IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD86919 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) June 24, 2025 MARVIN LEWIS HILL, JR., ) ) Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri The Honorable Stacey Lett, Judge
Before Division One: Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge
Marvin Hill, Jr., appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions of murder in the
second degree, § 565.021, 1 armed criminal action, § 571.015, endangering the welfare of
a child in the first degree, § 568.045, and unlawful use of a weapon, § 571.030, for which
he was sentenced to a total of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Hill raises two points on
appeal. First, he asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of all the evidence on the child-endangerment charge because there
was insufficient evidence that his actions created a substantial risk to a child. Second,
1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, Supp. 2019. Hill argues the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on all theories of
justification supported by the evidence. Finding no error, plain or otherwise, we affirm.
Background 2
On February 7, 2022, the Johnson County Prosecuting Attorney issued an
eleven-count felony information charging Hill with, among other things, second-degree
murder, armed criminal action, first-degree child endangerment, and unlawful use of a
weapon, in connection with an incident that occurred on March 7, 2020, in Warrensburg,
Missouri. The case was tried November 14-16, 2023. In the light most favorable to the
verdicts, the following evidence was adduced at trial.
In the early morning hours of March 7, 2020, Victim banged on the door of Hill’s
apartment and said, “You put your hands on my sister. Why don’t you come out and
fight me?” Hill recognized Victim by his voice as the brother of Hill’s ex-girlfriend,
whom Hill had admittedly hit a few times. Through the door, Hill responded, “If I open
this door, you’re not going to like it.” Victim continued to bang on the door, so Hill
opened it and shot at Victim twelve times while saying, “Didn’t I tell you to stop f***ing
with me?”
After the shooting, Hill left the scene, placed the gun in some bushes, and turned
himself in to the Warrensburg Police Department. Hill told officers where to find the
2 “On appeal, ‘[t]he evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.’” State v. Gonsalez, 619 S.W.3d 559, 562 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Stewart, 560 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018)).
2 gun, which they retrieved. The gun had one round in the chamber and an empty
magazine that could hold twelve bullets.
After waiving his Miranda rights, Hill told police that Victim had previously tried
to fight Hill and had been messing with him following a dispute between Hill and
Victim’s sister. Hill said he shot Victim after Victim stepped into Hill’s apartment and
tried, but failed, to punch Hill. Victim was found on the floor just inside Hill’s
apartment; Victim’s feet were on the threshold of the apartment.
The police found twelve spent cartridge casings as well as spent bullets and bullet
fragments inside Hill’s one-bedroom apartment. The police also found two bullet holes
in a wall inside Hill’s apartment and three bullet holes in the exterior of the apartment
across the hall. A Missouri State Highway Patrol firearms examiner tested a bullet
retrieved at the scene and confirmed that Hill’s gun fired the bullet. There were no signs
of forced entry into Hill’s apartment, no signs of a struggle in the apartment, and no
weapon found on Victim.
The Johnson County coroner pronounced Victim dead at the scene, and Victim’s
body was transported to the Johnson County morgue for autopsy. The medical examiner
determined that Victim died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. According to the
medical examiner, none of the gunshots were at close range, meaning the gun was at least
three feet from Victim when it was fired.
Police obtained a search warrant to draw Hill’s blood. The toxicology report
showed that he had THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) in his system.
3 Hill’s friend was in Hill’s bedroom at the time of the shooting. Friend testified
that she heard Victim banging on the door to Hill’s apartment then the door being opened
calmly. Friend also testified that Hill should have just refused to open the door to Victim.
Before hearing gunshots, Friend did not feel threatened by Victim, who Friend thought
was just trash talking.
Additionally, Hill’s cousin, her two-year old daughter (Toddler), and
ten-month-old son (Infant) (collectively, the Children) were also in the living room of
Hill’s apartment at the time of the shooting. Cousin testified that she was on Hill’s couch
and the Children were on a pallet on the floor; both the couch and the pallet were close to
the doorway where the shooting occurred.
Hill moved for a judgment of acquittal on all charges both at the close of the
State’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence; both motions were denied.
The jury found Hill guilty of second-degree murder, armed criminal action,
first-degree child endangerment, and unlawful use of a weapon. Hill moved for a new
trial, arguing, among other things, that there was no basis to find him guilty of child
endangerment because the evidence showed that he was trying to protect the occupants of
his apartment. The court denied Hill’s motion for new trial.
The court sentenced Hill to fifteen years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder,
ten years for armed criminal action, seven years for first-degree child endangerment, and
fifteen years for unlawful use of a weapon, with all sentences to run concurrently for an
aggregate sentence of fifteen years. This appeal follows. Additional facts will be
provided in the analysis, as necessary, to address the points raised on appeal.
4 Analysis
Hill raises two points on appeal. First, he asserts the trial court erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence on the child-
endangerment charge because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
his actions created a substantial risk to a child. Second, Hill argues the trial court plainly
erred by failing to include Friend and Cousin in the defense-of-others instruction
patterned after MAI-CR 4th 406.08. We address each point in turn.
I. There was sufficient evidence to support Hill’s conviction for first-degree child endangerment.
Our review of “a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction is limited to a determination of whether the trier of fact reasonably could have
found the defendant guilty.” State v. Blankenship, 415 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Mo. banc
2013). In conducting our review, “[a]ll evidence and inferences favorable to the State are
accepted as true, and all evidence and inference[s] to the contrary are rejected.” State v.
Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo.
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IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD86919 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) June 24, 2025 MARVIN LEWIS HILL, JR., ) ) Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri The Honorable Stacey Lett, Judge
Before Division One: Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge
Marvin Hill, Jr., appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions of murder in the
second degree, § 565.021, 1 armed criminal action, § 571.015, endangering the welfare of
a child in the first degree, § 568.045, and unlawful use of a weapon, § 571.030, for which
he was sentenced to a total of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Hill raises two points on
appeal. First, he asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of all the evidence on the child-endangerment charge because there
was insufficient evidence that his actions created a substantial risk to a child. Second,
1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, Supp. 2019. Hill argues the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on all theories of
justification supported by the evidence. Finding no error, plain or otherwise, we affirm.
Background 2
On February 7, 2022, the Johnson County Prosecuting Attorney issued an
eleven-count felony information charging Hill with, among other things, second-degree
murder, armed criminal action, first-degree child endangerment, and unlawful use of a
weapon, in connection with an incident that occurred on March 7, 2020, in Warrensburg,
Missouri. The case was tried November 14-16, 2023. In the light most favorable to the
verdicts, the following evidence was adduced at trial.
In the early morning hours of March 7, 2020, Victim banged on the door of Hill’s
apartment and said, “You put your hands on my sister. Why don’t you come out and
fight me?” Hill recognized Victim by his voice as the brother of Hill’s ex-girlfriend,
whom Hill had admittedly hit a few times. Through the door, Hill responded, “If I open
this door, you’re not going to like it.” Victim continued to bang on the door, so Hill
opened it and shot at Victim twelve times while saying, “Didn’t I tell you to stop f***ing
with me?”
After the shooting, Hill left the scene, placed the gun in some bushes, and turned
himself in to the Warrensburg Police Department. Hill told officers where to find the
2 “On appeal, ‘[t]he evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.’” State v. Gonsalez, 619 S.W.3d 559, 562 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Stewart, 560 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018)).
2 gun, which they retrieved. The gun had one round in the chamber and an empty
magazine that could hold twelve bullets.
After waiving his Miranda rights, Hill told police that Victim had previously tried
to fight Hill and had been messing with him following a dispute between Hill and
Victim’s sister. Hill said he shot Victim after Victim stepped into Hill’s apartment and
tried, but failed, to punch Hill. Victim was found on the floor just inside Hill’s
apartment; Victim’s feet were on the threshold of the apartment.
The police found twelve spent cartridge casings as well as spent bullets and bullet
fragments inside Hill’s one-bedroom apartment. The police also found two bullet holes
in a wall inside Hill’s apartment and three bullet holes in the exterior of the apartment
across the hall. A Missouri State Highway Patrol firearms examiner tested a bullet
retrieved at the scene and confirmed that Hill’s gun fired the bullet. There were no signs
of forced entry into Hill’s apartment, no signs of a struggle in the apartment, and no
weapon found on Victim.
The Johnson County coroner pronounced Victim dead at the scene, and Victim’s
body was transported to the Johnson County morgue for autopsy. The medical examiner
determined that Victim died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. According to the
medical examiner, none of the gunshots were at close range, meaning the gun was at least
three feet from Victim when it was fired.
Police obtained a search warrant to draw Hill’s blood. The toxicology report
showed that he had THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) in his system.
3 Hill’s friend was in Hill’s bedroom at the time of the shooting. Friend testified
that she heard Victim banging on the door to Hill’s apartment then the door being opened
calmly. Friend also testified that Hill should have just refused to open the door to Victim.
Before hearing gunshots, Friend did not feel threatened by Victim, who Friend thought
was just trash talking.
Additionally, Hill’s cousin, her two-year old daughter (Toddler), and
ten-month-old son (Infant) (collectively, the Children) were also in the living room of
Hill’s apartment at the time of the shooting. Cousin testified that she was on Hill’s couch
and the Children were on a pallet on the floor; both the couch and the pallet were close to
the doorway where the shooting occurred.
Hill moved for a judgment of acquittal on all charges both at the close of the
State’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence; both motions were denied.
The jury found Hill guilty of second-degree murder, armed criminal action,
first-degree child endangerment, and unlawful use of a weapon. Hill moved for a new
trial, arguing, among other things, that there was no basis to find him guilty of child
endangerment because the evidence showed that he was trying to protect the occupants of
his apartment. The court denied Hill’s motion for new trial.
The court sentenced Hill to fifteen years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder,
ten years for armed criminal action, seven years for first-degree child endangerment, and
fifteen years for unlawful use of a weapon, with all sentences to run concurrently for an
aggregate sentence of fifteen years. This appeal follows. Additional facts will be
provided in the analysis, as necessary, to address the points raised on appeal.
4 Analysis
Hill raises two points on appeal. First, he asserts the trial court erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence on the child-
endangerment charge because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
his actions created a substantial risk to a child. Second, Hill argues the trial court plainly
erred by failing to include Friend and Cousin in the defense-of-others instruction
patterned after MAI-CR 4th 406.08. We address each point in turn.
I. There was sufficient evidence to support Hill’s conviction for first-degree child endangerment.
Our review of “a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction is limited to a determination of whether the trier of fact reasonably could have
found the defendant guilty.” State v. Blankenship, 415 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Mo. banc
2013). In conducting our review, “[a]ll evidence and inferences favorable to the State are
accepted as true, and all evidence and inference[s] to the contrary are rejected.” State v.
Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. banc 2014). “[T]he relevant question is whether[,]
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (emphasis in original), superseded on
other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The information alleged that Hill had committed the offense of child
endangerment “by shooting a man with [Infant] in the room.” We “will review [Hill’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence] claim based upon how the crime was charged.” State v.
5 Gonsalez, 619 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Zetina-Torres,
482 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Mo. banc 2016)).
A person commits the offense of first-degree child endangerment “if he . . .
[k]nowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to the life, body, or health of a
child less than seventeen years of age.” § 568.045.1(1). Hill does not challenge that he
acted knowingly or that Infant was under the age of seventeen at the time of the shooting.
Thus, the only issue raised in Point I is whether Hill created a substantial risk to Infant’s
life, body, or health.
For purposes of § 568.045, “‘[s]ubstantial’ means ‘not seeming or imaginary: not
illusive,’ and ‘risk’ means ‘the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage or destruction.’”
State v. Shoemaker, 675 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting State v.
Rinehart, 383 S.W.3d 95, 101 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). “Health, as used in [§]
568.045.1(1), includes a child’s physical, mental, emotional, or psychological condition.”
Id. (quoting Harding v. State, 613 S.W.3d 522, 532 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)). “[N]o injury
or harm need result; a substantial risk may exist even though the risk does not materialize
into actual harm.” State v. Todd, 183 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). “The
State must allege and prove the defendant’s conduct giving rise to the risk, but the fact
finder must determine whether that conduct created a substantial risk to a child.” Id. at
277 (emphasis in original).
Hill’s insufficient evidence argument relies on two cases—State v. Gonsalez and
State v. Welch—where the courts affirmed child-endangerment convictions but which
Hill argues are distinguishable on the facts. In Gonsalez, the evidence showed Gonsalez
6 fired his gun “haphazardly” during a struggle in the upstairs hallway of his parents’
duplex while his son was in an upstairs bedroom. Gonsalez, 619 S.W.3d at 566-67.
There also was evidence that the gunshot occurred in close quarters and the home’s
construction was not substantial because the “bullet was able to travel through the closet
door, through a glass vase containing a wax candle, and through the wall of the closet
into a neighboring bathroom.” Id. at 567. The court concluded, “[g]iven the discharge of
a firearm during a struggle; in the narrow confines of an upstairs hallway, in a home with
insubstantial walls and doors, with [Gonsalez’s son] nearby, a jury could reasonably infer
that the discharge of the gun in the upstairs hallway created a substantial risk to
[Gonsalez’s son].” Id.
In Welch, the court affirmed child-endangerment convictions under similar
circumstances. While intoxicated, Welch followed his girlfriend around the mobile home
they shared with eight children, waving a gun and pointing it at his girlfriend while
yelling that he was going to kill her. State v. Welch, 600 S.W.3d 796, 802-03 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2020). Welch eventually went into a bathroom where his friend was showering; the
two struggled over the gun, which Welch fired three times. Id. at 803-04. Two of the
shots pierced a wall of the mobile home. Id. at 804. The court affirmed Welch’s
child-endangerment conviction as to the five youngest children who had remained in a
bedroom during the incident. Id. at 814. The court explained,
Although the bullets did not travel into the bedroom where the five youngest children were located, in a shared bedroom on the other end of the trailer, . . . the jury still could have reasonably found that [Welch] created a substantial risk to the life, body, or health of those children. Stray bullets traveling through walls in close quarters such as this mobile home . . . and
7 firing shots while struggling and drunk were evidence enough of a risk of injury, both physical and emotional.
Id.
While some facts in Gonsalez and Welch differ from those in the present case, we
disagree with Hill that Gonsalez and Welch require us to reverse Hill’s child-
endangerment conviction. Like the incidents underlying Gonsalez and Welch, the
shooting at issue here took place in close quarters but, unlike the children in Gonsalez
and Welch, Infant was in the room and located next to the door when Hill opened it and
shot at Victim twelve times. Victim was standing on the threshold of the apartment and
fell forward into the apartment. None of the gunshots were close range, meaning that
Hill was standing at least three feet inside his apartment when he fired his gun. Aside
from the bullets that struck Victim and remained in his body, officers observed five bullet
holes—two in walls inside Hill’s apartment. From evidence of the bullets’ trajectories
and Infant’s close proximity to the gunfire, the jury could reasonably infer that Hill
created a substantial risk to Infant’s life, body, or health.
The trial court did not err in denying Hill’s motion for judgment of acquittal for
first-degree child endangerment.
Point I is denied.
II. Hill’s claim of instructional error was not preserved for appellate review.
In his second point, Hill argues the trial court plainly erred by failing to include
Friend and Cousin in the defense-of-others instruction given by the trial court.
8 Hill submitted Instruction No. 19, a defense-of-others instruction patterned on
MAI-CR 4th 406.08, and the court instructed the jury accordingly. Instruction No. 19
stated:
One of the issues in this case is whether the use of deadly force by [Hill] against [Victim] was lawful. On the issue of defense of another person in this case, you are instructed as follows:
In this state the use of physical force, including the use of deadly force, to defend another person is lawful in certain situations.
In order for a person to lawfully use physical force in defense of another person, he must reasonably believe that physical force is necessary to defend the person he is trying to defend from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force and he can only use physical force to the extent that he reasonably believes is necessary to defend the other person.
But a person is not permitted to use deadly force unless he reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary to protect the other person against death or serious physical injury.
A person is not required to retreat before resorting to the use of physical force to defend another person if he is lawfully remaining in a dwelling on private property leased by the person.
The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [Hill] did not act in lawful defense of [the Children]. Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Hill] did not act in lawful defense of [the Children], you must find the defendant not guilty.
If any threats against [Hill] were made by [Victim] and were known by or had been communicated to [Hill], you may consider this evidence in determining whether [Hill] reasonably believed that the use of physical force was necessary to defend himself from what he reasonably believed to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by [Victim].
You, however, should consider all of the evidence in the case in determining whether [Hill] acted in lawful self defense.
9 On appeal, Hill contends that, because he injected defense of others into the case
and there was substantial evidence that he acted in defense of Friend and Cousin, as well
as the Children, the trial court committed reversible error, under plain error review, by
failing to submit a defense-of-others instruction that included Friend and Cousin.
“If a party fails to lodge a specific and timely objection at trial and in the motion
for new trial, the claimed instructional error is not preserved for review.” State v.
Garoutte, 694 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Kerksiek, 670
S.W.3d 32, 41 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). Because Hill offered Instruction No. 19 and,
thus, did not object to it, his claim of instructional error was not preserved for appeal.
Accordingly, Hill requests plain error review of the allegedly inaccurate instruction.
“[P]lain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the
court . . . when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted therefrom.” Id. (quoting Rule 30.20).
“[F]ailure of a trial court to offer a [defense-of-others] instruction where the
defendant has carried the burden of injecting the issue may . . . constitute plain error
requiring reversal.” State v. Thompson, 401 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
“However, an exception to the availability of plain error review of instructional error
exists in cases where a flawed [defense-of-others] instruction was given, but the flawed
instruction was offered by the party challenging the instruction on appeal.” Id. “In such
cases, ‘[i]t is axiomatic that a defendant may not take advantage of self-invited error or
error of his own making,’ and the defendant has waived all appellate review related to the
inaccuracy of the instruction.” Id. (quoting State v. Bolden, 371 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Mo.
10 banc 2012)). “Although plain error review is discretionary, [we] will not use plain error
to impose a sua sponte duty on the trial court to correct [Hill’s] invited error[].” Bolden,
371 S.W.3d at 806; see also State v. Caves, 700 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024)
(same); State v. Creviston, 694 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (same). 3
Thus, the trial court did not commit error, plain or other otherwise, by failing to
sua sponte amend Hill’s defense-of-others instruction to refer to Friend and Cousin.
Point II is denied.
Conclusion
The trial court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, and the court’s judgment
is affirmed.
___________________________________ Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge
Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, concur.
3 Hill’s instructional error argument relies primarily on State v. Endicott, 600 S.W.3d 818 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). But Endicott is distinguishable because there the defendant did not request a defense-of-others instruction, and the trial court did not submit one. Here, the trial court gave the defense-of-others instruction offered by Hill.