NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0916-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
B.C.L.,1
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Argued January 5, 2026 – Decided July 22, 2026
Before Judges Natali and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Accusation No. 24-04- 0437.
Patricia B. Quelch argued the cause for appellant (Helmer Conley & Kasselman, P.A., attorneys; Patricia B. Quelch, of counsel and on the brief).
Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Linda Estremera, Middlesex County
1 We use initials to identify the juvenile defendant and the witnesses to protect their identities. Rule 1:38-3(d)(5). Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Faced with multiple, serious charges lodged in a juvenile delinquency
complaint, including delinquency that if committed by an adult would constitute
the crime of first-degree purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), defendant
B.C.L. voluntarily agreed to waive his case to the Law Division, Criminal Part
for prosecution as an adult pursuant to a "global plea resolution." After a
hearing, the court granted defendant's request and the matter proceeded in adult
court where that same day defendant waived his right to an indictment and pled
guilty to reduced charges of second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
5(a), and second-degree knowingly leaving the scene of an accident that resulted
in death, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. The court accepted defendant's plea and sentenced
him consistent with the plea agreement to consecutive five-year sentences to be
served in the custody of the Juvenile Justice Commission, subject further to an
eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and assessed applicable fines and penalties.
Without first seeking to vacate his plea in the trial court, defendant now
challenges the court's decisions to grant his voluntary waiver application as well
as his sentence. He also, for the first time before us, asserts his plea counsel's
A-0916-24 2 performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-part test detailed in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for failing to advise him
properly regarding his plea agreement.
For the reasons that follow, we reject defendant's challenges to the court's
decision to grant his waiver application, or to his sentence, and accordingly
affirm the orders under review. We expressly do not address defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of this direct appeal, and
instead reserve defendant's right to assert those claims in a separate post -
conviction relief petition.
I.
We discern the following facts from the appellate record, police reports,
court proceedings, defendant's plea colloquy, juvenile delinquency complaints,
and pre-sentence report. On December 4, 2023, Old Bridge police responded to
a call about a person struck by a car in a Wawa parking lot. When the officers
arrived, the victim, A.P., was lying on the ground and being attended to by first
aid responders. He was wearing a black Wawa jacket with noticeable tire
impressions on it, moaning in pain, showing signs of shock, and was unable to
answer the officers' questions. Based on his injuries, he was immediately
transported to the hospital.
A-0916-24 3 The police spoke with a witness on the scene, M.B., who advised them
that he observed a white teenage male with dirty blond hair drive into the parking
lot recklessly in a two-tone silver colored Ford F-150 pickup. M.B. also
informed the officers that the teenager, later identified as the then seventeen-
year-old defendant, went into the Wawa and left with another teenage male.
M.B. also stated that A.P. approached the defendant who shoved him in
the parking lot, and when A.P. continued to follow the defendant to his truck
defendant attempted to push him away. During the confrontation, A.P. was
yelling for someone to help him stop both teenagers from leaving. Defendant
entered his vehicle and instead of stopping to address A.P.'s concerns, who was
now standing behind the truck, placed his vehicle in reverse and used the vehicle
to push A.P. backwards.
A.P. then asked M.B. to block the truck with M.B.'s car. M.B. complied
and moved his vehicle in an attempt to block the roadway nearest to one of the
gas pumps. Defendant then maneuvered his truck around M.B.'s car,
accelerated, and ran over A.P who was then standing in front of defendant's
vehicle.
Officers also spoke with two other eyewitnesses, R.F. and C.R. R.F. told
them he witnessed defendant run over A.P., and C.R. stated she saw defendant's
A-0916-24 4 truck driving erratically through the parking lot and that it nearly collided with
her vehicle.
The police contacted Old Bridge High School based on their suspicion
that the suspect was a student there. Based on the vehicle's description, the vice-
principal advised the officers that defendant was the owner of the truck. After
the police received additional inculpatory information tying defendant to the
incident, he was arrested, transported to police headquarters, and his vehicle
towed and impounded.
The next day officers contacted A.P. at the hospital and reported he had
three broken ribs, damage to his small intestine, a bleeding spleen, and a bruised
kidney. A.P. explained that he had recognized the defendant from two separate
instances when defendant had allegedly stolen gasoline from the Wawa. The
officers later learned from the hospital that A.P. was in critical but stable
condition, intubated, on a ventilator, and in an induced coma. Over the next
fifty-days, A.P. underwent numerous surgeries but ultimately succumbed to his
injuries and died.
Defendant was initially charged in juvenile court with first-degree
criminal attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1)-(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree
A-0916-24 5 leaving the scene of an accident, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.1; third-degree hindering,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1); fourth-degree tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1); and
fourth-degree obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). After A.P.'s death, the State
charged defendant with upgraded charges that if committed by an adult would
constitute first-degree purposeful murder; second-degree leaving the scene of an
accident; third-degree hindering; fourth-degree tampering; and fourth-degree
obstruction.
At the first case management conference, the State and defense counsel
informed the court that plea discussions were underway to resolve the case. The
State informed the court it had amended their plea offer, and defendant, now
over the age of eighteen, was seriously considering it. In light of defendant's
age and the consequences of his actions, the State expressed that the victim's
family "want[ed] to see [defendant] prosecuted in adult court and facing adult
time." Accordingly, the State noted that the conditions of the plea offer would
expressly require defendant to "voluntarily waive" to adult court in the Law
Division, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27, in exchange for lesser charges that
would otherwise be "non-waivable offenses," pursuant to the involuntary waiver
statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1.
A-0916-24 6 In response, defense counsel stated he discussed this new plea offer with
the State and with defendant a "great deal." He noted that he and his client
understood that if he did not accept the plea offer, the State was prepared to
pursue the "[involuntary] waiver route," pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1, and
charge defendant with waivable offenses under that statute, including first
degree purposeful murder. Defendant understood that under that option, the
State intended to "go[] to [a] jury trial."
At the subsequent waiver hearing, scheduled after defendant had sufficient
time to consider the consequences of the plea, the parties informed the judge
that they had resolved the case. Specifically, defendant's counsel stated that
defendant appeared before the court "for a voluntary waiver into the adult
system as part of a global plea resolution," and defendant was "ready to take the
necessary allocution . . . to waive [into] the adult system." Defense counsel
further informed the juvenile court judge that defendant would be entering a
guilty plea that same day in adult court if possible.
As noted, the plea agreement provided that defendant would voluntarily
waive into the adult system but plead guilty in adult court to otherwise non-
waivable offenses under the involuntary waiver statute, specifically second-
degree vehicular homicide and second-degree leaving the scene of an accident.
A-0916-24 7 Pursuant to the plea, the State would recommend a five-year sentence, the
minimum term of imprisonment for a second-degree offense, subject to NERA
for the vehicular homicide charge, and a consecutive five-year sentence for
leaving the scene of an accident. Defense counsel reserved the right to seek a
downgraded sentence in the third-degree range. The State further agreed to not
seek sentencing before September 2024 due to the fact defendant was diagnosed
with leukemia and had significant health-related issues.
At the waiver hearing, defense counsel questioned defendant to establish
the factual basis for his voluntary waiver. Defendant testified he understood
that he was charged with certain offenses which took place on December 4,
2023, while he was still a juvenile. He acknowledged that he understood how
an involuntary waiver hearing proceeded, including that the State would be
required to establish "probable cause that [he] committed certain offenses that
are . . . waivable to the adult court." He also stated he understood that if the
State could not demonstrate probable cause, he "would not be waived up on
those charges."
He further stated he and his counsel had discussed his voluntary waiver
"at length" and recognized the "certain risks associated with [proceeding to an
involuntary waiver hearing]," including the State rescinding the plea agreement.
A-0916-24 8 He stated he understood that once waived to adult court, he "come back" to
juvenile court, even if he decided to not accept the guilty plea before the adult
court. He acknowledged he asked his defense counsel to request the juvenile
court judge "sign an order where [he] . . . waive[d his] right to have that probable
cause hearing and instead . . . pass right through . . . and . . . go right up to the
adult court . . . with the intention of entering the guilty plea on the terms . . .
discussed."
The judge then addressed defendant directly. In response to the judge's
questions, defendant confirmed he had no additional questions for counsel or
the court, reiterated that he had sufficient time to discuss matters with his
counsel, was satisfied with his counsel's performance, and was not being forced
or coerced to agree to the voluntary waiver. Defendant also acknowledged he
was not under the influence of any substances to affect his ability to understand
the proceedings. In light of defendant's responses, the judge concluded she was
"satisfied that [defendant was] voluntarily waiving up" and that he sufficiently
understood "his rights and exposure" with respect to this decision.
Defendant entered his guilty plea immediately after the case was
transferred to adult court. The court addressed defendant to ensure his guilty
plea was being entered voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, and defendant
A-0916-24 9 further stated he reviewed the plea form with counsel in its entirety. He affirmed
that counsel had reviewed with him all the discovery in his case, he was satisfied
with counsel's performance, and had sufficiently consulted with his mother. He
further acknowledged that he waived his right to indictment by grand jury.
Defendant also understood the second-degree crimes to which he would
pleaded guilty carried a maximum of ten years imprisonment and of the NERA
consequences related to the vehicular homicide charge. The court then
proceeded with an accusation, and defendant acknowledged that his conduct
"fit[] the elements of . . . vehic[ular] homicide, the reckless driving resulting in
the death of . . . A.P.[,] [a]nd in addition . . . after striking [A.P.], instead of
stopping, instead of pulling over . . . [he] continued on [his] way and left the
scene of the motor vehicle crash that resulted in the death of A.P."
Following defendant's guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing, the court
applied mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) ("the defendant has no
history of prior delinquency or criminal activity"); mitigating factor nine,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9) ("the character and attitude of the defendant indicate that
the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense"); and mitigating factor
fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) ("the defendant was under [twenty-six] years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense"). The court also considered
A-0916-24 10 aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) ("the gravity and seriousness of
harm inflicted on the victim"); aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3)
("[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense"); and aggravating
factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) ("the need for deterring the defendant and
others from violating the law"). In light of these factors and the weight the court
allocated to each, it concluded "the aggravating factors outweigh[ed] the
mitigating factors" and that the "interest of justice" did not require sentencing
defendant as a "third-degree offender."
With respect to the mitigating factors, the court noted defendant's
"medical history and the endurances that [he] has overcome" and defendant's
"character, attitude, and sincere remorse." Then, it applied "appropriate weight"
to mitigating factor seven, in light of the fact that defendant had "no prior history
of criminal conduct." Next, it applied "moderate weight" to mitigating factor
nine and found defendant "did not demonstrate . . . remorse . . . on the date of
the incident when [he] left the scene," but concluded that defendant "had some
time to reflect." The court also applied "appropriate weight" to mitigating factor
fourteen, based on his age.
With respect to the aggravating factors, the court afforded "heightened
weight" to aggravating factor two, in light of the "gravity of injuries" defendant
A-0916-24 11 caused and the fact that the victim endured "an emotional rollercoaster" during
his critical care treatment, including "a myriad of various surgeries . . . ." The
court applied "light weight" to aggravating factor three and found defendant was
a "risk to commit another offense due to [the fact that his offense involved] a
motor vehicle infraction." The court also applied "heightened weight" to
aggravating factor nine due to the "obligation, duty, and responsibility" that
drivers possess "to operate that motor vehicle in a safe fashion," including
providing help to those injured at accidents and alerting police.
The court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to
an aggregate sentence of ten years in prison and committed defendant to the
custody of a juvenile facility until he reached the age of twenty-one. It stated
defendant's vehicular homicide charge was subject to NERA, and his knowingly
leaving the scene of an accident charge required a consecutive term.
II.
This appeal followed in which defendant raises three points for our
consideration which we have reordered to reflect the manner in which we
address them:
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS IN THE JUVENILE WAIVER HEARING.
A-0916-24 12 POINT II
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS BASED UPON THE FACTS AND IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS FOUND BY THE COURT, REQUIRING REMAND FOR RESENTENCING.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE WAIVER HEARING.
A. THE ATTORNEY'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT.
B. BUT FOR COUNSEL'S MISINFORMATION DEFENDANT WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY.
We reject these arguments and affirm. The record as we have detailed
demonstrates beyond any doubt that defendant was sufficiently apprised of the
consequences of his voluntary waiver and guilty plea and was afforded sufficient
due process protections. Moreover, we decline to second guess the court's
sentencing decision because the court's determination and application of the
aggravating and mitigating factors was fully supported by the record and in
accordance with the parties' plea agreement, which we conclude was reasonable
and not a shock to our judicial conscience. Finally, we do not address
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims because resolution of
A-0916-24 13 defendant's contentions involve consideration of evidence that lies outside this
record.2
III.
First, defendant contends he was denied due process at his juvenile waiver
hearing because the waiver hearing "failed to address one very important
provision . . . of the involuntary waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(2)."
Defendant maintains that had counsel or the court been required to advise him
of this provision, his decision to voluntarily waive to the adult court would have
been different. Defendant argues that he should have been specifically informed
at the time of his decision to accept the State's plea offer, which required
voluntary waiver to adult court, that any conviction for a non-waivable offense
would have resulted in a remand to Family Court for a juvenile disposition.
Further, defendant asserts that the facts of the case here do not provide
support for probable cause that he acted knowingly or purposely to cause the
death of A.P. and that lack of proof was "buttressed" by his plea colloquy. He
maintains that the plea agreement's contingency on a voluntary waiver was the
State's means to avoid the probable cause requirement because the State "did not
2 As noted, defendant reserves his right to assert a claim for post-conviction relief pursuant to Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Nothing in our opinion shall be interpreted as an expression of our view of the merits of any such claim. A-0916-24 14 have sufficient proofs as to murder." He urges us to prevent a "travesty of justice
in this case" and relies upon the dissent in State v. Heitzman, 107 N.J. 603, 606
(1987); State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 138 (2003); Padilla v. Kentucky, 599
U.S. 356, 369-71 (2010); State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009); and State
v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 362 (2012), where courts have "responded to prevent
injustice."
In response, the State contends defendant's arguments fail, in part, on
procedural grounds because defendant's guilty plea waived defendant's right to
appeal "all issues which were or could have been addressed by the trial court
before the guilty plea." While we reject the State's contention and address
defendant's arguments substantively, to the extent defendant argued the court
committed error in the manner in which it conducted the waiver hearing, or
suggests his due process rights were in any way infringed, we reject all those
contentions as noted and discussed, infra.
We first address the substantive legal prompts that guide our analysis.
"Our standard of review in juvenile waiver cases 'is whether the correct legal
standard has been applied, whether inappropriate factors have been considered,
and whether the exercise of discretion constituted a "clear error of judgment" in
A-0916-24 15 all of the circumstances.'" State in the Int. of J.F., 446 N.J. Super. 39, 51-52
(App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1, 15 (1987)).
We have previously recognized in State in Interest of Z.S., the use of the
term "waiver" in the juvenile waiver context is unique. 464 N.J. Super. 507,
513 n.3 (App. Div. 2020). Our Legislature has enacted two statutes which
govern juvenile waiver. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 authorizes juveniles aged fourteen
or older, charged with delinquency, to voluntarily elect a transfer to adult court.
In contrast with this statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 sets forth the process for a
prosecutor to seek involuntary waiver of jurisdiction without consent of the
juvenile to adult court.
"The decision whether to seek [involuntary] waiver vests in the
prosecutor." State in the Int. of E.S., 252 N.J. 331, 342 (2022). "'The Juvenile
Code allows prosecutors to seek to proceed in adult court against juveniles who
have committed certain serious offenses through the waiver process set forth
in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1." Ibid. (quoting State in the Int. of N.H., 226 N.J. 242,
248 (2016)). "Under the [involuntary] waiver statute, prosecutors have sixty
days after receipt of a complaint to move for waiver." E.S., 252 N.J. at 342
(citing N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(a)). The prosecution must establish that "[t]he
juvenile was fifteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged delinquent
A-0916-24 16 act; and . . . [t]here is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a
delinquent act which if committed by an adult would constitute" one or more
enumerated offenses under the statute. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1) to (2).
If a juvenile is eligible for involuntary waiver under subsections (c)(1)
and (c)(2) of the statute, the prosecutor considers a statutory list of eleven factors
to determine whether to seek waiver in a given case. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-
26.1(c)(3)(a) to (k). At a waiver hearing, the court reviews the evidence offered
by both the State and the juvenile. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(b). If the prosecution
makes the requisite showing, "the court shall waive jurisdiction of a juvenile
delinquency case." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c).
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2) provides the "certain serious offenses," for
which a prosecutor can pursue involuntary waiver against a juvenile defendant.
E.S., 252 N.J. at 342. The statute has a presumption in favor of waiver for
juveniles who commit serious criminal acts, and such a juvenile must overcome
an associated "heavy burden" to defeat a waiver motion. Z.S., 464 N.J. Super.
at 519 (citing R.G.D., 108 N.J. 12). These offenses include, in relevant part,
"criminal homicide, other than death by auto," and "second-degree aggravated
assault," both offenses for which defendant was originally charged. N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-26.1(c)(2)(a), (g). We note the offenses to which defendant ultimately
A-0916-24 17 pleaded guilty, vehicular homicide and knowingly leaving the scene of an
accident, are not enumerated as offenses that a prosecutor can pursue
involuntary waiver against a juvenile defendant. Ibid.
We further note, as pertinent here, in the event that a juvenile is not
convicted of the waivable offenses but is convicted of other offenses that are
otherwise not enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2), N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-
26.1(f)(2) provides that "a conviction for any other [non-waivable] offense shall
be deemed a juvenile adjudication and be remanded to the . . . Family Part for
disposition, in accordance with the dispositional options available to that court
. . . ."
Conversely, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 governs voluntary waiver for juveniles.
It provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny juvenile [fourteen] years of age or older
charged with delinquency may elect to have the case transferred to the
appropriate court having jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27. Our Supreme Court
has recognized, "waiver to the adult court is the single most serious act that the
juvenile court can perform . . . because once waiver of jurisdiction occurs, the
child loses all the protective and rehabilitative possibilities available to the
Family Part." R.G.D., 108 N.J. 4-5.
A-0916-24 18 Further, plea bargaining is "firmly institutionalized in this State as a
legitimate, respectable and pragmatic tool in the efficient and fair administration
of justice." State v. Means, 191 N.J. 610, 618 (2007). "The cornerstone of
the plea bargain system is the 'mutuality of advantage' it affords to both
defendant and the State." State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 361 (1979) (citations
omitted). A plea agreement "enables a defendant to reduce his penal exposure
and avoid the stress of trial while assuring the State that the wrongdoer will be
punished[,] and that scarce and vital judicial and prosecutorial resources will be
conserved." Ibid.
The interpretation of a plea agreement is informed by basic principles of
contract law. Means, 191 N.J. at 622. As the Court observed in Means:
When two parties reach a meeting of the minds and consideration is present, the agreement should be enforced. The essence of a plea agreement is that the parties agree that defendant will plead guilty to certain offenses in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation to dismiss other charges and suggest a certain sentence, all subject to the right of the court to accept or reject the agreement in the interests of justice.
[Ibid.]
In general, plea agreements are to be treated like contracts between the
prosecutor and defendant. See ibid.; State v. Conway, 416 N.J. Super. 406, 410-
12 (App. Div. 2010). "The analogy to contract law is, however, in certain
A-0916-24 19 circumstances imperfect, and [courts] do not always follow it." United States v.
Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006); see e.g., United States v.
Garcia, 956 F.2d 41, 44 (4th Cir. 1992) (declining to apply the parol evidence
rule in the context of a plea agreement). This is because "[a] plea bargain is not
a commercial exchange" but rather "an instrument for the enforcement of the
criminal law." United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).
"The interests at stake and the judicial context in which they are weighed require
that something more than contract law be applied." Ibid.
At bottom, the "validity of a plea agreement is guided by considerations
of fundamental fairness and public policy." State v. Subin, 222 N.J. Super. 227,
237 (App. Div. 1988). "It is axiomatic in plea bargaining that all material terms
and relevant consequences be clearly disclosed, fully understood, and
knowingly and voluntarily accepted by the defendant." State v. Warren, 115
N.J. 433, 444 (1989). As such, when evaluating a defendant's understanding of
a plea agreement "we generally limit our review to the terms of the written plea
agreement and the statements made under oath during the plea
colloquy." United States v. Jackson, 21 F.4th 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.
2022); see Conway, 416 N.J. Super. at 412 (stating that the conditions of a plea
A-0916-24 20 agreement "should [be] explicitly stated . . . in the written plea agreement or in
the prosecutor's confirmation of the agreement on the record").
"Because the sworn statements during the plea colloquy 'speak[ ] in terms
of what the parties in fact agree to,' United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453,
455 (1985), they 'carry a strong presumption of truth,' Muth v. Fondren, 676
F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2012)." Jackson, 21 F.4th at 1213 (alteration in
original); see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) ("[T]he
representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a
hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute
a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings."). Accordingly,
our Rules mandate that the terms of a plea agreement be expressly stated on the
record. R. 3:9-3(b) (providing that plea agreements "shall be placed on the
record in open court at the time the plea is entered").
Despite the importation of contract law principles, a plea agreement is not
like a private contract that comes to a reviewing court's attention only after a
dispute arises, at which point the court is called upon for the first time to divine
the intention of the parties. In the plea-bargaining setting, the parties propose a
negotiated resolution of charges, but it is the court, ultimately, that accepts or
rejects a plea agreement. As such, it is incumbent on the parties to fully apprise
A-0916-24 21 the court of the terms and conditions of the agreement so that it can properly
exercise its discretion in deciding whether the interests of justice will be served
by effectuating the agreement. See R. 3:9-2 (reposing with the trial court the
discretion to accept a plea of guilty after questioning the defendant and obtaining
"an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea").
As a procedural matter, first, we reject the State's contention that
defendant's unconditional guilty plea in adult court constituted a waiver to
contest the voluntary nature of his plea. We acknowledge it is well-established
that an individual who pleads guilty is generally foreclosed from claiming a
constitutional infringement on appeal, subject to narrow exceptions not
applicable here. See State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 470 (2005) (quoting State v.
Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 316 (1997)) ("Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty
is prohibited from raising, on appeal, the contention that the State violated his
constitutional rights prior to the plea.").
A defendant's right to challenge the voluntary nature of his plea, however,
does not fall within the holding in Knight. By way of example, challenging the
factual basis of the plea is not waived. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.
Court Rules, cmt. 1.3.2 on R. 3:9-2 (2026) ("[d]espite the usual finality of an
unconditional guilty plea, defendant retains the right to raise on appeal the
A-0916-24 22 question as to whether there was in fact a factual basis for the plea"); see also
State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 527-28 (2015). Like a defendant's right to
challenge the factual basis of the plea, we are satisfied defendant did not waive
his right to challenge the voluntariness of the plea. See also State v. Slater, 198
N.J. 145, 150 (2009).
With respect to defendant's substantive arguments, and applying the
aforementioned legal principles to the facts in the record, we are also satisfied
the juvenile court judge properly advised defendant of the type of hearing he
would receive if he did not consent to voluntary waiver. Specifically, the record
reveals the juvenile court judge expressly informed defendant that for the State
to try him as an adult pursuant to an involuntary waiver, they would have to
show probable cause that he committed certain offenses waivable to the adult
court. At the hearing, defendant responded that he understood the State's burden
of proof at the probable cause portion of an involuntary waiver hearing and that
he would be waived only on charges to which the court found probable
cause. Further, defendant and his counsel both confirmed that the State's
recitation of the terms of the agreement was correct.
The record of defendant's plea hearing establishes that "all material terms
and relevant consequences [were] clearly disclosed, fully understood, and
A-0916-24 23 knowingly and voluntarily accepted by the defendant," Warren, 115 N.J. at 444,
and thus, we conclude that enforcing the terms of the plea agreement, which
significantly reduced his potential penal exposure, was proper and in accordance
with notions of "fundamental fairness and public policy." Subin, 222 N.J. Super.
at 237.
As in all cases, and particularly here, context matters. When defendant
and counsel approached the highly experienced Family Part judge, counsel
informed her he spoke to the State about the new plea offer and with defendant
a "great deal," as noted. Neither defendant's counsel, defendant, nor the State
indicated any reluctance or uncertainty regarding the plea or the decision that
defendant would waive voluntarily to adult court to effectuate it. Nor was the
court informed, in any way, that defendant and counsel were unaware of the
consequences of a voluntary as opposed to an involuntary waiver.
In fact, the contrary is true—the record indicates that both parties
understood the plea agreement would require defendant to waive to adult court
to plead guilty to otherwise non-waivable offenses under the involuntary waiver
statute. Further, defendant understood that if he did not accept these conditions
of the plea offer, the State intended to pursue involuntary waiver and
accordingly charge him with waivable offenses.
A-0916-24 24 We are also unpersuaded by defendant's argument, on the current record,
that he was unaware of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
waiver, and that he could return to juvenile court if not convicted of a waivable
offense, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(2). At both the case management
conference and waiver hearing, the court, defense counsel, and the State
expressly explained to defendant the mechanisms of the involuntary waiver
statute should he decide to decline the plea offer, in light of the fact that the
State intended to charge defendant with waivable offenses if he did so. Further,
the State and defense counsel explained to the judge in the defendant's presence
that the entire premise of the plea offer was to ensure defendant faced the adult
consequences of his actions, even if those offenses to which he intended to plead
guilty were non-waivable.
In any event, we reject defendant's position that the court was required to
explicitly inform him regarding N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(2) in that context, as it
unnecessarily would have required the court to not only assume defendant was
uninformed, contrary to his sworn statements, but also to advise him of a future,
speculative outcome, unmoored to the negotiated plea as represented. Indeed,
defendant would only return to the Family Part if he rejected the plea offer, the
A-0916-24 25 State pursued involuntary waiver, and defendant was tried and found not guilty
with respect to both the waivable offenses to which he was previously charged.
We conclude requiring the judge to assume such a hypothetical scenario
particularly inappropriate here where defendant told the court he intended to
immediately plead guilty to two lesser charges in adult court and where multiple
parties expressly informed him of steps involved with any involuntary waiver.
There was no reason under these facts, and where there was neither hesitation
nor uncertainty in defendant's decision, to inform him of the consequences of a
trial that was not going to occur, nor a plea different than what was told to the
court he intended to enter.
We are unpersuaded that the cases cited by defendant—Padilla v.
Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010); State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127 (2003); State v.
Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 (2012); State v. Heitzman, 107 N.J. 603 (1987) (Wilentz,
C.J., dissenting); and State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009)—compel a
contrary result as they are wholly distinguishable factually and legally. In
Padilla, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether counsel's failure to
advise a non-citizen defendant of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea
constituted ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. 599 U.S. at 374-
75. The Court held that the defendant was clearly deportable under the
A-0916-24 26 applicable statute, and thus, his counsel's failure to provide accurate advice was
constitutionally deficient under Strickland. Ibid.
State v. Bellamy involved the failure to advise a defendant of the
possibility of civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act because
of his guilty plea. 178 N.J. at 135-40. Our Supreme Court held that fundamental
fairness required that a defendant be informed of the possibility of future
commitment as it could be for a term longer than his incarceration. Ibid.
In State v. Gaitan, our Supreme Court considered whether the rule
announced in Padilla should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review. 209 N.J. at 364. The Court held that Padilla announced a new rule of
law and under both federal and state retroactivity principles, was not to be
applied retroactively to cases that reached finality before Padilla was decided.
In addition, the court differentiated between affirmative misadvice and mere
failure to advise, holding that only affirmative misadvice could support a claim
of ineffective assistance under pre-Padilla law. Id. at 379. In Nunez-Valdez,
the defendant was deemed to have received ineffective assistance of counsel
when provided false advice with respect to potential deportation. 200 N.J. at
129.
A-0916-24 27 In Heitzman, our Supreme Court affirmed substantially on the basis of the
majority opinion in our decision, where we held that "defendant need be
informed only of the penal consequences of his plea and not the collateral
consequences, such as loss of public or private employment, effect on
immigration status, voting rights, possible auto license suspension, possible
dishonorable discharge from the military, or anything else." Heitzman, 107 N.J.
at 604.
Contrary to these authorities, the issues presented here do not involve
claims of misadvice regarding deportation such as in Padilla, Gaitan, or Nunez-
Valdez, whose holdings centered on the unique and severe collateral
consequence of deportation and where the courts' analysis was rooted in the
evolving professional norms regarding immigration advice at the time of the
plea. Nor do they relate to a civil penalty intimately tied to the criminal process
such as in Bellamy, which was appropriately limited to the unique context of
civil commitment for sex offenders and the extraordinary liberty interests at
stake. Likewise, defendant's voluntary and knowing plea does not implicate the
retroactivity of new constitutional rules or the failure to advise of collateral
consequences such as employment forfeiture as in Heitzman. Rather, this appeal
involved a fully informed plea, in which defendant advised the court that he
A-0916-24 28 intended to plead guilty to reduced charges, a wholly distinct set of facts and
legal issues that do not align or contravene the holdings of Padilla, Bellamy,
Gaitan, Heitzman, or Nunez-Valdez.
Defendant also contends that while due process in an involuntary waiver
is defined by statute and our common law, no such protections are afforded to a
juvenile's decision to voluntarily waive jurisdiction to the adult court. He asserts
that the waiver hearing in this case highlights the lack of meaningful protections
not only for this juvenile but also all juveniles electing to voluntarily waive to
adult court. For the reasons stated, we find no support for defendant's due
process arguments. He and his counsel negotiated a plea, the terms of which,
including his agreement to voluntarily waive his case to adult court, were
thoroughly addressed by the court.
IV.
Second, defendant contends a remand is required because the judge failed
to consider all applicable mitigating factors and improperly weighed the
aggravating factors. Specifically, regarding the judge's application of the
mitigating factors, defendant asserts the judge: (1) did not give sufficient weight
to mitigating factors seven, nine, and fourteen; (2) failed to apply mitigating
factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) ("the defendant's conduct was the result of
A-0916-24 29 circumstances unlikely to recur") despite defendant's age and remorse; and (3)
failed to properly consider defendant's medical history by applying either
mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) ("imprisonment of the
defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant") or a non-statutory
factor. Further, with respect to the application of aggravating factors, he
contends the judge improperly relied upon the family member's "anguish" and
the victim's suffering during his critical care treatment and "ignored the accepted
social science regarding . . . a youth's brain." Defendant also contends "the
interest[s] of justice demand a [sentence] downgrade." He maintains his illness
and medical history "substantiate a finding that the interest of justice would be
best served by sentencing this defendant to a three-year sentence . . . ." We are
unpersuaded by all these arguments.
We employ a deferential standard when reviewing a trial court's
sentencing decision. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015); State v. Fuentes,
217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). We must affirm a sentence unless: (1) the trial court
failed to follow the sentencing guidelines; (2) the court's findings of aggravating
and mitigating factors were not based on competent and credible evidence in the
record; or (3) "'the [court's] application of the guidelines to the facts of [the]
case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial
A-0916-24 30 conscience.'" Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (second alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
"While the sentence imposed must be a lawful one, the court's decision to
impose a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement should be given great
respect, since a 'presumption of reasonableness . . . attaches to criminal
sentences imposed on plea bargain defendants.'" State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super.
61, 71 (App. Div. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Sainz, 107 N.J.
283, 294 (1987)).
Rule 3:21-4(h) provides that "[a]t the time [the] sentence is imposed[,] the
judge shall state reasons for imposing such sentence including findings pursuant
to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment." Ibid. A sentencing
judge's statement of the factual basis for their findings is necessary and
"important for meaningful appellate review of any criminal sentence" because
the appellate court is "expected to assess the aggravating and mitigating factors
to determine whether they 'were based upon competent credible evidence in the
record.'" State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. 364-
65).
Relevant to defendant's argument, we note aggravating factor two
"focuses on the setting of the offense itself with particular attention to any
A-0916-24 31 factors that rendered the victim vulnerable or incapable of resistance at the time
of the crime." State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 611 (2013). A court may not base
its finding of aggravating factor two solely upon the fact that the harm
contemplated by the statute proscribing the criminal conduct occurred. State v.
Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 356-58 (2000). A court further should not base its
finding on "the emotional trauma to the victim's family caused by his death
. . . ." State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557, 575 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd o.b.,
121 N.J. 527 (1990) (citations omitted). Rather, the sentencing court "must
engage in a pragmatic assessment of the totality of harm inflicted by the offender
on the victim . . . ." Kromphold, 162 N.J. at 358; see also Lawless, 214 N.J. at
613 ("N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(2)'s plain language calls for a precise inquiry limited
to the direct victim of the offense.").
Regarding defendant's request for a downgraded sentence, it is well
established "the standard governing the downgrading of a defendant's sentence
. . . is high." State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996). With respect to a
second-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) provides:
In cases of convictions for crimes of the . . . second degree where the court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence the defendant to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than
A-0916-24 32 that of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. If the court does impose sentence pursuant to this paragraph, ... the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the appeal of the sentence by the prosecution.
In Megargel, based on N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), our Supreme Court
established a two-part test to justify a sentence downgrade: (1) "[t]he court must
clearly be convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the
aggravating ones;'" and (2) "the interest of justice demand[s] a downgraded
sentence." Id. at 496 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)).
"Accordingly, downgrading, while not required, is appropriate where both
prongs of the statutory test are satisfied." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453
(2020). In applying this test, "the severity of the crime" is "the most . . .
important factor." Id. at 500. Furthermore, "[t]he reasons justifying a
downgrade must be 'compelling,' and something in addition to and separate
from, the mitigating factors that substantially outweigh the aggravating factors."
State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Megargel,
143 N.J. at 505).
Against these principles, we satisfied the record is replete with competent
and credible evidence to support the judge's findings that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors and that the interests of justice do not warrant
A-0916-24 33 a sentencing downgrade, particularly in light of the fact that defendant's sentence
was pursuant to the valid negotiated plea agreement. The record demonstrates
the judge provided a comprehensive recitation of the facts underlying his
findings with respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors, including
defendant's character and remorse.
We reject defendant's contention that the judge did not properly consider
his medical history in light of the fact that the judge expressly accounted for this
circumstance in his findings. Further, to the extent the court improperly relied
upon the victim's family suffering in his application of aggravating factor two,
we discern that the judge primarily relied upon defendant's suffering prior to his
death for the basis of his finding. See Kromphold, 162 N.J. at 358. Indeed, the
record indicates that the judge based his finding on the fact that defendant
suffered both emotional and physical harm while in critical care over the course
of fifty days, including several intensive surgeries during this period. We
accordingly discern no basis to disturb the court's findings on defendant's
sentence.
Finally, defendant asserts that his counsel's performance at the waiver
hearing was constitutionally ineffective under the two-part test detailed in
A-0916-24 34 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.3 Defendant maintains his trial counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to fully explain the waiver
processes. Specifically, defendant asserts his counsel failed to advise him of
consequences of being convicted of a non-waivable offense. Defendant states
that he made his voluntary waiver without full knowledge of all relevant and
material information and his subsequent guilty plea is invalidated.
As noted, we decline to address defendant's PCR-related claims and do so
because as a general matter, "ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not
entertained on direct appeal 'because such claims involve allegations and
evidence that lie outside the trial record.'" State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285
(2002) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992)); see also State v.
Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 81 n.5 (2016) (declining to address an ineffective-
assistance claim raised first on appeal because such was "better suited for review
on [PCR]"). "Our courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims
3 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland, by demonstrating that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Strickland test has been adopted for application under our State constitution in New Jersey. State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). A-0916-24 35 involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record." Preciose, 129
N.J. at 460 (citations omitted); see also State v. Sparano, 249 N.J. Super. 411,
419 (App. Div. 1991) ("Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be raised on direct appeal.").
The more appropriate forum to raise such claims is in a petition for post-
conviction relief where an adequate, reviewable record can be developed. See
State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 70 n.7 (2013); State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 29-
30 (2012). That is particularly true where, as here, the allegations of ineffective
assistance appear to implicate discussions between defendant and his counsel
that may necessitate an evidentiary hearing. The record before us does not
include, for example, certifications or testimony as to any discussions between
defendant and his trial attorney concerning whether counsel informed defendant
about both voluntary and involuntary waiver processes. Furthermore, because
defendant raises his ineffective assistance claims for the first time in this appeal,
the trial court did not have an opportunity to make findings regarding the
Strickland/Fritz test. In reaching this result, we expressly preserve defendant's
right to make his arguments to a PCR court.
A-0916-24 36 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
arguments, it is because we have concluded they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
A-0916-24 37