State of New Jersey v. Annamarie Tierno

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3580-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANNAMARIE TIERNO, a/k/a ANNA MARIE TIERNO,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________

Argued May 21, 2026 – Decided August 7, 2026

Before Judges Chase and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 22-12-3623.

Lucas B. Slevin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Lucas B. Slevin, of counsel and on the briefs).

Maura M. Sullivan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura M. Sullivan, of counsel and on the brief).

Defendant Annamarie Tierno appeals from a May 10, 2024 judgment of

conviction after pleading guilty to third-degree money laundering, N.J.S.A.

2C:21-25(a). Having reviewed the record of her guilty plea and governing legal

principles, we affirm.

I.

On December 8, 2022, in a twenty-eight-count indictment, defendant was

charged with one count of third-degree money laundering and financial

facilitation, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a) and/or (b). The remaining counts of the

indictment charged five co-defendants with drug distribution and related charges

stemming from a "yearlong investigation" into an alleged drug trafficking

network.

Defendant moved to dismiss the money laundering charge, which the trial

judge denied. On January 30, 2024, defendant pled guilty to money laundering

in exchange for the State recommending a two-year term of non-custodial

probation.

During the factual basis of the plea, defendant admitted the following:

Q: [O]n or about September 22, 2022, . . . you had a home; is that correct?

A: Yes.

A-3580-23 2 Q: And you received some money for that home, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you engaged in – did you engage in the transaction of violent property 1 known to derive from the criminal activity?

A: Yes.

Q: And you put the property in a bank, right?

A: Yes.

....

Q: Did you intend to conceal the nature of the proceeds?

A: No.

....

Q: Ms. Tierno, did you sell your house to an individual?

A: Yes.

Q: And you knew that the proceeds that you were receiving for that house were proceeds – money derived from criminal activity; is that correct?

[Defense Counsel]: Is that correct?

1 In her brief, defendant states that the reference to "violent property" seems to be a misstatement or scrivener's error as the money laundering statute makes no reference to it. See N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25. A-3580-23 3 Q: If you don’t –

A: Yes. I guess.

Q: Okay.

A: Yes.

....

Q: And you knew [] [the] money you were depositing into the account you created that day, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And [were] proceeds of criminal activity, correct?

A: Yes.

....

Q: And the criminal activity that you knew what – that this person was involved with drug sales, correct?

A: Yes.

Defendant admitted that she opened a bank account that day and deposited

the cash she received into this account. She also admitted knowing that the

money she deposited was the proceeds of criminal activity. Satisfied that

defendant's plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that there was an

adequate factual basis for it, the judge accepted defendant's guilty plea. The

plea agreement also recommended that defendant "[forfeit] . . . whatever interest

A-3580-23 4 [she] may have had in the $55,000 that was deposited in the bank account" as

proceeds of the sale of her home. The plea was also contingent on co-defendants

pleading guilty.

On May 10, 2024, defendant was sentenced consistent with the negotiated

plea agreement and forfeited the money she received for the sale of the house.

The judgment of conviction stated that defendant's final charge was for third -

degree money laundering-transportation/possession of criminal property,

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a).

Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I

DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE (A) UNDER THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTE THE FACTUAL BASIS OF HER GUILTY PLEA WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR A CONVICTION, AND (B) THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE IT IS [UNCONSTITUTIONALLY] VAGUE AS APPLIED.

A. The Factual Basis Of Defendant's Guilty Plea Does Not Constitute Criminal Conduct Under The Money Laundering Statute When Properly Construed To Comport With Principles Of Statutory Interpretation And To Avoid Constitutional Defect.

A-3580-23 5 i. Under the plain language of the money laundering statute, transactions involving property derived from criminal activity may only be prosecuted under subsection (b) of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25.

ii. This [c]ourt must construe N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25 in this manner to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to [d]efendant's conduct.

iii. Upon application of this interpretation of the statute, [d]efendant's plea must be vacated because the factual basis was insufficient to establish the necessary elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25.

B. If This Court Does Not Construe The Money Laundering Statute This Way To Avoid a Constitutional Defect, The Court Must Find The Statute Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To Defendant.

II.

"The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a

plea for lack of an adequate factual basis is de novo." State v. Urbina, 221 N.J.

509, 528 (2015) (quoting State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015)). "That is so

because '[a]n appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing

whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential

A-3580-23 6 elements of an offense.'" State v. E.J.H., 466 N.J. Super. 32, 37 (App. Div.

2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Tate, 220 N.J. at 404).

Under New Jersey's Criminal Code, money laundering occurs in any one

of three instances set forth in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:21 -25.

For purposes of this appeal, the relevant subsections are (a) and (b) which

provide:

a. transports or possesses property known or which a reasonable person would believe to be derived from criminal activity; or

b. engages in a transaction involving property known or which a reasonable person would believe to be derived from criminal activity

(1) with the intent to facilitate or promote the criminal activity; or

(2) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part:

(a) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the property derived from criminal activity; or

(b) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under the laws of this State or any other state or of the United States; or . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a) and (b).]

A-3580-23 7 We begin with defendant's contention that her guilty plea must be vacated

because the factual basis she gave was inadequate to sustain a conviction for

money laundering under either N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a) or (b) when properly

interpreted. Defendant argues that transactions involving property derived from

criminal activity should only be prosecuted under subsection (b) of N.J.S.A.

2C:21-25, and not under subsection (a), which addresses possession or

transportation. Defendant asserts that any other interpretation of the statute

improperly merges the two subsections rendering subsection (b) surplusage and

impermissibly vague.

The State counters that the plain language of the statute supports

defendant's conviction under subsection (a), as she admitted to possessing the

proceeds of criminal activity by depositing the money into a bank account she

set up. The State maintains that possession and transactions are two distinct

concepts under the statute. Thus, defendant's prosecution under subsection (a)

does not render subsection (b) surplusage or the statute unconstitutionally

vague. The State also asserts that defendant's admissions established the two

requisite elements of money laundering under subsection (a) of the statute.

The two essential elements of money laundering under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-

25(a) are that a person: (1) knowingly transports or possesses property; and (2)

A-3580-23 8 that they knew was, or a reasonable person would have believed to be, derived

from criminal activity. (Emphasis added). In this case, defendant admitted

depositing money in a bank account which she created and thus had access to.

Defendant argues that the facts as admitted were insufficient to acknowledge

possession of the criminal proceeds, and claims she only admitted to

"transacting" with the criminal property and did not admit to "possessing" it.

We are unpersuaded.

As our Supreme Court has expressed:

The law recognizes three distinct forms of possession, actual, constructive, and joint. A person has actual possession of an object when he [or she] has physical or manual control of it. Alternatively, a person has constructive possession of an object when, although he [or she] lacks physical or manual control, the circumstances permit a reasonable inference that he [or she] has knowledge of its presence, and intends and has the capacity to exercise physical control or dominion over it during a span of time.

[State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 14 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).]

In order to establish possession of property, "[p]hysical or manual control of the

proscribed item is not required as long as there is an intention to exercise control

over it manifested in circumstances where it is reasonable to infer that the

capacity to do so exists." State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 597 (1979). Thus,

A-3580-23 9 constructive possession exists when a person intentionally obtains a measure of

"control or dominion over the [property]" although they are under the physical

control of another. Morrison, 188 N.J. at 12.

Defendant's admission that she opened a bank account over which she had

control and deposited the money into this account amounts to constructive

possession. Defendant's admissions satisfy the first element of the money

laundering statute under subsection (a).

Defendant next admitted that she knew the "proceeds" she deposited into

the bank were the proceeds of criminal activity. In response to a question asked

by her attorney during her plea colloquy, defendant admitted knowing that the

person who bought her house and gave her $55,000 in cash "was involved with

drug sales." These admissions satisfy the second element of the money

laundering statute, namely, that the money she received for the sale of her house

was proceeds of criminal activity. Thus, the judge, "satisfied from the lips of

the defendant," that there was an adequate factual basis, properly accepted her

guilty plea. Urbina, 221 N.J. at 526 (quoting State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408,

415 (1989) (quoting State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989))). We hold that

defendant's admissions during the plea colloquy satisfy the elements of money

laundering under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a).

A-3580-23 10 Defendant next contends that if the act of depositing the money into a

bank account suffices to convert conduct of a transaction into possession, then

there would be no need to prosecute conduct under subsection (b). In other

words, subsection (a) would "swallow" subsection (b), resulting in subsection

(b) becoming "unnecessary surplusage." This argument is unavailing.

At the outset, we underscore that the primary goal of statutory

interpretation "is to determine as best [as possible] the intent of the Legislature,

and to give effect to that intent." State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 262 (2014)

(quoting State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012)). "[T]he best indicator of

that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature." State v. Gandhi,

201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477. 492 (2005)).

"When the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear and unambiguous result,

the interpretive process comes to a close, without the need to consider extrinsic

aids." State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011) (citing State v. D.A., 191 N.J.

158, 164 (2007)).

We examine the plain language of the money laundering statute. Gandhi,

201 N.J. at 176. These two subsections—(a) and (b)—criminalize two distinct

forms of conduct; subsection (a) refers to possession while subsection (b) refers

to transactions. See State v. Harris, 373 N.J. Super. 253, 263 (App. Div. 2004)

A-3580-23 11 ("The text of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25 makes clear by use of the designations (a) or

(b) or (c) that it criminalizes three distinct types of conduct.") Defendant argues

that every act of possession involves a transaction; however, the plain text of

the statute does not support this contention.

"[S]ubsection (b) criminalizes two separate and distinct criminal acts if

the person 'engages in a transaction involving property known . . . to be derived

from criminal activity.'" Harris, 373 N.J. Super. at 264 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:21-

25(b)). Subsection (b), in other words, "criminalizes two types of transactions

involving property known to be derived from criminal activity." State v. Marias,

463 N.J. Super. 526, 532 (App. Div. 2020) (alteration omitted). The first

requirement of this subsection is that an actor "engages in a transaction" without

a requirement to possess the property. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(b). The second

requirement is that the actor engaged in the transaction: "(1) with the intent to

facilitate or promote the criminal activity; or (2) kn[ew] that the transaction is

designed in whole or in part: (a) to conceal or disguise the . . . property derived

from the criminal activity . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(b)(1), (2)(a). The plain

language of the statute does not require both possession and transaction under

subsection (b). Even if a transaction leads to possession, subsection (b) is not

rendered surplusage because there are additional requirements to criminalize the

A-3580-23 12 conduct under this subsection, namely, the requirements of either facilitation or

promotion of the criminal activity, or concealment.

Here, defendant accepted the proceeds knowing they were from criminal

activity and placed them into a bank account she set up. Thus, we are satisfied

that the judge's decision to accept defendant's guilty plea as knowing and

voluntary was supported by an adequate factual basis and grounded in credible

evidence.

Having rejected defendant's assertion that her factual basis was

insufficient to satisfy the elements under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a), defendant urges

us to find the statute unconstitutionally vague. We decline to do so for two

reasons. First, having discerned no error in the court's acceptance of defendant's

guilty plea, we need not reach the constitutional issue. See State v. J.H.P., 478

N.J. Super. 262, 283 (2024) ("As a general rule, our courts strive to avoid

reaching constitutional issues unless they are 'imperative to the disposition of

the litigation.'" (Quoting Strategic Env't Partners, LLC v. N.J. Dep't of Env't

Prot., 438 N.J. Super. 125, 147 (App. Div. 2014))).

Second, "[g]enerally, a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all issues which

were or could have been addressed by the trial judge before the guilty plea."

State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 585 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v.

A-3580-23 13 Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 1988)). "When a criminal

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that [they are] in fact guilty of

the offense with which [they are] charged, [they] may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449,

470 (205) (quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).

"A presumption of validity attaches to every statute." State v. Hill, 256

N.J. 266, 280 (2024) (quoting State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 265-66 (2014)).

"Courts 'are obligated to construe a challenged statute to avoid constitutional

defects if the statute is reasonably susceptible of such construction.'" Lenihan,

219 N.J. at 266 (quoting Cnty. of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 506

(App. Div. 2009)).

There are limited exceptions to this general rule; an issue that goes "to the

jurisdiction of the trial court or concern[s] matters of great public interest."

Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds

Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). Moreover, as

the Court explained in State v. Knight, there are generally only three exceptions

to the waiver rule provided by Court Rule. 183 N.J. at 471; see also State v.

Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 417 n.1 (2007). The first, expressly provided for by

A-3580-23 14 Rule 3:5-7(d), permits a defendant to challenge an unlawful search and seizure

of physical evidence on appeal after entering a guilty plea. Knight, 183 N.J. at

471. The second, expressly permitted by Rule 3:28(g), permits an appeal of an

order denying entry into the pre-trial intervention program after a guilty plea.

Ibid. The third exception provides that a defendant may appeal those adverse

decisions specifically reserved by a conditional guilty plea entered in

accordance with the Rule. Ibid. In the present case, we are not persuaded that

defendant's constitutional claim fits into any of the limited exceptions.

Affirmed.

A-3580-23 15