) (4th ed. Supp. 2024). 2 The pattern of racketeering alleged in count one was premised on underlying criminal conduct including: (1) interference with commerce or threats or violence, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act); (2) theft by extortion, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5; (3) financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25; (4) misconduct by corporate official, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-9; and (5) conspiracy to commit those crimes, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. For purposes of this appeal, the parties

A-1833-24 4 • first-degree conspiracy to commit theft by extortion, criminal coercion, financial facilitation of criminal activity, misconduct by corporate official, and official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:5- 2, (count three - Triad1828 Centre and 11 Cooper) between April 16, 2013 and June 13, 2024;

• four counts of first-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a), (c), (count five - Triad1828 Centre credits, possession); (count six - Triad1828 Centre credits, directing transactions); (count nine – 11 Cooper credits, possession); and (count ten – 11 Cooper credits, directing transactions), between January 1, 2013 and June 13, 2024;

• second-degree misconduct by a corporate official, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-9(c), (count twelve – Triad1828 Centre and 11 Cooper Companies), between April 16, 2023 and June 13, 2024; and

• second-degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2,[3] (count thirteen), between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2024.

In addition, George,4 Philip, Redd, and Tambussi were charged with:

treat potential Hobbs Act violations as coterminous with state law extortion; the State does not contend that either offense could survive if the other failed. 3 Although the indictment did not include citation specifying whether it charged a violation of subsection (a) (acts), (b) (omissions), or both, its language was tailored to the text of subsection (a) alone. 4 Because George Norcross and Philip Norcross share the same surname, we use first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. A-1833-24 5 • first-degree conspiracy to commit theft by extortion, criminal coercion, financial facilitation of criminal activity, misconduct by corporate official, and official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:5- 2, (count two – L3 Complex), between June 5, 2013 and June 13, 2024;

• two counts of first-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a), (c), (count seven – L3 Complex credits, possession); (count eight – L3 Complex, directing transactions), between January 1, 2013 and June 13, 2024; and

• second-degree misconduct by a corporate official, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-9(c), (count eleven – Cooper Health), between June 5, 2013 and June 13, 2024.

Further, George, Philip, and Tambussi were charged with:

• second-degree conspiracy to commit theft by extortion and criminal coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, (count four – Radio Lofts), between October 1, 2013 and October 31, 2023.

The indictment also sought forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten gains from all

six defendants pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:41-3(b).

George moved to dismiss the indictment and the remaining defendants

followed suit. Defendants argued the indictment, on its face, failed to allege the

criminal offenses charged and violated the applicable statutes of limitations.

Following a series of correspondence and conferences, the motion court

A-1833-24 6 determined its review would be limited to the "four corners" of the indictment,

accepting all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom as true, and would

not as the State requested, include a review of the grand jury record.5

Defendants preserved their right to challenge the sufficiency of the State's

evidence presented to the grand jury in a subsequent motion.

The motion court thereafter granted the Association of Criminal Defense

Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amicus curiae, and New

Jersey NAACP State Conference, New Jersey State AFL-CIO, and New Jersey

Building and Construction Trades Council (collectively, Organizational Amici)

leave to appear jointly as amici curiae.

Following lengthy oral arguments on January 22, 2025, the motion court

reserved decision. On February 26, the court issued a ninety-six-page written

decision and accompanying order dismissing the indictment. In summary, the

court found as a matter of law: the factual allegations set forth in the indictment

failed to constitute the offenses of theft by extortion or criminal coercion, which

5 In its merits brief, the State asserts, during the five-month presentation, the grand jury heard testimony from witnesses "totaling over 2,000 pages of testimony" and reviewed "some 341 exhibits." The State also notes the prosecution "turned over in discovery more than 4.3 million files, more than 6,000 wiretap recordings[,] and at least 700 hours of audio recordings, including the interviews of about 100 people." A-1833-24 7 underpinned all other offenses; the indictment failed to allege a racketeering

enterprise; "Redd did not commit any act of official misconduct"; and "[a]ll

charges [we]re facially time-barred."

The State appealed. We thereafter separately granted the New Jersey State

Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers (NJ-ACTL) and New

Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) leave to appear as amicus curiae. The

ACDL and the Organizational Amici participate in this appeal pursuant to Rule

1:13-9(d)(1).

The State challenges the motion court's decision on procedural and

substantive grounds. The State maintains the court's facial review of the

indictment exceeded its bounds by conducting a searching "sufficiency-of-the-

evidence-included-in-the-indictment test" without reviewing the grand jury

record. Arguing the court erroneously established a new and unjustifiable

standard of review, the State claims the court should have limited its analysis of

defendants' facial challenges to whether the speaking indictment alleged the

elements of the offenses in the same way required of non-speaking "barebones"

indictments. Contending the indictment sufficiently alleged the offenses

charged, the State claims the court failed to accept the truth of the allegations

and interpret any inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

A-1833-24 8 Further, the State asserts the court erroneously held the offenses

concluded when the redevelopment deals were completed and therefore were

time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations. The State claims the

conspiracy continued beyond the limitations periods because: defendants

received tax credits from the developments; after the Enterprise acquired those

developments, certain defendants made statements constituting "acts of

concealment" of the crimes; or the Enterprise continued to pursue its objective

of "promoting compliance" through intimidation and similar tactics.

Not surprisingly, defendants urge us to affirm the dismissal order

substantially for the reasons embraced by the motion court. Supported by the

Organizational Amici, defendants warn criminalizing the behavior alleged in the

indictment would imperil valuable political advocacy, collective bargaining, and

similar activity. The ACDL, NJ-ACTL, and NJSBA (collectively, Legal Amici)

assert the indictment of attorneys, such as Philip and Tambussi, for actions

involving the practice of law would exert a chilling effect, detrimental to lawyer

and client alike.

As a threshold matter, we reaffirm a speaking indictment is subject to the

same facial review as non-speaking indictments; defendants' motions called for

A-1833-24 9 no more. For purposes of our review, similar to the motion court, we assume

the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment.

We are not convinced, however, that we must afford the State the benefit

of all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. We acknowledge before the

motion court and this court, the parties agreed the review of the factual

assertions in the indictment should be conducted under the "light most

favorable"/"favorable inferences" standard. However, the court and the parties

have not cited, and our research has not revealed, any authority requiring, or

indeed, authorizing the court to adopt such an indulgent standard. But see State

v. De Vita, 6 N.J. Super. 344, 347 (App. Div. 1950) (explaining "[t]he essential

facts constituting the crime must be directly stated in the indictment" and "[t]he

omission of an essential element cannot be supplied by inference or

implication"); cf. State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 56-57 (2015) (applying the

"light most favorable"/"favorable inferences" standard when the trial court

reviews the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury).

Based on our de novo review, see State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017),

we conclude: the charges arising from the conspiracies alleged in counts one

through three, and the official misconduct offense asserted in count thirteen,

were untimely; the offenses charged in counts four through ten failed to state

A-1833-24 10 the offense charged; and the offenses charged in counts eleven through twelve

were time-barred and otherwise failed to state an offense. We therefore affirm

the February 26, 2025 order for slightly different reasons than the motion court.

See Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) (permitting appellate courts

to affirm for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court because

"appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions" (quoting

Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001))).

In reaching our decision on the time-barred conspiracy counts, we

consider, as a matter of first impression, whether the receipt of ongoing ,

otherwise lawful payments – here, tax credits – tolls the applicable statute of

limitations. Persuaded by federal law, for the reasons that follow, we adopt the

rationale underscoring the "Doherty/Grimm doctrine."6 We therefore hold the

long-term, recurring award of tax credits does not extend the statute of

limitations for a conspiracy offense.

We similarly consider the novel issue underscoring the State's theory that

the receipt of a benefit extended the statute of limitations for an official

misconduct charge when the indictment did not assert an express agreement to

6 See United States v. Grimm, 738 F.3d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 61 (1st Cir. 1989). A-1833-24 11 perform the act of misconduct in exchange for that benefit. We conclude the

mere receipt of a benefit under those circumstances does not extend the life of

an official misconduct charge indefinitely.

I. The Indictment's Factual Allegations

The factual allegations of the indictment were set forth in 211 paragraphs

and spanned eighty pages. Pursuant to our de novo review, similar to the motion

court, we catalog the alleged facts that inform our decision. In view of the

State's procedural and substantive contentions, we summarize the facts alleged

in the indictment in substantial detail.

A. Individuals and Organizations

The indictment commenced with an "Overview" of the Norcross

Enterprise, "whose members and associates agreed the [E]nterprise would extort

others through threats and fear of economic and reputational harm and commit

other criminal offenses to achieve the [E]nterprise's goals." The "Relevant

Individuals and Entities" were identified in the indictment as follows:

George: chair of the board of trustees of Cooper University Health Care (Cooper Health); executive chair of Conner Strong & Buckelew (CSB), an insurance firm; "partner in the groups that own the Ferry Terminal Building, 11 Cooper, and the Triad1828 Centre"; former member of Cooper's Ferry Partnership (CFP); former chair of the Camden County Democratic Committee (CCDC); former member of the Democratic

A-1833-24 12 National Committee; and, according to the indictment, George "exercises control of Democratic politics throughout South Jersey, and beyond."

Philip: managing shareholder and chief executive officer (CEO) of the Parker McKay law firm; chair of the board of the Cooper Foundation, a nonprofit organization associated with Cooper Health; Cooper Health board member; and "registered agent for the groups that own the Ferry Terminal Building and the Triad1828 Centre."

Tambussi: an attorney with the Brown and Connery law firm, often employed by George, the CCDC, the City, the Camden Redevelopment Agency (CRA), Cooper Health, and CSB.

Redd: CEO of Camden Community Partnership (CCP), CFP's successor; and served on the City Council from 2001-10, as the City's mayor from 2010-18, and as CEO of the Rowan University/Rutgers-Camden Board of Governors from 2018-22.

Brown: CEO of NFI, a trucking and logistics company; Cooper Health board member; and partner in the groups that own the Ferry Terminal Building, Triad1828, and 11 Cooper.

O'Donnell: CEO of The Michaels Organization (TMO), a residential development company; partner in the Ferry Terminal Building, Triad1828, and 11 Cooper; and periodic member of CFP/CCP.

New Jersey Economic Development Authority (EDA): an independent government entity created to "attract and expand industry in New Jersey," which owned real property parcels and redevelopment rights in and around the City's waterfront.

A-1833-24 13 CFP: "a private nonprofit corporation dedicated to planning and implementing redevelopment projects in the City of Camden" by working with private and public sector actors, previously known as Cooper's Ferry Development Association (CFDA); and subsequently known as CCP.

Liberty Property Trust (LPT): a real estate investment trust, which "purchase[d] the rights to develop Camden waterfront properties from Steiner & Associates," which was involved in development projects in the City.

Dranoff Properties, Inc. (DPI): a residential developer "led by its founder (Developer-1)";[7] involved in the Victor Lofts and Radio Lofts redevelopment projects.

CRA: created in 1987 by the City Council "to redevelop the waterfront."

B. Economic and Legislative Backdrop

Commencing with paragraph 21, the indictment provided background on

the City's government structure, history as "an industrial and manufacturing

hub," and eventual decline after many companies ceased operations. City

officials thus endeavored "to revitalize the downtown area," focusing on the

City's Waterfront District. In 1984, the CFDA was established "to work with

7 We use the same designations as the indictment to protect the identities of the individuals named therein. A-1833-24 14 public and private entities to redevelop the waterfront"; in 1987, the CRA was

established to accomplish that purpose.

The indictment next described the tax credit incentives available to

redevelopers, pursuant to the "Grow New Jersey Assistance Program"8 (Grow

NJ). Pursuant to Grow NJ, tax credits were awarded to businesses meeting

certain criteria, such as making capital investments in a qualified incentive area.

The State accepted Grow NJ applications through July 2014. Approved tax

credits were issued annually, permitting qualified businesses to offset their state

tax liabilities or sell the credits to another company for that purpose. Further,

the Economic Opportunity Act of 2013 (EOA)9 "streamlined" New Jersey's five

economic development programs into two: Grow NJ and the Economic

Redevelopment and Growth (ERG) program.

In the next section, under a heading titled, "The Norcross Enterprise's

Efforts to Craft the EOA for its Use and Benefit," the indictment described at

8 See N.J.S.A. 34:1B-242 to -250. Enacted in 2011 and effective January 2012, the Grow New Jersey Assistance Act authorized the EDA to award tax credits to eligible businesses "to encourage economic development and job creation and to preserve jobs that currently exist in New Jersey but which are in danger of being relocated outside of the State." N.J.S.A. 34:1B-244(a). 9 See L. 2013, c. 161. The EOA is codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 34 and 52 of the New Jersey Statutes. A-1833-24 15 length defendants' interests and involvement in the EOA. For example, the

indictment referenced a meeting held in "2012 or 2013," during which George

told CFP and Cooper Health officials the new law would be "for our friends"

and expressed his wish to use the EOA to "construct an office building for free."

The indictment further summarized communications among Philip,

"representing [George's] interests," another Parker McCay attorney (Lawyer-1),

and various CFP executives. In these communications, the group allegedly

discussed their preferred focuses for the new legislation.

In the paragraphs that followed, the indictment described the "Norcross

Enterprise's Involvement in Drafting the EOA." The indictment alleged between

June 30, 2012 and September 30, 2013, Philip "communicated directly with the

then-State Senate President . . . regarding the drafting of the EOA." Further,

"[o]n June 4, 2013, Lawyer-1 sent an email, copying [Philip], to representatives

of the[ ]then Governor's office" with an edited draft of the EOA. The indictment

alleged the revisions favored George's interests, such as ensuring Camden-based

projects and projects benefiting hospitals "would have an easier route to

approval."

After the bill was enacted, in December 2013, Lawyer-1 "lobbied the

EDA" to ensure a hospital, "such as Cooper Health" would not be defined as

A-1833-24 16 "point of sale retail" thereby enabling "a hospital to take advantage of the EOA

and apply for tax credits." According to the indictment, "[t]he EDA made the

requested amendment" to its regulations.

The indictment also detailed George's actions while the legislation was in

progress. George allegedly "obtained information about the status of various

redevelopment rights on the Camden waterfront" and explored the status of "a

view easement held by Developer-1 to protect the views from the Victor Lofts,

which would expire in 2022."

C. The Redevelopment Projects

In paragraphs 47 through 211, the indictment described the Enterprise's

acquisition of the three redevelopment projects, exertion of pressure on the

developers during the processes of those acquisitions, and derivation of benefits

realized therefrom.

1. The L3 Complex

As alleged in the indictment, during 2012, CFP explored options to

purchase from the EDA the L3 Complex near the waterfront. Beginning in 2013,

members of the Enterprise pressured CFP's CEO (CFP CEO-1) to collaborate

with the Enterprise and its favored developers. For example, in 2013, Redd's

chief of staff, referenced in the indictment as CC-2, "told CFP CEO-1 that he

A-1833-24 17 should start meeting with Philip . . . and herself" to ensure CFP had George's

and Philip's approval for "various projects going forward." Philip, Redd's chief

of staff, and CFP CEO-1 thereafter met "regularly" in what would "later evolve[]

into weekly Camden 'stakeholder' meetings," even though Philip did not have a

role at CFP or a position in the Camden City government.

By way of context, the indictment alleged around that same time, CFP

CEO-1 was aware CFP's founder had a dispute with George "in the early 2000s,"

and thereafter "the Camden government had cut off or reduced funding to CFP."

CFP CEO-1 also knew CFP's founder believed George caused the funding cut –

and the founder left CFP and Camden as a result.

In paragraphs 56 through 67, the indictment described the Enterprise's

reaction to CFP's January 20, 2014 "agreement of sale with the EDA to buy the

L3 Complex for approximately $32.7 million," a price discounted roughly ten

percent below market value in light of CFP's nonprofit status. The indictment

detailed George's alleged angry reaction to the agreement and Philip's statements

to "CFP CEO-1 and CFP['s p]resident[] that CFP should not be involved in

development and should turn the deal over to a private investor partner"

recommended by the Enterprise, rather than CFP's preferred developer . On

April 23, 2014, Cooper Health's CEO emailed CFP officials to handle the issue

A-1833-24 18 "gingerly" because Philip was "still torqued about [CFP's] 'blowing off'

[Investor-1]," the Enterprise's recommended developer.

Around the same time, as alleged in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the

indictment, Cooper Health explored its options for relocation. By April 2014,

however, Cooper Health determined, "even with tax credits," it could not afford

to construct a new building and only the L3 Complex suited its needs.

Paragraphs 70 through 79 of the indictment described Philip's putative

threats to CFP CEO-1 to relinquish CFP's partnership with its chosen investors

and CFP's ultimate assent to do so. During an April 25, 2014 meeting, in the

presence of Redd's chief of staff, Philip "told CFP CEO-1 that CFP was not

allowed to use [CFP's investor] and it should only use Investor-1." CFP CEO-1

considered Philip's statement "a threat" because CFP CEO-1 was aware of

George's historical "dispute" with CFP's founder. CFP's officials therefore

"agreed to partner with Investor-1 and another real estate investor working with

Investor-1" (Investor-2).

On May 9, 2014, "Investor-2 emailed an offer to CFP to acquire a joint

interest in the L3 Complex," which CFP's president considered "very very light"

because the offer "was over $2 million less" than CFP's deal with its investor.

A-1833-24 19 CFP's president viewed the option between CFP's chosen investors and those

preferred by the Enterprise, a "false choice . . . given the opposition."

During the negotiations, CFP CEO-1 contacted Redd's office "for help on

the deal, explaining the negative financial consequences for CFP." Redd, who

was a co-chair of CFP, and Redd's chief of staff both told CFP CEO-1 "he had

to deal with Philip . . . to resolve" his concerns. "Redd and [her chief of staff]

also told CFP CEO-1 at various stages during the L3 transaction that his job was

in jeopardy."

As of summer 2014, CFP "verbally agreed" with Investor-1 and Investor-

2 "that CFP would purchase the L3 Complex" with financing secured by the

investors, then sell the property to L/N CAC, an entity created by the investors,

while retaining a share of the profits. Around the same time, Cooper Health

agreed with the investors that it would be a part of L/N CAC. The plan was

subsequently rescinded when Philip "informed Cooper Health officials that

having an ownership interest in the L3 Complex would complicate its

application for tax credits." Cooper Health officials and the investors agreed

"Cooper Health would not officially become part of the ownership entity until

after the EDA had awarded Cooper Health tax credits."

A-1833-24 20 In late September 2014, Cooper Health's CEO, who also sat on the board

of, and co-chaired, CFP died unexpectedly. His roles at CFP were filled by

Cooper Foundation's CEO (CC-1). Redd informed CFP CEO-1 that she "had

been told" to appoint CC-1 and that his appointment would "help get CFP back

on [George's] side"; Philip told CFP CEO-1 that CC-1's appointment would help

"mend fences" with George.

Between October 1 and December 30, 2014, CFP CEO-1 told CC-1 "the

deal kept getting worse for CFP and that there still was not a signed agreement."

CC-1 responded that CFP CEO-1 "had to deal with [Philip] and pushed him to

close the transaction."

Paragraphs 82 and 83 of the indictment described CFP's purchase and sale

of the L3 complex. On December 30, 2014, CFP closed on the L3 Complex,

which was "appraised at $54 million." That same day, CFP conveyed the

property to L/N CAC for $1 and netted "approximately $125,000 for its role in

the L3 Complex transaction, which [wa]s far less than CFP stood to earn through

its proposed partnership" with its preferred investor. Also, "CFP did not receive

a share of the L3 Complex's future profits."

In paragraphs 80 through 81, and 85 through 88, the indictment described

the tax incentives awarded to Cooper Health in connection with the L3 Complex.

A-1833-24 21 Specifically, in its November 7, 2014 application to the EDA, seeking tax credits

for its forthcoming move to L3, Cooper Health "identified Investor-2" as the

landlord but "did not disclose its plans to become part owners for the L3

Complex to the EDA." At that time, George was the chair of Cooper Health's

board of trustees. On December 9, 2014, the EDA approved a $39,990,000 tax

credit award to Cooper Health, payable over ten years, subject to annual

certifications of continued job creation and retention.

In 2015, Cooper Health signed a lease agreement with L/N CAC and

occupied the L3 Complex. In March 2015, Cooper Health purchased an

ownership interest in L/N CAC valued at approximately $2.45 million. Between

January 2016 and June 2022, Cooper Health filed six annual certifications and

received $27,114,000 in tax credits. Cooper Health sold the tax credits to third

parties for $25,080,450.

In paragraph 88, the indictment concluded the Norcross Enterprises'

conduct regarding the L3 Complex caused: (1) CFP "to partner with L/N CAC,

rather than its preferred development partner"; (2) L/N CAC "to obtain a

building appraised at $54 million for less than $34 million in funding, including

payments to the EDA and a fee to CFP"; (3) Cooper Health to "bec[o]me 49%

partners in L/N CAC, which owned the L3 Complex, at a cost of approximately

A-1833-24 22 $2.45 million"; (4) Cooper Health "to lease space in the building, and pay rent

to an entity that was 49% owned by Cooper Health"; (5) Cooper Health to

receive a $40 million tax credit award; and (6) "[i]n 2017, L/N CAC [to]

refinance[ its] bank loan on the L3 Building and obtain[] a disbursement of

approximately $10 million."

The indictment next addressed statements made by members, agents, and

associates of the Enterprise in the years following the L3 deal. In paragraphs 89

and 90, the indictment discussed an August 2016 Federal Bureau of

Investigation interview, the reason for which was undisclosed. George,

accompanied by Tambussi, professed not to "know anybody" at CFP and told

agents, "I don't know what they do."

Relatedly, in paragraphs 91 and 92, the indictment asserted, "[b]etween

October 3, 2019 and December 2022, agents of members and associates of the

. . . Enterprise made statements to members of the media in order to conceal the

true facts surrounding the L3 acquisition." In particular, "[t]hese statements

promoted the claims that CFP was not capable of purchasing L3, that CFP

planned to use Cooper Health funds to finance the deal, and that Cooper Health

CEO-1 had unilaterally committed Cooper Health to an above-market lease in

L3 without the knowledge of other Cooper Health officials." The indictment

A-1833-24 23 identified three such statements: an October 3, 2019 statement by "a

spokesperson" for George and Philip; an October 17, 2019, Philadelphia Inquirer

article referring to unnamed "Cooper Health officials"; and a May 2022 call

among Tambussi, George, and others with a WNYC reporter, later "posted

online by the New Jersey Globe."

2. The Triad1828 Centre and 11 Cooper

In paragraphs 93 through 172, the indictment alleged members of the

Enterprise pressured DPI and its operator, Developer-1, to sell certain waterfront

property and view easement rights to a third-party developer favored by the

Enterprise. Those transactions enabled the Enterprise to construct an office

building (Triad1828) on the Triad parcel and a residential building (11 Cooper)

on the 11 Cooper site, capturing significant tax credits in the process.

More particularly, the indictment alleged from around "2013 to the

present," George and other Enterprise members "conspired to extort from DPI

and Developer-1 tax credits and rights to develop the Camden [w]aterfront . . .

to allow the construction of a headquarters for [George's] CSB firm and two

other businesses run by [Enterprise members] . . . and to obtain tax credits and

residential development rights held by Developer-1." The Enterprise members

A-1833-24 24 and related companies thereafter "sold the tax credits for millions of dollars and

continue to retain the rights to obtain and sell future tax credits."

The indictment alleged to accomplish its purpose, the Norcross Enterprise

contended with "several significant impediments" concerning redevelopment of

the Triad parcel and 11 Cooper site because the Enterprise held no ownership or

other rights to redevelop the property; redevelopment options were held by other

entities; DPI's view easement at the Victor Lofts limited the height of structures

on the Triad parcel; and DPI "possessed a right of first refusal for residential

development area in the Camden Waterfront area, which included the 11 Cooper

site."

According to paragraph 95 of the indictment,

when negotiations with Developer-1 to sell his property and rights did not proceed to [George]'s liking, [he]: (1) threatened Developer-1 with economic and reputational harm; (2) conspired to cause the City . . . to condemn Developer-1's rights through legal action to gain leverage in their negotiations; (3) plotted for Camden City officials to publicly "accus[e]" Developer-1 of being "not a reputable person"; (4) caused certain Camden City officials, including the [m]ayor, to stop communicating with Developer-1; and (5) plotted to damage an unrelated project of Developer-1's using the Camden government.

The following paragraphs set forth DPI's historical involvement in the

Camden waterfront, including its recruitment by the CFP founder's predecessor

A-1833-24 25 to develop the area in the early 2000s. In redeveloping a former manufacturing

building to the residential units comprising Victor Lofts, DPI was afforded: (1)

a "payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) agreement with the City," (2) a view

easement "limiting the height of structures that could block the Victor's view of

the Delaware River and the Philadelphia skyline," (3) a "right of first refusal for

residential development in the Camden Waterfront Development area," and (4)

an option to redevelop another building in the area (Radio Lofts).10

In paragraphs 99 through 108, the indictment recounted "[George's] Plans

to Put the EOA Into Action," commencing with a January 23, 2014 email to LPT

officials "to discuss how to properly plan the [w]aterfront" and "deal[] with land

issues/options/ownership." The indictment alleged George sought the meeting

even though he did not hold a City position, own waterfront property, or have

"any business interest in the Waterfront [D]istrict" other than as Cooper Health's

chair. The following month, George and Philip met with representatives of LPT

and EDA regarding the status of the waterfront's plans and agreements.

The indictment also cited a September 24, 2015 press conference

announcing plans to redevelop the waterfront. George and Redd attended the

10 The indictment explained redevelopment of Radio Lofts stalled around 2010 due to environmental remediation issues. A-1833-24 26 press conference, as did the then governor. George, Brown, and O'Donnell were

listed in the press release as "local leaders who have committed to investing in

the project either personally or through their firms." But, at that time, George,

Brown, and O'Donnell did not have any "business interests in LPT or the

property being redeveloped."

In paragraphs 109 through 154, the indictment detailed LPT's negotiations

with Developer-1, George's threats to Developer-1, and Developer-1's

relinquishment of certain property and rights to LPT for less than Developer-1

believed they were worth.

According to the indictment, LPT's negotiations with Developer-1 began

in the latter part of 2015, which led to a year-long series of meetings and

correspondence. Philip, as counsel to LPT, and George were present at the

meetings. At some point during the negotiations, LPT's CEO told Developer-1

"he would have to partner with TMO – of which [O'Donnell] was CEO – going

forward in connection with his Camden Waterfront interests." Developer-1 "had

reservations" but "continued negotiating" because he "wanted to participate in

the development and trusted the LPT CEO." Developer-1 was "wary of working

with [George] but understood him to be a powerful individual in Camden and

knew that LPT intended to work with [George] and TMO."

A-1833-24 27 While negotiations were ongoing in 2015-16, Developer-1 applied for

"tax credits for the residential development project as a joint venture between

DPI and TMO." In March 2016, Redd signed a letter on the City's behalf

supporting the application. Thereafter, negotiations between Developer-1 and

TMO "broke down." Developer-1 was uncomfortable with TMO's "level of

control" and "did not need or want a partner for residential development."

"[D]uring a conference call in the summer of 2016," George threatened

Developer-1 stating, "if you f**k this up, I'll f**k you up like you've never been

f**ked up before. I'll make sure you never do business in this town again ."

According to the indictment, Developer-1 "took this threat seriously, believing

that if he stood in the way of LPT['s] obtaining DPI's residential development

rights or extinguishing DPI's view easement, Developer-1's ability to conduct

business in Camden and his financial interests in general would be in jeopardy."

Philip was present on the call.

In August 2016, George admitted he made the threat during a recorded

conversation with a CSB senior executive. Among other things, George

acknowledged he "insulted" Developer-1 and commented, "obviously I'll never

do business with the guy again."

A-1833-24 28 Later that same month, during a recorded conversation with the LPT CEO,

George disclosed "his motivations for threatening Developer-1." George

explained "[his] group was committed to constructing its building and that the

Developer-1 view easement issue was preventing his group from filing its

application." George further stated that if he "walked away, it would be a . . .

bad thing for the [C]ity" and "humiliating" for him personally. George also

noted he had discussed this issue with O'Donnell.

In paragraphs 122 through 125, under a heading titled, "[George] Makes

Good on His Threat to Developer-1 By Directing City Officials to Freeze Him

Out," the indictment explained while negotiating with the Norcross Enterprise

and LPT concerning the Triad parcel in 2016, Developer-1 sought to confer with

City officials concerning his options to redevelop the Radio Lofts building.

However, Redd did not return his calls. "Unbeknownst to Developer-1, his calls

were not being returned because [Philip] instructed [Redd] and [her chief of

staff] not to meet with Developer-1 because [Philip] was negotiating other

matters with Developer-1 as part of the waterfront development."

Paragraphs 126 through 151 encompass the next section of the indictment,

titled, "'A Bat Over His Head': The Norcross Enterprise Follows Through on Its

Threats by Plotting a Condemnation Action to Strip Developer-1 of His

A-1833-24 29 Interests." In mid-October 2016, with these issues still unresolved, George,

Philip, Tambussi, Brown, and O'Donnell allegedly "agreed to cause the CRA to

bring court action against DPI with the purpose of creating additional pressure

on Developer-1 to sell his rights." Specifically, Philip and Tambussi, "and

members of their respective law firms, coordinated to devise a plan by which

the CRA, a City government entity and client of [Tambussi]'s firm, would seek

to condemn Developer-1's view easement."

According to the indictment, Philip and Tambussi exchanged memoranda

evaluating the legal merits, likelihood of success, and potential timeline of a

CRA-initiated condemnation of Developer-1's easement. On October 20, 2016,

"Tambussi's law partner, Lawyer-2, who represented the CRA," emailed the

CRA's executive director, proposing the CRA "file an application in [c]ourt . . .

to confirm that the power of eminent domain is available to extinguish the view

easement."

That same day, George and Philip spoke with Developer-1 and his

attorney. George "again threatened Developer-1 that there would be

consequences if he did not reach an agreement to release his view easement and

transfer his right of first refusal on residential development, associated

redevelopment rights, and tax credits."

A-1833-24 30 The October 20, 2016 negotiations resulted in a proposed deal with

Developer-1. Philip conveyed the terms to LPT that night, LPT generated a

draft agreement on October 21, 2016, but the deal "fell through" that same day.

Also on October 21, 2016, George told a friend that during the previous

day's call, Developer-1 "tried to f**king shake us down. As usual . . . And I told

him, 'No.' I said, '[Developer-1], this is unacceptable. If you do this, it will

have enormous consequences.' He said, 'Are you threatening me?' I said,

'Absolutely.'"

Later on October 21, 2016, in a recorded conversation between George

and Philip, George referenced a discussion he had with Tambussi and "the plan

to use [Tambussi] and the CRA to act against Developer-1." During another

call, George and O'Donnell discussed "what had happened with Developer-1 that

day and linked the condemnation action with the Norcross Enterprise['s]

obtaining an advantage in its negotiations with both Developer-1 and LPT."

During an October 22, 2016 call, George, Philip, Tambussi, Brown,

O'Donnell, and another executive discussed the condemnation plan and its

potential benefits. George remarked:

I don't even know why we're dealing with [Developer- 1]. . . . [T]he [C]ity ought to condemn his ass and just move on . . . he's gonna come under some very serious accusations from the City of Camden which are gonna

A-1833-24 31 basically suggest that he's not a reputable person and he's done nothing but try to impede the progress of the [C]ity . . . you can never trust him until you got a bat over his head.

George also said "the [C]ity should instigate" the removal of Developer-1's

unused Radio Lofts redevelopment rights, calling the building "an eyesore," and

framing it as a way "to apply additional pressure" or "another point of attack ."

Later that day, Philip notified LPT that the CRA was "seriously

considering . . . seeking an immediate ruling confirming CRA's right to condemn

the view easement." He added, "[a]s a showing of good faith," Camden

Partners11 would file their tax credit application, thereby formalizing their

commitment to the project, as soon as the action was filed, but asked "in return"

that LPT cooperate in the condemnation proceeding.12

Ultimately, LPT declined to cooperate. Instead, LPT "offered to pay

Developer-1 an additional approximately $200,000 out of its own end of the

11 The indictment loosely defined the "group" that "referred to itself as the Camden Partners Tower Group" or "Camden Partners" as "the group seeking to build on the Triad Parcel." Various other apparently related corporate entities, such as Camden Partners Land LLC, Camden Partners Tower Equities, and CP Residential, were mentioned throughout the indictment, but their unifying corporate structure, if any, was not explained. 12 The declaratory action was never filed. A-1833-24 32 deal, which brought the total cash value of the transaction to $1.95 million, in

order to resolve the matter."

Paragraphs 152 and 153 described Devloper-1's relinquishment of his

rights. On October 24, 2016, Developer-1 agreed to extinguish the Victor Lofts

view easement and sell his residential development property rights, rights of

first refusal, and $18 million in tax credits that accompanied the planned 11

Cooper development.

According to the indictment, although Developer-1 was "open to

extinguishing the Victor Lofts view easement," he "believed that it was worth

more than what he was ultimately paid for it." Developer-1 "also wanted to

participate in the residential redevelopment as part of the project with LPT" but

George's "threats . . . led Developer-1 to conclude that remaining in the project

– or sticking to his price for the value of his various rights – would lead [George]

to use his control of the Camden government to cause DPI financial harm."

Developer-1 "also feared [George] would attack his business in the media which

would cause his firm reputational harm."

In paragraphs 155 to 157, the indictment described Tambussi's efforts to

"Conceal" the "Enterprise's Plot" during the 2018 litigation between Developer

-1 and Tambussi's clients, the City and CRA, regarding the Radio Lofts site. We

A-1833-24 33 discuss those allegations below in the context of the assertions concerning Radio

Lofts.

In the sections that followed, the indictment detailed the Norcross

Enterprise's application for, and receipt of, tax credits for Triad1828 Centre and

11 Cooper, and asserted the credits were awarded "as a Result of Extorting

Developer 1's Interests." In particular, on October 24, 2016 – the same day

Developer-1 relinquished his rights outlined above – CSB, owned by George,

NFI, owned by Brown, and TMO, led by O'Donnell, applied for Grow NJ tax

credits, proposing to construct and relocate to an office building on the newly

acquired Triad parcel.

On March 24, 2017, tax credits were awarded to CSB for $86.2 million,

NFI for $79.3 million, and TMO for $79.3 million. The Triad1828 Centre was

owned by Camden Partners Tower Equities, which was comprised of limited

liability companies associated with George, Brown, and O'Donnell. CSB, NFI,

and TMO were the only tenants of the office building.

Each company applied for its first occupancy tax credit in 2021, received

approval in 2022, and sold the credit in 2022 or 2023. CSB sold its credit for

$7,933,677.84, NFI for $7,186,923.32, and TMO for $7,026,943.29 . Each firm

has "the right to seek Grow [NJ] tax credits for each year up to and including

A-1833-24 34 the 2030 calendar year." As of the return date of the indictment, CSB, NFI, and

TMO "received a total of at least $29 million" in credits.

11 Cooper was constructed by TMO and owned by CP Residential GSGZ

(CP Residential), which was owned by limited liability companies "that include

[George], [Brown], and [O'Donnell] as part of their ownership." CP Residential

applied for its first ERG tax credit for 11 Cooper in February 2022, received the

award in June 2022, and sold the credit in July 2022 for $2,179,220 .

In paragraphs 173 through 180, in a section titled "CFP CEO-1 Resigns

From CFP Under Threat of False Reputational Harm," the indictment described

allegations against the Enterprise members and associates for conduct occurring

in 2017, pertaining to CFP CEO-1. Specifically, in mid-2017, CFP CEO-1 met

with the then co-president and CEO of Cooper Health (Individual-2) and another

person. Individual-2 reported George "wanted to move people around in

Camden" and "disapproved of CFP CEO-1['s] remaining" in his position. CFP

CEO-1 responded "he was happy in his position and was not looking to leave."

In December 2017, CC-1 told CFP CEO-1 that Redd "needed a place to

go as her term as mayor was ending" and predicted: Redd would replace the

current CEO (Individual-1) of the Rowan University/Rutgers Camden Board of

Governors (Rowan/Rutgers Board); Individual-1 would assume CFP CEO's

A-1833-24 35 position; and CFP CEO-1 would be offered a position with the Camden County

Improvement Authority (CCIA). "CC-1 also told CFP CEO-1 that she needed

him to resign." Because resignation would cause CFP CEO-1 to forfeit his

bonus and any severance, and the CCIA position would pay "nearly $100,000

less than his current position," CFP CEO-1 protested. CC-1 responded,

"Tambussi had looked at CFP CEO-1's contract and said they could 'drive a truck

through it.'" CC-1 further stated if CFP CEO-1 did not resign, "'they' would just

make something up about him, which would lead to hi[s] being terminated for

cause."

CFP CEO-1 attempted to negotiate his exit, asking CC-1 to "restructure"

his severance package to give CC-1 "cover." CC-1 replied restructuring would

not give her "cover with George" and said "you don't want that fight ." CC-1

further stated, "If you don't think that he can't get to anybody he wants to, you're

kidding yourself . . . He has been relentless with me for the last year about why

we pay you so much money." CFP CEO-1 therefore "agreed to resign from CFP

at of the end of 2017" and was replaced by Individual-1. In turn, Individual-1

was replaced by Redd as CEO of the Rowan/Rutgers Board.

3. Radio Lofts

A-1833-24 36 In paragraphs 181 through 197, the indictment included allegations

pertaining to the Enterprise's "Point of Attack" to remove "Developer-1's option

to redevelop the Radio Lofts building." Under sections titled, "Camden

Officials Follow the Norcross Enterprise's Plan" and "The Enterprise Causes

Developer-1 to Give Up His Radio Lofts Rights," the indictment related the

Enterprise's conduct.

Around December 2017, Developer-1 agreed to sell six DPI properties,

including Victor Lofts and its PILOT program, to a real estate investment trust

(REIT). The sale of the PILOT agreement required the City Council's approval.

During a stakeholder meeting in March 2018, Philip suggested to "City

officials, including the City Attorney," and a CRA official that "the Victor

PILOT agreement transfer approval should be slowed down by the City in order

to create a 'legal strategy' to deal with Developer-1's Camden interests." Philip

further stated the "Victor PILOT agreement should be treated as a 'package

deal'" with DPI's Radio Lofts development options. Philip said, "the purpose of

slowing down the Victor PILOT agreement transfer approval was to cause

Developer-1 to forfeit DPI's option to redevelop Radio Lofts."

Also in March 2018, the CRA's executive director emailed Individual-1,

the new CFP CEO, and Lawyer-1, inquiring "how the CRA might 'unwind'

A-1833-24 37 Developer-1's rights to the Radio Lofts site." By March 28, 2018, the CRA

"prepared a draft letter purporting to terminate DPI's option agreement to

purchase Radio Lofts." On April 11, the plan was presented to the CRA board,

on April 13, REIT filed the application to transfer DPI's PILOT agreement, and

on April 20, the CRA sent DPI a letter "purporting to terminate its Radio Lofts

redevelopment option."

As of June 2018, DPI and REIT were unable to obtain information about

the PILOT transfer request. In response, DPI filed a lawsuit against the City,

the CRA, and their representatives. Tambussi, among other attorneys,

represented the CRA and the City. In response to the lawsuit, Philip provided

Tambussi "talking points," including "assertions that Developer-1 was

responsible for the failure to redevelop Radio Lofts and that the City of Camden

'will not be bullied or intimidated' by Developer-1's litigation tactics." Those

points were repeated by the City attorney to REIT concerning "the stalled

transfer of the PILOT agreement." The indictment stated the City filed a

countersuit, without asserting the specific claims.

Developer-1 moved pretrial to admit evidence that the opposing parties

"became adversarial to him beginning in 2016, while he was negotiating with

members and associates of the Norcross Enterprise." Tambussi filed an

A-1833-24 38 opposing motion to "preclude any reference" to George and Philip in the lawsuit.

During oral argument, Tambussi argued George and Philip were not parties to

the view easement transaction between LPT and Developer-1. The indictment

alleged conversely, the transaction "was consummated" at Philip's insistence

"through a four-party agreement among DPI; LPT; Camden Partners Land LLC

(an entity associated with [George, Brown, and O'Donnell]); and TMO."

In September 2023, the parties settled their claims. Developer-1 released

his Radio Lofts redevelopment option to the City, "sold a parking lot to the City

for $1," and agreed to pay the City $3.3 million. Developer-1 agreed to the

settlement even though he felt "he was in the right." The indictment explained

Developer-1 was concerned about "corruption" in the City, "which made him

believe that he would not be treated fairly by the court system, he had already

expended considerable funds on legal fees, and, even if he were successful,

pending appeals would interfere with his ability to refinance or sell the Victor."

The indictment alleged "as a result of the plan to delay approval of the Victor

PILOT agreement transfer, the Norcross Enterprise successfully caused

Developer-1 to forfeit his Radio Lofts development option."

A-1833-24 39 In paragraphs 198 through 211, the indictment detailed the personal

benefits received by the Enterprise members and entities. Those benefits

included tax credits, wages, and enhancement of the Enterprise's political power.

II. The Indictment's Charging Language

The indictment's thirteen counts and forfeiture provision comprised the

remainder of the charging instrument. Pertinent to this appeal, the racketeering

conspiracy charged in count one asserted nine "objects and purposes of the

[E]nterprise," including the "means" of achieving the same:

a. Preserving, protecting, promoting, and enhancing the power, reputation, and profits of the Enterprise and its members and associates;

b. Preserving, protecting, promoting, and enhancing the reputation and political power of [George], who was the leader of the Enterprise, through the use of various means, including controlling endorsements and access to the local political party apparatus, directing appointments to government positions, intimidating political opponents, using its influence and control over government agencies to cause opponents to lose government contracts;

c. Enriching and rewarding members, allies, and associates of the Enterprise, including with political endorsements, appointments to public positions, influencing government contracts, and placement in lucrative private sector jobs;

d. Influencing the New Jersey Legislature, which sits in Trenton, New Jersey, to pass the EOA in 2013 in a

A-1833-24 40 manner that greatly increased tax credit awards for projects in Camden and was tailor made to advance the interests of the Enterprise;

e. Obtaining Grow NJ and ERG tax credits over a 10- year period, beginning with the acquisition of the tax credits through applications to the EDA by the Enterprise members and associates and their associated firms, and by other means, and which, according to the Enterprise's plan, would be received during that 10-year period through annual certifications to the EDA;

f. Using the tax credits to pay for a building or buildings in Camden, which would be occupied by certain of the Enterprise members' firms, and firms associated with Enterprise members, and to cover the costs of Camden property occupied by firms associated with Enterprise members, so that costs expended in planning, constructing, or occupying such property would be offset by the application or sale of the tax credits;

g. Concealing, misrepresenting, and hiding the illegal operation of the Enterprise and acts done in furtherance of the Enterprise from the public and law enforcement, for the purpose of advancing the objectives of the Enterprise, including by misleading the public, law enforcement, the news media, and others into believing that the acquisition and sale of the tax credits stemmed from purely lawful activity, and thus avoiding attempts by the State to recapture the value of awarded tax credits;

h. Promoting compliance with the Enterprise's demands by retaliating against those in the way of and opposed to the Enterprise; and

A-1833-24 41 i. Using the Enterprise's reputation for controlling governmental entities to intimidate and threaten those who held property interests that the Enterprise wanted to acquire, including in order to apply for, and receive, Grow NJ and ERG tax credit awards.

In count two, conspiracy regarding the L3 Complex, the indictment

alleged, George, Philip, Redd, and Tambussi agreed, in pertinent part , to

commit:

(1) theft by extortion of CFP's property

by purposely threatening: (1) to take and withhold action as an official and cause an official to take and withhold action; and (2) to inflict a harm which would not substantially benefit . . . defendants, but which was calculated to materially harm [CFP], contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5;

(2) criminal coercion by agreeing to

[k]nowingly . . . threaten[ing] to: 1) take and withhold action as an official and cause an official to take and withhold action; and 2) to perform an act which would not in itself substantially benefit . . . defendants but which was calculated to substantially harm [CFP] and CFP CEO-1 with respect to their business, career, financial condition, and reputation, with purpose to unlawfully restrict CFP CEO-1's and [CFP]'s freedom of action from engaging in conduct and refraining from engaging in conduct, including, their choice in a developer, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5; [and]

(3) official misconduct

A-1833-24 42 in that [Redd], acting with the purpose to obtain a benefit for herself and another in excess of $200 and to injure another and deprive another of a benefit, did commit an act relating to her office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of her official functions, knowing that such act was committed in an unauthorized manner, that is, [Redd] then and there being a public servant, to wit, Mayor of the City of Camden, having thereby the official functions and duties, among others, to perform the duties of the office impartially, to supervise all of the departments of the City government, to supervise and direct all necessary public city functions, to conduct business according to the highest ethical standards of public service, to devote her best efforts to the interests of the city, to perform her duties in a legal and proper manner, to display good faith, honesty and integrity, and to be impervious to corrupting influences, did commit the acts described in Counts 1, 7, 8, 11, and the preceding sections of Count 2 of this Indictment, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2.

Count three, conspiracy regarding the Triad1828 Centre and 11 Cooper,

contained substantially similar charging language as count two on the criminal

coercion and official misconduct offenses. As to theft by extortion, the

indictment charged all defendants agreed to obtain DPI's and Developer-1's

view easement, right of first refusal, residential development rights, and tax credits, by purposely threatening to: 1) publicize any asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt and ridicule, and to impair his credit and business repute; 2) take and withhold action as an official and cause an official to take and withhold action; and 3) inflict a harm which would not

A-1833-24 43 substantially benefit . . . defendants, but which was calculated to materially harm [DPI] and Developer-1, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5.

Count four, conspiracy regarding Radio Lofts, charged George, Philip,

and Tambussi, agreed to commit theft by extortion and criminal coercion

offenses; count four did not allege official misconduct. More particularly, as to

theft by extortion, count four alleged George, Philip, and Tambussi agreed to:

Purposely and unlawfully . . . obtain by extortion property of [DPI], that is, property and development rights related to the Radio Lofts building, by purposely threatening to: 1) publicize any asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt and ridicule, and to impair his credit and business repute; 2) take and withhold action as an official and cause an official to take and withhold action; and 3) inflict a harm which would not substantially benefit . . . defendants, but which is calculated to materially harm [DPI] and Developer-1, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5.

As to criminal coercion, count four alleged George, Philip, and Tambussi

agreed to:

Knowingly . . . threaten to cause an official to take and withhold action, and perform any other act[, which] would not in itself substantially benefit . . . defendants but which was calculated to substantially harm [DPI] and Developer-1 with respect to their business, career, financial condition, and reputation, with purpose to unlawfully restrict [DPI]'s and Developer-l's freedom of action from engaging in conduct, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5.

A-1833-24 44 The remaining counts largely tracked the language of the underlying

statutes.

III. Governing Legal Principles - Indictments

"Under the New Jersey Constitution, no defendant may be compelled to

stand trial for a crime unless the State first presents the matter to a grand jury

and an indictment is returned." State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 12 (2006) (citing

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8). The grand jury is thus assigned the "constitutional role

of standing between citizens and the state." State v. Del Fino, 100 N.J. 154, 164

(1985). "[A]n indictment's 'primary purpose' is to enable a defendant to prepare

a defense by adequately describing the offense charged." State v. Jeannotte-

Rodriguez, 469 N.J. Super. 69, 103 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Rios, 17

N.J. 572, 603 (1955)).

Rule 3:7-3 prescribes certain requirements for an indictment's "[n]ature

and [c]ontents." An indictment "shall be a written statement of the essential

facts constituting the crime charged." R. 3:7-3(a). "It may be alleged in a single

count either that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are

unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specific means."

Ibid. "Allegations made in one count of the indictment . . . may be incorporated

by reference in another count." Ibid. Thus, when reviewing an indictment, a

A-1833-24 45 court must review the document in its entirety, with each part informing the

others. See State v. Wein, 80 N.J. 491, 499 (1979).

A speaking indictment, unlike a conventional indictment, is more detailed.

Although our courts have not addressed speaking indictments, let alone facial

challenges to such indictments, federal courts have done so. See, e.g. United

States v. Sittenfeld, 522 F. Supp. 3d 353, 366 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (undertaking a

facial challenge to a speaking indictment and recognizing the lack "of any

authority [anywhere] that explicitly recognizes" a "distinction between a

'speaking indictment' and a 'non-speaking indictment'").13

A defendant may move to dismiss an indictment pursuant to Rule 3:10-2.

But a defendant challenging an indictment faces a "heavy burden." State v.

Graham, 284 N.J. Super. 413, 417 (App. Div. 1995). That is because "[a]n

indictment is presumed valid," State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016), and

"should be disturbed only on 'the clearest and plainest ground,' and only when

13 Speaking indictments are more prevalent in federal court, but they are not without controversy. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence is Golden: The New Illinois Rules of Attorney Extrajudicial Speech, 33 Loyola Univ. Chi. L.J. 323, 373 (2002) (positing speaking indictments stand in for press conferences, allowing prosecutors to state everything they "would want to say in pretrial publicity in glorification of the case and in condemnation of the defendant" (quoting Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics, 233 (1990))). A-1833-24 46 the indictment is manifestly deficient or palpably defective." State v. Hogan,

144 N.J. 216, 228-29 (1996) (quoting State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 168 (1991)).

"The test of validity is whether the indictment in reasonably

understandable language charges the defendant with commission of the essential

factual ingredients of the offense." State v. Silverstein, 41 N.J. 203, 207 (1963);

see also R. 3:7-3(a). Stated another way, "if an indictment alleges all the

essential facts of the crime, the charge is sufficiently stated and the indictment

should not be dismissed unless its insufficiency is 'palpable.'" State v. N.J.

Trade Waste Ass'n, 96 N.J. 8, 19 (1984); see also State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513,

531-32 (2018). Sufficient specificality is necessary "to preclude the substitution

by a trial jury of an offense which the grand jury did not in fact consider or

charge." State v. LeFurge, 101 N.J. 404, 415 (1986) (quoting State v. Boratto,

80 N.J. 506, 519 (1979)). "[W]here the statute of limitations has run," an

indictment is deemed palpably defective. State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 182

(1953).

Ordinarily, an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion

to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion. Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 55

(2015). However, appellate courts "review a trial court's decision to dismiss an

indictment de novo" when "it did not involve 'a challenge to fact-finding on the

A-1833-24 47 part of the trial court.'" S.B., 230 N.J. at 67 (quoting State v. Cagno, 211 N.J.

488, 505 (2012)). We therefore conduct a de novo review of issues concerning

statutory construction, including the meaning of a statute's terms. See State v.

Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 638 (2015); see also State v. Bernardi, 456 N.J. Super.

176, 186 (App. Div. 2018) (recognizing appellate courts review de novo a trial

court's decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment "based on the court's

interpretation of the statutes pursuant to which [the] defendant was charged ").

Our review is de novo in the present matter because the motion court determined

the facts alleged in the indictment, "d[id] not constitute a crime . . . as a matter

of law" pursuant to the governing statutes and were time-barred under the

applicable statutes of limitations.

A. Procedural Review

As a threshold matter, the State argues the motion court improperly

penalized the prosecution and the grand jury by subjecting the detailed speaking

indictment to an elevated standard of review – dubbing it a "sufficiency-of-the-

evidence-on-the-face-of-the-indictment" test. Specifically, the State claims the

court inquired "whether there was sufficient evidence cited in the [i]ndictment

itself, without reviewing the reams of testimony and exhibits the grand jury

saw." The State maintains the present indictment is supported by the evidence

A-1833-24 48 presented to the grand jury and does not lend itself to a facial review as would

a conventional barebones indictment. The State further asserts the complexity

of the offenses charged implicated questions of fact on issues such as intent and

motive and, as such, defendants' challenges were ill-suited for pretrial

resolution, particularly without the color and context provided by the full grand

jury record.

In its decision, the court recognized most dismissal motions require trial

courts to review the "entire grand jury proceedings." Noting the State chose to

proceed via the "fairly rare" speaking indictment, the court found that option did

not "change the standards governing a motion to dismiss." The court

acknowledged the indictment did not constitute "a full proffer of the State's

case," but essentially found its nature and contents "open[ed] the door to the

facial challenge" brought by defendants.

The court was persuaded defendants' "purely legal" facial challenge was

appropriate for its review because defendants did not cite the grand jury record,

assumed the truth of the indictment's allegations, and assumed all allegations

"w[ere] adequately supported before the grand jury."14 The court thus framed

14 In its merits brief, the State notes the court therefore "did not consider the portions of Tambussi's brief that cited the grand[ ]jury transcripts and evidence, and the State did not respond to them." A-1833-24 49 defendants' argument as suggesting all essential facts of the offenses were

detailed in the indictment, and "those facts, accepted as true and construed in

the most favorable way to the State, d[id] not constitute a crime . . . as a matter

of law." Defendants thus contended "the indictment [wa]s manifestly deficient

and facially and palpably defective."

A facial challenge to an indictment is permissible provided the court's

review is limited to the legal sufficiency of the allegations, that is, whether the

allegations constitute an offense. See State v. Mason, 355 N.J. Super. 296, 299

(App. Div. 2002) (recognizing "where the indictment is factually unsupported

either on its face or in the grand jury proceedings, the dismissal is appropriate").

Facial sufficiency motions are well-established in our jurisprudence.

For example, in State v. Thompson, 402 N.J. Super. 177, 181 (App. Div.

2008), the indictment charged thirty-six counts of official misconduct and

related charges. The majority of these counts concerned the acceptance of gifts

by public officials from a vendor engaged in public bidding. Id. at 182-83. The

State alleged by failing to abide by their organization's code of conduct, which

forbade accepting gifts, the employees "refrain[ed] from performing an official

duty with a purpose to obtain a benefit." Id. at 184.

A-1833-24 50 The trial court in Thompson dismissed the official misconduct and related

charges "based upon legal insufficiency" and thus did not "reach defendants'

arguments that the evidence presented to the grand jury was factually

insufficient." Id. at 182. We affirmed, holding the ethics violations "standing

alone" did not provide a basis for the charges. Id. at 201. We therefore

concluded the charges stemming from the ethics violations alone were properly

dismissed. Id. at 204.

Thompson is not an outlier. Seventy-five years ago, in De Vita, this court

considered a pre-code indictment alleging the defendant "did unlawfully,

corruptly and wickedly entice, solicit and persuade [another] to abandon,

withdraw and alter his testimony," construed by the trial court as charging

suborning or attempting to suborn perjury. 6 N.J. Super. at 346. We rejected

the State's argument that the indictment's terms implied the defendant wished to

extract false testimony. Ibid. Concluding the text did not allege that fact, we

reversed the court's decision and dismissed the indictment. Ibid. Much more

recently, in Jeannotte-Rodriguez, we upheld the dismissal of an indictment

concluding, in part, "[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

the indictment on the grounds it omitted sufficient detail to enable [the]

defendants to defend." 469 N.J. Super. at 104; see also R. 3:10-2(d) (permitting

A-1833-24 51 dismissal motions where the defendant alleges "the indictment . . . fails to charge

an offense").

Measured against these standards, we discern no error in the motion

court's decision to conduct a facial review of the speaking indictment here. Our

state has long permitted facial challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment,

requiring the court to accept the truth of the indictment's allegations and decide

whether only those allegations constitute all elements of the offenses charged.

A facial review does not, however, permit a court to assess the evidentiary

strength of the State's case.

The parties have not provided, and our research has not disclosed, any

authority prohibiting a court from entertaining a facial sufficiency challenge to

a speaking indictment simply because it is a speaking indictment, or reviewing

the entire indictment in the process. Indeed, our Supreme Court has long

recognized the court's obligation to review the indictment in its entirety. See

Wein, 80 N.J. at 499. Although a motion court must not review the indictment

as though it were a complete statement of the State's evidence, there is no reason

a court should not pass judgment on the legal theories embodied in the

indictment. This approach is administrable, equitable, complies with existing

case law, and accords proper respect to the grand jury's role. If the theories of

A-1833-24 52 culpability embodied in the indictment do not constitute a crime on their face,

the court should dismiss the indictment. See State v. Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 93-94

(2018) (explaining "an indictment must allege all the essential facts of the

crime," and "specify" "every element" (first quoting LeFurge, 101 N.J. at 418;

and then quoting State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 633 (2004))); see also R. 3:7-

3(a). Accordingly, we conclude the motion court correctly conducted a facial

review of the indictment here.

B. Substantive Review: Statutes of Limitations and Validity of Charges

We turn to the State's challenges to the substance of the motion court's

decision. The State argues the court failed in its stated task and did not accept

the truth of the indictment's allegations and their reasonable inferences. Guided

by the tenor of defendants' arguments, the court's decision focused on the

absence of any alleged facts supporting the offenses charged. Distilled to its

essence, the court was persuaded overall that the facts alleged nothing more than

non-criminal "hard bargaining."

The court also found the offenses charged were time-barred. Because a

criminal charge filed beyond the statute of limitations "is tantamount to an

absolute bar to the prosecution of the offense," State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 55

A-1833-24 53 (1993), and renders the indictment palpably defective, Winne, 12 N.J. at 181-

82, we first consider the statutes of limitations pertaining to the present charges.

The State reiterates the motion court, in its purported facial review, failed

to accept as true the durations of the offenses as alleged in the indictment and

further erred by finding the offenses terminated around the time the development

deals were completed. According to the State, certain offenses are ongoing and

will continue until all tax credits associated with the redevelopments are

received; other offenses continued beyond the limitations periods because the

Enterprise members committed acts of concealment or "promot[ed] compliance"

through intimidation and other tactics. The State maintains the end dates, if any,

were questions of fact for the jury.

"A criminal statute of limitations is designed to protect individuals from

charges when the basic facts have become obscured by time." State v. Diorio,

216 N.J. 598, 612 (2014). "A statute of limitations balances the right of the

public to have persons who commit criminal offenses charged, tried, and

sanctioned with the right of the defendant to a prompt prosecution." Ibid.

Critically, such statutes "protect a defendant 'from being put to his defense after

memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has

been lost." State v. Rosado, 475 N.J. Super. 266, 273 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting

A-1833-24 54 State v. Thompson, 250 N.J. 556, 573 (2022)). They "provide predictability by

specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a

defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 534

(quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971)).

"Courts are bound to the statute of limitations and 'cannot unilaterally

nullify [its] protections.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Short, 131 N.J.

at 55). Moreover, the "statute of limitations is not intended to assist the State in

its investigations; it is intended to protect a defendant's ability to sustain his or

her defense." Id. at 539. Thus, where the State does not commence prosecution

within the relevant timeframe, the statute of limitations is a complete defense

and bar to prosecution. Thompson, 250 N.J. at 573.

As it relates to the date of accrual for a statute of limitations, N.J.S.A.

2C:1-6(c) states, in pertinent part: "An offense is committed either when every

element occurs or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of

conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the

defendant's complicity therein is terminated." Thus, for continuing offenses,

defined as "conduct spanning an extended period of time," which "generates

harm that continues uninterrupted until the course of conduct ceases," Diorio,

A-1833-24 55 216 N.J. at 614, the statute of limitations "does not begin to run until the

prohibited conduct ceases." Id. at 602.

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1) provides, in most cases, "prosecution for a crime

must be commenced within five years after it is committed." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-

6(b)(3) provides that official misconduct, among other crimes, must be

prosecuted within seven years after its commission. "Prosecution is commenced

when an indictment is returned." State v. Coven, 405 N.J. Super. 266, 272 (App.

Div. 2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(d)). As the motion court explained, in this

case, to comply with the applicable statutes of limitations, most of the charges

must have continued after June 13, 2019, except the official misconduct charges,

which must have continued after June 13, 2017.

1. RICO and General Conspiracies

The RICO and general conspiracies charged in the indictment are

continuing offenses. Cagno, 211 N.J. at 509 (RICO); Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 543

(conspiracy). Accordingly, a conspiracy terminates only when either "the crime

or crimes which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be

committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he [or she]

conspired." N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(f)(1); see also Cagno, 211 N.J. at 509-10.

A-1833-24 56 In its decision, the motion court characterized the indictment's statements

concerning the timeframe, and the Enterprise's purposes, as "allegations,

assertions, and, ultimately, conclusions" – "not facts." The judge was persuaded

"many critical events occurred prior to June 13, 2019." Following its summary

of those events described in the indictment, the court determined "[a]ny

extortion to obtain property was complete by 2019." The court rejected the

State's contentions that the RICO conspiracy was extended by defendants'

ongoing tax credit awards; "promoting compliance with the Enterprise's

demands" through intimidation and retaliation; and "concealing the illegal

activities of the Enterprise."

On appeal, the State reprises the same arguments. 15 We consider these

contentions seriatim.

a. Tax Credits

The motion court held the tax credits were not criminal proceeds, the

receipt of which would have extended the statutes of limitations. The judge

reasoned the indictment neither alleged "any business sought or received tax

credits for which it was not eligible" nor "fraud in the application process."

15 The State asserts the general conspiracy offenses, charged in counts two through four, are timely in much the same manner as the RICO conspiracy. A-1833-24 57 Because the tax credits were properly awarded, the court found their annual

distribution did not extend the time frame of the conspiracy. Citing federal case

law, the court was persuaded "a conspiracy for economic gain does not continue

until the accomplishment of the conspiracy's economic objectives if those

economic objectives are achieved through the receipt of serial payments that are

'lengthy, indefinite, ordinary . . . noncriminal and unilateral.'" See United States

v. Grimm, 738 F.3d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Doherty,

867 F.2d 47, 61 (1st Cir. 1989).

Again, we are confronted with an issue in this matter where the court and

the parties have not cited, and our research has not revealed, controlling

authority. Indeed, New Jersey law does not specifically articulate a framework

for analyzing ongoing payments to extend a conspiracy. On appeal, the parties

again address the issue through the lens of the Doherty/Grimm doctrine. The

State asserts the tax credits were a "central objective" of the conspiracy and thus

necessarily extend its life. Defendants counter under the Doherty/Grimm

doctrine, which they contend is consistent with New Jersey law, the long-term,

recurring award of tax credits cannot extend the life of a conspiracy. George

expressly argues to rule otherwise would "make every financial crime a

perpetual offense, thereby defeating the very purpose of a statute of limitations."

A-1833-24 58 In Doherty, the government alleged a conspiracy among several public

employees to steal, sell, and share an upcoming civil service examination for

promotion purposes. 867 F.2d at 51. The indictment asserted one of the

conspiracy's goals was to secure benefits including increased salary payments.

Id. at 56. The government argued the employees' salaries were the payoff of the

conspiracy, extending the statute of limitations as long as they were received.

Id. at 61.

The court in Doherty disagreed, cautioning that approach "would for all

practical purposes wipe out the statute of limitations in [these kinds of]

conspiracy cases." Id. at 62 (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,

402 (1957)). The court elaborated:

[W]here receiving the payoff merely consists of a lengthy, indefinite series of ordinary, typically noncriminal, unilateral actions, such as receiving salary payments, and there is no evidence that any concerted activity posing the special societal dangers of conspiracy is still taking place, we do not see how one can reasonably say that the conspiracy continues. Rather, in these latter circumstances, one would ordinarily view the receipt of payments merely as the "result" of the conspiracy.

[Id. at 61.]

In Grimm, the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to commit wire

fraud in a bond manipulation scheme. 738 F.3d at 500. In response to the

A-1833-24 59 defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment, "the district court dismissed the

wire fraud charge because the government had not alleged any activity within

the five-year limitations period, but declined to dismiss the conspiracy charges,

holding that the alleged conspiracies continued as long as [the] unindicted co-

conspirators . . . made interest payments on the [contracts at issue]." Id. at 501.

The Second Circuit reversed, clarifying the Doherty criteria. Id. at 504.

The court reasoned, "'[i]ndefinite' cannot mean 'without end.'" Id. at 503.

Rather, "[p]ayments can be 'indefinite' either in the sense that they are of

undetermined number or in the sense that they are prolonged beyond the near

future." Ibid. The court therefore held when "anticipated economic benefit

continues, in a regular and ordinary course, well beyond the period 'when the

unique threats to society posed by a conspiracy are present,'" those benefits are

"the result of a completed conspiracy" and "'[t]hough the result of a conspiracy

may be continuing, the conspiracy does not thereby become a continuing one.'"

Id. at 503-04 (first quoting Doherty, 867 F.2d at 62; and then quoting Fiswick

v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946)).

Although the Doherty/Grimm doctrine is not binding authority, we are

persuaded its rationale applies to the long-term, recurring receipt of tax credits.

We are particularly concerned that an alternative conclusion would render the

A-1833-24 60 statute of limitations a mere form of words when applied to certain conspiracy

prosecutions. Doherty, 867 F.2d at 62; see also Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402.

We therefore adopt the doctrine and bar the perpetual award of tax credits to

extend the life of a conspiracy.

Applying the Doherty/Grimm doctrine here, we accept at face value for

purposes of this analysis, the first count of the indictment alleged one of the

"objects and purposes" of the Enterprise was "[o]btaining Grow NJ and ERG tax

credits over a 10-year period," which would be utilized "to pay for a building or

buildings in Camden" occupied by firms of the Enterprise and its associates. 16

Notably, however, that object and purpose was similar in nature to the increase

of salary payments goal asserted in the Doherty indictment as they constituted

"the 'result' of the conspiracy," Doherty, 867 F.2d at 61, and were prolonged

"beyond the near future," Grimm, 738 F.3d at 503. We are therefore persuaded

the same factors underpinning the holdings in Doherty and Grimm – particularly

the long-term, recurring payments marked by no independent illegality – support

16 In addition, the specific factual allegations suggested the tax credits were not the ultimate goal of the conspiracies. As one notable example, the indictment alleged that George stated, in 2012 or 2013, "he wanted to be able to use the new legislation to construct an office building for free." On its face, this statement suggested the tax credits were a tool to achieve the true goal of the enterprise: the redevelopment projects. A-1833-24 61 the motion court's conclusion that, with the completion of the redevelopment

deals, the objects of the conspiracies were concluded. See N.J.S.A. 2C:5-

2(f)(1); see also Cagno, 211 N.J. at 509-10. We therefore reject the State's

renewed contention that the receipt of tax credits extended the RICO and general

conspiracies.

b. Concealment

We turn to the State's contention that "[d]efendants engaged in alleged

acts of concealment during and after October 2019" by making certain

statements. Citing Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 543, the motion court recognized these

statements were, at most, "mere overt acts of concealment," but found they

lacked the requisite "nexus, even inferential, between these statements and an

effort to keep the conspiracy active after the accomplishment of its core

objectives."

Under certain circumstances, acts of concealment that "have significance

in furthering a criminal conspiracy" can extend the applicable statute of

limitations. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 405. However, the Supreme Courts of the

United States and New Jersey have emphasized the "'vital distinction' 'between

acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the

conspiracy,' which extend the conspiracy and toll the statute of limitations, and

A-1833-24 62 'acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, for

the purpose only of covering up after the crime.'" Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 544

(quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 405). Thus, after the conspiracy's "central

criminal purposes" are accomplished, "a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may

not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy

was kept a secret and that the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in

order to escape detection and punishment." Ibid. (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S.

at 401-02).

A contrary rule "would for all practical purposes wipe out the statute of

limitations in conspiracy cases." Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402; see also Twiggs,

233 N.J. at 544. Accordingly, "prosecutors cannot 'extend the life of a

conspiracy indefinitely' by inferring a conspiracy to conceal 'from mere overt

acts of concealment.'" Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 543 (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S.

at 402). Instead, courts have required "an express original agreement among the

conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-

protection, traces of the crime after its commission." Ibid. (quoting Grunewald,

353 U.S. at 404).

The indictment in this case did not assert such an agreement, nor would

the alleged acts of concealment accomplish that purpose. Initially, the

A-1833-24 63 indictment identified a series of three media reports made between 2019 and

2022 that allegedly skew the facts around the L3 deal, implying CFP was out of

its league in the "redevelopment and management of a large[-]scale property,"

and Cooper Health was its heroic savior by "salvag[ing] the sale of the property."

Of the three reports, only one is attributed to a member of the conspiracy.

Tambussi allegedly told a reporter, during a recorded call with George on the

line, "CFP couldn't 'do the deal'" for the L3 Complex and, on behalf of Cooper

Health, its CEO "unilaterally agreed to a long-term lease . . . at an inflated rate."

Other examples of concealment identified in the indictment involved

Tambussi's litigation of the Radio Lofts case on behalf of CRA. The indictment

cited Tambussi's never-decided motion to preclude reference to George and

Philip, and Tambussi's statement, during argument on the motion, that the view

easement deal was between Developer-1 and LPT.

However, the indictment did not allege any facts indicating an "agreement

. . . to continue to act in concert in order to cover up" an offense. See Twiggs,

233 N.J. at 544 (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 404). As the motion court

found, the asserted conduct was, at worst, "acts of concealment done after these

A-1833-24 64 central objectives ha[d] been attained" and thus did not extend the statute of

limitations. See ibid. (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 405).17

c. Promoting Compliance

Nor are we persuaded by the State's renewed argument that the RICO

conspiracy's objective of "promoting compliance" through intimidation and

similar tactics extended the limitations period. To support its argument, the

State references the 2018-23 litigation between the City, CRA, and Developer-

1, but cites no authority in support of its contention. Because we conclude the

RICO and general conspiracies ended with the completion of the redevelopment

deals, we find insufficient merit in the State's promoting compliance argument

to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

2. Radio Lofts Conspiracy Exception

We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding the timeliness of the

conspiracy alleged in count four. This count essentially asserted between

17 It is not lost on us that labeling these statements as acts of concealment was not particularly plausible as they appear to be at cross purposes. Although Tambussi's media commentary on the L3 Complex exaggerated Cooper Health's role, his efforts in the Radio Lofts litigation sought to minimize the presence of George and Philip. Moreover, the indictment made clear their association and role in the redevelopment projects were no secret, as evidenced by their appearance alongside the then governor and others at the redevelopment launch press conference. A-1833-24 65 October 1, 2016 and October 31, 2023, George, Philip, and Tambussi agreed to:

"obtain by extortion property of [DPI], that is, property and development rights

related to the Radio Lofts building"; and "threaten to cause an official to take or

withhold action . . . to unlawfully restrict [DPI]'s and Developer-1's freedom of

action from engaging in [coercive] conduct." Assuming, without initially

deciding the indictment alleged a criminal offense, the prosecution of the

conspiracy, as asserted, was timely commenced.

As stated above, a conspiracy persists until "the crime or crimes which are

its object are committed." N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(f)(1). Extortion requires, as an

element, that the defendant "obtains property." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5. As charged

in count four, criminal coercion, as an element, required George, Philip, and

Tambussi to obtain property from Developer-1 by "threaten[ing] to cause an

official to take or withhold action." Developer-1 did not surrender his rights to

Radio Lofts until 2023. Pursuant to our holding that the general conspiracies

ended when the redevelopment deals were completed, we conclude count four,

on its face, asserted a timely conspiracy because the limitations period was

extended through and including the 2023 date of the Radio Lofts closing. We

therefore turn to the validity of the Radio Lofts conspiracy charge.

A-1833-24 66 The State generally argues "the [i]ndictment validly charge[d]

conspiracies to extort and coerce through threats of government and reputational

harm." In view of our decision that all counts, except for count four, failed to

charge timely conspiracies, we confine our review to the Radio Lofts

conspiracy.

In its merits brief, the State claims, "[b]etween 2018 and 2023,

[d]efendants worked together to use their control over [the] Camden government

to leverage Developer-1's interests in the Radio Lofts and Victor Lofts

properties." The State maintains Philip "instructed local officials to slow down

the approval" of Developer-1's PILOT transfer "and treat it as a 'package deal'

with Developer-1's option to redevelop Radio Lofts." In doing so, Philip

allegedly said, "the purpose of linking the two interests was to cause Developer-

1 to forfeit his Radio Lofts redevelopment option, which George . . . had earlier

identified as 'another point of attack on' Developer-1." According to the State,

as a result of Philip's instruction, "the City withheld approval for the PILOT

transfer" and "the CRA moved to terminate Developer-1's option agreement to

redevelop Radio Lofts." The State further contends, in response, Developer-1

filed the 2018 litigation "against the City, CRA, and related officials" and

ultimately settled the litigation even though he "believe[d] he was in the right."

A-1833-24 67 George counters the indictment failed to assert any Norcross Enterprise

member threatened Developer-1, invalidating any claim of extortion or criminal

coercion that could support the conspiracy charge. Further, no member of the

Enterprise acquired Developer-1's rights to Radio Lofts. Philip contends there

is no allegation in the indictment that the statements attributed to him "were

communicated or intended to be communicated to [Developer-1]."

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a) defines conspiracy as follows:

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he [or she]:

(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

An "agreement to commit a specific crime is at the heart" of the conspiracy

statute. State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 245 (2007). The State must prove the

defendant either agreed with another to engage in criminal conduct or agreed to

aid the other in planning or committing the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a). "The

mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the substantive offense, without

A-1833-24 68 an agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish one as a participant in a

conspiracy." State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390, 401 (App. Div. 1992).

Rather, the defendant must have "intentional[ly] participat[ed] in the

activity with a goal of furthering the common purpose." Ibid.; see also Model

Jury Charges (Criminal), "Conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2)" at 1 (rev. Apr. 12,

2010) (instructing the defendant must have acted with purpose). The State need

not prove the underlying offense was committed; "it is the agreement that is

pivotal." Samuels, 189 N.J. at 245-46. But the elements of the conspiracy

charged in the indictment must be considered vis-à-vis the underlying offense

or offenses. Id. at 246.

The underlying offenses charged in the Radio Lofts conspiracy include

certain provisions of the theft by extortion and criminal coercion statutes.

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 provides, in pertinent part:

A person is guilty of theft by extortion if he [or she] purposely and unlawfully obtains property of another by extortion. A person extorts if he [or she] purposely threatens to:

....

c. Expose or publicize any secret or any asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;

A-1833-24 69 d. Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action; [or]

g. Inflict any other harm which would not substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to materially harm another person.

The correlating model jury charge describes the elements of the offense

as follows:

1. That defendant obtained the property of another.

2. That defendant obtained that property purposely and unlawfully.

3. That defendant obtained the property by extortion.

[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Theft by Extortion (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5)" at 2 (rev. June 5, 2006).]

Pertinent to this appeal, the term, "[o]btain in relation to property means

to bring about a transfer or an apparent transfer of a legal interest in the property,

either to the defendant or to another." Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1(f).

Extortion requires that a person purposely threatens to commit any of the acts

enumerated in the statute, including those cited above. See id. at 3-4.

Similarly, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a) provides, in pertinent part:

A person is guilty of coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to

A-1833-24 70 engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he [or she] threatens to:

(4) Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action; [or]

(7) Perform any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to substantially harm another person with respect to his [or her] health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

In the accompanying model jury charge, the elements of criminal coercion

are stated as follows:

(1) that the defendant threatened to (choose from [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5] (a)(1) to (7)); and

(2) that the defendant acted with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct.

[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Criminal Coercion (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5)" at 1-2 (approved Jan. 11, 2016).]

"Our interpretation of a statute is guided by well-established principles."

State v. Oliver, 482 N.J. Super. 401, 418 (App. Div. 2025). As we recently

reiterated in Oliver:

A-1833-24 71 "The overriding goal of all statutory interpretation 'is to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent.'" The plain text of a statute "is the 'best indicator' of legislative intent." "The '[c]ourt may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'"

Accordingly, "[w]hen the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear and unambiguous result, the interpretive process comes to a close, without the need to consider extrinsic aids. When the plain language is ambiguous, however, [courts] consider extrinsic interpretative aids, including legislative history." "If an ambiguity in a criminal statute is not resolved by reviewing the text and extrinsic sources, the rule of lenity dictates that the ambiguities must be interpreted in favor of the defendant." We do so mindful that "penal statutes are to be strictly construed."

[482 N.J. Super. at 418 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]

Applying these principles of construction here, it is clear the language of

the theft by extortion and criminal coercion statutes largely overlaps. Compare

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5(d), with N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a)(4); compare N.J.S.A. 2C:20-

5(g), with N.J.S.A. 2C:13-(a)(7). All sections of both statutes require the

commission of a threat. Although neither statute nor our case law expressly

defines the term, "threat" specific to the extortion or criminal coercion context,

neither statute purports to cover all threats. Rather, the identified threats must

A-1833-24 72 fall within the ambit of one of the definite categories, or the remaining catch-all

category. As the model jury charges make clear, the type of threat employed is

an element of the offense. Accordingly, the type of threat must be supplied on

the face of the indictment and cannot be left to presumption. See De Vita, 6 N.J.

Super. at 347.

Both statutes also apply only where a defendant intends to achieve the

goal through the threat itself, not through the threatened action. N.J.S.A. 2C:20 -

5 applies where a defendant "purposely . . . obtains property by extortion," and

defines "extortion" as making certain threats. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 applies where a

person makes threats "with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of

action." This interpretation of the text is bolstered by the existence of other

statutes criminalizing the taking of either property or free choice by act rather

than threat. See State v. Churchdale Leasing, 115 N.J. 83, 104 (1989)

(remarking "the Legislature 'ordinarily does not intend to punish the same

offense under two different statutes'" (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.

684, 692 (1980))).

For example, an individual who obtains property of another by threatening

to inflict bodily injury or physical confinement, faces charges of extortion.

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5(a). But if the individual obtains the same property by actually

A-1833-24 73 inflicting bodily injury or actually subjecting a victim to physical confinement,

the individual faces charges of robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), or kidnapping,

N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(a). It follows, then, that reliance on a threat – rather than on

the threatened action – is a necessary element of the offenses underlying the

remaining timely Radio Lofts conspiracy.

In addition, the primary difference between N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 and N.J.S.A.

2C:13-5 is the actor's purpose: extortion is designed to "obtain[] property of

another," N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5; coercion seeks to "restrict another's freedom of

action," N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5. The specific intent elements are particularly crucial

because, without the need for an improper purpose, both statutes would

criminalize a wide array of otherwise permissible behavior. See, e.g., State v.

Roth, 289 N.J. Super. 152, 158 n.4. (App. Div. 1995) (explaining that "many of

the threats criminalized by the [extortion] statute 'would be perfectly appropriate

if made without a demand for property'" (quoting Cannel, New Jersey Criminal

Code Annotated, cmt. 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 (1995))).

In Roth, the defendant was convicted of theft by extortion after

threatening "to file a motion to set aside a sheriff's sale unless the successful

bidder paid him $2,000." Id. at 155. The defendant, charged under the

"catchall" subsection of N.J.S.A. 20C:20-5(g), argued he stood to "substantially

A-1833-24 74 benefit" by challenging the sale and therefore did not fall within the ambit of the

statute. Id. at 158. We rejected the argument that defendant, who was strapped

for cash and not a serious participant in the market, could "substantially benefit"

either by promoting general competition or overturning the sale. Id. at 158-59.

The defendant's final argument, that his threat was no more than "an offer

to settle a legitimate lawsuit," relied on the 1971 Commentary to the New Jersey

Penal Code. Id. at 160 (citing 2 The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of

the New Jersey Law Revision Commission § 2C:20-5, at 227-28 (1971) (1971

Commentary)). We recognized:

The 1971 Commentary acknowledges that a law which included every threat made for the purpose of obtaining property would encompass a significant portion of "accepted economic bargaining." Ibid. (emphasis added). Therefore, certain commercial or economic menaces have been excluded from the purview of the statute, such as threats

to breach a contract, to persuade others to breach their contracts, to infringe a patent or trade[]mark, to change a will or persuade another to change a will, to refuse to do business or to cease doing business, to sue, to vote stock one way or another. For the most part these are situations in which a private property economy must tolerate considerable "economic coercion" as an incident to free bargaining. Civil remedies are usually adequate to deal with abuse of the privilege.

A-1833-24 75 [Id. at 160-61 (second emphasis and third emphasis – from "to refuse" to "to sue" – added) (quoting 1971 Commentary, at 227-28).]

However, we disputed the defendant's reliance on this provision and his

characterization of the "offer to settle." Id. at 160-61. In so doing, we

"reject[ed] the notion that the 1971 Commentary merely requires a threat to

assume the guise of a lawsuit to bypass the statute's mandate of a substantial

benefit." Id. at 161. We held "before exempting threats otherwise considered

illegal under this provision, the Code drafters intended an economic or

commercial nexus to exist between the actor who utters these 'protected' threats

and the underlying transaction." Ibid.

Although we decided Roth in 1996, we are unaware of any cases that have

either applied or overturned this aspect of its holding in the intervening years.

The State argues the court's focus in Roth was limited to a violation of N.J.S.A.

2C:20-5(g), whereas the indictment in the present matter also cited subsections

(c) and (d), along with N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5. See Roth, 289 N.J. Super. at 155.

In our view, however, Roth's holding applies to all subsections of the theft

by extortion statute, as the 1971 Commentary demonstrates. The 1971

Commentary's discussion of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 is comprised of a "General

Scope" portion, followed by individual portions for each statutory subsection.

A-1833-24 76 1971 Commentary § 2C:20-5, at 227-30. The economic bargaining exemptions

are located in the "General Scope" portion, suggesting they apply to all

subsections. Id. at 227. Moreover, because the threats proscribed under

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 and N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 are similar, as expressly cross-

referenced in the text of the 1971 Commentary, we discern no reason why the

economic bargaining exemptions would not apply to the coercion statute. See

1971 Commentary § 2C:13-5, at 189 (recognizing "[t]he threats here outlawed

parallel those found in the Theft by Extortion provision (Section 2C:20 -5)").18

Against these principles, we turn to the viability of the Radio Lofts

conspiracy as alleged in count four of the indictment. Based on our de novo

review, we conclude the indictment did not satisfy the elements of conspiracy

to extort or coerce Developer-1 to relinquish his Radio Lofts rights.

As a preliminary matter, the indictment did not allege an agreement

among George, Philip, and Tambussi to extort or coerce Developer-1 to

relinquish his rights to Radio Lofts. See Samuels, 189 N.J. at 245. The

indictment contained limited factual allegations connecting defendants to Radio

18 Exempting a wider swathe of economic behavior is consistent with federal practice. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 523 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing "fear of economic loss is a driving force of our economy that plays an important role in many legitimate business transactions"). A-1833-24 77 Lofts: in a number of October 2016 phone calls, George suggested the Radio

Lofts rights should be condemned or could be used as leverage for the LPT deal.

Philip replied it was better to focus on extinguishing the Victor Lofts view

easement. Around the same time, LPT drafted a proposed deal based on George

and Philip's negotiations with Developer-1 that would require LPT and Camden

Partners to support and facilitate Developer-1's Radio Lofts redevelopment

efforts. Then, in a March 2018 "stakeholders" meeting with City officials, Philip

suggested the City delay Developer-1's request to transfer the Victor PILOT

agreement as leverage to induce him to surrender the Radio Lofts redevelopment

rights. No other defendants were alleged to have been present. Tambussi,

among other attorneys, represented the City and the CRA when, as a result of

the delay, Developer-1 sued.

None of these allegations suggested an agreement. The 2016 call alleged,

if anything, a disagreement. The draft deal suggested LPT and the Enterprise

members foresaw Developer-1's retaining his Radio Loft rights. Philip was the

only defendant at the March 2018 meeting, just as Tambussi was the only

defendant who represented the CRA following Developer-1's lawsuit. No

further facts demonstrating coordination were alleged. Nor did the allegations

suggest a unity of purpose as George appeared to view the Radio Lofts rights as

A-1833-24 78 a "pressure" point to advance the LPT deal completed in late 2016, well before

Philip broached the issue with City officials in March 2018.

Even if the indictment were construed to allege an agreement, however,

the putative threats identified for this offense did not fit the necessary criteria

for theft by extortion or criminal coercion. The indictment did not allege

George, Philip, or Tambussi – or any member of the Enterprise – conveyed or

caused to be conveyed, a threat to Developer-1 related to the Radio Lofts

settlement. Instead, the indictment asserted Developer-1 identified general

notions of corruption and the cost of litigation as the motivation for the

settlement – not a threat from an Enterprise member.

Criminal coercion and theft by extortion require the defendant make a

threat with purpose to either exert control over, or extract property from, a

victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5. "A person acts purposely with

respect to the nature of his [or her] conduct or a result thereof if it is his [or her]

conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result."

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1). If the defendant does not expect a threat to reach a

victim, the defendant's conscious object cannot plausibly be to manipulate the

victim with that threat. Cf. State v. Crescenzi, 224 N.J. Super. 142, 146-47

(App. Div. 1988) (approving of a conviction for "knowingly attempt[ing]" to

A-1833-24 79 tamper with a witness where the defendant knew that his threats would reach

their target "or that there was a high probability thereof"); cf. also State v.

Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108, 121-22 (2007) (recognizing a terroristic threat need not

be conveyed "directly to the victim for the threat to be actionable," but must be

made "with the purpose to put [the other] in imminent fear" (alteration in

original) (first citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 403 (1998); and then

quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b))).

Yet in this case, the indictment did not allege that any such

communication occurred or was anticipated. More particularly, the indictment

disclosed private conversations among Enterprise members in October 2016,

during which they discussed the possibility of advocating for a condemnation

action against Developer-1. However, these discussions were focused on a

possible condemnation of the Victor Lofts view easement to facilitate the LPT

deal that would lead to Triad1828 Centre and 11 Cooper. While George raised

the possibility of exerting pressure via Radio Lofts, Philip dismissed the idea

and the focus remained on the view easement.

In any event, there was no allegation in the indictment that Developer-1

was made aware of these conversations, defendants intended to inform him of

them, or there was a high probability these statements would reach him. Further,

A-1833-24 80 according to the indictment, while the Enterprise already was pursuing the

condemnation action, George and Philip spoke with Developer-1 and his

attorney and did not mention the possibility of condemnation. Nor did the

indictment allege any Enterprise member threatened Developer-1 with potential

legal or regulatory actions.

Equally, the indictment did not allege when Philip discussed Developer-

1's Radio Lofts rights at a March 2018 "stakeholder" meeting, that discussion

was ever brought to Developer-1's attention. According to the indictment, Philip

suggested to City officials that they "slow[] down" the approval to "create a

'legal strategy' to deal with Developer-1's Camden interests" and "cause

Developer-1 to forfeit DPI's option to redevelop Radio Lofts." 19 City officials

then proceeded by sending a letter purporting to unilaterally terminate the

redevelopment option. Neither the plan suggested by Philip, nor the action

executed by the City, is alleged to have been communicated to Developer-1 in

advance. Thus, the indictment did not assert Developer-1 was subject to any

19 The indictment appeared to assume, without explanation, that the PILOT transfer would be approved. Likewise, the indictment did not indicate the context of Philip's statements, that is, whether he was responding to a question or offering unprompted advice. A-1833-24 81 extortionate or coercive threats as a result of the 2018 meeting, nor that

defendants planned such a threat.

Moreover, the indictment stated CRA and CFP officials conferred among

themselves, the CRA prepared a letter "purporting to terminate" Developer-1's

redevelopment rights, and the CRA board thereafter approved a termination

action. According to the indictment, Developer-1 became aware of the potential

foreclosure and associated legal action against him on April 20, 2018, when the

CRA sent correspondence stating his redevelopment rights were terminated.

Developer-1 then sued the City and the CRA resulting in a settlement five years

later. The indictment did not allege any defendants were parties to the lawsuit,

or that they received the settlement proceeds.

In summary, because the indictment: (1) did not allege any Enterprise

members threatened or planned to threaten Developer-1 to transfer his rights to

Radio Lofts; (2) did not assert the defendants named in count four, or any

Enterprise member received, or aimed to receive, Radio Lofts property; and (3)

affirmatively alleged Developer-1 relinquished his property as the result of a

lawsuit he initiated against the City, the indictment did not assert a conspiracy

A-1833-24 82 to commit either extortion or coercion. We therefore discern no error in the

court's dismissal of count four on the merits. 20

3. Financial Facilitation

The financial facilitation offenses, charged in counts five through ten, all

were premised on the concept that the tax credits associated with the various

development projects constituted "property known or which a reasonable person

would believe to be derived from criminal activity." N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25. Stated

another way, the State argues tax credits, as pled in the indictment, represented

proceeds of criminal activity. Because the facial deficiency of these charges

confounds a statute of limitations analysis, we address the merits.

Diorio is instructive. The Court observed N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25 "requires

two 'transactions,' (1) the underlying criminal activity generating the property,

and (2) the money-laundering transaction where that property is either (a) used

to facilitate or promote criminal activity, or (b) concealed, or 'washed.'" 216

N.J. at 622 (quoting State v. Harris, 373 N.J. Super. 253, 266 (App. Div. 2004)).

20 Because we conclude the indictment failed to allege an Enterprise member threatened Developer-1 to relinquish his Radio Lofts rights – and the conspiracies alleged in counts one through three were time-barred – we have no occasion to reach whether any purported threats fell within the economic bargaining exemptions under the extortion and coercion statutes. A-1833-24 83 Crucially, then, criminal activity must "generat[e]" property and the defendant

must transact "that property." Ibid.

Here, the indictment charged defendants with possessing or transacting

tax credits, but the tax credits were not "generated" by criminal activity. As the

motion court found, the government awarded tax credits pursuant to legitimate

applications – and the State does not contend otherwise. At most, the alleged

criminal acts generated property rights. The redevelopment projects eventually

yielded occupiable property that, in turn, made certain defendants eligible for

tax credits. Because the property "generated" from criminal activity was not the

same property alleged to have been transacted, the financial facilitation offenses

charged are not viable.

4. Corporate Misconduct

Little need be said regarding the corporate misconduct offenses charged

in counts eleven and twelve. Both counts alleged defendants "use[d],

control[led], and operate[d]" various corporations to promote, among other

things, financial facilitation. Count eleven related to Cooper Health and the L3

deal, and count twelve related to Triad1828, 11 Cooper, and the associated

companies. Both counts relied on the underlying charges of theft by extortion,

criminal coercion, financial facilitation, and, in count twelve, official

A-1833-24 84 misconduct. As we have explained, each of the underlying charges failed either

because they were time-barred or facially deficient. It therefore follows counts

eleven and twelve similarly fail.

5. Official Misconduct

In count thirteen, the indictment alleged all defendants violated subsection

(a) of the official misconduct statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, between January 1, 2014

and December 31, 2017. The motion court found Redd undertook no criminal

action after the statute of limitations for this offense expired in June 2017.

Having left her mayoral position on January 1, 2018, the court rejected the

State's argument that Redd obtained her 2018 position at Rowan/Rutgers as "a

reward for faithful service and fidelity to the Enterprise," finding instead she

simply "got a new job at a time she needed one." The court deemed the State's

theory "that the job was a quid pro quo and a financial reward for corrupt

participation . . . conclusory supposition." Finding Redd's actions between 2013

and 2016 "clearly time-barred," the court concluded, "[a]ll she did after June

2017 was finish her term and get a job."

As to the validity of the charge, the motion court found for each act in the

indictment attributed to Redd, she acted within her rights by not exercising the

powers of her office beyond their authorization or withholding action she was

A-1833-24 85 compelled to take. The court further found the indictment failed to allege facts

supporting the conclusion Redd received any reward from the Enterprise, much

less that her actions were dictated by the prospect of receiving an award.

Consistent with its global statute of limitations argument, the State

maintains Redd was a member of the Enterprise, which existed for the purpose

of receiving tax credits, and assisted the Enterprise throughout her mayoral term.

Alternatively, the State contends the indictment validly alleged Redd received

the Rowan/Rutgers position as "a benefit for her participation."

As to the validity of the charge, the State contends the court's analysis was

inappropriately exacting, imposing too high a standard for showing an official

duty, breach, and intent. The State argues Redd committed four acts that fall

under the statute: (1) "instructing the CFP CEO to meet regularly with members

of the Enterprise to ensure that CFP's projects were pre-approved . . . and

redirect[ing] CFP's CEO to Philip . . . when he came to her for help"; (2)

"[c]utting off communication with Developer-1 and ignoring his requests for

help with the Radio Lofts"; (3) "[a]greeing to use the Enterprise's

reputation . . . to help intimidate and threaten"; and (4) "[t]elling CFP's CEO

that his 'job was in jeopardy' for resisting the Enterprise's demands." The State

A-1833-24 86 notes, "[i]f a duty is required, the court overlooked that Redd owed a duty to

serve the public with good faith and integrity."

Pertinent to this appeal, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2:

A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with purpose to obtain a benefit for himself [or herself] or another or to injure or to deprive another of a benefit:

a. He [or she] commits an act relating to his [or her] office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his [or her] official functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized or he [or she] is committing such act in an unauthorized manner[.]

Accordingly, under subsection (a) of the official misconduct statute, the

indictment must allege the defendant: (1) "was a 'public servant' within the

meaning of the statute"; (2) acted "with the purpose to obtain a benefit or deprive

another of a benefit"; (3) "committed an act relating to but constituting an

unauthorized exercise of [his or] her office"; and (4) knew "such act was

unauthorized or that [he or] she was committing such act in an unauthorized

manner." State v. Bailey, 251 N.J. 101, 129 (2022) (quoting Saavedra, 222 N.J.

at 58); see also Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Official Misconduct (N.J.S.A.

2C:30-2)" at 1 (rev. Sept. 11, 2006) (setting forth the elements of the offense).

"[T]he benefit can be obtained for the actor or 'another.'" State v.

A-1833-24 87 Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115, 144 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting N.J.S.A.

2C:30-2); see also Bailey, 251 N.J. at 129.

Pursuant to the official misconduct statute, a defendant can be found

guilty only if the alleged misconduct was "sufficiently related" to the defendant's

role as a public employee or official, or his or her official duties. State v. Kueny,

411 N.J. Super. 392, 407 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v. Hinds, 143 N.J.

540, 546 (1996)). "It is insufficient to show that an act of misconduct was

'committed by a person who happens to be a public officer.'" State v. Gibson,

___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2025) (slip op. at 26-27) (quoting

Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. at 144). "There must be a relationship between

the misconduct and public office of the wrongdoer, and the wrongdoer must rely

upon his or her status as a public official to gain a benefit or deprive another. "

Kueny, 411 N.J. Super. at 407. Acts that are only tangentially related to a

defendant's office do not fall under this statute. See State v. DeCree, 343 N.J.

Super. 410, 418 (App. Div. 2001) (holding the defendant's participation in a

fraud scheme was not official misconduct because it "had nothing to do" with

her particular office and "everything to do with her public employment and

participation in the State Health Benefits Program").

A-1833-24 88 "Moreover, the indictment charging official misconduct must allege both

the prescribed duty of the office and facts constituting a breach thereof ."

Thompson, 402 N.J. Super. at 192 (quoting Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. at

144). A qualifying duty may be assigned by law or arise out of the particular

nature of the office. See ibid. To violate the statute the actor must "knowing[ly]

fail[] to perform a duty." Id. at 198. "The duty must be 'one that is unmistakably

inherent in the nature of the public servant's office, i.e., the duty to act is so clear

that the public servant is on notice as to the standards that he [or she] must

meet.'" Ibid. (quoting Hinds, 143 N.J. at 545-46).

We turn to the State's assertion that Redd's Rowan/Rutgers hiring in 2018

extended the seven-year statute of limitations for official misconduct. Based on

our review of the indictment, the charge itself failed to allege Redd's

Rowan/Rutgers CEO position was the benefit she acted with purpose to obtain.

Rather, the thrust of the indictment was that Redd acted to obtain benefits for

the Enterprise and to deprive the putative victims, CFP and Developer-1, of

benefits. The Rowan/Rutgers position, conversely, was not mentioned until

December 2017, well after both redevelopment deals were completed and after

any alleged interactions between Redd and CFP and Developer-1.

A-1833-24 89 These allegations on their face did not allege Redd committed the alleged

acts of misconduct with the intent or expectation she would receive the

Rowan/Rutgers position. A more natural reading suggests she intended, at

worst, to transfer benefits from CFP and Developer-1 to the other defendants

and their associates. Because Redd's last act involving the real estate dealings

occurred in 2016, when she allegedly stopped returning Developer-1's calls, at

the latest, the offense concluded at that time.

The State asserts in a footnote if receipt of compensation did not extend

the statute of limitations, "a corrupt official could evade the limitations period

by instructing a bribe-payer to deliver funds seven years and a day after she

leaves office—at which point it would be too late. That cannot be right."

Indeed, it is not right. Neither the official misconduct nor bribery statute

requires actual receipt of payment; purpose, offers, solicitations, and agreements

suffice. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2; cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2; In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 564-

65 (1984) (discussing the defendant's three bribery convictions, two where "he

received the money" and a third conviction where "he solicited the bribe but

never received it"). Thus, a delayed payout scheme would not prevent

immediate prosecution. Alternatively, an express agreement to commit

A-1833-24 90 misconduct, conceal that misconduct for seven years, then exchange payment

would constitute an actionable conspiracy.

However, just as the State cannot rely on "mere overt acts of concealment"

to "wipe out the statute of limitations" and "extend the life of a conspiracy

indefinitely," Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, we hold the State cannot rely on the

mere receipt of a benefit, which is not an element of the offense, to extend the

life of an official misconduct charge indefinitely. The State's proposed

framework, where a payment could revivify an otherwise time-barred

prosecution when the indictment did not allege an express agreement for such

payment, would impermissibly permit any gift Redd received from an alleged

Enterprise member – no matter how remote or unsought – to reset the clock,

contravening the right to "prompt prosecution." Diorio, 216 N.J. at 612. We

therefore conclude, as a matter of law, the official misconduct offense charged

in count thirteen was time-barred.

* * * * *

In conclusion, notwithstanding the duration of the grand jury proceedings,

the undisputed voluminous record considered by the grand jurors, and the

resultant lengthy speaking indictment, we discern no error in the motion court's

decision to entertain defendants' facial challenges. Pursuant to our de novo

A-1833-24 91 facial review of the indictment, for the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded the

offenses underlying the conspiracies charged in counts one through three, and

the official misconduct charge asserted in count thirteen, were untimely and, as

such, palpably defective, see Winne, 12 N.J. at 181-82; counts four through ten

failed to state the offenses charged; and counts eleven through twelve were time-

barred and otherwise failed to state an offense. Our decision does not prevent

the State from re-presenting any counts not barred by the applicable statutes of

limitations.

In view of our disposition, we need not consider the "routine practice of

law" arguments raised by Philip and Tambussi, as supported by Legal Amici.

To the extent not addressed, any remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

The interim stay issued by the motion court on February 26, 2025 is

vacated, subject to the parties' rights to pursue an appeal in the Supreme Court

within forty-five days. If an application is filed within that time frame, the stay

shall remain in force until such time as the Court may direct.

Affirmed.

A-1833-24 92