State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.G.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: August 8, 2024
• Docket: A-3394-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3394-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF M.G.1 _________________________

Submitted May 30, 2024 – Decided August 8, 2024

Before Judges Susswein and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket No. FJ-20-0307-23.

James P. Nolan, Jr. and Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant (James P. Nolan, Jr., on the brief).

Milton S. Liebowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Liebowitz, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

M.G., a juvenile, appeals her trial adjudication of delinquency for

aggravated assault as an accomplice in an altercation at her high school. She

1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim and the other underaged participants in the physical altercation. See R. 1:38(d)(5). contends the prosecutor failed to prove the culpable mental state needed to

establish accomplice liability, and that the victim's injuries did not rise to the

level of "significant bodily injury" as to warrant an adjudication for third-degree

aggravated assault. She also contends the disposition imposed on her

adjudication is excessive. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the

governing legal principles and arguments of the parties, we affirm the

adjudication of delinquency and disposition.

I.

The fight giving rise to this juvenile prosecution occurred on January 18,

2023. On February 2, 2023, M.G. was charged by a juvenile delinquency

complaint with an offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute third-

degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7). M.G. pled not guilty and a

bench trial was held on May 16, 2023. On June 13, 2023, the Family Part entered

an order adjudicating her delinquent and imposed disposition.

We discern the following pertinent facts from the trial record. M.G. was

in the girl's restroom at her school along with other students, M.R., N.L., S.M.,

and M.C. M.R.—the victim—was in the "big stall," while the other students

were standing outside of it. N.L. and M.C. were angry because they could not

use the big stall. N.L. climbed on top of a sink and into the big stall. Once

A-3394-22 2 inside the stall, N.L. attacked M.R. Eventually, the fight spilled out into the

main area of the restroom. N.L. got on top of M.R. and hit her. While N.L. was

on top of M.R., S.M. went over and kicked M.R.

At some point during the fight, M.R. was able to get on top of N.L. At

that juncture, M.G. pushed M.R. off N.L., telling M.R. something along the lines

of "get off of her. Stop. Get off. Get off. You're not choking her." As a result

of M.G.'s physical intervention, N.L. was able to get back on top of M.R. and

continue to assault her. Eventually, the fight moved into the hallway.

During the altercation, N.L. slammed M.R.'s head against the bathroom

stall door, the bathroom wall, and against lockers in the hallway. N.L. also

repeatedly punched M.R. in the face, in her back, and pulled M.R.'s hair. S.M.,

M.C., and M.G. recorded the altercation on their smartphones. S.M.'s recordings

were introduced into evidence.

After the fight was over, M.R. went to the nurse's office. School resource

officer Richard Hernandez observed M.R. and testified that she "was very upset,

disheveled, [and] her hair was a mess and she was also crying." He recalled

seeing a bite mark on one of M.R.'s arms.

M.G. testified in her own defense. She claimed N.L. and M.R. were

arguing before she entered the bathroom and that she did not know what the

A-3394-22 3 argument was about. M.G. claimed she was not friendly with either N.L. or

M.R. She claimed she did not hit, strike, or choke anyone during the fight. M.G.

also claimed that when she saw M.R. get on top of N.L. and put N.L. in a choke

hold, she touched M.R.'s shoulder and told her to get off N.L. and stop choking

her. M.G. testified that she did not intend to help N.L. gain an advantage and

resume the assault on M.R. Instead, M.G. testified she intended "[t]o break up

the fight."

On cross-examination, M.G. stated that she had no reason to get involved

in the fight. She remained in the restroom throughout the altercation "because I

was already in a video and I wanted to take a video as transparency to any school

official who asked me what had happened in the bathroom." She claimed she

tried to turn over the video, but the school principal made her delete it.

M.G. further testified that she wanted to stop the fight because "they were

hurting each other," but admitted she did not get a teacher. M.G. testified she

told N.L. to "relax," but admitted she did not say anything while N.L. picked

M.R. up by her hair and slammed her against the bathroom wall. When asked

why she did not tell N.L. to stop, M.G. stated, "I wasn't thinking clear in that

moment." Despite her claim that she intervened because M.R. had placed N.L.

A-3394-22 4 in a choke hold, M.G. acknowledged N.L. never said "I can't breathe" and did

not appear to be gasping for air.

Based on the foregoing testimony and video recording of the altercation,

the trial judge found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that M.G. aided

and abetted the assault against M.R. He rejected the defense contention that

M.G. was a "Good Samaritan." The judge imposed a disposition of twelve

months of probation, anger management training, attendance at school with no

unexcused absences, forty hours of community service, restitution in an amount

to be determined, a curfew to be determined by probation if necessary, DNA and

fingerprint surrender, and that M.G. was to have no intentional contact with the

victim. The judge further ordered that upon successful completion of probation,

M.G. may apply for a deferred disposition. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1).

This appeal follows. M.G. raises the following contentions for our

consideration:

[M.G.] SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED ON ALL COUNTS BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

A. M.G. cannot be considered an accomplice under [N.J.S.A.] 2C:2-6(C) because she did not have the requisite purposeful intent.

A-3394-22 5 B. M.G. cannot be charged with aggravated assault as the injuries from the altercation did not rise to the level of "significant."

C. Finding M.G. guilty of aggravated assault is antithetical to the legislative intent of § 2C:2-6 and § 2C:12- 1[(b)](7).

D. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in its assumption that M.G. knew her actions would result in N.L. gaining the upper hand in the fight.

E. The [t]rial [c]ourt subjected the [a]ppellant to an unduly harsh punishment.

II.

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the procedural and substantive

legal principles governing this appeal. When reviewing the disposition after a

bench trial, appellate courts "must give deference to those findings of the trial

judge which are substantially influenced by his or her opportunity to hear and

see the witnesses and have the 'feel' of the case, which [appellate courts] do not

enjoy upon appellate review." State ex rel. S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 241 (App.

Div. 2000). Relatedly, appellate courts

do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence. [Appellate courts] are not in a good position to judge credibility and ordinarily should not make new credibility findings. However, [appellate] review of the sufficiency of the facts to satisfy an applicable legal standard is a question of law.

A-3394-22 6 [Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498-99 (App. Div. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Turning to substantive legal principles, an accomplice to a crime is legally

responsible for the conduct of the person who physically commits the crime.

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c), provides that:

A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:

(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he

....

(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it.

To be found guilty as an accomplice, a defendant must not only share the same

intent as the principal who commits the crime, but also must "'at least indirectly

participate[] in the commission of the criminal act.'" State v. Bielkiewicz, 267

N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 95

(1965)).

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she "[a]ttempts to cause

significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely

or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the

A-3394-22 7 value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury." N.J.S.A.

2C:12-1(b)(7). Accordingly, for a juvenile to be adjudicated delinquent as an

accomplice to an aggravated assault, the State must prove he or she (1) acted

"[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating" the aggravated assault; and (2)

"[a]id[ed] or agree[d] or attempt[ed] to aid [the principal] in planning or

committing" the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(b).

III.

Applying the foregoing general principles to the present matter, we first

address M.G.'s contention the trial judge's finding was against the weight of the

evidence. M.G. argues she lacked the requisite intent and thus cannot be

adjudicated for aiding and abetting N.L. The gravamen of the defense argument,

at both the trial court level and on appeal, is that she was not an accomplice to

the assault, but rather was only trying to prevent either combatant from getting

injured.

As we have noted, we defer to a judge's bench trial findings so long as

they are supported by credible evidence in the record. An actor's intent is a state

of mind inferred from attending circumstances. As explained in the Criminal

Model Jury Charges used in adult prosecutions, an actor's purpose is a

"condition[] of the mind which cannot be seen and can only be determined by

A-3394-22 8 inferences from conduct, words or acts." Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "State

of Mind" (approved Jan. 11, 1993) ("A state of mind is rarely susceptible of

direct proof, but ordinarily can be inferred from the facts."). Said another way,

a state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be

inferred from the facts. See State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 328 (App.

Div. 2022).

Here, the testimony and video evidence show M.G. did not stop N.L. from

continuing to assault M.R., did not tell N.L. to stop, and did not seek help or

assistance from a teacher. Rather, she electronically recorded the assault. Those

facts alone, while relevant to M.G.'s state of mind, would not be sufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt the mental culpable state needed to establish

accomplice liability. Importantly, however, M.G. physically pushed M.R. at a

critical stage of the fight, enabling N.L. to once again gain the upper hand and

continue the assault.

That physical touching shows M.G. was not just a bystander. The trial

judge acted well within his factfinding prerogative in inferring from the nature

and timing of M.G.'s physical intervention that M.G. pushed M.R. with the

purpose to aid N.L. during the ongoing assault.

A-3394-22 9 We likewise reject M.G.'s contention that the trial judge's finding is

antithetical to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) because the

Legislature could not have intended to hold someone who tries to stop a crime

culpably responsible for the crime they are attempting to stop. We agree that as

a matter of law, as well as common sense, a person who attempts to stop an

ongoing crime is not an accomplice to that crime. M.G.'s argument nonetheless

fails because the trial judge rejected her claim that she was acting as a "Good

Samaritan." The judge found her exculpatory version was not credible and that

"there was nothing in the record to suggest she wanted to stop the fight." The

trial judge again acted well within his factfinding prerogative in rejecting M.G.'s

"Good Samaritan" argument and self-serving testimony. We thus have no basis

upon which to overturn the judge's finding, which is based on credible evidence

in the record and his opportunity to observe M.G.'s testimony firsthand.

IV.

We turn next to M.G.'s argument the State failed to prove the victim

suffered significant bodily injury as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d).

She argues there was no medical testimony and the only injury that was

mentioned at trial was a bite mark on one of M.R.'s arms.

A-3394-22 10 Significant bodily injury means "bodily injury which creates a temporary

loss of the function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one

of the five senses." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d). We agree with M.G. that the State's

evidence fails to establish that M.R. sustained any such significant bodily injury.

However, the crime of third-degree aggravated assault does not require that the

assault actually cause significant bodily injury. Rather, that crime can also be

proved by showing the actor (and an accomplice) "[a]ttempts to cause significant

bodily injury to another." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) (emphasis added).

The trial proofs show M.R. was slammed against bathroom stalls, lockers,

and walls, punched about her face and body repeatedly, kicked, dragged, and

bitten, all in the presence of M.G. The violent and sustained nature of the assault

amply establishes an attempt to inflict significant bodily injury. We note many

of these assaultive acts occurred before M.G. pushed M.R. off N.L. In these

circumstances, the trial judge properly determined that the State proved the

elements of third-degree aggravated assault.

V.

We turn, finally, to M.G.'s contention the disposition imposed was

excessive. Appellate review of a juvenile disposition is guided by the same

general principles that apply to our review of sentences imposed in adult

A-3394-22 11 prosecutions. We examine whether the trial judge followed lawful sentencing

guidelines and determine whether the sentence imposed could have been

reasonably reached based upon the evidence presented. See State v. Roth, 95

N.J. 334, 365-66 (1984). The scope of our review is limited, reflecting the

deference we owe to the sentencing court. We are "bound to affirm a sentence,

even if [we] would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court

properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are

supported by competent credible evidence in the record." State v. O'Donnell,

117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989) (citing State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400-01 (1989));

see Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65.

Under the Juvenile Code, the judge must weigh the aggravating and

mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(a). The judge must then place,

on the record, the factual basis supporting the findings of the particular factors

affecting the disposition, as well as the reasons for the disposition chosen,

whether custodial or non-custodial. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(1); see R. 5:24-

3.

In this instance, the trial judge found aggravating factor G, "[t]he need for

deterring the juvenile and others from violating the law;" aggravating factor J,

A-3394-22 12 "[t]he impact of the offense on the victim or victims;" and aggravating factor K,

"[t]he impact of the offense on the community." See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(a)(1).

The judge also found mitigating factor G, "[t]he juvenile has compensated

or will compensate the victim for the damage or injury that the victim has

sustained, or will participate in a program of community service;" mitigating

factor H, "[t]he juvenile has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity

or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the

commission of the present act;" mitigating factor I, "[t]he juvenile's conduct was

the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;" and mitigating factor K, "[t]he

juvenile is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to noncustodial

treatment." See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(a)(2).

M.G. does not challenge any of these specific findings, but rather claims

the sentence is unnecessarily harsh. We disagree. The trial judge properly

evaluated the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed an

appropriate disposition in accordance with the law.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining

contentions raised by M.G. lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-3394-22 13