NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3152-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALEXANDER EIDEN,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted April 21, 2026 – Decided June 17, 2026
Before Judges Gilson and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 23-07-1514.
Robert Carter Pierce, attorney for appellant.
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M. Rosano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises out of a fatal automobile collision during which a car
driven by defendant Alexander Eiden struck the side of a car driven by Christine Perrella and the force of the collision caused injuries resulting in the tragic death
of Perrella. Following the collision, defendant was indicted for two crimes and
ultimately pled guilty to second-degree causing death by reckless operation of
an automobile, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a). He appeals from the denial of his motion
to suppress evidence seized in accordance with four warrants. Having reviewed
the record and law, we affirm the order denying his motion to suppress and,
therefore, his conviction.
I.
Just before 10 a.m. on January 9, 2023, a motor vehicle driven by
defendant hit the side of a vehicle driven by Perrella. Officers from the Roseland
Police Department responded to the scene, which was near 101 Eisenhower
Parkway in Roseland. Defendant had been operating a BMW M5, traveling
southbound on Eisenhower Parkway when his BMW struck the passenger side
of a Nissan Rogue operated by Perrella. Perrella had been traveling northbound
and was attempting a left-hand turn into her place of employment when her
vehicle was struck by defendant's vehicle. As a result, Perrella's vehicle traveled
over the curb line, and came to rest facing southwest from the point of impact.
Perrella was transported to the hospital and died from her injuries. The airbags
in defendant's vehicle deployed and he was not seriously injured.
A-3152-24 2 At approximately noon, the Essex County Prosecutor's Office (ECPO)
Crime Scene Investigation Bureau was informed of the accident, responded, and
took over the investigation. The investigation at the scene revealed: (1) the
BMW had suffered "extreme [] front end damage"; (2) the airbags in the BMW
had deployed; (3) the Nissan Perrella had been driving "came to rest
approximately 175 feet facing southwest from the point of impact;" (4) the
Nissan "suffered severe damage to the passenger side door, which . . . resulted
in the doors caving in to the passenger cabin;" (5) the front tire of the Nissan
"was dislodged and came off upon impact;" and (6) as a result of the damage the
Nissan sustained, Perrella had to be extracted from the vehicle.
On January 10, 2023, Detective Angelica Barnes applied for a warrant to
search defendant's BMW. The warrant certification was captioned
"Investigation into the Death of Christine Perrella," and included the code "VH -
2023-03." Barnes began her certification by listing her credentials and training,
as well as her general responsibilities. In that regard, she stated that she had
completed several crash investigation courses and was "responsible for
conducting [c]rash [i]nvestigations that have resulted in serious bodily injury or
death."
A-3152-24 3 Next, Barnes stated that she had "been assigned to assist in the
investigation of a fatal crash on January 9, 2023, in the area [of] 101 Eisenhower
Parkway . . . in which [] Perrella . . . was struck and killed." The certification
then listed the following facts:
a. On Monday, January 9, 2023, at approximately 12:11[p.m.], the Essex County Prosecutor's Office Crime Scene Investigation Bureau received notification from the Roseland Police Department regarding a dual motor vehicle collision, which resulted in the death of [] Perrella near 101 Eisenhower Parkway in Roseland, New Jersey.
b. Around 9:59[a.m.], Roseland Police Department officers had responded to the scene. A 2019 BMW M5 –[registration number] – [V.I.N. number] was being operated by [defendant] when it struck the decedent's vehicle, a 2012 Nissan Rogue – [registration number] – [V.I.N. number].
c. [Defendant] was traveling southbound on Eisenhower Parkway and the decedent was navigating a left-hand turn (westbound) into 101 Eisenhower Parkway when her vehicle was struck on the passenger side. This caused the decedent to lose directional control of the car, travel over the curb line, and come to a final rest facing nominally south. Additionally, airbags were deployed in the 2019 BMW M5.
d. Both vehicles were transported to the Essex County Prosecutor's Office – Crime Scenes Investigation Bureau in Orange, New Jersey pending further processing and mechanical inspections.
A-3152-24 4 e. The decedent was transported to St. Barnabas Medical Center, but ultimately succumbed to her injuries.
f. [Defendant] remained on scene and possess[ed] valid driving credentials.
Barnes also stated she had not included "each and every fact known to
[her] concerning this investigation," but only those facts that she believed were
"necessary to establish probable cause" to search defendant's vehicle. She
further attested "that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of [the]
incident is contained within the [defendant's vehicle]." Lastly, Barnes described
the scope of the search to be conducted. Accordingly, she stated:
The purpose and scope of this search is to recover evidence of the incident. This evidence would include but [is] not [] limited to fingerprints, DNA and other forensic evidence, documents pertaining to ownership of the vehicle and operation of it during the time of the collision, any evidence pertaining to the manner in which the vehicle was being driven during the collision, including cell phone use and alcohol or drug use. . . . This search is also requested to include any event data recorder systems, electronic communications devices located within the vehicle[], and/or installed "infotainment systems." In addition, a mechanical inspection is sought to determine if any mechanical malfunctions contributed to this crash, and a search of the event data recorder or black box to ascertain speed, braking, and other data available related to the vehicles near the time of the crash.
A-3152-24 5 On January 10, 2023, a Superior Court judge granted the search warrant.
During the ensuing search, detectives obtained the Event Data Recorder (EDR),
or "black box," from defendant's vehicle. Using crash data retrieval software,
detectives learned defendant's vehicle had been traveling at 103 miles per hour
(mph) seconds before the crash. The anti-lock brake system activity showed
defendant applied the brakes one second before the crash, and on impact,
defendant's vehicle was traveling seventy-four (74) mph. Additionally, the
search of defendant's vehicle revealed that his BMW was equipped with an
Escort M2 Dash Camera, but that its secure digital card was missing.
On January 13, 2023, Barnes sought three additional warrants, two of
which were communication data warrants (CDW), to search and obtain
information from defendant's: (1) cell phone, (2) Apple iCloud account, and (3)
T-Mobile cellular data records. In the three certifications submitted for the
additional warrants, Barnes set forth all the facts she had provided in her first
certification and added other information. First, as additional information,
Barnes identified the crime she was investigating: "the potential crime[] of
Death by Auto – driving a vehicle . . . recklessly pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5."
Second, she certified that the warrant to search the BMW had been granted, but
she did not disclose what information had been discovered. Third, she added
A-3152-24 6 certain facts related to each application, including that the investigation had
revealed defendant used an iPhone 14 pro max, and there was a dash camera -
ESCORT M2 Dash Camera - in the BMW, with its secure digital card missing.
Barnes then explained why the State was seeking access to defendant's iPhone,
Apple iCloud account, and T-Mobile cellular data records.
In terms of the scope of access to defendant's Apple iCloud account, the
third warrant sought:
full subscriber information; service dates; registration information including registration ip; cellular telephone numbers; linked and related email addresses; mail logs; password logs and other service accounts with authorized access to account; ip address at account creation; ip logs; all inbound and outbound ports associated with said ip addresses; stored imessage, sms, and mms messages; any and all other icloud content, including: all ios icloud backups in an unencrypted format; mail logs; photos and videos stored in icloud and photostream; docs stored in icloud drive, pages, and other associated applications on icloud; notes saved to icloud and in backups; calendar(s) saved to icloud and in icloud backups; bookmarks and safari browsing data stored to icloud and in backups; contacts stored to icloud and in backups; voicemails stored in icloud and in ios backups; find my iphone data; find my friends data; customer service records including reports of abuse and or violations of Apple terms of service; and any information located on servers or in databases owned or controlled by Apple, Inc., or located within any business documents or files associated with the above-mentioned user, from JANUARY 1, 2023 - JANUARY 13, 2023, in a timely fashion from Apple,
A-3152-24 7 Inc. in order to obtain evidence of the specified crimes as well as aid in the identification and location of parties involved in said illegal activities.
The scope of the fourth warrant concerning defendant's T-Mobile account
sought information, including:
the content of any and all SMS messages received and sent from said cellular telephone facility number, billing records [] including payment information and source/means of payment, customer service records, subscriber information for said cellular telephone facility number and for all numbers called to and called from said cellular telephone facility number, IP address logs associated with internet access from said cellular telephone facility, and the make and model and/or MSID/IMSI or ESN/IMEI of the handset(s) assigned to said cellular telephone facility, from January 8, 2023 through the duration of this order.
On January 13, 2023, another Superior Court judge granted all three
search warrants. Seven months later, on July 27, 2023, defendant was indicted
by a grand jury for two crimes: first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-4(a)(1) (count one); and second-degree death by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
5(a) (count two).
On March 15, 2024, defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained
from the searches of his vehicle, cell phone, Apple iCloud account, and T-
Mobile data. Defendant asserted that all four warrants were facially deficient
because they presented insufficient facts to establish probable cause. He also
A-3152-24 8 argued that the CDWs for his iCloud and T-Mobile data were overbroad. In
response, the State contended that while the warrant applications could have
included more facts, the facts presented were sufficient to establish probable
cause and defendant failed to overcome the warrants' presumed validity.
Alternatively, the State asserted the evidence discovered using the warrants
would have inevitably been discovered because if any of the warrant
applications had been rejected, the State would have resubmitted the application
with additional facts gathered from the on-scene investigation.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion in an
oral decision placed on the record on September 4, 2024. Initially, the trial court
reasoned the validity of the cell phone warrant and CDWs depended on whether
the first warrant to search defendant's vehicle was valid. In that regard, the court
noted "if the [c]ourt were to find an issue with the first [warrant] then there
would be an issue with the second and the CDWs." The trial court then
discussed the warrant application for defendant's vehicle and found that "while
the affidavit was rather skimpy . . . [the judge who granted the warrant] certainly
could have reasonably inferred from the facts that were included that [defendant]
was speeding, which would have caused or contributed to this accident."
A-3152-24 9 Accordingly, the court found that the first warrant application contained enough
facts to establish probable cause and the warrant was valid.
Next, the court discussed the applicability of the inevitable discovery
doctrine. The court found that, alternatively, the State had shown by "clear and
convincing evidence," the information obtained through the search of
defendant's vehicle would have inevitably been discovered through the course
of normal investigatory procedures. The court noted that had the initial warrant
application been denied, the State "had ample additional information that they
could have . . . added to the affidavit which would have . . . had nothing to do
with post securing the search warrant." In that respect, the court listed the
additional facts the State could have included in its warrant application,
detailing the facts obtained from the on-scene investigation of the crash.
Therefore, that same day, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's
motion to suppress.
On March 24, 2025, defendant pled guilty to count two of the indictment,
second-degree death by auto. In the plea agreement he preserved his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In exchange for the plea, the State
recommended defendant be sentenced in the third-degree range to a four-year
prison term subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
A-3152-24 10 On May 19, 2025, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea
agreement to four years in state prison subject to NERA. Count one of the
indictment was dismissed. Defendant now appeals from the order denying his
motion to suppress the information obtained from the four search warrants.
II.
On appeal, defendant makes three main arguments, which he articulates
as follows:
POINT 1 – THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED USING THE MOTOR VEHICLE SEARCH WARRANT WHICH FAILED TO STATE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ALLOW THE SEARCH.
POINT II – THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE TO SUSTAIN THE SEARCH WARRANT OF [DEFENDANT'S] MOTOR VEHICLE.
POINT III – THE CELLULAR PHONE WARRANT, AND THE APPLE AND T-MOBILE COMMUNICATION DATA WARRANTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ALL EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
A. No information contained in the cellphone search warrant affidavit established probable cause.
B. The iCloud and T-Mobile communications data warrants were likewise unconstitutional.
A-3152-24 11 Generally, in reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, an appellate
court will defer to the factual findings made by the trial court "so long as those
findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record." State v. Smart, 253
N.J. 156, 164 (2023) (quoting State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017)). When
the facts are undisputed, however, we review the trial court's interpretation of
"the law on a non-testimonial motion to suppress . . . de novo." Ibid. That de
novo review is consistent with an appellate court's plenary review of legal
determinations. State v. Radel, 249 N.J. 469, 493 (2022) (quoting State v.
Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015)).
A. Whether the Warrants Were Supported by Probable Cause.
The federal and New Jersey Constitutions protect people from
unreasonable governmental searches. Smart, 253 N.J. at 164-65; State v.
Bryant, 483 N.J. Super. 13, 29 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting U.S. Const. amend.
IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7). There is a presumption that a governmental search
is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to a judicial warrant based on probable
cause. State v. Gathers, 234 N.J. 208, 220 (2018); State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J.
204, 211 (2001). A valid warrant requires "probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed, or is being committed" and that the place, thing, or
A-3152-24 12 data to be searched contains evidence of the crime. Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 210;
State v. Missak, 476 N.J. Super. 302, 316 (App. Div. 2023).
It is well established that when making a probable cause determination,
the issuing judge "is required to make the determination based on only that
information which is 'contained within the four corners of the supporting
affidavit' or sworn testimony provided by law enforcement personnel." State v.
Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 26 (2009). "Probable cause eludes precise definition."
Ibid. (quoting Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 210). "Probable cause has been aptly
described as 'a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set
of legal rules.'" Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056
(3d Cir. 1993)). "The standard 'deals with probabilities and depends on the
totality of circumstances.'" Ibid. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
371 (2003)). Accordingly, issuing courts can consider "all relevant
circumstances," Gathers, 234 N.J. at 221 (quoting State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541,
554 (2005)), and "reasonable and natural inferences" flowing from those
circumstances. State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 384 (2003).
A search warrant enjoys a presumption of validity. State v. Bivins, 226
N.J. 1, 11 (2016); State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 612 (2009). So, a defendant
A-3152-24 13 challenging the validity of a search bears the burden of proving "there was no
probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant." State v. Jones, 179 N.J.
377, 388 (2004).
"[S]ubstantial deference must be paid by a reviewing court to the
determination of the judge who has made a finding of probable cause to issue a
search warrant." Evers, 175 N.J. at 381. Any "[d]oubt as to the validity of the
warrant 'should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search.'" Keyes, 184
N.J. at 554 (quoting Jones, 179 N.J. at 389). "[W]hen the adequacy of the facts
offered to show probable cause . . . appear[] to be marginal, the doubt should
ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search." State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J.
110, 116 (1968) (first citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1965); and then citing State v. Mark, 46 N.J. 262, 273 (1966)).
Defendant in this matter focuses his analysis on the first warrant, which
authorized a search of his BMW. He contends the warrant did not contain a
specific reference to the crime being investigated nor did it contain facts
supporting probable cause that defendant had committed a crime in causing the
collision.
Barnes' first certification did not expressly state in the certification itself
that the prosecutor's office was investigating a crime. Nevertheless, a review of
A-3152-24 14 the certification in totality supports probable cause for a search of the BMW.
The certification was labeled as "Investigation into the Death of Christine
Perrella." Moreover, the facts set forth by Barnes demonstrate that the
prosecutor's office was investigating whether defendant had caused the death by
recklessly driving his vehicle. A review of the facts in Barnes' certification
allowed the issuing judge to infer that the prosecutor's office was investigating
whether defendant had been speeding or been on his cell phone at the time of
the accident. Indeed, the clearest inference was that defendant had been
speeding because Barnes' set forth facts explaining that Perrella's vehicle had
been propelled by the force of the collision across the curb and down a roadway
where it came to rest at a ninety-degree angle from the direction it had been
traveling when struck by defendant's BMW. In short, there were sufficient facts
from which the issuing judge could find probable cause that defendant had been
speeding at the time of the accident, the speeding contributed to causing
Perrella's death, and there was reason to believe that information in the BMW
would reveal whether defendant had been speeding.
Obviously, the better practice would have been for Barnes to have
expressly stated the facts supporting that defendant had been speeding. In that
regard, the investigation at the scene showed that Perrella's vehicle had been
A-3152-24 15 driven down the roadway 175 feet before it came to rest. We note, moreover,
that there are limits to what can be inferred from a warrant certification and that
the better practice is for the affiant to expressly state the facts establishing
probable cause. We also point out that an affiant's declaration that she or he
believes there is probable cause for the warrant is not a substitution for the
judge's determination of probable cause. All that said, an evaluation of the
totality of the facts set forth in Barnes' first certification supported probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant to search defendant's vehicle.
Having determined that there was probable cause supporting the first
warrant, we also hold that there was probable cause supporting the three other
warrants. Each of those three additional warrant certifications expressly
identified that the prosecutor's office was investigating the crime of death by
auto. Those warrants also provided more facts related to the investigation and
the items or data sought to be searched. While Barnes still did not expressly
state that the prosecutor's office had facts supporting a belief that defendant had
been speeding, that inference can be readily drawn from the facts that were set
forth in those three additional certifications.
A-3152-24 16 B. The Inevitable Discovery of the Information Obtained from the Warrants.
As an alternative ground for its ruling, the trial court also found that even
if the warrants had been defective, the State would have inevitably discovered
the information by other lawful means. That alternative finding is supported by
the substantial credible evidence in the record and is consistent with the law.
Normally, evidence seized in violation of the warrant requirement must
be suppressed. State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 353-54 (2003). "The inevitable
discovery doctrine may be invoked to preserve 'the admissibility of evidence
obtained without a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement.'"
Bryant, 483 N.J. Super. at 41 (quoting State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 301
(2019)). "When 'the evidence in question would inevitably have been
discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct,' thereby negating
any taint, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for its admissibility." Id. at
41-42 (quoting State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 156 (1987)).
For the exception to apply, the State must show by "clear and convincing
evidence" that:
(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the
A-3152-24 17 discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.
[Id. at 42 (quoting State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 552 (2015)).]
The inevitable discovery exception "does not require 'the State [to] demonstrate
the exact circumstances of the evidence's discovery.'" Camey, 239 N.J. at 302
(alteration in original) (quoting Maltese, 222 N.J. at 552). Instead, the State
may demonstrate the evidence would have eventually been discovered based on
the totality of "the evidence understood in light of ordinary experience and
common sense." Sugar, 108 N.J. at 163.
In this matter, the only facts missing from the warrant certifications
submitted by Barnes were the facts showing that defendant probably had been
speeding. In other words, as already explained, Barnes' certification in support
of each of the applications for the four warrants set forth facts showing that there
had been a collision in which defendant's car had struck Perrella's vehicle on its
passenger side, the force of the collision sprung Perrella's vehicle down the road,
and as a result she died from her injuries. If Barnes had simply added the
distance that Perrella's vehicle had moved—175 feet—and the statement that all
the other evidence gathered at the scene, supported that defendant's vehicle had
A-3152-24 18 been speeding at the time of the collision, those facts would have established
probable cause without the need for any inference. The same reasoning applies
to the other three warrant certifications.
Had the first issuing judge declined to sign the warrant, the State would
have inevitably submitted a new warrant application including the facts
concerning the distance Perrella's car moved after the collision. The record
established that the information was already available to the State based on the
investigation at the scene. Consequently, the same evidence would have been
discovered independent of the first warrant because a separate warrant would
have been issued on a certification with additional facts.
Defendant argues the inevitable discovery doctrine cannot be invoked to
uphold a search "merely because evidence of probable cause could have
supported securing a warrant." In making that argument, defendant relies on
language from State v. Premone, 348 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 2002). The
discussion of the inevitable discovery doctrine in Premone is distinguishable
from this case and does not support defendant's argument. There, detectives
investigating a murder conducted a warrantless search of the defendant's bag left
in a motel room and found bloody clothes. Id. at 509. At a suppression hearing,
the trial court rejected the State's contention that the detectives could have
A-3152-24 19 secured a warrant based on available evidence as circular, and we agreed. Id. at
510, 515. Here, as already discussed, Barnes sought and secured a search
warrant before searching defendant's vehicle, unlike the detectives in Premone.
Therefore, the facts and issues discussed in Premone are distinguishable from
the argument defendant makes in this matter.
Usually, when the State needs to prove something by clear and convincing
evidence, an evidentiary hearing is required. In this case, however, we
determine that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. Defendant does not
dispute the facts disclosed from the investigation of the scene of the collision.
As already explained, with a few additional facts, Barnes' certification would
have set forth all the facts needed to directly establish probable cause even
without an inference. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to remand
this matter for an evidentiary hearing because the conclusion of that hearing is
clear.
C. The Scope of the CDWs.
Finally, defendant argues that the CDWs were overbroad and, therefore,
unconstitutional. In addition to being supported by probable cause, a valid
warrant must be particularized in identifying the searches to be conducted.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978); Facebook, Inc. v. State,
A-3152-24 20 254 N.J. 329, 340, 346 (2023). The purpose of the particularity requirement is
to prevent "general" and "wide-ranging exploratory searches." Marshall, 199
N.J. at 611 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)).
In this matter, the warrants for defendant's iCloud and T-Mobile data
sufficiently described the places to be searched. Nevertheless, defendant
contends that the information sought was overbroad. The warrant for
defendant's iCloud account included requests for "notes saved to iCloud . . .
calendar(s) saved to iCloud . . . bookmarks and safari browsing data stored to
iCloud . . . voicemails . . . find my iPhone data; [and] find my friend data."
Similarly, the warrant for defendant's T-Mobile data requested "billing records
including [] payment information and source/means of payment . . . subscriber
information for said cellular telephone facility number and for all numbers
called to and called from said cellular telephone facility number."
While some of that information was overly broad, there is no showing that
the information was obtained. More to the point, defendant's plea was not based
on any of the alleged overbroad information. Instead, he pled guilty because he
had been recklessly driving by speeding. Consequently, there is no basis to
reverse the order denying his motion to suppress because two of the warrants
were overly broad. Accordingly, in the context of this case, we determine that
A-3152-24 21 defendant's overbreadth argument is not a basis to reverse the order denying his
Affirmed.
A-3152-24 22